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Introduction
The power to create States belongs to the
people who inhabit them; the power to admit
them into the Union belongs to Congress.
Senator Lewis Cass, speaking on the ad-
mission of California, 1850.
It is said they [the Hawaiian Islands] will
come in as a State some time. But they will
not come in as a State unless they are fit to
be a State…. We never have been in a hurry
about this thing.
Senator George Frisbie Hoar, speaking on
annexation of Hawaii, 1898.
In the century after Captain James Cook’s fatal landing at
Kealakekua Bay, Hawaii’s political sovereignty and traditional
social fabric were eroded by white penetration which its native
peoples were unable to resist. The islands were drawn inex-
orably toward the United States. Planters, missionaries, and
traders carried to the distant islands the political and ideo-
logical imperatives of “manifest destiny.” As early as the 1840s
the Monroe Doctrine was, in effect, extended to Hawaii, and
some European diplomats anticipated that it would soon be an-
nexed to the United States. In the following decades officials in
Washington were adamant that the independent kingdom must
not be “cut adrift” from the “American system” by the exploits
of any ambitious European or Asian state. 1 At the close of the
nineteenth century, as the United States won its new empire
in the Pacific, Far East, and Caribbean, Hawaii’s independence
formally ended. Its monarchy was overthrown in 1893 by a tiny
but powerful minority of whites. Five years later, against a back-
ground of war with Spain and unprecedented enthusiasm for
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expansion, the United States annexed the islands. Until 1959,
when it was belatedly accepted as a state, Hawaii remained
a semi-colonial appendage of the United States. It was incor-
porated as a territory in 1900, and governed under terms de-
rived largely from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which had
previously been reserved for America’s continental possessions.
By acquiring an overseas empire at the turn of the century
the United States irreversibly broke the constraints implicit in
the Monroe Doctrine, and conveniently submerged its tradi-
tional disdain for the corrupt practices of old-world imperialism.
Westward expansion and settlements were projected forcefully
beyond continental limits.
These events have been discussed by many historians. An-
nexation of Hawaii was a pivotal episode in America’s thrust for
empire and a symbol of its determination to join the European
imperialist powers on the world stage. This book does not aim to
duplicate the literature on this intensively studied initial phase
of American expansion abroad. 2 Nor is it intended as a general
history of the islands since annexation, although it necessarily
covers a variety of developments, both local and national, since
the 1890s. Any analysis of Hawaii during this period must be
informed by the rich historical and sociological literature of au-
thors such as Ralph S. Kuykendall, Romanzo Adams, Andrew
Lind, Lawrence Fuchs, and Gavan Daws. But previous studies
of modern Hawaii have devoted little attention to the statehood
issue. 3 Certainly they have not treated the issue thoroughly, nor
considered it within the wider framework of American politics.
Hawaii’s annexation, Americanization, and eventual
statehood are relatively recent fragments of a much broader
theme embracing white settlement and transformation of the
New World. In this context the traditional island community
can be seen as the object of American penetration and set-
tlement. It was gradually absorbed into the political and ideo-
logical spheres of that major power. In contrast to the colonial
possessions of the various European nations, Hawaii after an-
nexation was never anxious to win political sovereignty as an
independent nation. Nor did Washington ever encourage such
an aspiration, or contemplate granting independence to the
islands. As an incorporated territory Hawaii enjoyed greater
autonomy than most colonies under the control of European
powers. Rather than sever its political associations with the
metropolitan power and seek independence, Hawaii chose to
win unqualified political equality within the American body
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politic. It thus followed a path unusual among colonial posses-
sions—a path leading to equality with the existing American
states, not sovereign independence on the world stage.
The explanation for this development lies partly in the par-
ticular nature of Hawaii’s annexation and incorporation as an
American territory at the turn of the century. But any analysis
of Hawaii’s political evolution and statehood must also take ac-
count of its gradual Americanization—a process begun early in
the nineteenth century. Thus, in tracing the formal and informal
integration of Hawaii into the United States, my study has
been obliged to cast its net very wide. While the forces which
transformed the island community are central to my book, de-
velopments within the nation-at-large must also be explored.
Links between the two areas multiplied throughout the nine-
teenth century. Whalers, missionaries, planters, and entrepre-
neurs brought new ideas, practices, and institutions from the
United States. These provided the foundations for annexation
and eventual statehood. The political, cultural, social, and eco-
nomic systems of traditional Hawaii were eroded, eclipsed, and
ultimately replaced. A Polynesian kingdom became an American
territory and, in turn, an American state.
The poet John Masefield observed that “States are not made,
nor patched; they grow.” 4 In part this book is a history of
Hawaii’s growth—a study of its development, modernization,
and gradual adaptation to America’s political norms and values.
Yet in the final analysis, states of the Union are “made,” as ad-
mission depends on legislative action by Congress. A territory
has only the right to petition for statehood; the authority to
accept or reject such initiatives rests with Congress. This study,
then, is a detailed history of the way in which Hawaii was
brought under the American flag, first as a territory and later,
after a long and difficult struggle, as a state. It seeks to explain
Washington’s ambivalence to Hawaii’s claims for statehood
during more than half a century. Beginning with the overthrow
of the Hawaiian monarchy, it traces the changing patterns of
support for, and resistance to, statehood within the island com-
munity. Gradually, a traditional Pacific island community
became part of America’s political system, cultural norms, and
economic arrangements. Statehood was a belated, formal
manifestation of this larger, almost imperceptible trend. It both
symbolized and made irreversible the Americanization of the
island community.
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The question of statehood for Hawaii was not simply about
home rule. It was also about who should rule at home. 5 It cen-
tered on demands for sovereign equality as a state within the
Union, but it also involved attempts to establish full-fledged
democracy within the island community itself. Those who re-
sisted statehood locally were generally hostile to any sub-
stantial change in the political, social, or economic status quo
which they had long controlled to their own advantage. In ad-
dition, some native Hawaiians clung desperately to territorial
government, believing that it might at least delay the final
victory of foreign influences, both Asian and Caucasian, which
their ancestors had vainly attempted to resist in the late nine-
teenth century. On the other hand, support for statehood was in-
creasingly synonymous with enthusiasm for truly representative
government which would reflect both the islands’ unique ethnic
patterns and the more liberal political aspirations of its recently
Americanized people. It was not until after the war against
Japan, however, that the entrenched authority of the old white
elite was seriously challenged by an assertive, confident, and
essentially nonwhite majority. In large part these new forces,
which ultimately achieved statehood, were identified with the
burgeoning Democratic party. Supported largely by the descen-
dents of Asian immigrants, who had long been denied equality
in island life, the Democrats fervently believed that equality as
a state in the Union would pave the way for genuine democracy
and equality of opportunity at home. For many of Hawaii’s non-
white peoples, especially those of Japanese descent who had
borne the brunt of hostility and suspicion, statehood was much
more than a guarantee of unqualified political rights: by the
1940s it had become an emotive symbol of genuine acceptance
into the wider American society.
Thirty-seven areas were accepted as states after confeder-
ation. But of these, the noncontiguous, multiracial territory of
Hawaii was the most thoroughly studied, the most exhaustively
investigated, and the most frequently rejected by Congress. The
islands were subject to territorial rule for longer than all but
one incorporated area, New Mexico. A mountain of testimony
and information was collected through more than thirty con-
gressional hearings and reports. Beginning shortly after annex-
ation, Hawaii ritualistically, but with little initial enthusiasm,
petitioned Congress for admission. After 1919 statehood bills
were frequently introduced into Congress by the territory’s
nonvoting delegate. In 1935 economic difficulties confronting
“King Sugar” prompted Hawaii to begin an organized, forceful,
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and expensive campaign for political equality with the existing
states. Five years later, against a background of war in Europe
and mounting tensions in the Pacific, a plebiscite indicated that
more than two-thirds of Hawaii’s electorate favored statehood.
All Gallup polls conducted in the United States after 1945 also
revealed that a substantial majority consistently favored im-
mediate admission. Before the outbreak of World War II, a
congressional committee had concluded that Hawaii was en-
titled to statehood because it fulfilled the traditional require-
ments for entry. After the war statehood was supported by
both major national political parties, recommended by Truman
and Eisenhower, and endorsed by an overwhelming majority
of national editorial opinions. In addition, as Donald Dedmon
concluded, those on the side of statehood always presented
the stronger case in the exhaustive debates on the issue. 6 Yet
Congress continued to deny Hawaii equality within the Union.
Hawaii’s statehood hopes were constantly dashed on the rocks
of national politics in Washington.
An understanding of Hawaii’s long-frustrated bid for
statehood demands an appreciation of the ways in which it im-
pinged on wider national controversies. These disputes deter-
mined its fate in Congress, especially during the war against
Japan, the cold war, and the drive for desegregation and civil
rights during the 1940s and 1950s. Consequently, the interplay
of local and national developments provides the organizing
structure of this book. Locally the struggle over statehood
ranged those who viewed it as a legitimate and urgent demo-
cratic aspiration against those determined to stifle disruptive
change. Nationally it sharpened conflict over such fundamental
questions as minority rights in wartime, states’ rights, internal
subversion, appropriate patterns of Americanization, racial
equality, and relative party strengths in Congress. Statehood
was withheld until it was finally extricated from these deep na-
tional conflicts.
Hawaii was always much more than an irritating political
thorn in the side of the American body politic. Once annexed
and incorporated as a territory, Hawaii presented Congress with
an unprecedented dilemma: it raised unavoidably the question
of equality under the nation’s Constitution for a noncontiguous
area with an essentially nonwhite population. The issue re-
mained embarrassingly unresolved for sixty years. Hawaii’s
status within the Union, as well as its unique racial composition
and ambiguous Americanization, provoked deep controversy,
even hostility, in Washington. In particular, its diverse ethnic
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composition and tolerant social practices challenged the pat-
terns of race relations imposed in many mainland states, no-
tably those still segregated. On the other hand, the islands’
dependent and restricted political status contradicted popular
American notions of anti-colonialism, not to mention basic
tenets of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Appeals for
statehood invariably highlighted these glaring contradictions.
But in Washington the merits of Hawaii’s case were much less
persuasive than were the self-interested influences of certain
geographic sections and party factions.
America’s most prolonged and violent domestic crisis, the
conflict between the North and the South which resulted in
the bloody civil war of 1861–1865, was in part a result of po-
litical and racial tensions deriving from the issue of statehood
for its territories. Moreover, contests over constitutional prin-
ciples, moral and racial assumptions, expansion of the Union,
and the balance of political or sectional forces within Congress
were frequently translated into congressional debate on the
nature and number of potential new states. Territories and their
statehood aspirations were burning political questions in ante-
bellum America. “Indeed,” William R. Brock concluded recently,
“the problem of governing distant territories was at the heart
of much controversy during the period” leading up to the war.
7 The question of slavery versus freedom for such territories
was obviously the most divisive dispute. But concern over this
issue ‘stemmed from mounting tension over the very nature of
American federalism, involving the sovereignty of states with-
in the Union as well as the racial complexion and social prac-
tices appropriate for new states. The elevation of territories
to statehood had direct implications for this contest between
the industrial North and the rural South, as new states might
disrupt the delicate congressional balance which existed after
the Missouri Compromise.
The considerations which confused and fuelled the contro-
versy over continental expansion and states’ rights were not
buried with the North’s hard-won victory over the South. They
resurfaced, although usually in muted and rhetorical forms,
whenever Congress contemplated giving an existing territory
statehood. In the case of Hawaii, these considerations were
more explicit and divisive than for any territory admitted after
the Civil War. Yet even before the war, compromises between
the sections and political parties sometimes brought territories
into the Union fairly quickly. As Louisiana and Texas demon-
strated, statehood was conferred rapidly when powerful fac-
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tions could exploit the opportunity to boost their voting strength
in Congress. By contrast, Hawaii was repeatedly denied ad-
mission so that the sectional and political status quo on Capitol
Hill would not be disrupted. The racial and political complexion
of Hawaii’s voters, and the anticipated impact they would have
on the fortunes of the conservative and racially sensitive fac-
tions of Congress, were the central reasons why it was for so
long denied equality as a state. Cynical political partisanship,
combined with Southern hostility to civil rights for nonwhite
Americans, induced Congress to withhold statehood from
Hawaii’s heterogenous people until 1959.
Under the Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance, Con-
gress has the power to admit new states and to “dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Ter-
ritory or other Property belonging to the United States.” While
America’s expansion remained continental, precedent and ju-
dicial opinion ensured that territoriality was an intermediate
step to full and equal statehood. Even during the heated,
widening conflict over the admissions of such territories as Mis-
souri and Maine or Kansas and Nebraska this principle was gen-
erally accepted. Dispute centered on the economic, racial, and
political preferences of such territories, rather than on the ul-
timate entitlement of the inhabitants of these areas to statehood
under the Constitution. The entry of Vermont and Kentucky as
a pair of states in 1791 suggested very early in the history of
the new republic that practical politics would override consti-
tutional principles in determining the fate of America’s many
territories. States like Indiana and Mississippi (1816–1817) or
Illinois and Alabama (1818–1819) were also accepted in pairs
in order to maintain the delicate political and sectional balance
in Congress. Yet this difficult juggling act was ultimately unable
to prevent a bloody war between the states—a conflict fuelled
at every level by issues relating to expansion of the Union,
statehood for territories, and states’ rights.
Despite the tragic consequences of sectional rivalry over
admission of new states, constitutional historians like John
Mathews have argued that Congress displayed a surprising
willingness to accept them. 8 Nationalist historians like Daniel
Boorstin, ever anxious to stress the unifying experience of
nineteenth-century American democracy, have asserted that the
Northwest Ordinance reduced state making to straightforward,
simply followed procedures. For Boorstin, and indeed most
American historians, his country’s rapid spread westward was
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not synonymous with imperialist or colonial expansion but with
the growth of democracy. “Over a broad continent,” he con-
cluded, “‘self-government’ was created in place after place with
perfunctory simplicity.” 9 In this view territorial rule was but
a brief, welcome interlude on the way to equality under the
uniquely flexible American political system. But as slavery and
segregation, the Civil War, and the fate of North American In-
dians all demonstrated, any consensus over the entitlement
of all citizens to equality was fragile indeed. Even after the
Civil War, statehood for some Western territories was deter-
mined by what might be considered irrelevant partisan con-
cerns. These included the relative strengths of various parties
and regions in Congress, opposition to alleged Western rad-
icalism, and the perceived threat to dominant religious and
social customs posed by groups such as Utah’s Mormons.
As America expanded beyond continental boundaries in the
1890s, its overt democratic principles were again sharply chal-
lenged by the administrative and political structures it imposed
on its newly dependent peoples. Washington moved very slowly
after 1898 to resolve this contradiction. America remained a
colonial power for a shorter time than the major European
states; but this was largely a result of its late entry into the
race for overseas possessions. If limited representative govern-
ment came quickly to some parts of America’s new empire, re-
sponsible government or sovereign equality did not. Hawaii’s
people lived under the inequalities of territorial rule until long
after World War II. By deferring statehood, Congress openly tol-
erated this situation. Ironically, America’s self-conscious anti-
colonialism was not translated into an early resolution of
Hawaii’s dependent status. Indeed statehood came to America’s
island possession only after much of Asia and Africa had won in-
dependence from their European overlords.
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Chapter 1
Toward Annexation
FOREIGN PENETRATION AND SETTLEMENT
During the nineteenth century Hawaii’s isolated native peoples
found that distance was not a barrier to foreign penetration and
settlement. In the face of mounting European and American ex-
pansion into the Pacific the Hawaiian kingdom was gradually
transformed, its sovereignty eroded, its culture and social fabric
undermined. The future of the islands was shaped increasingly
by forces and values foreign to the small Polynesian population
of this remote archipelago. And, as the century wore on, the
United States rather than Europe became the principal source
of the powerful influences which cut across every facet of island
life. Annexation, territorial government, and eventually
statehood were the tangible symbols of this gradual absorption
into an expanding America.
The influence and power of American settlers in Hawaii
grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century. At the same
time mainland interest in the islands intensified. Hawaii’s sur-
vival as an independent monarchy was increasingly threatened
by American settlers in the islands and expansionists on the
mainland. Yet even before its monarchy was overthrown, Hawaii
enjoyed, at most, a very tenuous independence. The principal
forces undermining Hawaii’s autonomy were associated with
the development of a single crop, sugar. More than any other
factor this crop transformed the islands. It brought radical
changes to their demographic and social structures, and con-
centrated economic and political power in the hands of a few
immigrant families.
As early as the 1840s American commercial influence sur-
passed that of any other nation. It was estimated, for example,
that more than 80 percent of all ships entering island ports
in this decade were American owned. 1 Missionaries, who ar-
1
rived in substantial numbers after the first Congregationalists
reached Oahu in 1820, were also overwhelmingly American.
Traders and missionaries quickly transformed the economic
and cultural base of the islands, competing unashamedly for
the allegiances of the native population. Even so, as late as
1850 whites comprised less than 3 percent of the total pop-
ulation of about eighty thousand. 2 New settlers were quick
to exploit their rich new environment. As the seemingly un-
limited potential of sugar production was realized, landown-
ership soon came to be concentrated in the hands of European
and American settlers and their descendents, or haoles as they
were locally known. Many of those who eagerly reaped this
new harvest were missionaries or their descendents. Trans-
porting the Protestant ethic to tropical conditions may have
confused and demoralized the indigenous population, but it gen-
erated very tangible rewards for the carriers of Christianity.
“They came to do good, and they did well,” was a comment
widely used in the islands; it captures well the feelings of many
Hawaiians about the consequences of these missionary activ-
ities. By the 1880s second-generation missionary families like
the Baldwins, Cookes, Alexanders, Rices, Wilcoxes, and Han-
cocks dominated the plantation economy and were diversifying
into other business and trading activities. 3
White penetration and settlement of the island kingdom
brought rapid changes, and tragic consequences, for its native
inhabitants. Disease and conquest reduced a Hawaiian popu-
lation of perhaps 300,000* in the 1770s to less than 135,000
fifty years later, and to about 70,000 at the time of the first
formal census in 1853. The old quasi-feudalistic social order
was undermined by practices and assumptions imported by
those who came to trade, plant, or to carry out missionary work
in the islands. The role of the monarch and the influence of
native Hawaiians were gradually eroded. Although it is not the
aim of this study to discuss in detail the impact of white set-
tlement on nineteenth-century Hawaiian society and culture,
it nevertheless must be emphasized that the commercial and
political triumph of Caucasian settlers over the natives, sym-
bolized so unambiguously in the overthrow of the monarchy
and annexation during the 1890s, was a fundamental result of
the destruction and demoralization of the aboriginal popula-
* This figure is now widely disputed as being too high, perhaps by
as much as 50,000 to 100,000.
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tions of the islands during the preceding century. It was for-
tuitous indeed for the white settlers, haoles, who journeyed to
Hawaii seeking land and wealth that foreign penetration re-
duced the numbers and cohesion of its native peoples. By the
time of annexation, political control was indisputably in the
hands of a small white, essentially American minority com-
prising only 5 percent of the total population; Christianity and
capitalism dominated the cultural and economic fabrics of both
Hawaiian and haole societies, and white men owned more than
three-quarters of all land in the islands. Sixty years earlier
David Malo, a Hawaiian scholar and nationalist, had commented
prophetically: “The white man’s ships have arrived with clever
men from the big countries. They know our people are few in
number and our country is small. They will devour us.” 4
Paradoxically, plantation agriculture—which demanded a
plentiful, cheap, and controlled labor force—emerged at the
time when Hawaii’s native population was suffering a precip-
itous decline. Until the turn of the century when the native
population, Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians, stabilized at about
forty thousand, it declined annually by an estimated 2 percent.
Even if the native population had not fallen so sharply, it is
unlikely that it would have provided an enthusiastic or ade-
quate labor supply for the burgeoning plantations. Hawaiians
and part-Hawaiians were reluctant to sanction growing haole
influence in government or the economy. Political cleavages
in the late nineteenth century, for example, were essentially
along Hawaiian versus haole lines, although both groups im-
plicitly accepted that the political influence of Asians should
be restricted. The native population also proudly resisted sub-
jugation as convenient labor under white control. Permanent
work under a competitive economic system was alien to
Hawaiian traditions. “The whole idea of steady work for wages
was so foreign to their old culture that it had no value or appeal
to them,” Edwin Burrows has written. This reluctance to work
as hired plantation laborers also resulted from the fact that con-
ditions on the plantation were usually harsh and exhausting, tol-
erated largely by those laborers tied to contracts from which
they could not escape. 5 But if the intractability of Hawaiian
workers was influenced by the nature of plantation work, it also
symbolized a broad hostility to the consequences of conquest
and dispossession during the nineteenth century.
Like their mainland counterparts before them, plantation
owners looked abroad for an appropriate labor force—one that
was numerous, inexpensive, and tractable. After the 1850s ap-
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proximately four hundred thousand workers and dependents,
many of whom were bound by rigid labor contracts, were re-
cruited to work on Hawaii’s plantations. In 1864 ad hoc private
recruitments were replaced by an efficient system of contract
labor organized jointly by planters. In the following years
workers from East Asia arrived in large numbers. They became
the backbone of the islands’ prosperous plantation economy, an
economy dominated by a wealthy group of plantation owners
which historians have appropriately labelled a “dynastic elite.”
The stability and profits of this class were built on a labor force
which it controlled by a combination of “perquisite paternalism”
and, when necessary, outright suppression of unrest and orga-
nized protest. Plantations operated as essentially autonomous
economic and social units, free from close government
scrutiny—an ideal climate for enterprises which depended on
cheap, essentially unfree labor. 6
Initially southern Chinese formed the nucleus of Hawaii’s
contract labor force. Most arrived after the late 1870s. In 1882,
when the U.S. Congress passed its Chinese exclusion act,
Chinese laborers comprised about half of the total work force
on Hawaii’s plantations. However, many returned home imme-
diately upon expiration of their contracts. Others disappointed
their masters and at the first opportunity left the plantation in
search of more rewarding employment in Honolulu. Asian im-
migration was indeed a thorny question. Many islanders were
ambivalent about it; they viewed it as both an economic ne-
cessity and a growing social threat. Haoles, Hawaiians, and
part-Hawaiians generally agreed that their community must not
accept large numbers of laborers from any one Asian nation.
Even the mouthpiece of those who so fervently promoted con-
tract labor, the Planters’ Monthly, anticipated problems. It was
alarmed that uncontrolled Chinese immigration foreshadowed
“an oversupply of this class.” The journal argued that such an
influx could only be viewed as acceptable if the Chinese were
tied to contracts which compelled them to return eventually
to their homeland. Despite efforts to find alternative workers,
during the 1890s about fifteen thousand more Chinese entered
Hawaii, bringing the total at the time of annexation to an esti-
mated forty-six thousand. 7 Chinese immigration ended abruptly
with annexation as the islands were brought under the authority
of America’s infamous Chinese exclusion act.
In the face of mounting opposition to the Chinese, planters
looked anxiously to other regions for labor. Initially they suc-
ceeded in recruiting substantial numbers of Europeans (al-
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though, as Andrew Lind has pointed out, these people were
regarded and dealt with as a separate racial group for as long
as they stayed on the plantation). Portuguese laborers were
brought in from the Azores and Madeira Islands—twelve
thousand arrived in the decade after 1878; another six thousand
in the following twenty years. At the turn of the century other
European or part-European workers were imported, especially
Spaniards (about eight thousand) and Puerto Ricans (about six
thousand). 8 In an age accepting of social Darwinism and en-
trenched racism, Europeans were reluctant to agree to labor
contracts usually identified as appropriate only for nonwhites,
whether they were of Asian, African, or Pacific island extraction.
But if notions of white supremacy restricted the availability of
cheap European labor, they also sustained and excused a rigid
system of contract labor for nonwhites.
In the absence of other adequate sources, Hawaii’s planters
continued to look to Asia for laborers. With rural recession and
starvation afflicting many peasants in Honshu and Kyushu in
the 1880s, owners induced large numbers of Japanese to uproot
themselves with the promise of work and prosperity in Hawaii.
From 1886, when the Meiji government accepted new immi-
gration levels, to 1924, when the Japanese exclusion act was
formally approved, about 180,000 Japanese arrived in Hawaii.
During these years also, about 8,000 Korean laborers were
brought in. Roughly half of the Japanese eventually returned to
their homeland, but the remainder and their descendents es-
tablished permanent roots. By 1900 they comprised the largest
single ethnic component of Hawaii’s by then diverse population.
Only slowly, however, did the Japanese move from plantation
to town or city, from the deprivations of contract labor to the
limited opportunities available to them in the wider community.
Until they were supplanted by newer arrivals from the Philip-
pines, the Japanese remained the worst paid, least mobile, most
separate and oppressed group in the islands. 9
The history of Hawaii’s annexation, and ultimate statehood,
can only be understood against this background of racial and
social change. The influx of plantation workers transformed the
island community, giving it a unique ethnic mix and distinctive
social patterns. These became central issues in every facet of the
long struggle for statehood. By the 1890s, ethnic stratification
and economic class systems were complicated and rigid. Solid
class barriers separated a relatively small oligarchy of whites
from much larger groups of nonwhite laborers. Pronounced divi-
sions also cut across the laboring class, reflecting ethnic differ-
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ences and the sequence of arrival of the various groups. Virtually
no middle class existed, although some Chinese, poorer whites,
and part-Hawaiians performed service and entrepreneurial func-
tions usually associated with a middle class. Many Hawaiians
and part-Hawaiians remained isolated geographically and so-
cially, reluctant to work for white masters on plantations, am-
bivalent about the possible advantages of urban life or Western
education and training, but resigned to the further erosion of
their culture and traditions. “The social structure of Hawaii was
a curious amalgam of a tropical European colony and a New
England settlement,” Fuchs has observed.
In Hawaii, as in the European colonies, there was virtually no
middle class. Oriental immigrants comprised almost 75 per cent
of the population. There were many Chinese merchants and ped-
dlers and a sprinkling of Japanese trade workers in town; but
none of them could vote, few held land, and there was no social
mixing with the upper-class haoles…. On top were the haoles,
only slightly more than 5 per cent of the population, controlling
politics, land, enterprise, and labor…. There was no middle class
in the American sense of small independent landholders or small
businessmen. Prestige, power and status were firmly in the pos-
session of a small haole élite. 10
Yet the authority of the haoles was somewhat tenuous. Cer-
tainly, many felt deeply insecure in the face of their physical
isolation, ethnic separateness, and small numbers. These white
settlers looked anxiously to Washington for assurances of
support in the event of political or economic difficulties. In
general, after the early 1870s Washington responded sympa-
thetically to their appeals. Successive governments were
anxious to secure a foothold in the islands and determined
to exclude European countries or Japan from this vital Pacific
outpost. The islands were a crucial link in America’s strategic
planning and commerce well before they were brought under
its permanent control in 1898.
HAWAII AND THE DEBATE OVER
AMERICAN EMPIRE
During two distinct periods of expansion the United States de-
veloped into a large, powerful state with a substantial overseas
empire. 11 The first phase of expansion was exclusively conti-
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nental, linking the original Atlantic seaboard states with the
western territories on the Pacific coast by the 1840s. The
second, much briefer thrust at the turn of the century extended
America’s formal authority and informal influence across the
vast waters of the Pacific and into the Caribbean. Each phase
reflected a blend of economic, strategic, and jingoistic incen-
tives. Although ultimately based on physical power, each stage
was sanctioned and rationalized by notions of manifest destiny
and a pervasive belief that it was the new nation’s mission to
assume moral leadership of a Western Hemisphere untainted
by the Old World. All areas acquired during the first phase of
expansion were quickly incorporated as territories and thereby
constitutionally assured eventual statehood. Areas taken during
America’s outward thrust in the 1890s were governed very dif-
ferently. Congress did not accept that these new possessions
were necessarily entitled to eventual equality within the Union,
or to sovereign independence as separate nations. The issues of
political and civil rights for their inhabitants were not resolved
in a uniform way. The Constitution and Bill of Rights no longer
automatically followed the flag. 12 Government of America’s new
empire differed sharply from that exercised over contiguous
areas previously incorporated as territories of the Union. Of
these new possessions, only Hawaii was ever incorporated 13
or given statehood. Its unique fate was the result of particular
pressures, both local and national in origin, which coalesced at
the turn of the century.
Immigrants from the mainland had extended America’s
frontier to the Hawaiian islands by the 1840s, but European
settlers and European powers also competed for influence and
profits in the small kingdom. While Washington did not seek
colonial authority over the islands, it was adamant that no other
power be permitted to colonize them. Twenty years after the
Monroe Doctrine attempted to exclude European imperialists
from the Western Hemisphere, President John Tyler issued a
similar warning to any nation which might covet the Hawaiian
islands. A special relationship now existed between Hawaii and
the United States, he implied in 1842, and his government
would not tolerate any threat to Hawaii’s independence. In
the following year Secretary of State Daniel Webster affirmed
that America’s interest in Hawaii exceeded that of any nation.
Shortly afterward President Millard Fillmore asserted that
Hawaii “should not pass under the control of any other great
maritime State, but should remain in an independent condi-
tion and so be accessible and useful to the commerce of all na-
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tions.” 14 Against this background the French foreign minister
predicted: “The Sandwich Islands seem inevitably destined to
come under the direct influence if not a complete annexation on
the part of the United States.” In the same year, 1849, a New
York newspaper, the Northern Journal, advocated statehood fol-
lowing immediate annexation of the islands by the United
States. The Honolulu newspaper Polynesia was informed by its
New York correspondent that a number of influential papers
shared that sentiment. 15 Yet during the 1840s, despite unprece-
dented national fervor for expansion, Washington was content
simply to apply the vague terms of the Monroe Doctrine in the
hope of dissuading other nations from encroaching on the is-
lands.
Such imprecise claims, however, did not appease the Amer-
icans who had settled in the islands. They attempted to secure
either annexation by the United States or, failing this, a com-
mercial monopoly for American settlers. Such proposals found
growing sympathy on the mainland. Antebellum support for ac-
quiring new territory in the Pacific developed against a back-
ground of direct naval, commercial, and missionary involvement
in Asia. In 1853 Commodore Perry’s gunboats opened Japan
to Western penetration. Justifying this unprecedented action,
Perry foreshadowed the extension of American power and ter-
ritorial control beyond continental limits. “It is self-evident,” he
observed with rather curious logic, “that the course of coming
events will ere long make it necessary for the United States
to extend its jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Western con-
tinent.” 16 For those who shared Perry’s view, Hawaii was a
unique stepping stone to Asia.
During the 1850s annexation, and even statehood, received
serious consideration at the highest levels in Washington and
Honolulu. In the following decades some native Hawaiians be-
lieved that annexation was synonymous with statehood. Few
white settlers or American officials shared this view, but it did
receive some encouragement from Washington. In 1852 the
supporters of President Franklin Pierce celebrated his election
with a toast to the islands, which included the wish: “May they
soon be added to the galaxy of states.” Following a petition
from the ageing and insecure King Kauikeaouli (Kamehameha
III), the Pierce administration drafted a treaty of annexation.
But while the unsteady monarch and some of his white sup-
porters were inclined to surrender Hawaii’s sovereignty to the
United States, many Hawaiians were not. To ensure that the
kingdom’s status did not change, and to overrule their king, the
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draft treaty finally negotiated by the Hawaiian officials in Wash-
ington anticipated not only annexation but immediate statehood
as well. It stated, in part:
[The] Hawaiian Islands shall be incorporated into the American
Union as a State enjoying the same degree of sovereignty as other
States, and admitted as such as soon as it can be done in consis-
tency with the principles and requirements of the Federal Consti-
tution, to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a State as
aforesaid on a perfect equality with other States of the Union. 17
The proposal to grant Hawaii equality was radical indeed: it
would have given the largely non-Caucasian island peoples po-
litical equality with white mainland Americans. It must be re-
membered that Congress had not yet moved to abolish slavery;
nor had Congress established real equality for some other mi-
norities, notably native Americans. Clearly, the Hawaiian del-
egates recognized that while annexation might be approved,
statehood would not. The statehood clause was inserted delib-
erately by the king’s officials to jeopardize his rash initiative.
Predictably, Congress refused to act. Kauikeaouli’s death in
December 1854 and his succession by the forceful pro-British
Kamehameha IV abruptly ended these premature negotiations.
18
In the following year, a reciprocal treaty abolishing duties on
sugar imported from Hawaii also failed to gain approval by Con-
gress. Fearing competition from such imports, sugar producers
from the mainland South had lobbied heavily against the treaty.
Again, in 1867, a reciprocal treaty was rejected. Protectionist
sentiment in the plantation South again proved decisive, but
other considerations were also significant. Despite Secretary
of State William Seward’s desire to annex the islands, expan-
sionism did not yet command majority support in Congress or
throughout the nation. In addition to commercial factors, racial
considerations retarded efforts to forge closer permanent ties
with Hawaii. Southern whites (and many Northerners also) re-
mained convinced that all nonwhites, whether they be blacks
or Asians, were inherently and irreversibly inferior to whites.
Equally, they were adamant that racial difficulties and tensions
had been compounded by emancipation and Reconstruction in
the 1860s. These problems would be further aggravated, they
argued, if additional non-Caucasians were incorporated into
America’s society. But racial questions cut across the early
mainland debate on Hawaii’s future in an ambivalent way. Some
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of the most liberal critics of the racial prejudices and stereo-
typing which afflicted Civil War America were also vigorously
opposed to any expansion of their country’s influence on the
islands. Former abolitionist Charles Sumner, for example, op-
posed reciprocity for reasons which were very different from
those advanced by most whites. He argued that closer economic
or political ties would condemn Hawaii’s nonwhite peoples to
an inferior status in a new nation with an unfortunate record
on racial issues, and deprive the islands and their inhabitants
of eventual sovereign independence. Undoubtedly, many native
Hawaiians shared Sumner’s alarm. But as the nineteenth
century drew to a close, such concerns had less and less impact
on whites in either community. 19
America’s interest in the islands grew relentlessly
throughout the nineteenth century. But other colonial powers
also competed for Hawaii’s resources. In 1843 a struggle be-
tween Britain and France resulted in a brief interlude of British
colonial rule over the kingdom. Although British influence
should not be overestimated, it did remain strong in the 1850s
despite Washington’s efforts to invoke the Monroe Doctrine
against any European adventures in the islands. Kamehameha
IV and Queen Emma were openly sympathetic to Britain, and
ruled with the aid of numerous English advisers. As late as 1875
about one-third of Hawaii’s sugar went to the British Empire.
However, the European states and European settlers did not
triumph. From the 1860s on Hawaii’s economy and trade were
dominated by American settlers and investors; and this group
felt much less threatened by a residual European presence than
by rising Japanese ambitions in the Pacific and by changes in
the islands’ racial mix. Numerical insecurity combined with a
deep-seated belief in the inherent right of white men to rule
over the uncivilized native races of such a tropical outpost led
to growing demands that Hawaii be a de facto, if not an actual,
protectorate of the United States. Fortunately for the white mi-
nority, such appeals were viewed with fresh sympathy in Wash-
ington after the Civil War. In 1868 President Andrew Johnson
told Congress that the two Pacific countries should establish
reciprocal free trade until Hawaii “shall … at no distant day, vol-
untarily apply for admission into the Union.” President Grant
went a step further and in 1871 asked Congress to consider an-
nexation: “That such is to be the political destiny of this arch-
ipelago seems a foregone conclusion,” he stated prophetically.
20 But Congress was not yet convinced of the logic of such pro-
nouncements.
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Perry’s belief that America would win overseas possessions
was not quickly realized. Although it purchased Alaska in 1867,
America’s actual military power and foreign adventures were
still very limited. 21 Believing itself immune to the conflicts of
the Old World and protected from foreign entanglements by the
Monroe Doctrine, the United States remained essentially isola-
tionist after the Civil War. Understandably, it was preoccupied
with healing the wounds of its own recently ended internal con-
flict. Some prominent figures argued for Pacific colonies and
an isthmian canal to boost access to East Asia. Nevertheless,
Henry Cabot Lodge was scarcely exaggerating when he com-
plained as late as 1889: “Our relations with foreign nations fill
but a slight place in American politics, and excite generally only
a languid interest.” 22 Events in the 1890s quickly made this
claim obsolete, as the United States hurriedly joined the major
European states and Japan as a colonial and expansionist power.
After a century of conquest, purchase, and settlement, the
thirteen original Eastern seaboard states had grown into a re-
public of forty-eight continental states or territories entitled to
eventual admission as states. John Quincy Adams’ vision of an
America stretching from ocean to ocean had been realized—but
at great cost to the aboriginal inhabitants and only after war
had forced the dissenting Southern states back into the Union.
With the trauma of war and the frustrations of Reconstruc-
tion behind them, the United States turned outward seeking
new territory, markets, resources, and strategic outposts. The
western frontier had ended, and many sought a new frontier.
“We are the most advanced and powerful people on earth, and
regard to our future welfare demands an abandonment of the
doctrines of isolation,” Senator Orville Platt asserted in 1893.
“It is to the ocean that our children must look as they once
looked to the boundless West.” 23 Opposition to imperialism was
strong in some sectors of the American Congress, public, and
press, but during the following decade Platt’s views prevailed.
During the 1890s ideals of national mission and economic
self-interest propelled America outward. An increasing number
of intellectuals, publicists, and politicians like Lodge, Alfred
T. Mahan, Walter Hines Page, Theodore Roosevelt, and Albert
Shaw urged that new territories be acquired, especially if these
lay on the way to new markets abroad. In 1893, for example,
the influential Mahan echoed Seward’s earlier call for a Central
American canal and for annexation of Hawaii. These, he argued,
would establish the United States as the dominant commercial
and strategic factor in the Pacific and Far East. They would
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also give the products of Eastern states safe access to vast new
markets, and provide naval protection for the Western states.
24 At the same time manufacturers, traders, and entrepreneurs
intensified their appeals for new foreign markets, especially in
China. While market rewards in Asia ultimately proved illusory,
the myth of the vast China market was nonetheless a vital stim-
ulant to expansion. 25 To argue that expansion was fundamen-
tally based on economic incentives, however, is not to suggest
that business leaders conspired to lead America into war with
Spain. Nor is it to imply that after territories were acquired as
springboards to East Asia, the American economy was saved
from periodic downturns or major depressions. On the contrary,
the rewards of expansion and empire rarely met the grandiose
expectations of late-nineteenth-century imperialists.
Although exaggerated, the belief persisted that America
must find new markets or risk domestic gluts, recession, and
instability. In the 1890s both the industrial and rural sectors
of the American economy experienced acute depression. Huge
gluts confronted farmers and manufacturers. Prices for farm
products were now lower than at any time since the bleak days
of the 1840s. Unprecedented industrial efficiency resulted in
overproduction for a saturated domestic market. New overseas
markets, as well as an expanded local demand through immigra-
tion, were viewed increasingly as solutions to this malaise.
Abroad, however, access to markets was apparently being
stifled by decisions over which no administration in Washington
had any control. A wave of protectionism in Europe erected new
barriers against American imports. In China possible American
markets were threatened as the old European imperialists and
Japan attempted to carve the decaying Manchu Empire into
spheres of exclusive national influence. Clearly, American ex-
pansionists were not alone in thinking that embarrassing do-
mestic surpluses could be absorbed in new overseas markets.
Furthermore, the United States viewed the grab for colonies in
Africa and Asia by the European states as an additional threat to
its own economic expansion. The actions of the Old World impe-
rialists provided a convenient justification for similar American
behavior, at least in the Pacific, East Asia, and the Caribbean.
Pressure to control Pacific way stations to the allegedly limitless
markets of Asia, and later efforts to gain equal access to China
through the Open Door policy, signalled America’s belated par-
ticipation in the “new imperialism” which all major industrial
states embraced in the late nineteenth century. 26
Chapter 1
12
For the advocates of expansionism, the Hawaiian islands
were ideally situated, both geographically and politically. Since
the early 1800s they had served as a vital refuelling and supply
station for trade in sandalwood, silks, teas, chinaware, and
furs between the West Coast and Canton. American interests,
settlement, and investment in the islands had also developed
through stages of whaling, missionary activity, sugar planting,
and commerce. Anticipating later arguments by expansionists
like Mahan, Secretary of State James G. Blaine had advised his
minister in Honolulu in 1881 that exclusive control of Hawaii
and the proposed Panama Canal were essential for extending
America’s commercial empire in the Pacific. Hawaii, he as-
serted, “holds in the western sea much the same position as
Cuba in the Atlantic. It is the key to the Gulf trade … [U]nder
no circumstances can the United States permit any changes
in the territorial control of either which would cut it adrift
from the American system, whereto they both indispensably
belong.” 27 Support for this view grew quickly in the years
before war with Spain. “We need Hawaii just as much and
a great deal more than we did California,” William McKinley
wrote shortly before he was elected president in 1896. “It is
Manifest Destiny.” 28 Some of McKinley’s advisors shared the
view that Hawaii’s annexation was an essential element in the
drive to secure a share of China. In addition, the president’s
political mentor, Mark Hanna, suggested that control of the
Philippines would also help the United States “take a large slice
of the commerce of Asia.” After the dust of war with Spain
had settled, a leading Republican, Chauncey M. Depew, un-
ambiguously acknowledged the relationship between surplus
production at home and colonial adventures abroad when he
stated:
The American people now produced $2 billion worth more than
they can consume, and we have met the emergency, and by the
providence of God, by the statesmanship of William McKinley, and
by the valor of Roosevelt and his associates, we have our market
in Cuba … in Puerto Rico … in Hawaii … in the Philippines, and
we stand in the presence of 800 million people, with the Pacific
as an American lake, and the American artisans producing better
and cheaper goods than any country in the world…. [T]he world
is ours and we have conquered it by Republican principles. 29
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Hawaii, like the Philippines, was considered vital as both a
market and a base for wider opportunities. But a broad con-
sensus on Hawaii, the Philippines, and an isthmian canal did not
emerge until war erupted with Spain over Cuba in 1898.
It would be misleading to imply that America’s interest in
Hawaii simply reflected economic imperatives, recognized and
supported by a sympathetic national government. If explicit eco-
nomic motives were pushing the United States toward overseas
commitments by the 1890s, other factors also affected poli-
cymakers. Economic factors were fundamental, but they were
often rationalized or disguised. As Marilyn B. Young has con-
vincingly argued, the United States went to war with Spain and
acquired territories in the Pacific, Asia, and the Caribbean as a
result of a range of nationalistic, religious, racist, and political,
as well as economic, factors. These merged after about 1895
into a “national neurosis [which] … was acted out in the fan-
tastic fervor which preceded the war [with Spain] and perhaps
made it inevitable.” Certainly by the time Hawaii was annexed
many Americans had incorporated (albeit subconsciously) eco-
nomic aims into a broader perspective “which saw a strong
navy, trade, political power and the territory … necessary to
maintain both trade and power, as complementary factors con-
tributing to the wealth and strength of the nation.” Young con-
cludes appropriately that the “economic arguments used by
the imperialists were an integral part of a larger complex of
nationalist ideals.” 30 Certainly there were also times during
the debate over imperialism when the rhetoric of marketplace
expansion was conveniently invoked to bolster the popular
support that vague appeals to prestige, security, and glory
sometimes failed to elicit. 31 The very term “manifest destiny”
was sufficiently vague and emotive to serve those who sought
overseas territory for whatever reason or reasons.
In the 1840s when America was pushing its continental fron-
tiers to their limits, manifest destiny and assumptions of Anglo-
Saxon superiority and mission helped stimulate and justify ex-
pansion and conquest. In the 1890s these ideas resurfaced; but
now, with the addition of social Darwinism, they were more vig-
orous and “scientific.” Writers John Fiske, Josiah Strong, and
John W. Burgess were the principal exponents of such views
in the later period. Burgess, for example, argued that Teutonic
people were “entrusted, in the general economy of history, with
the mission of conducting the political civilization of the modern
world.” 32 Other expansionists, however, were less impressed
with appeals to mission than with the possible political conse-
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quences of economic dislocation at home. Some pragmatic con-
servatives argued, for example, that overseas adventures were
necessary if the internal division and antagonisms which had at-
tended industrialization, urbanization, and recession in Europe
were to be averted in America. “While it might be putting it too
strong to say that war is needed in this country now,” a Kansas
newspaper editorialized, “yet who is there who does not believe,
and in fact know, that such a thing would clear the air and stamp
out the growth of socialism and anarchy, discontent and sec-
tional prejudices that are gaining a foothold in this nation.” 33
Even among those who argued that an empire was needed
there was little agreement on how it might be won. No broad
consensus ever existed on the desirability or nature of ex-
pansion. Moreover, despite the nationalist hysteria which ac-
companied the crusade for war with Spain in 1898, opposition
to imperialism was very strong in some quarters. Opponents of
Hawaii’s annexation embraced a wide range of views and in-
terests. The Southern sugar lobby continued to resist closer na-
tional ties with an obvious competitor for the limited domestic
market. It was also alarmed that annexation of Hawaii would
foreshadow acquisition of other territories which could produce
sugar relatively cheaply with the help of a compliant non-Eu-
ropean work force. Labor interests feared, albeit irrationally,
competition from a flood of cheap Asian workers. Anti-impe-
rialists like Senator George Frisbie Hoar, philosopher William
James, industrialist Edward Atkinson, labor leader Samuel
Gompers, and the Nation’s editor E. L. Godkin argued that
colonialism was fundamentally undemocratic, inhumane, and
immoral. For this group imperialism was an unfortunate de-
parture from traditional American practices. “Most impor-
tantly,” Thomas Osborne has concluded:
The anti-imperialists were certain that Hawaii’s acquisition con-
stituted the “entering wedge” of a new imperialist policy. For
them the annexation of an insular nation symbolized America’s
loss of innocence. The opponents of empire viewed the United
States as the archetype of a virtuous republic—a secularized “City
upon a Hill”. The possession of Hawaii signified the abandonment
of America’s time-honored mission of exemplifying the workings
of self-government and augured the drift into colonialism with all
its attendant embroilments and injustices.
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Moreover, Osborne has demonstrated that anti-imperialists
were not unanimously and indefinitely opposed to Hawaii’s an-
nexation. Some wavered, believing only that territorial ex-
pansion was premature, that “Empire Can Wait.” Events in
Hawaii in 1893 had precipitated America’s “Great Debate” over
empire, but until 1898 the views of the anti-imperialists gen-
erally prevailed in Washington. 34
Racial arguments and racial fear were also important ingre-
dients in the debate over Hawaii and overseas expansion gen-
erally. Ignoring America’s substantial black, Indian, and Asian
populations, some opponents of annexation argued that incor-
poration of a so-called mongrel population of detested and dan-
gerous Asiatics would permanently undermine the Anglo-Saxon
tradition of the nation. Convinced of the innate inferiority of
all who were not derived from Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic stock,
these anti-imperialists argued that Asian and Polynesian
peoples must be excluded from the political umbrella of the
American Republic. No noncontiguous areas or non-Caucasian
peoples should be incorporated, as this would undermine the
geographical and racial unity of the Union. The difficulties re-
sulting from emancipation and Reconstruction were sufficient
to convince many that America must not embrace new regions
populated by people not readily assimilable. If the nation’s Con-
stitution was extended to Hawaii or Asia, Congress would con-
front new dilemmas over race relations: “In the name of the
white men of America,” Representative Robert F. Broussard of
Louisiana argued, “let us not enlarge the scope of this race
question.” The cultural, racial, and political supremacy of
Anglo-Saxons within America would be diluted and perhaps
negated by overseas imperialism, Thomas M. Cooley wrote in
Forum during 1893: “[T]here was an instinctive feeling among
American people that protested against the thought … that the
Constitution of the United States should have capacity for ex-
pansion that might extend it over independent states of colored
people.” If the Constitution permitted the establishment of
states consisting of nonwhites, he asserted, it might “be ex-
tended to cover colonies in Arabia or in Zululand which would
eventually become states and send representatives to Wash-
ington to assist in governing us.” For Cooley, racial issues pre-
sented serious impediments to Hawaii’s annexation. 35 During
the following sixty years most of those opposed to statehood for
the islands held a similar view, although their arguments were
usually couched in more moderate language.
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National opinion in the 1890s was not clearly divided along
imperialist versus anti-imperialist lines. Substantial sections of
business, Congress, and the informed public differed over spe-
cific issues like Hawaii and Cuba, and expressed diverse views
on the extent and nature of possible expansion. Some sought
colonies in the Pacific but not in Asia or Central America; some
promoted informal empire through spheres of influence and
the Open Door; others argued conventionally that tougher
diplomacy would enable the United States to compete satisfac-
torily for international markets without acquiring an overseas
empire.
However, the opinions of Americans living in the islands
were much less divided, at least in relation to the issue of an-
nexation. Their views were shaped by local events which ini-
tially had only a limited bearing on the national debate over
expansion and empire. Foremost among these was the rebellion
against Hawaii’s monarchy: in the early 1890s a powerful group
of whites abruptly overthrew the old order and immediately
asked Washington to annex the islands.
REVOLUTION: END OF THE MONARCHY
The rapid growth of Hawaii’s sugar industry and its substantial
dependence on American markets after the 1850s provided the
foundations on which political union with the United States ulti-
mately rested. When the American Civil War abruptly ended the
supply of domestic sugar to the Northern states, the demand for
“Sandwich Island sugar” escalated sharply. Capitalizing on this
unexpected opportunity island producers boosted production
almost tenfold, to about nine thousand tons annually at the end
of the Civil War, But with reconstruction of the South’s economy
came revived competition for Hawaii’s growers, who recognized
that their long-term prosperity depended on guaranteed access
to the American market. Predictably, all efforts to secure formal
guarantees were strenuously resisted by representatives of the
reemerging South (and for the next one hundred years this
pattern was repeated whenever Hawaii sought closer ties with
Washington). In an attempt to win permanent duty-free access
to the U.S. market, Hawaii was willing to grant the United
States exclusive, unrestricted trading rights. But in the decades
after the Civil War Washington was less interested in Hawaii’s
markets than in Pacific security and way stations to Asia. In par-
ticular it was anxious to obtain naval station rights at Puuloa
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(Pearl Harbor), and in return was prepared to grant trading
concessions to Hawaii. Ultimately it was the islands’ strategic
location rather than the promise of immediate commercial ad-
vantage which drew the two unequal nations into a special rela-
tionship.
The turning point came unexpectedly in 1874, following the
death of King Lunalilo. In the elections for a successor, David
Kalakaua easily defeated the queen dowager, Emma, the pro-
British widow of Kamehameha IV. Later in the year Kalakaua
sailed for the United States—the first reigning monarch to make
this journey. Meanwhile his representatives pressed for a treaty
of reciprocity, although as we have seen, similar initiatives had
been rejected during the Civil War and early years of Recon-
struction. However, Hawaii’s rulers were not anxious to sur-
render or compromise their nation’s sovereignty. Kalakaua was
a fervent nationalist and widely regarded as anti-haole. He re-
fused to make unnecessary concessions to any foreign power,
but at the same time he appreciated that his vulnerable
kingdom could not stand alone. Despite the king’s fruitful dis-
cussions with President Grant, it was the appeals of Hawaii’s in-
creasingly vocal white settlers which ultimately induced Wash-
ington to accept a treaty.
The reciprocity arrangements took effect in 1876. They gave
Hawaii’s sugar duty-free entry into the United States, on con-
dition that the kingdom undertook to make no territorial con-
cessions to any other foreign power. Nor was Hawaii permitted
to grant any other nation the privileges of reciprocity. As a
concession to mainland sugar interests and to satisfy those
congressmen who wanted Pearl Harbor ceded to America, the
treaty was to be renegotiated after eight years. In the interval,
however, it was an unprecedented victory for Hawaii’s white
settlers who had anxiously petitioned Washington: “it is on all
accounts desirable that our interests should be increasingly and
abundantly protected.” The treaty served the United States as a
signal to all other nations of its special interest in the islands. It
was for the United States an unequivocal statement, reiterating
that the Monroe Doctrine embraced this distant Pacific outpost,
as well as continental America. 36
The anticipated boom in sugar production immediately fol-
lowed the new treaty. Hawaii’s economy became more closely
integrated with, and essentially dependent on, the United
States market, capital, and expertise. “The country’s economy
in effect became mortgaged to the United States,” Milton Plesur
has observed. 37 For Hawaii’s restless planters, however, the
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treaty did more than provide a guaranteed market and in-
creased profits. Like most haoles, the planters were convinced
that Washington was now sympathetic to their pleas for
support. Reciprocity was thus interpreted as the first step
toward annexation.
The Southern sugar states continued their strong opposition
to any form of protection for Hawaii’s nascent plantation indus-
tries, but by the 1880s principal mainland concern had largely
shifted from fear of economic competition to questions of race
and immigration control. As Hawaii’s planters depended in-
creasingly on Asian labor, alarm was expressed that Hawaii
might be transformed into an Asiatic society, controlled perhaps
by a rival European power or Japan. By 1881 Secretary Blaine
was sufficiently disturbed to instruct his ministers in Paris,
Berlin, and London that his government would not tolerate any
transfer of Hawaiian territory to another power. He empha-
sized also that the islands lay within the field of legitimate
American commercial domination and must be considered a
part of what he suggested vaguely was the American system.
Blaine maintained, and his successors implicitly agreed, that in
any dispute involving America, Hawaii must maintain “benev-
olent neutrality” or risk being exposed to an “avowedly Ameri-
can solution.” Well before the expansionist surge of 1898, ad-
ministration officials were prepared to threaten war in order to
keep the islands a de facto protectorate of the United States.
Such behavior was not without precedent. During the 1880s
Washington exploited the terms of its 1878 agreement with
Samoa and intervened to ensure Samoa’s neutrality, and its
own preeminence in the western Pacific. In 1888 these maneu-
vers resulted in Washington becoming one member of a tri-
partite protectorate for Samoa. In Samoa, as in Hawaii, America
had demonstrated a willingness to confront European states
and risk war to promote seemingly minor strategic or trading
interests in a remote part of the Pacific. Such behavior fore-
shadowed stronger initiatives in the 1890s. 38
The Reciprocity Treaty was renewed and extended in 1884
and 1887, when the United States was granted exclusive access
to Pearl Harbor as a naval station. Many newspapers now
argued that control of Hawaii was essential if America’s com-
mercial and strategic interests were to be protected. 39 A further
extension of the treaty was widely anticipated.
Three years later, however, these expectations were sud-
denly dashed. Congress, through the controversial McKinley
Act, abolished all duties on imported raw sugar but at the same
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time granted local producers a bounty of two cents per pound.
Hawaii ceased to receive any tangible benefits from the Reci-
procity Treaty. It was lumped with all other foreign producers
and placed at a disadvantage relative to domestic producers.
More than any single event, the McKinley Act spurred local
support for annexation, especially among the dominant white
business and sugar groups. The bounty threatened the very
livelihood of plantation owners in the islands. Surprisingly, this
reversal coincided with other developments which implied that
American support for closer formal ties, and eventually annex-
ation, had not waned. In 1891 Secretary Blaine, now a member
of President Harrison’s administration, advised:
There are only three places that are of value enough to be taken
that are not continental. One is Hawaii and the others are Cuba
and Porto Rico. Cuba and Porto Rico are not now imminent and
will not be for a generation. Hawaii may come up for decision at
any unexpected hour and I hope we shall be prepared to decide in
the affirmative.
Harrison was equally convinced of the obvious and urgent need
for maintaining and expanding the nation’s hold on the islands.
40 But when the “unexpected hour” arrived in January 1893,
neither Congress nor the administration acted as Blaine had
hoped.
Within Hawaii the tariff dispute confirmed what many
whites had long believed—that annexation was essential for the
very survival of their wealth and growing political power. In
1887 influential haoles succeeded in bringing the lower house
and King Kalakaua under the effective control of the House of
Nobles, dominated by propertied and wealthy whites. Unrest
among the established plantation owners and their merchant
friends led to the formation of a quasi-military organization de-
termined to dictate policy to the extravagant nationalist Kala-
kaua, now generally referred to as the Merry Monarch. Working
through a haole-dominated organization, very inappropriately
called the Hawaiian League, opponents of the king pledged to
secure a well-run, upright and honest government by whatever
means necessary. Under the leadership of the influential at-
torney and publisher Lorrin A. Thurston, armed members of
the league marched on Iolani Palace on June 30, 1887. With
the threat of violence they compelled the king to acquiesce
to their demands. The so-called Bayonet Constitution they im-
posed on Kalakaua obliged his once-powerful cabinet favorite,
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Walter Murray Gibson, to retire. It also weakened the power of
Claus Spreckels, an entrepreneur and sugar magnate whose in-
fluence threatened the very sovereignty of the small kingdom.
More significantly, the new constitution imposed property qual-
ifications which disfranchised about three-quarters of the ex-
isting native Hawaiian electorate. It also included a special
eligibility clause which permitted any male resident to
vote—provided he could read and write in a European language
and swore to uphold the new constitution.
The contest over who should govern in the islands was now
to be fought according to rules which were heavily biased in
favor of the haole minority. Any residual Hawaiian influence
which centered on the monarchy was soon extinguished by the
very group which had imposed the Bayonet Constitution. If local
politics had in the past often resembled a Victorian comic opera,
from this point on it became tense and serious. The economic
future, social patterns, and political sovereignty of the islands
were at stake. The balance of local power now lay with the haole
plantation owners and their sympathizers. And this group would
not willingly relinquish its new-found authority, which it increas-
ingly sought to bolster with support from Washington. 41
Hawaiian nationalists, led initially by Robert Wilcox, re-
sisted the changes imposed by the white revolutionaries. Early
in 1889 he and a group of native supporters captured Iolani
Palace. But their triumph was brief indeed. Under heavy attack
they were forced to surrender only hours after seizure of the
palace. Although tried for treason, Wilcox was found not guilty
by an all-native jury. Wilcox’ efforts, and his acquittal, sym-
bolized the resistance of his people. Nonetheless, his efforts
failed. In the following decade all other attempts to quash or
limit the authority of Hawaii’s white elite proved equally futile.
Parties now emerged to fight for the interests of the only
ethnic groups not excluded from local politics: a Reform party
representing most whites, and a National Reform party repre-
senting most still-enfranchised Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, and
a handful of haole sympathizers. Island politics afforded these
groups a limited degree of direct representation. But in any
contest between them, victory usually went to the predomi-
nantly haole group. When Hawaiian nationalists tried to reverse
this trend by promoting a revised constitution with a broader
franchise, their efforts were quickly aborted.
Queen Liliuokalani succeeded Kalakaua following his death
in January 1891. She was determined to assert her sovereignty
and promote the rights of her native subjects. But her ambitions
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merely provided powerful opponents with an ideal opportunity
to end the monarchy and concentrate political power even more
directly where economic power already lay—in the hands of
white settlers. The fact that more than 50 percent of the islands’
population was of Japanese extraction and about 20 percent
of Chinese origin was essentially irrelevant to the day-to-day
working of politics in the islands. Both Asian groups were vital
to the economic life of the community; but being foreign-born
and denied the vote, neither participated in the political turmoil
which brought Hawaii into the United States.
Although Liliuokalani had sworn to uphold the constitution
of 1887, she attempted to assert her royal authority over her
ministers. Moreover, speculation persisted that she would pro-
mulgate a new constitution at the earliest opportunity. These
developments compounded the political instability and eco-
nomic difficulties which characterized the early months of her
reign. Predictably, they also gave rise to renewed haole oppo-
sition to the monarchy, and encouraged collusion between white
settlers and American officials who now tacitly accepted that
decisive action must be taken against the old Hawaiian order.
Responsibility for American policy in Hawaii during 1893
rested with Blaine’s successor, John W. Foster, and Blaine’s
close friend, John Stevens, the United States minister in Hon-
olulu. Both officials strongly promoted annexation—albeit with
varying degrees of discretion—and local advocates of annex-
ation eagerly attempted to exploit their sympathies.
Late in 1892 Stevens advised that “the facts can hardly fail
to lead to the conclusion that the relations and policy of the
United States towards Hawaii will soon demand some change,
if not decisive measures, with the aim to secure American in-
terests and future supremacy.” Hawaii had “reached the parting
of the ways,” he concluded, “She must now take the road which
leads to Asia, or the other which outlets her in America, gives
her an American civilization and links her to the care of
American Destiny.” Foster was confident that incoming pres-
ident Grover Cleveland would be “if not aggressive, at least pos-
itive and active” over Hawaii. 42 Events were to prove Foster’s
optimism exaggerated. Cleveland’s indecision, however, did not
delay the collapse of the old Hawaiian order, or undermine
the authority of the new haole oligarchy which overthrew the
monarchy. Confident that Stevens would sympathetically rep-
resent their interests in Washington, Thurston’s conspirators
moved boldly to wrest control from Liliuokalani.
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The crisis over the queen’s powers and the deeper conflict
over political authority in the islands climaxed dramatically in
January 1893. In response to rumors that Liliuokalani intended
to promulgate a new constitution which boosted the rights of
her native subjects and retrieved some of the monarchy’s lost
powers, prominent haoles organized to protect their rights and
property from royal actions. Led by Thurston, the newly formed
Annexation Club (which quickly changed its name to the more
euphemistic Committee of Safety) moved to overthrow the
queen. Stevens supported this effort with an enthusiasm which
exceeded even the wildest expectations of the annexationists.
On January 14 Liliuokalani boldly dissolved the existing leg-
islature and attempted to promulgate a new constitution. Her
actions were clearly designed to reverse the changes imposed
under the infamous Bayonet Constitution. But two days later,
amidst rumblings of rebellion from the haole community,
Stevens ordered 150 Marines ashore from the USS Boston on
the pretext of protecting the United States Legation and Con-
sulate in Honolulu and securing the safety of American citizens.
The troops quickly took control of all buildings which the white
rebels deemed essential for a successful coup d’etat. With this
sudden show of physical strength, the whites deposed the queen
and proclaimed a provisional government which was to exist
“until terms of union with the United States have been nego-
tiated and agreed upon.” This was not the first time American
marines had landed in Honolulu. But on the previous occasion,
in 1874, they were supported by British troops and acted on
behalf of the elected monarch, Kalakaua, against rioters sup-
porting “Queen” Emma. In the coup of 1893, however, American
troops acted against the traditional rulers on behalf of a small
group of haole insurrectionaries.
The rebels were confident that Washington would soon
sanction their actions and embrace their government. Certainly
they received some initial encouragement from American of-
ficials. Stevens in particular continued to act sympathetically.
He hastily recognized the de facto provisional government, de-
clared an American protectorate over the islands, and raised
the Stars and Stripes over the old palace in Honolulu. The
Cleveland administration officially repudiated the protectorate
proclamation but remained silent on all other issues raised by
the coup. This did not discourage the rebels. Having wrested
control from the old monarchy with unexpected ease, they
quickly turned to Washington for sanction and support. 43 While
preparations were being made to try the queen and her prin-
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cipal advisers for treason, Thurston set out for Washington with
a special mission, which he portrayed as representing a large
proportion of the islands’ property owners and commercial in-
terests. The composition of the powerful fourteen-member Ad-
visory Council to the provisional government also reflected ac-
curately the interests which the revolution of 1893 served: it
contained many owners of substantial sugar stock, but only six
Hawaiian citizens, and not one person of native Hawaiian an-
cestry. 44
For the representatives of the rebel government, annexation
and statehood were separate issues. At no time did they ask
for annexation as a state. Indeed, as Charles Hunter has ob-
served: “Over and over the spokesmen for the delegation sent
to Washington to seek adoption to the Union let it be known that
statehood was precisely what they did not want.” Annexation
as an American territory was a way of averting possibly insur-
mountable problems which national independence or, alterna-
tively, statehood might bring for the rebel government. Hawaii
was a small, vulnerable outpost in the Pacific and its new rulers
doubted their ability to ensure its economic prosperity or
physical security without the formal guarantees of American
support which would flow automatically from territorial status.
In an age of new imperialism in Asia and the Pacific, their inse-
curity was understandable. “In reality the members of the new
Provisional Government in Hawaii hoped for a status somewhat
modified from that of the customary American territorial
system‚” Hunter has concluded. “They would have consented
to being taken as a protectorate…. They knew full well that
they could not continue to stand alone.” Yet the rebels thought
statehood was too high a price to pay for assurances of
American support. It was an unattractive option primarily be-
cause it necessarily involved unrestricted adult male suffrage
under American constitutional requirements and, in the view of
the rebel government, this would reverse the gains won by the
coup of 1893. 45
Despite the aims of the new government and the activities
of Thurston in Washington, local support for immediate annex-
ation was not uniformly strong, even among whites. Business
and commercial interests in Honolulu were essentially united,
favoring immediate absorption by the United States. But at the
last moment some plantation owners, fearing Congress would
legislate to end contract labor, either opposed union or equivo-
cated. Many ardent proponents, however, supported annexation
primarily because they opposed further Asian immigration.
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Many whites were anxious to end contract labor as, in the long-
term, it threatened the political, economic, and cultural domi-
nance they had established throughout the nineteenth century.
Some Hawaiians, although not enthusiastic about possible an-
nexation, were also anxious to end imported labor and reluc-
tantly accepted annexation as the lesser of two evils. Ironically,
among native Hawaiians support for annexation grew as threats
against the monarchy materialized. This was largely because
many Hawaiians believed annexation meant immediate state-
hood—and statehood would at least permit the Hawaiians to
exert some influence at the polls. 46
The “Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden
hour for the United States to pluck it,” Stevens eagerly told his
superiors in Washington immediately after the coup of 1893.
Secretary of State Foster apparently shared this view, and
argued for a treaty of annexation. 47 But neither the president
nor the Senate were yet ready for such decisive action.
Shortly after he was inaugurated for his second term as
president, Cleveland withdrew the proposed annexation treaty
from the Senate, primarily because it failed to provide for a
plebiscite which would test the opinions of all islanders on this
question. The president also sent a special commissioner, James
H. Blount, to investigate events in the islands. Blount’s findings
confirmed suspicions that Stevens had colluded with the Annex-
ation Club, that the queen had not surrendered before Stevens
had recognized the provisional government, and that the ma-
jority of Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian residents did not oppose
the queen. 48 The annexation lobby in Washington was unable to
counter these damaging, but widely anticipated, findings. When
Cleveland announced on December 18, 1893, that his adminis-
tration opposed annexation, the new white rulers were obliged
to accept that national politics was not responsive to the types
of pressure they had exploited so effectively in the small island
community.
The rebels’ defeat in Washington, however, was not without
compensation. Although the House of Representatives over-
whelmingly agreed that the actions of the so-called new Mis-
sionary Monarchy were unjustified and ill-advised, both houses
of Congress also promptly passed resolutions warning other na-
tions not to interfere in the affairs of the islands. Washington
still jealously sought to exclude other powers from this vital
mid-Pacific area. But at the same time, racial fears made many
congressmen hostile to a more intimate political relationship
with the islands—especially one which implied eventual
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statehood. “Shall great public issues affecting the vital interests
of all our people be submitted for determination to the Senators
and Representatives from Hawaii?” Representative Henry
Johnson of Indiana later asked rhetorically. Unlike many whites
in Hawaii, Johnson deplored any suggestion that nonwhites in
the islands should be excluded from political influence in order
to overcome this objection against statehood. Such a solution
“would impose upon Hawaii … by force of positive law the same
deprivation of suffrage claimed to exist in the Southern States
now, in defiance of law.” But the monarchy had been overthrown
to enhance the interests of a few, not to bring democracy to the
population at large. Hence the rebel government ignored the
appeals of congressmen like Johnson and moved quickly to dis-
franchise virtually all nonwhites and supporters of the former
monarch. Voting rights in the new republic were restricted to
a mere 2,700 people, almost all of whom were white owners of
substantial property. This action did not immediately promote
annexation. It did, however, permit the new rulers to launch
a concerted drive for closer ties with Washington untroubled
by dissenting voices from nationalist Hawaiians who were ex-
cluded from the formal political arena. Hawaii’s electorate was
later enthusiastic about annexation; but this was largely be-
cause the electorate, like the small republic’s leadership, was
narrowly unrepresentative of the islands’ diverse community. 49
While the rebel government was unable to sway events in
Washington, it nonetheless had real political authority at home.
Acting on Blount’s recommendations, Cleveland attempted to
induce the rebels to resign and make way for a restoration of
the queen. Predictably, the new government resisted. Short of
interfering by means of military force, Washington was pow-
erless to reverse events. Moreover, relations between Wash-
ington and the provisional government were highly ambivalent.
Congress was apparently opposed to annexation, but this did
not necessarily mean that it favored restoration. The Cleveland
administration took no further action, and on July 4, 1894, the
rebels proclaimed the Republic of Hawaii, with Sanford B. Dole
as president. The triumph of the new rulers was completed
on January 24, 1895, when Queen Liliuokalani reluctantly re-
nounced all claims to the throne in return for a general amnesty
for her defeated supporters. 50 The Hawaiian monarchy had
ended, but without annexation its political successors faced an
uncertain future.
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ANNEXATION
Those who overthrew the old order in Hawaii were dismayed to
discover that this action alone did not guarantee annexation by
Washington. Ultimately, annexation resulted from national de-
velopments which leaders of the island republic could exploit,
but over which they exercised no decisive influence. Yet their
partially frustrated efforts of 1893–1894 clearly foreshadowed
and facilitated annexation five years later. When war erupted
with Spain over issues not directly linked to Hawaii, local annex-
ationists and congressional expansionists quickly took advan-
tage of the new circumstances. They doubtless came to share
John Hay’s famous observation that the Spanish-American con-
flict was indeed “a splendid little war.”
Initially, however, it was Meiji Japan’s decision to flex its
imperialist muscles in Asia which induced Washington to seek
rapproachement with the infant Hawaiian republic. Hawaii’s
political revolution almost coincided with Japan’s easy victory
over neighboring China in 1894—an event which many Amer-
icans saw as a portent of much broader Japanese military and
commercial adventures in the Asian-Pacific region. At the same
time, the new government in Hawaii grappled with two related
problems resulting from the unwillingness of sugar planters to
reduce the level of imported Asian labor. First, the 1890s wit-
nessed an unprecedented influx of Japanese workers. In the
fifteen years from 1882 the number of Japanese contracted to
plantations rose from a handful to more than thirty thousand.
Immigration peaked in 1896–1897, when almost ten thousand
Japanese entered Hawaii. Planters found European labor costly
and difficult to entice to the harsh, poorly paid work on tropical
estates. 51 The new government attempted to sustain white in-
fluence by insisting that 10 percent of all immigrants be of Eu-
ropean extraction. When this policy failed it took more direct
action to restrict the influx of Asian laborers. In 1897 three
shiploads of Japanese were refused entry at Honolulu, osten-
sibly because they had not been processed under the terms of
the 1886 Hawaii-Japan immigration agreement. This immedi-
ately precipitated a second, acute problem for the rebel gov-
ernment—a confrontation with Japan. The Meiji government
protested bitterly, alleged discrimination, halted all contract la-
bor, dispatched its warship Naniwa to Honolulu, and threatened
war if the issue was not speedily resolved. 52
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Fortunately for the proponents of annexation, 1896 not only
brought difficulties with Japan but changes in Washington
which quickly paved the way for action to finalize what the
coup of 1893 had only foreshadowed. The American elections
in November 1896 put a Republican, William McKinley, in the
White House and boosted the strength of expansionists in both
houses of Congress. The new Republican majorities were also
willing to confront Japan, or indeed any other state, which en-
tertained military or commercial designs on Pacific outposts.
Two of Hawaii’s representatives in Washington, Francis M.
Hatch and W. O. Smith, reported ecstatically that the contrast
between McKinley and his Democratic predecessor was similar
to that between daylight and darkness. They were convinced
that the new president would grasp any reasonable opportunity
to take the islands. 53 The revived hopes of the rulers of the
infant republic were quickly confirmed.
After consulting with Hawaii’s officials in Washington, the
State Department drafted an annexation treaty which McKinley
accepted and sent to the Senate in June 1897. This immediately
widened the rift between Hawaii and Japan. However, the
United States was now prepared, in effect, to act for Hawaii.
The administration was willing to move toward annexation. It
was, nevertheless, reluctant to inherit a major dispute with
Japan, especially as pressure for intervention in Cuba now
threatened to entangle McKinley in overseas difficulties on an-
other front.
Tokyo promptly protested the terms of the draft annexation
bill, arguing that it threatened existing Japanese rights in
Hawaii and prejudiced claims made by Tokyo in the dispute
over immigration. Given the background of bitter congressional
debate between imperialists and anti-imperialists, difficulties
with Spain over Cuba, and exaggerated popular alarm over
Japan’s possible ambitions in the Pacific, McKinley’s response
to Japan was remarkably conciliatory. Secretary of State John
Sherman assured Tokyo that annexation would not result in any
discrimination against Japanese nationals or commerce, and he
induced Hawaii to pay reparations to Japan in connection with
the immigration dispute. In return, in December 1897 Japan
withdrew its opposition to the proposed treaty. 54
Secretly, however, through the work of the ebullient under
secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, the administration
took a tougher stand against Japan. It drew up plans to land
troops and declare a protectorate over Hawaii should Tokyo
prove inflexible on the immigration issue. Such a contingency
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was anticipated, and perhaps sought, by at least some influ-
ential American naval and military officers. Roosevelt, unrepen-
tantly jingoistic, wanted the archipelago annexed “tomorrow,”
leaving the details of its political status to be dealt with later.
“To me this question of possible war with Japan over Hawaii
seems of very much more importance than the Spanish one,”
a prominent member of the Naval War Board advised the sec-
retary of the Navy. “Japan could do us very much more per-
manent harm on the Pacific Coast than Spain could do on the
Atlantic.” 55 In the hysteria which was shortly to accompany war
with Spain and the acquisition of an overseas empire, such ex-
aggerated insecurity was widely shared. By 1898 it had become
an important ingredient in the thrust for new territory.
Congressional debate over annexation was exhaustive,
bitter, and often irrational and exaggerated. In large part it re-
peated the diverse views expressed during previous years in
the Great Debate over empire. In tone and substance it also
foreshadowed later arguments over statehood. But in the 1890s
opposition to closer ties with the multiracial, noncontiguous is-
lands was proportionately stronger, if not more intense, than
during the protracted debate over statehood during 1945–1959.
Moreover, annexation involved wider issues than statehood: it
was an integral factor in the emerging conflict over imperialism,
the nature of the Union, and the future role of the United States
in Pacific and world affairs.
The issues raised by annexation were substantial and en-
during. But too often the debate on this question betrayed a pre-
occupation with racial fears and hostilities. The Honolulu Star
set the unfortunate tone when it insisted that the central issue
was “the white race against the yellow … nothing but annex-
ation can save the islands.” 56 Local whites apparently feared
their long-term economic and political survival was threatened
by the islands’ now predominantly Asian population, which
might gain support from an expanding and sympathetic Japan.
Close formal ties with the mainland were viewed as a means
of maintaining white political supremacy in the islands, and
of averting possible future interference by Japan or any other
state. Some sugar planters were prepared to tolerate such risks
in order to maintain their access to contract labor from Asia.
But for those whites who supported the coup of 1893 and anx-
iously encouraged annexation, the end of contract labor seemed
a relatively small price for the guarantees of protection—racial,
economic, and military—which would inevitably accompany in-
tegration into the United States.
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To the dismay of annexationists, the debate over Hawaii’s
future could not be isolated from the emotive statehood
issue—indeed statehood was the major obstacle to annexation.
Throughout 1893–1898 the leaders of Hawaii’s new government
firmly rejected all offers of help to secure statehood. In 1896
they led a move to defeat the first resolution ever proposed
in Congress to grant the islands statehood: “We do not for
a moment anticipate” that the Joint Resolution introduced by
Representative George Spalding (Rep., Mich.) “will pass … un-
modified,” Hawaii’s minister for Foreign Affairs wrote. Pres-
ident McKinley was left in no doubt as to the attitude of
Hawaii’s rulers. They wanted annexation, he was advised, but
under terms which gave the islands’ government maximum pos-
sible autonomy over home affairs. Statehood was neither en-
visaged nor sought. Fortunately for Hawaii’s haole rulers, this
position was shared by most congressmen and mainland news-
papers. Those officials unconvinced of Hawaii’s unsuitability
for statehood were informed that it “needed the restraining in-
fluence of the President of the United States, otherwise it would
be subject to all sorts of wild legislation.” Statehood would
bring with it an elected governor, it was argued, and this would
mean handing Hawaii over to the mob. Usually this fear of “mob
rule” was expressed in more gentle words, notably in references
to the “problems” which would follow if such an “immature” and
racially “mixed” electorate was given virtual self-government
under statehood. 57
While Hawaii’s lobbyists could apparently separate annex-
ation from statehood, opponents of annexation were convinced
that it would inevitably foreshadow statehood. Constitutional
precedents certainly added weight to this view. It was the very
real possibility of statehood which caused many mainlanders
to balk at annexation. For this group, as for later opponents
of statehood, Hawaii’s people must be permanently disqualified
from equality under the American flag because they were over-
whelmingly non-Caucasian: “a lot of non-descript Asiatico-
Polynesian ignoramuses,” a congressman from Missouri de-
scribed them in the debates of 1898. “How can we endure
our shame,” he concluded derisively, “when a Chinese senator
from Hawaii, with his pig-tail hanging down his back, with his
pagan joss in his hand, shall rise from his curule chair and in
pidgin English proceed to chop logic with George Frisbie Hoar
or Henry Cabot Lodge.” 58 Few opponents were prepared to use
such derogatory language, but many shared the sentiments it
expressed. Opposition to annexation centered on the race-con-
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scious Southern states, although it was never exclusive to this
section; and during the sixty years of territorial rule which fol-
lowed annexation, Southern congressmen dominated all efforts
to deny Hawaii’s diverse peoples equality under statehood.
Nonetheless, the annexation lobby pushed on. A draft treaty
of annexation was approved unanimously by the Hawaii legis-
lature on September 6, 1897. An investigation by Congress, ex-
pressions of support from McKinley, discussions between Pres-
ident Dole and administration officials, and a secret Senate
debate all followed in late 1897 and early 1898. But the pro-
posed treaty could not muster the two-thirds majority required
in both houses of Congress. No consensus had emerged on
Hawaii. Friends of the ruling faction in the islands reluctantly
accepted that the draft treaty would not pass Congress unless
it was converted to a joint resolution requiring only a simple
majority in each chamber. A similar strategy had previously
brought the short-lived Republic of Texas into the Union.
The sudden outbreak of war with Spain in April 1898 and
Commodore George Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay on May 1
transformed the debate on Hawaii. Rather than declare neu-
trality in the conflict, Hawaii acted as an undeclared ally of the
United States. Its strategic significance and political sympathies
achieved great prominence. It became a vital link in the war
with Spain, refuelling and supplying American ships and pro-
viding a rest and recreation base for soldiers and sailors en
route to the Philippines. “To maintain our flag in the Philip-
pines,” a New York newspaper asserted, “we must raise our
flag in Hawaii.” 59 For expansionists like Mahan, Lodge, and
Roosevelt, the logic of this claim was conclusive. The Spanish-
American War brought the United States an overseas empire
and provoked decisive action on Hawaii.
Three days after Dewey’s dramatic victory a new joint reso-
lution to annex Hawaii was introduced into Congress by Repre-
sentative Francis G. Newlands. In contrast to the unsuccessful
treaty of 1897, the Newlands resolution made a major con-
cession to those who feared that annexation would inevitably
bring statehood: it deleted the preamble of the treaty which had
stipulated that the islands were incorporated into the United
States “as an integral part thereof.” The omission of this phrase,
most constitutional experts believed, removed the implication
that the annexed territory was an “inchoate state.” 60 This did
not stop all of the old arguments, both for and against an-
nexation, from surfacing during debate on the Newlands reso-
lution. But events in the Philippines and feverish demands for
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an empire were more persuasive than the time-worn assertions
about mission, commerce, security, or race. On June 15 the
House approved the Newlands resolution by an overwhelming
290 to 91 votes. After fifteen days of intense debate, the Senate
on July 6 also approved it. The margin of Senate approval was
two to one, 42 votes for, 21 against. In both chambers, voters
were aligned essentially along party lines—Republicans in favor,
Democrats opposed. The anticipated economic and strategic
advantages of expansion clearly appealed more strongly to
Northern and Western business interests represented by the
Republican party than to the more varied groups represented
by the Democrats. 61 For Hawaii, as for the numerous other
areas now tied into America’s broad empire, 1898 signalled the
beginning of a new era when its fortunes would be determined
fundamentally by decisions made in Washington.
A century of continental expansion and informal commercial
penetration of the Pacific and Central America had, by the
start of the twentieth century, induced America to emulate the
great powers of the Old World and win an overseas empire.
In a sudden burst of imperialist activity it acquired Hawaii,
Guam, Wake Island, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. It also
won substantial influence in Cuba and much of Central America,
and used the Open Door policy to establish itself as an equal
with the numerous other imperialist states seeking to dominate
China. Although American goals and policy in all of these areas
were linked, the methods of acquisition and types of gov-
ernment imposed on them varied substantially. The dreams of
men like Seward, Mahan, Lodge, and Roosevelt for “national
expansion and aggrandizement” 62 overriding continental bar-
riers, were suddenly fulfilled. While the decisions for war and
territory signalled a departure from continentalism, they were
consistent with the form and intention of previous American ex-
pansion westward. The roots of the new empire lay in the ge-
ographic exhaustion of the old empire, in the transition from
an agrarian to an industrial economy, in the demands for new
markets and investments abroad, and in the need to protect ex-
panded overseas interests with a navy, bases, an isthmian canal,
and political dominion in vital outposts. 63 The material rewards
which actually flowed to the United States from its expansionist
adventures fell well short of those anticipated by the imperialist
lobby. But it was the expectation of gains rather than their real-
ization which propelled America into new imperialism.
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These incentives, and the fever for war, were powerful
indeed. They submerged the very question of the constitution-
ality of Hawaii’s annexation beneath the allure of nationalism
and self-interest. At that time it seemed impertinent for Amer-
icans to ask if this initial decision which paved the way for
statehood was consistent with the nation’s constitutional proce-
dures and principles. In the following decades this question was
considered occasionally, but by then it had become a narrow
legal issue. “It has long been held in some quarters that the
annexation of Hawaii by joint resolution was unconstitutional,”
William B. Tansill observed in 1954, as “relations between inde-
pendent Nations can be governed legitimately only by treaties.”
Tansill concluded, therefore, that a legislative act such as the
joint resolution which brought Hawaii under American control
could have no extraterritorial impact. Yet this important
question has never been considered directly by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Rather, the Court has consistently (and perhaps
conveniently) “recognised that the methods and means of ac-
quiring territory constitute matters which are within the
province exclusively of the political branches of the Gov-
ernment.” Nonetheless Westel W. Willoughby’s classic study of
U.S. constitutional law has argued that
annexation by legislative act was constitutionally justified upon
the same ground that the extension of American sovereignty by
statute over the Guano Islands was justified; namely, as an ex-
ercise of a right springing from the fact that, in the absence of ex-
press constitutional prohibition, the United States as a sovereign
nation has all the power that any sovereign nation is recognized
by international law and practice to have with reference to such
political questions as the annexation of territory….
It [is] also quite reasonable to argue that the annexation of
the Hawaiian Islands by act of Congress was a “necessary and
proper” measure for the military defence of the nation, and for
the protection and increase of our foreign commerce; for there
can be no question but that a conceived military and commercial
need was one of the strongest of the motives that operated to
bring about the annexation.
This was a limp defense indeed. But despite the potential di-
visiveness of this question, it never impeded the movement
toward statehood. 64
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The ruling white minority in Hawaii welcomed annexation as
a guarantee of its political and economic control for at least a
generation. Furthermore, in the longer term, annexation made
the triumph of white values and ideology through “American-
ization” a formal necessity if the new territory was ever to
achieve statehood. Two years after Hawaii was annexed, Con-
gress designated it an “incorporated territory.” Like numerous
incorporated continental territories before it, this ultimately en-
titled the islands to statehood.
For the submerged remnants of Hawaii’s once-proud and nu-
merous native peoples, annexation was a further irreversible
indignity. “This was the ultimate dispossession,” Daws has ob-
served poignantly.
The Hawaiians had lost much of their reason for living long ago,
when the kapus were abolished; since then a good many of them
had lost their lives through disease; the survivors lost their land;
they lost their leaders, because many of the chiefs withdrew from
politics in favor of nostalgic self-indulgence; and now at last they
lost their independence. Their resistance to all this was feeble.
It was almost as if they believed what the white man said about
them, that they had only half learned the lessons of civilization….
They chose to operate within the conventions laid down by white
men, and by so doing they put themselves at a disadvantage. They
listened to political harangues and composed chants to fit the po-
litical occasion; they drew up petitions and they read the stirring
editorials in the Hawaiian language newspapers; but beyond that
they did not go. And so they became Americans. 65
Annexation both symbolized and ensured the triumph of foreign
influences which had transformed the islands so radically in
the preceding century. The eclipse of Hawaiian culture, tradi-
tions, and political authority was also reflected starkly in the
fact that less than one in every four people living in the islands
in 1900 was descended from Hawaiian or part-Hawaiian an-
cestors. Irrespective of the long-term economic and social ben-
efits of the changes which accompanied white settlement, Tom
Dinell, Allan Spitz, and others have concluded that “their impact
upon the native Hawaiian population was almost catastrophic.”
The once-independent and relatively prosperous native people
became an underprivileged minority. By the time of annexation,
the problems of demoralization and adjustment to imported cul-
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tural norms, economic power, and political authority had so dis-
rupted the native population that it seemed for a while as if they
might die out altogether. 66
Hawaiian nationalists opposed the various steps which Eu-
ropean settlers devised to wrest political power from native
rulers and the native electorate. But despite this resis-
tance—which at times included attempts to employ military
force—their efforts were ultimately futile. Unable to reverse
the coup of 1893, they were powerless to thwart annexation
five years later. Indeed, in 1898 Hawaii’s native people had
to be content with a solemn written protest to the American
government against the fact that annexation had taken place
“without reference to the consent of the people of the Hawaiian
islands.” 67 Nearly forty thousand Hawaiians were denied the
chance to air their views on annexation. This resulted from
the constitution imposed by the coup of 1893, which formally
denied the political franchise to those Hawaiian residents who
would not renounce their allegiance to the former monarch and
who would not pledge to renounce their claim to their native
land and accept annexation by the United States. 68 A later
report on events in 1898, issued by a dissenting minority of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, conceded that “the people
of Hawaii have not been consulted about the proposed an-
nexation.” 69 Not surprisingly, native Hawaiians were conspicu-
ously absent from the public ceremony which officially replaced
the Hawaiian flag with the Stars and Stripes in 1898. 70 But
for many native Hawaiians the prospect of rule by the United
States was less disturbing than the anticipated consequences
of Asian immigration and settlement. People of Hawaiian an-
cestry now constituted barely one-quarter of the total island
population. Understandably, many resented foreign influences
of all persuasions. Although it was largely a symbolic gesture,
some Hawaiians joined secret societies like the Order of Kame-
hameha which sought to arrest foreign influences and restore
indigenous culture and traditions. But the past could not be re-
captured. Unable to resist further erosion of their power and
traditions, many native Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians tolerated
the end of the old order with quiet resignation.
Annexation changed permanently the political options open
to Hawaii and its people. Disenchantment with the system of
government imposed on the islands persisted long after the
events of 1898, and influenced the core of local opposition to
both statehood and further Anericanization during more than
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half a century of territorial rule. It is to this unexpectedly long
period of struggle over Hawaii’s political future that we now
turn. However, in contrast to events in the nineteenth century,
after 1898 Hawaii’s status and the rights of its people were fun-
damentally domestic American questions; they were no longer
international issues involving the future of a small sovereign
nation and its subjects. Annexation ended Hawaii’s sovereignty
and tied its political future inextricably to the exigences of
United States politics and the principles of the United States
Constitution.
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Chapter 2
Incorporated but Not Equal,
1898–1941
More than a century separated the first tentative references to
statehood for Hawaii and its eventual admission. As we have
seen, statehood was first discussed in the 1850s. Ironically, it
was at this time used by Hawaiian nationalists as a means of
defeating possible annexation by Washington. In the following
decades Hawaii’s haole population anxiously pressed for annex-
ation, but did not seek immediate statehood. Indeed, most of
those who helped overthrow the Hawaiian kingdom and to win
annexation wanted to avoid statehood—at least until American
values were more pervasive and white inhabitants were more
numerous.
Hawaii was one of a number of problems which confronted
Congress as a result of America’s imperialist adventures in the
1890s. Congress had to govern ethnically and geographically di-
verse colonies in the Pacific, East Asia, and the Caribbean. It
was obliged to create an administrative structure, or structures,
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the peculiarities of its new
possessions. This had to be accomplished without jeopardizing
the authority or interests of the metropolitan power. After in-
dependence the Northwest Ordinance had guided the forms of
government established in numerous sparsely populated con-
tinental territories. As Indian tribes were pushed aside, their
lands were occupied by white settlers who successfully peti-
tioned for incorporation into the United States as territories.
But this pattern of settlement and government did not gen-
erally follow the American flag into the overseas possessions it
won in the 1890s. Of these possessions, only Hawaii was gov-
erned broadly in accordance with precedents growing out of the
Northwest Ordinance and a century of territorial settlement.
Despite this, Hawaii differed sharply from its continental prede-
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cessors. It comprised a collection of mid-Pacific islands, peopled
by a unique mixture of native and immigrant groups, which had
been annexed by Washington in an unprecedented way.
Annexation was an agonizing question for Congress. No less
complex were the resulting issues of Hawaii’s political status
and the terms under which it should be governed. In part, such
problems derived from a belief in Washington that a strategic
outpost like Hawaii should be tightly controlled, especially one
whose population was primarily “alien.” But they were also a
product of pressure from white settlers who comprised less
than 20 percent of the islands’ population and were anxious that
territorial status should confirm, not threaten, their established
authority. In particular, they wanted territorial rule to ensure
physical and economic protection by the United States, even
if this brought the islands under immigration laws which re-
stricted the access of planters to Asian labor. The rights and in-
terests of Hawaii’s Caucasian minority could be best protected,
its members argued, if Washington had ultimate authority over
government in the islands. This view subsided very slowly. But
by the 1930s, in the face of attacks by Congress against “King
Sugar,” it was challenged from within the haole group. Many of
those who had once championed territorial rule now questioned
its capacity to protect their interests. They turned, instead,
to statehood. This chapter discusses the patterns of changing
support for statehood, both within the islands and in Wash-
ington, before war in the Pacific transformed the drive for im-
mediate admission.
INCORPORATING THE ISLAND TERRITORY
In the period between annexation in mid-1898 and the passage
of the Organic Act on April 30, 1900, Congress considered the
precise form of government to be imposed on Hawaii. Suffrage
requirements and immigration laws were vigorously debated.
These questions were related to a central preoccupation of most
haoles: how to maintain political authority at home within the
new framework of the United States Constitution and mounting
pressure for a wider franchise in the islands. 1 Fortunately for
Hawaii’s whites, America’s naturalization laws did not extend to
immigrants from Asia. In the late nineteenth century Congress
was far from anxious to ensure that nonwhites could exercise
Chapter 2
38
voting rights equal to those of whites in the various mainland
states. It was this reluctance which influenced the voting regu-
lations it eventually established in multiracial Hawaii.
The Organic Act defined franchise restrictions and proce-
dures which excluded all aliens from the right to vote. As Lind
has pointed out, this meant that “only a handful of Orientals al-
ready citizens of the Republic of Hawaii were granted American
citizenship when Hawaii was annexed.” Orientals, meaning
Chinese and Japanese, constituted almost 60 percent of
Hawaii’s total population at the turn of the century. Thus, about
three-quarters of adult male residents in the islands were per-
manently excluded from voting by the Organic Act. If born in
the islands, however, all children of immigrant parents were au-
tomatically citizens and entitled to normal voting rights. By the
1920s children of immigrant laborers began to influence local
politics. It was not, however, until the late 1940s, when a large
majority of all the Asians in Hawaii were locally born, that po-
litical participation accurately reflected the demographic and
ethnic features of the island community. 2
The most significant provision of the Organic Act was that
which, in effect, repeated part of the draft treaty of annexation
and asserted Hawaii’s incorporated status. In June 1898 the
Newlands Resolution had accepted and ratified the “cession” of
the islands by the Republican government of Hawaii. But as in-
dicated previously, the Newlands bill deleted any reference to
that provision of the annexation treaty which specifically incor-
porated Hawaii as an integral part of the United States. This
decision was, in effect, reversed by Congress when it approved
Hawaii’s Organic Act in 1900. Both the House and Senate re-
jected amendments stating that the act should not be inter-
preted as implying a congressional promise of future statehood.
The defeat of these amendments helped to establish Hawaii as
an incorporated territory. The question of incorporation had far-
reaching constitutional and political implications.
Although the United States Constitution did not distinguish
between incorporated and unincorporated territories, by 1900
the Northwest Ordinance and a number of important court de-
cisions had established that Congress could incorporate a ter-
ritory by declaring the applicability of the U.S. Constitution and
laws within that territory. Incorporated status extended to the
territory all constitutional and statutory safeguards applicable
within the states. Section 5 of the Organic Act clearly made
such provisions, stating:
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That the Constitution, and except as herein otherwise provided,
all the laws of the United States which are not locally applicable,
shall have the same force and effect within the said territory
[Hawaii] as elsewhere in the United States. 3
Implicit in this clause was an assurance of ultimate statehood. A
variety of Supreme Court decisions subsequently acknowledged
that the qualified political status of an incorporated territory
was an intermediary step to eventual statehood. In the case of
O’Donoghue v. United States, for example, the court’s decision
stated:
The impermanent character of these Territorial governments has
often been noted. Thus it has been said: “The Territorial state is
one of pupilage at best….” “A Territory, under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, is an inchoate State.” 4
In 1901 the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Downes v.
Bidwell stated that Hawaii, although not incorporated through
annexation, was incorporated by the provisions of the Organic
Act of 1900. Carl Swisher has concluded that a series of
Supreme Court rulings during 1901–1905 on the political status
of America’s newly acquired insular possessions confirmed and
defined Hawaii’s incorporated status. These decisions stipu-
lated that Hawaii was an “integral part of the United States,”
and as such “destined for admission as a State” after serving a
period of pupilage as a territory. The numerous congressional
investigating committees on Hawaiian statehood accepted
these decisions and generally referred to the territory as an “in-
choate state.” 5
Following the admission of Arizona and New Mexico to the
Union as states in 1912, Hawaii and Alaska became the only in-
corporated territories within the United States. The Philippines,
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa
remained unincorporated possessions outside the scope of the
U.S. Constitution. Supreme Court decisions in the case Dorr v.
United States (1904), and Balzac v. Puerto Rico (1922), ruled
that neither the Philippines nor Puerto Rico had been incorpo-
rated, and a distinction between incorporated and unincorpo-
rated territories was clearly drawn. Commenting on this
question Willoughby wrote in 1910: “If it be that a territory is
merely appurtenant to but not ‘incorporated’ into the United
States, Congress in its legislation regarding it is bound by but
few of the limitations which apply in the case of incorporated
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territories.” After 1901, United States policy toward unincor-
porated territories was never premised on an assumption that
statehood would ultimately be given to these areas. In con-
trast, official policy toward Hawaii and Alaska never seriously
envisaged an alternative to eventual statehood, although other
options were discussed briefly in the 1930s and 1950s. There
were many occasions, however, when opponents of statehood
attempted to deny this implication of the 1900 act, advocating
instead Commonwealth status or even independence. Such so-
lutions were later adopted for Puerto Rico and the Philippines
respectively. 6
Apart from an elected delegate to Congress and elected
members of the local legislature, all important posts in the ter-
ritory’s government were filled by appointments determined in
Washington. The Organic Act provided a constitution for the
new territory, broadly in accordance with provisions previously
applied to incorporated territories under the Northwest Ordi-
nance. But the act gave Hawaii’s appointed officials greater dis-
cretionary powers and wider authority than those afforded offi-
cials in any previous territory. It established legislative, judicial,
and executive branches of government in Hawaii. A local leg-
islature comprising fifteen elected Senate members and thirty
elected members of a House of Representatives was estab-
lished, but all territorial legislation could be vetoed by the ap-
pointed governor or nullified by the U.S. Congress. Nonetheless,
an important concession to home rule was also included which
permitted the legislature to override a governor’s veto on all
but money bills. This decision could not be reversed in Wash-
ington. The territory’s secretary (a position roughly equivalent
to that of lieutenant governor), along with judges of the terri-
torial supreme court and the four major circuit courts, were all
appointed by the president. Initially these judicial appointees,
unlike the governor, did not have to be local residents. Hawaii
was permitted to elect one delegate to serve in the national
House of Representatives for a two-year term; however, the del-
egate had no vote in this body. The territory had neither a voice
nor a vote in the national Senate. Although denied voting rep-
resentation in Congress, Hawaii was nonetheless subjected to
all taxes, import duties, and other obligations, such as military
service, which were imposed on existing states. Decisions on
such crucial matters as immigration, military or naval uses of
the islands, and the political fate of the territory were all exclu-
sively the preserve of Congress. A number of authors have com-
mented on the ability of Hawaii’s old elite to sustain its unique
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position and influence despite—or perhaps because of—the re-
quirements of territorial government through Congress. “No
community of comparable size on the mainland was controlled
so completely by so few individuals for so long,” Lawrence
Fuchs has concluded.
Rarely were political, economic, and social controls simultane-
ously enforced as in Hawaii. Rarely were controls so personal,
and rarely were they as immune for such counterforces as Eugene
Deb’s socialism, Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, and Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s New Deal as in Hawaii. For forty years Hawaii’s oli-
garchy skillfully and meticulously spun its web of control over the
Islands’ politics, labor, land, and economic institutions, without
fundamental challenge. 7
Alternative pressures did surface, especially around the
Hawaiian-based Home Rule party in the first decade under ter-
ritorial government, and periodically around labor groups at-
tempting to organize unions and strikes. The constraints of rule
through Congress and presidential appointments were at times
insufficient to stifle such pressures. On these rare occasions,
the interests of employers were protected by the use of co-op-
tation or outright repression.
Prior to World War II economic control in the islands was
monopolized by five major sugar corporations, referred to var-
iously (though seldom affectionately) as the “Big Five,” the
“hegemony,” the “ruling group,” or the “oligarchy.” In 1910
this group produced 75 percent of Hawaii’s major commodity,
sugar. By 1933 it controlled 96 percent of the sugar crop.
Moreover, as Gavan Daws has concluded, the Big Five also con-
trolled all sugar-related businesses, including banking, insur-
ance, utilities, wholesale and retail merchandising, and rail and
sea transportation. 8 Through a system of interlocking director-
ships, thirty men controlled 116 of the 193 directorships in the
Big Five and twenty other major corporations which dominated
the economy of the islands. All but a few directors of these
and sixty-four additional corporations directly associated with
the Big Five were Caucasians. 9 Political power was also under
the centralized control of these related economic corporations.
Lind has commented that the Big Five appeared “to constitute
a single monopolistic control over the entire economy and po-
litical life of the islands.” 10 The attorney general of Hawaii,
Edward P. Dole, a member of the so-called family compact which
exercised immense political and economic influence in the ter-
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ritory, conceded in 1903: “There is a government in the Ter-
ritory which is centralized to an extent unknown in the United
States and probably almost as much centralized as it was in
France under Louis XIV.” 11 This interest group, through its
lobby in Washington and as a result of general congressional
sympathy for Caucasian interests in the islands, influenced the
appointment of most territorial officials, including governors
and judges. Most white residents had little reason to be dissat-
isfied with territorial government.
The centralized nature of the territory’s government was
most clearly reflected in the wide range of the powers accorded
the appointed governor. By stipulating that the governor must
be a local resident the act avoided any suggestion of carpetbag
rule. Perhaps because of this safeguard, the powers of this
office were very broad. Nonetheless, as an official appointed by
the president, the governor might represent the party which
controlled the national executive, and not that which repre-
sented the preferences of the local electorate. Unlike officials
elected under the national Constitution, he could not be im-
peached for misconduct. More importantly perhaps, the ap-
pointed governor was in turn empowered to appoint literally
hundreds of local officials. His powers included the right to
invoke martial law, suspend habeas corpus, veto money bills,
and extend legislative sessions to ensure action on appropri-
ations. Finally, matters normally the responsibility of state or
local authorities were largely determined by the exec-
utive—including health, education, welfare, and public works.
Despite the political risks which might have flowed from an-
nexation, the interests of the small group of whites who had
overthrown the monarchy were not seriously threatened by the
form of government established in 1900. Indeed, their authority
was perhaps bolstered, as both Republican and Democratic
administrations in Washington almost without exception ap-
pointed governors and top officials from this influential faction.
Changed political circumstances did, however, oblige the ka-
maaina haoles (whites born or of long residence in the islands)
to pursue new strategies in order to offset the influence of the
largest enfranchised group, the Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians.
For the first time since the Bayonet Constitution of 1887, Poly-
nesians had voting rights equal to those of whites. While this in-
duced whites to grapple with new challenges, they were seldom
forced to make substantial compromises. As the following pages
indicate, the group which Thurston derisively called the “ig-
norant majority,” was generally unable to translate its numbers
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into an effective political force. 12 The families and interests
which had dominated the short-lived republic maintained ef-
fective control of politics, capital, and labor from the early
1900s until after World War II. “I do not think there is any
contest as to who shall dominate,” a representative of the
Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association confidently asserted in
1920, “the white race, the white people, the Americans in
Hawaii are going to dominate and will continue to dom-
inate—there is no question about this.” 13 The seeds of future
change remained buried, unable to germinate in the unfa-
vorable soil of territorial government.
EARLY AMBIVALENCE OVER STATEHOOD
From 1900 to the early 1930s statehood was the subject of
much political rhetoric in the territory; but it was not actively
supported by any influential political or economic faction. In his
inaugural address as the first territorial governor, Sanford B.
Dole spoke of the hope of statehood. Yet during 1901 the legis-
lature declined to petition Congress for it. Residents had little
confidence in the prospect of early admission, and little enthu-
siasm for it. “At best statehood is a long way off,” the Evening
Bulletin commented in 1901 and:
If it is desired to obtain statehood with a reasonable period of pro-
bation it behoves all parties and all factions to be firmly united in
each and every appeal made to Congress for an advance toward
the goal of independent state…. Frequent repetition of the
appeal—and the request must be made early and often to be
effective—will finally attract interest and attention followed by
careful investigation and eventually the prize will be won.
This appeal went unheeded, as did a suggestion made a decade
later by the Friend:
The State of Hawaii? It looks well and sounds well. It is time to
organize a campaign to secure it. 14
But another two decades passed before a campaign was inau-
gurated. Sincere enthusiasm for immediate admission was not
openly voiced by any influential individuals or prominent ethnic
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or political groups until the early 1930s, when haole compla-
cency was disturbed by the impact of the Great Depression on
the islands’ fragile economy.
Nonetheless, shortly after annexation the territorial legis-
lature initiated a series of formal appeals aimed at promoting
eventual statehood. In 1903 it passed a joint resolution re-
questing Congress to pass “an act enabling the people of this
Territory, who are citizens thereby and duly qualified to vote,
to meet in Convention and frame a State Constitution whereby
and whereunder this Territory may be admitted as a State into
the Union.” Although similar resolutions were passed in 1911,
1913, 1915, and 1917, it was not until 1919 that Hawaii’s del-
egate, Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole, introduced the first
statehood bill in Congress. This initiative was repeated in 1920.
But each bill died quietly in the Committee on Territories. Island
politicians accepted these defeats without protest. 15 These ini-
tiatives did not reflect widespread enthusiasm for immediate,
or indeed eventual, admission. They were, at most, token ges-
tures designed to placate those in the islands and in Congress
who rightly viewed territorial rule as a transitory step toward
full-fledged democracy and who had supported annexation on
this basis. The influential English language newspapers, the
Evening Bulletin (later the Honolulu Star-Bulletin) and the Hon-
olulu Advertiser, as well as dominant economic interests in the
territory, did not support these modest statehood initiatives.
The Honolulu Star-Bulletin stated unequivocally in 1920, for ex-
ample, that “Hawaii is not yet ready for statehood.” Nor were
the various territorial legislatures genuinely sympathetic. Con-
sistently after 1900 they refused to provide funds to support
an organized statehood campaign. Business and community
leaders also refused to promote such a drive. 16
In the aftermath of annexation statehood was not a pressing
issue. But the question of who should rule at home under the
new constitutional arrangements was of immediate concern,
and in the early 1900s it consumed the political energies of both
Polynesians and whites. Their conflict was soon submerged be-
neath a common concern: how to avoid or at least delay the
triumph of the non-Caucasian majority in politics, economics,
and society. Many haoles and Hawaiians felt that statehood
would exacerbate this unwelcome trend—it would necessarily
bring with it genuine local democracy, subject to the will of the
majority. It appeared inevitable that the descendents of contract
laborers from Japan would soon constitute the largest groups
of voters. The right to vote could not be denied American cit-
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izens, irrespective of their ancestry. By maintaining territorial
government, however, the influence of Hawaii’s voters could
be curtailed and indeed overridden by appointed officials or
congressional action. Thus many haoles and Hawaiians were
anxious to retain territorial rule and avoid the likely political
consequences of statehood. 17
Formal politics in the early years of the territory was largely
a contest involving the two populous enfranchised groups, Cau-
casians and Hawaiians-part-Hawaiians. Yet it was never a
simple contest in which race dictated party preference. The Re-
publican party continued to defend the interests of haoles, while
native interests were promoted briefly and somewhat erratically
by the Home Rule party. In the first territorial elections, to the
alarm of many whites, Hawaiian supporters of the Home Rule
party triumphed under the leadership of Robert Wilcox, the
former head of Liliuokalani’s nationalist forces. It was indeed
ironic that Wilcox should have been elected as the territory’s
first delegate to Congress. The nature of island politics was cap-
tured in his party’s successful electoral slogan of 1901–Nana i
ka ili, “Look to the Skin.” Predictably the tactics of the Repub-
lican party were quickly adjusted to avert any repetition of their
defeat in 1901. In 1902 the GOP candidate for delegate to Con-
gress was a popular Hawaiian with royal connections, Prince
Kuhio, who like Wilcox had been imprisoned for his part in the
abortive uprising of 1895. Following his win in 1902 the prince
served his white political masters well for two decades—so well
in fact that by 1912 the Home Rule party had disintegrated
leaving the Republicans in firm control of the territory until
after World War II. 18
Genuine two-party conflict was very short lived. After 1902
a curious and often uneasy haole-Hawaiian alliance developed
under Republican party authority. The strength of this alliance
rested on its ability to bring immediate rewards to many
Hawaiians, especially appointments to government jobs,
without disturbing the property and corporate bases of white
wealth and prestige in the islands. Each faction attempted to
exploit the alliance for selfish ends, Fuchs has observed, and
“in some respects mutual benefits were won, but clearly the oli-
garchy was more successful in manipulating Hawaiian votes for
its purposes than were Kuhio and his followers in using the oli-
garchy to restore the Hawaiian people to their former dignity.”
19 Skillful maneuvering by the GOP, effective lobbying in Wash-
ington by representatives of the Big Five, weaknesses within
the local Democratic party, growing Hawaiian disillusionment
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with formal politics, and increased settlement by whites helped
restore the old elite to a position of unchallenged control. In
the final analysis, however, this authority rested on its over-
whelming economic strength and strong social cohesion. As
long as territorial government successfully defended the in-
terests of this group, statehood was never a realistic propo-
sition.
“Hawaii for the Hawaiian” and restoration of the “rights of
the Hawaiian people” were the rallying cries of the titular po-
litical leader of the natives, Prince Kuhio. But despite their su-
perior numbers at the polls, the Polynesians failed to win any
enduring victories which might have advanced Kuhio’s stated
objectives. The only major material and cultural concession they
were able to wrest from the legislature—the Hawaiian Homes
Act, known as the Hawaii Rehabilitation Act when passed in
1921—became a poignant symbol of the eclipse of Hawaiian
influence and traditions. This measure ostensibly guaranteed
special homestead leases on pockets of land throughout the
island for those claiming 50 percent or more Hawaiian blood.
It was officially welcomed as a victory for the Hawaiians, a
triumph of justice for at least that portion of them which was
assumed to be most in need of “rehabilitation.” However, rel-
atively few native families benefitted from the act, and at the
time of statehood only 10 percent of the land originally set aside
was being used by Hawaiian or part-Hawaiian families, while
about 20 percent was unusable and the remainder was leased
to ranches or plantations. As Dinell, Spitz, and others have con-
cluded, its 185,000 acres of generally poor and unused lands
did little to restore either the dignity or economic well-being
of Hawaii’s native population. Rather, the Hawaiian Homes Act
and its subsequent failure brought “major victories for Hawaii’s
political and economic elite,” Spitz observed; and plantation
owners were “able to exempt sugar lands from homesteading,
gain the political allegiance of the Hawaiians, and in the process
kill any future homesteading.” Like the election of Kuhio, the act
was a symbol of Hawaiian influence and survival, but it did little
to arrest the declining power or status of the native population.
20
The restoration of white political authority over the
Hawaiian majority shortly after annexation resolved a potential
difficulty for the wealthy haole faction. But annexation brought
a further major problem, at least for plantation owners. The
lucrative system of contract labor was ended abruptly by the
Organic Act, and the nation’s Chinese Exclusion Act applied
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equally to the territory, ending a crucial source of labor for
Hawaii’s planters. Seven years later the gentleman’s agreement
with Japan further closed the door to cheap Asian labor. But
the demand for plantation workers continued unabated. As we
have seen, this problem was anticipated by planters, prompting
some to oppose annexation. Fortunately, the Philippines were
acquired as an American colony at the same time as Hawaii.
They promptly became a convenient new source of Asian labor.
Filipinos were not restrained by federal laws from entering
Hawaii. More than one hundred thousand workers from the
provinces of Tagalog, Visayas, and Ilocos arrived in the fol-
lowing thirty years. They comprised more than two-thirds of all
plantation laborers by 1932. Like the Japanese and to a lesser
extent the Chinese before them, the Filipinos found it difficult
to adjust to an alien way of life. They encountered deep hos-
tility from old settlers and recent immigrants alike, and suffered
the harsh ghetto existence of the plantations. Many returned
home. Those who stayed were assigned to a laboring class made
up almost exclusively of men. Unlike other laboring groups
who were displaced in part by newer arrivals, the Filipinos
were seemingly trapped in a system which afforded them few
opportunities for geographic or vocational mobility. Estranged
from traditional community and family relationships, Filipinos
stayed overwhelmingly on plantations, providing the economic
backbone of the fifty-or-so huge plantations which dominated
life outside of Honolulu. 21
Almost 400,000 immigrant workers—mainly southern
Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino—arrived in Hawaii from the
1840s to the 1930s. Ironically, the very workers whose labor had
brought immense profits to white sugar interests provided in
the long-term the basic threat to the authority of the Caucasian
settlers. The level of immigrant labor declined after 1900, and
the proportion of island residents of Caucasian ancestry in-
creased. Nevertheless, by 1920 this group still comprised only
one-fifth of Hawaii’s total population of 255,000. In contrast,
there were approximately 110,000 residents of Japanese ex-
traction, more than 40 percent of the population. Chinese, Fil-
ipino, Korean, Hawaiian, and part-Hawaiian ethnic groups com-
prised almost 100,000 residents also. 22
Most Japanese and Filipinos were resident aliens. Fur-
thermore, many of those born in the territory of Asian parents
did not choose to exercise their voting rights. It was estimated
that in 1920 less than one-third of all nisei (those born of
Japanese immigrants in Hawaii) who were eligible to vote had
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attempted to register. Nonetheless, on the eve of World War
II about one-quarter of Hawaii’s registered voters were of
Japanese ancestry. Japanese language newspapers, especially
the Ha waii Hochi, the Hawaii Asahi, and the Kwasan, often
attacked the white oligarchy, and urged nisei to exercise their
vote. But in general, until after the Pacific war those Japanese
who did vote often supported the dominant, haole-led Repub-
lican party. Not until the 1930s were a handful of Japanese
elected to office. In this same decade less than 3 percent of
appointed positions were given to citizens of Japanese ances-
try. The percentage of other nonwhite ethnic groups eligible to
vote also increased during these years. Pioneer Hawaiian soci-
ologist Romanzo Adams estimated in 1936 that the percentage
of adults of Asian ancestry able to vote had increased to about
40 percent of the enfranchised population. He predicted that
by 1944 approximately two-thirds of Hawaii’s adult population
would have the vote. A significant number of each major ethnic
group in the territory would by then exercise full citizenship
rights. He concluded prophetically that with an increase in the
voting strength of the non-Caucasian majority would come a re-
distribution of power in the islands. 23
Many locals had apparently reached a conclusion roughly
similar to that advanced by Adams. Certainly an increasing
number of Caucasian and Hawaiian citizens identified statehood
with possible Japanese control of the local legislature. Writing
on The Human Side of Hawaii in 1920, Albert Palmer acknowl-
edged that one issue was paramount for whites: “How will it
all come out? Will Hawaii at last be American or Japanese?
Will it be Christian or Buddhist? East and West are meeting
here—which will prevail?” For the Caucasian minority, as Daws
has concluded, the answer to such questions was clear: “The
important thing was to prevent the Japanese from ‘taking over‚’
whatever that might mean.” By maintaining an appointed gov-
ernor and judges, future Japanese domination of local politics
could be stifled. Territorial status was thus a major vehicle for
protecting white interests. Clarence H. Cooke, a wealthy mis-
sionary descendent, prominent Republican, and president of the
Bank of Hawaii, put this view unambiguously when he wrote
during the depression: “through appointment of officers by the
President of the United States, such as the governor, secretary
of the Territory and judges, we have always had a better class
of men in these positions than states enjoyed through their
elective systems.” 24
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By the 1920s however, some attempts were made to conceal
this objective by arguing that the territory’s pressing social
problems had to be solved before consideration of statehood
could be seriously undertaken. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin
stated, for example:
The question of future political control is a most vital one, and
it is inextricably interwoven with the great problem of American-
ization in these islands.
Hawaii, someday, no doubt will arrive at a status justifying an
appeal for statehood, but that day has not yet come. There are too
many racial problems waiting on the future for solution.
Usually, however, local English language newspapers were
much less polite about the so-called Japanese problem. Para-
doxically, the victims of Hawaii’s social structure were often
blamed for causing discrimination and ethnic antagonism. In
the opinion of the Star-Bulletin, resentment against the
Japanese had been “engendered almost entirely by their tem-
peramental characteristics, their insecurity…. Studying deeper
into the causes of the feelings entertained against the Japanese
we have their insularity, their failure to enter into community
life and become part of it, their herding together and aloofness
from their occidental neighbours.” Some mainland opinions
about Hawaii’s Japanese were even less tolerant, being notable
for explicit racism and hostility. Writing in Current History in
1920, for example, Robert Neal suggested that the problem was
“how to get rid of the portion of the population, especially the
oriental element, which cannot be Americanized, and how to
make legal Americans of the portion that cannot be got rid of?”
For white supremacists, the political implications of Hawaii’s
unique racial features were self-evident. “The Americans are
being bitterly encysted as a small and dwindling aristocracy,”
Lothrop Stoddard lamented in The Rising Tide of Color (1922).
“In 1917 the births of the two races were: Americans, 295;
Japanese 5,000! Comment is superfluous.” During the 1920s
Hawaii’s legislature restricted the activities of Japanese lan-
guage schools and newspapers, and through the Press Reg-
ulation Bill permitted the attorney general to censor political
literature printed in a foreign language. In the following decade
the powerful haole-dominated Taxpayers’ League of Honolulu
appealed for the introduction of voting restrictions based on
racial criteria. 25
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Throughout the interwar years, according to John A. (Jack)
Burns, who rose to dominate postwar politics in the islands, the
belief was widely held that “certain people are born to rule the
lives of others…. You had a haole group that believed in the
haole-group superiority.” Republican authority was synonymous
with haole control. Assumptions of racial superiority helped to
rationalize the severe inequalities of opportunity and condition
experienced by different ethnic groups. These views helped pre-
serve the facade of two-party politics in a community where the
Republicans ruled virtually without challenge after 1902. The
GOP controlled the legislature until the mid-1950s, except for a
split House of Representatives in 1947, usually with majorities
of more than four to one over its rivals in both chambers. The
fact that governors appointed by the Roosevelt and Truman ad-
ministrations were nominally Democrats did little to alter this
situation. Indeed, many locals saw the hand of the Big Five in
these appointments. Moreover, some who won office in the is-
lands as Democrats did so because of Big Five, or occasionally,
Dillingham family patronage. 26
For almost half a century the Republicans held the territorial
legislature in an ironclad grip. Daniel Inouye has noted with
only slight exaggeration:
Economic power was still hand-held by the few dominant Cau-
casian families descended from the missionaries and traders …
the Castles, Cookes, Baldwins, Damons, Athertons, Robinsons,
and most pervasively powerful of all, the Dillinghams. Their eco-
nomic interests were best defended by the Republican Party and
their newspapers diligently preached the Republican message
and their plantation supervisors hustled the Republican vote. In
1941 they were still tying the ballot pencil in such a way that,
even in the privacy of the curtained booth, a field hand voting for
a Democrat might just as well shout it from the top of a palm tree.
Not surprisingly, few did. 27
Commenting on the relationships between the Republican party,
kamaaina haoles, and the dominant economic interests,
Norman Meller has observed:
It has been a widely held belief … that the leadership of the
Republican Party was merely another manifestation in different
guise of the same group which enjoyed economic and social dom-
inance in the community. The heavy components of Big Five and
plantation administrators in the Republican legislative majorities
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of the past materially reinforced the belief. This, of course, tended
to have ethnic overtones, as Orientals comprised a larger pro-
portion of the lower socio-economic segments of the Island com-
munity. 28
From the early 1930s, when local-born Japanese first won
office in the territory, until after World War II, islanders of Asian
descent were severely underrepresented in both the House and
Senate. Not until 1941 was any nisei legislator elected to the
Senate, although in this year six won seats in the House. Daniel
Aoki, a Hawaii-born citizen of Japanese extraction who was
later prominent in the Democratic party, has observed that the
Big Five’s economic control was such that individuals who ran
as Democrats or did not follow the directives of the Big Five
found themselves out of a job. “In other words‚” he concluded,
this group “had a real strong economic stranglehold in the
entire community” The hegemony “always talked about their
two parties,” Burns commented in a similar vein. According to
him, they could exert their influence and, at will, achieve any
desired result at all levels of island politics. 29 This assessment
was not confined to disgruntled Democrats. Many younger Re-
publicans—including Hiram Fong, Joseph R. Farrington, and
later William Quinn—were disturbed by this sharply concen-
trated power and appreciated that a close association with the
old guard of their party might damage their political careers.
Until after the war, however, most members of the legislature
were, in Quinn’s words, “dictated to by Merchant Street and in-
fluential haoles.” Fong’s early experiences in the legislature il-
lustrate starkly the closed, concentrated nature of political and
economic life in the territory. Although he won office in 1938
as a Republican and remained a Republican throughout his long
and very distinguished career, Fong was always a political mav-
erick. He quickly came into conflict with leaders of his party,
notably the powerful servant of the large sugar corporations
clustered around Merchant Street in downtown Honolulu, Royal
(Roy) A. Vitousek, whom a colleague in the legislature described
as “an agent of the Big Five—their stooge, bought and paid
for.” Fong was also convinced that Vitousek was in fact the
spokesman of the Big Five and that the party was overbalanced
in their favor; he withheld support from Vitousek. The reward
for acting independently, Fong recalled with surprisingly little
bitterness, was constant harrassment from leaders of his own
party. This included an attempt to deny him his seat in the
legislature. In addition, Fong noted that though not ostracized
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outright by the party, “I never got any business from the en-
trenched economic powers here; never any bit of business at
all.” 30
Elite control and inequality were not limited to the formal
political arena; they penetrated virtually every facet of com-
munity life. In the words of the outspoken liberal Democrat
Tom Gill the islands were dominated by “a sugar factor hier-
archy.” “This hierarchy was a closed society. It talked to itself. It
spoke to the people through chosen instruments, the principal
one being the Republican Party. It enforced its mandates with
methods that were often ruthless and always self-serving. It
was paternalistic and fundamentally racist.” 31 The principal
English language newspapers, what’s more, unashamedly en-
dorsed the hierarchy’s authority and reflected its views—a situ-
ation which persisted until after the Pacific war. Ernest Murai,
a leader of the Japanese community recalled that the territory
was dominated by the Republicans, the Caucasians, with the
result that there was a double wage standard based on race,
informal but obvious residential segregation along ethnic lines,
and the exclusion of many nonwhites from equal participation
in community affairs, extending to sports and social clubs. This
control also produced unequal educational opportunities, which
reflected a combination of socioeconomic and ethnic factors
that disadvantaged most severely those nonwhites growing up
on the outer islands. Segregation was very real on many plan-
tations, according to Quinn, who commented that the managers
“would allow the Japanese to come up the hill only so high.” Dis-
crimination against Hawaii’s Japanese, he acknowledged, was
reflected “in the way they were trained, and in the way they
were allowed to take their position in the life of the community.”
Understandably, in the interwar years many nonwhites, es-
pecially nisei, felt themselves socially ostracized and econom-
ically disadvantaged. Recalling his childhood in a Japanese
family, Aoki observed: “We were treated fairly in the plantation
… but still it was not equal treatment with the so-called haole
segment of our community.” On Maui, for example, the plan-
tations were divided into a “haole camp” occupied exclusively
by whites (mainly the bosses), and other areas for nonwhite
families. Living in what was in effect a segregated community,
Aoki felt excluded. This nurtured feelings of group inferi-
ority—feelings apparently widely shared by others of Oriental
descent until after the Second World War. It was difficult to
accept their equality with whites, Seichi Hirai later recalled.
Under the paternalistic system in prewar Hawaii, nonwhites
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confronted pervasive (if sometimes subtle) discrimination. As
Chuck Mau and most youngsters of Asian parentage found even
in the New Deal years, “industry” and the “economic barons”
actively discouraged those seeking wider opportunities. For ex-
ample, youngsters wanting a higher education were often pres-
sured not to leave the islands as this would exacerbate labor
shortages. People born of alien parents in Hawaii, an incorpo-
rated American territory, were obliged to secure a labor cer-
tificate before moving to the mainland for any purpose. Mem-
bers of the local judiciary responsible for granting these certifi-
cates in the late 1930s, Mau observed, were still “indoctrinated”
by the “barons” of the Big Five in defining their policies. 32 Many
members of Hawaii’s Chinese and Japanese communities also
believed that kamaaina haoles were consistently given prefer-
ences in business and employment at the expense of nonwhites.
Haole exclusiveness was economic as well as social. 33
The economic, social, and even geographic mobility of many
ambitious Hawaii-born nonwhites was thwarted by various in-
struments of social control which penetrated island life. Be-
cause of this, Seichi Hirai observed, people from various ethnic
groups kept to themselves, except perhaps during school or
work. At the very least, many nonwhites felt powerless, be-
lieving the haole-dominated political system would not respond
sympathetically to their needs. 34 Even if it is conceded that such
feelings were sometimes exaggerated or ill founded, they were
nonetheless widely shared. And it was these very beliefs which
fuelled the drive by many non-Caucasians for equality under
statehood. Initially, however, these feelings provided fertile soil
for the growth of trade unions.
Those workers who joined infant trade unions were dis-
turbed by the unsympathetic response of plantation owners to
demands for improved hours, conditions, and wages. Within
a decade of the first substantial organized strike on Oahu in
1909, the largest groups of plantation workers—the Japanese
and the Filipinos—had organized separate federations of labor.
Major strikes soon followed. The reaction of the Hono lulu Ad-
vertiser to a strike in 1920 waged largely by Japanese workers
was typical of the views of property owners. “What we now
face is an attempt on the part of an alien race to cripple our
principal industry and gain dominance of the American Ter-
ritory of Hawaii,” Thurston’s newspaper claimed. 35 But reac-
tions to the demands of labor were not restricted to angry
words. Nor were Japanese workers the only problem for the
plantation owners. In 1924 the Castle and Cooke plantation at
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Hanapepe on Kauai was the scene of a bloody conflict between
Filipino strikers and police. It left 16 strikers dead, and led
to the arrest of 101 strikers, 60 of whom were sentenced to
up to four years in prison. Such unfortunate events left hostile
memories on all sides, and retarded the growth of unionism.
Nonetheless, by the mid-1930s new efforts were being made
to organize dock workers along similar lines to those used in
waterfront areas of the Pacific coast on the mainland. Yet as
the Hilo dock strike of 1938 demonstrated, organized strikers
and their picket lines were still deeply resented by business in-
terests. In this strike—which became known as the Hilo Mas-
sacre—police fired on picketers, wounding more than 50, some
of whom were crippled for life. Protections offered to American
workers under New Deal legislation were extended to most
mainland areas by the late 1930s. But Hawaii’s workers did not
reap the benefits of such legislation until after the Pacific War.
36
Labor unrest provided the most concrete, immediate chal-
lenge to the existing economic and political order. Yet, on the
eve of the war other pressures surfaced. Cracks appeared in
the facade of the Republican party. A handful of independent
members began to question its leadership and conservatism.
Voices from within the party called for it to be more open and
responsive to the wishes of Hawaii’s changing electorate. A
substantial minority of members of the legislature were now
of Asian descent. Moreover, the Democratic party was not to-
tally impotent. Indeed the most important locally elected office,
that of mayor of Honolulu, was consistently captured by a very
popular part-Hawaiian Democrat, John H. Wilson. At the same
time, Roosevelt’s Democratic administration proved less re-
sponsive than previous administrations to appeals from the ter-
ritory’s legislature, governor, or sugar interests. Indeed the
drive for statehood, which began in the mid-1930s, was unmis-
takable evidence that the customary distribution of power in the
islands and between Honolulu and Washington was undergoing
unprecedented stress. It suggested that the interests of the old
elite could no longer be protected adequately by territorial rule.
37
Before the mid-1930s, however, statehood was precisely
what most influential haoles wished to avoid. Thus the ter-
ritorial legislature was obliged to tread a delicate political
path—it attempted to resist unfavorable congressional inter-
ference in island affairs without encouraging demands for full-
fledged local autonomy under statehood. Rather than expand
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on Prince Kuhio’s initiatives in Congress and promote enabling
bills, Hawaii’s political leaders asked Washington to reaffirm
Hawaii’s rights as an American territory.
Shortly after he became governor in 1921 Wallace R. Far-
rington recruited a committee to draft legislation which could
form the basis of a petition to Congress. It was an indication of
the nature of island politics twenty-five years after annexation
that the members of this group were all prominent leaders of
the Hawaiian republic—Thurston, Edward Dole, and Walter F.
Frear. In 1923 their recommendations became a bill of rights,
which the legislature and Farrington duly endorsed. Although
it protested against political discrimination by Congress, the
bill of rights made no explicit reference to statehood (given
Thurston’s views on the matter, this was a predictable
omission). Instead, it attempted to redefine Hawaii’s rights
within the existing political context of territorial status. The bill
of rights asserted Hawaii’s right to participate equitably in na-
tional measures and requested assurances from Congress that
Hawaii would be included “in all acts in aid of good roads, edu-
cation, farm loans, maternity, home economics, training in agri-
culture, trade and industry, and other acts of a like nature which
apply to the states as a whole.” It sought also to clarify Hawaii’s
status in the Union, and to correct misconceptions in Congress
and in some executive departments of the federal government
which had in the past led to the territory’s exclusion from nu-
merous federal appropriations. The bill emphasized that as an
integral part of the Union, Hawaii could not “legally, equitably
or morally be discriminated against,” and should be included
in all financial legislation and appropriations which extended
to all states. President Coolidge and Congress formally recog-
nized the bill of rights. Annual appropriations to the territory in-
creased by five hundred thousand dollars immediately, but this
was not its principal reward. Most significantly, it confirmed
Hawaii’s incorporated status. By implication at least, Congress
accepted that the territory was entitled to the privileges and
benefits of a state wherever its function and responsibilities
were those of a state. Although the bill of rights did not end
discrimination against the islands, it was viewed by most haoles
as a suitable substitute to an appeal for statehood. 38
By 1927 even the strongly anti-statehood, anti-Japanese
Honolulu Advertiser conceded that Hawaii exhibited almost all
of the attributes which had helped other territories gain
statehood. “She has population, wealth, a tradition of political
allegiance and loyalty to the United States; pays more taxes to
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the Federal Treasury than many of the present states; and as
a state would lend powerful support to American military and
naval defense and to the creation of an appropriate American
merchant marine.” Such developments, however, did little to
convince the powerful Caucasian minority that statehood was
necessary. The alternative to territorial government, the Ad-
vertiser claimed, was “government controlled by an oriental
power…. such a power is Japan.” As late as 1933 a meeting of
the Taxpayers League in Honolulu (a predominantly Caucasian
body) overwhelmingly endorsed a motion to seek changes in the
Organic Act which would restrict the voting rights of non-Cau-
casians in the territory. Thurston expressed the opinion of most
Caucasian inhabitants when he stated in 1927: “Do I object to
statehood? Most assuredly not, so long as it remains an ideal,
not a reality” 39
SEEDS OF THE STATEHOOD DRIVE
Despite occasional unfair treatment at the hands of Congress,
during the first three decades as a territory Hawaii’s legislature
did not act decisively on statehood. Rather it was content to
seek more equitable treatment within existing political arrange-
ments. Thus it dutifully sent petitions to Congress, lobbied its
friends on Capitol Hill, and supported the efforts of its delegate
in the House of Representatives. Not until Congress moved de-
liberately against Hawaii’s sugar producers were these prac-
tices seen as ineffectual and statehood accepted as a necessary
objective. In the 1920s and 1930s Congress attempted to limit
imports of Asian laborers and to reduce Hawaii’s access to the
sugar markets of the mainland. These threats stung the ter-
ritory’s legislature into uncharacteristically decisive action.
Following decisions by California and some other states to
restrict the rights of Japanese residents to own or rent land,
Congress moved against Japanese immigration. On July 1, 1924,
an immigration act was passed which replaced the earlier gen-
tleman’s agreement and in effect ended all further immigration
from Japan. Yet mainland pressure against immigrants from
any region of Asia—including America’s colony in the Philip-
pines—continued unabated. In the late 1920s Filipino laborers
became the major focus of hostility. Hawaii’s sugar and pine-
apple plantations now relied heavily on these laborers, de-
manding a minimum intake of five thousand workers annually.
Confronted with Japanese laborers increasingly prepared to or-
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ganize and seek better conditions and wages, and denied access
by the 1924 act to any immigrants from Japan, Hawaii’s sugar
planters wanted desperately to maintain their access to Filipino
workers. The planters supported an organized, influential lobby
in Washington for such emergencies, and immediately pressed
that Hawaii be exempted from the proposed Filipino exclusion
bill. Hawaii’s delegate to Congress, Victor S. K. Houston, ad-
vised the Planters’ Association that statehood was essential if
such unfavorable decisions were to be avoided. However, the
sugar owners were not yet convinced that such a radical step
was appropriate; they were confident their plight would be
understood by sympathetic friends on Capitol Hill. Nor was
such confidence misplaced. Through its lobby in Washington the
Planters’ Association was able to incorporate in the subsequent
Johnson Immigration Act a provision which permitted Hawaii
alone to continue importing Filipino labor.
Despite opposition from sugar interests, Houston continued
to press vigorously in Hawaii and Congress for statehood. He
argued that equality as a state was essential if further dis-
crimination by Congress was to be avoided. As yet, however,
plantation owners were reluctant to jettison their direct access
to Washington in return for the very uncertain benefits of
democracy at home and popularly elected representatives in
Congress. In 1925, for example, the legislature issued a further
“Declaration of Rights.” This act again redefined the territory’s
“inalienable rights” as an integrated part of the Union. It was di-
rected ostensibly against federal practices which discriminated
against American citizens in the territory, notably Orientals,
who were often denied freedom of movement between the is-
lands and the mainland and treated as foreign immigrants when
they reached mainland ports. In reality, the declaration was
an attempt to strengthen Hawaii’s bargaining position during
delicate discussions over national immigration laws which
threatened its access to Filipino labor. 40
Nonetheless, local support for statehood continued to grow,
and was often expressed openly. The electorate, which now
included a substantial number of nisei and second-generation
Chinese, was always more sympathetic to this prospect than the
powerful Sugar Planters’ Association or the Honolulu Chamber
of Commerce. Members of the legislature were often caught be-
tween these conflicting forces. As a result, the territory’s po-
litical parties and elected officials generally expressed public
support for statehood, but the phrase “immediate statehood”
was rarely heard. Conveniently, such pronouncements were not
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accompanied by plans for achieving this goal in either the im-
mediate or longterm. In 1930, for example, both the Republican
and Democratic parties in Hawaii endorsed statehood in their
election platforms. The following year a joint resolution seeking
statehood passed both houses of the territorial legislature by
overwhelming majorities. After 1930 similar resolutions passed
most territorial legislatures, but this did not materially advance
statehood. Daws has commented aptly that “no one could tell
whether a politician was supporting the resolutions because he
genuinely wanted something done, or because he knew that
nothing would be done.” In 1931 the joint resolution was vetoed
by the governor, primarily for technical reasons. However, the
legislature failed to redraft the bill or to override the veto. This
suggested, as C. Nils Tavares observed, that the original fa-
vorable vote “was intended more for home consumption and
perhaps notice to Congress of future expectations, than for se-
rious consideration then by Congress.” 41
Hawaii was an isolated and relatively insignificant factor
in American politics before the depression years. It had rarely
gained the attention of the wider American public. But events
in the islands in the early 1930s excited real controversy and
brought the tropical outpost under national scrutiny. Apart from
heightening racial tensions and suspicions, these events sug-
gested that in remote Hawaii whites could commit acts of vi-
olence, even murder, with apparent impunity—provided the
victims of such attacks were not Caucasians. On September 12,
1931, Thalia Hubbard Massie claimed she had been beaten and
criminally assaulted by a group of five Hawaiian and Japanese
men (a special enquiry later found that the accused men could
not have committed this offense). Shortly afterward the mother
and naval-officer husband of Thalia Massie were charged with
the murder of one of her alleged attackers, a Hawaiian, Joseph
Kahahawai. They were found guilty of manslaughter by a local
court and each sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The con-
victed couple served only one hour of their sentences before
they were freed—an executive order by Governor Lawrence M.
Judd promptly commuted their sentences. Judd’s decision was
made after he had talked briefly, in private, with the defen-
dants’ celebrated lawyer, Clarence Darrow. It reflected deep,
often hysterical white concern for the physical and sexual safety
of, in the Advertiser’s words, “white women of refinement and
culture.” This cause célèbre revealed a community subject to
racial preoccupations sometimes very similar to those which
shaped relations between blacks and whites in mainland states
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during the 1920s and 1930s. The incident led to charges in
Congress that law and order had broken down in the territory.
Some mainland opinion was concerned that whites were af-
forded preferential treatment under the law; but most commen-
tators expressed alarm that the American territory was unsafe
for white Americans. 42
The sequence of events in the Massie case contrasted
starkly with those three years earlier when a nisei, Myles
Fukunaga, was tried for the murder of Gill Jamieson, the young
son of a wealthy haole banker. The trial, conviction, and ex-
ecution of the mentally unbalanced Fukunaga were all com-
pleted within a brief two weeks amid rumors that Honolulu’s
whites might take matters into their own hands if the law did
not quickly deal with him. Viewed together, these two emotive
trials doubtless convinced many nonwhites (if there were many
not already persuaded) that Hawaii’s system of criminal justice
was biased by racial stereotyping and prejudice. The divisions
and tensions generated by the Massie case helped, as perhaps
no other single event had, to expose the nature of white au-
thority in the islands and to stimulate wider opposition to it. The
editor of the Hawaii Hochi, George Wright, perhaps best sum-
marized the consequences of this miscarriage of justice when
he wrote: “More harm has been done the cause of Americaniza-
tion by recent events than can be remedied in many years….
Republican leadership has been discredited and many of the
most powerful people in public life stand branded as traitors
in the eyes of the common people….” The swing toward the
Democrats in Honolulu after this event as well as the election
of a Democrat, Lincoln McCandless, as delegate to Congress
in 1932 confirmed the growing dissatisfaction with the Repub-
lican party. The reaction of Congress to the Massie case also re-
vealed the vulnerability of the islands to outside interference.
This further strengthened the demand for full-fledged local au-
tonomy under statehood. 43
The excited controversy over law and order prompted re-
actions in Washington which were unacceptable to all sectors
of Hawaii. In previous years the Big Five had periodically ad-
vocated that a commission government replace territorial rule,
assuming of course that it would dictate appointments to this
more centralized and “efficient” administration. But in 1932
Congress proposed a form of commission government which
was unacceptable to the Big Five, for it recommended that a
high commissioner be sent from Washington to direct the af-
fairs of the territory. Realizing that the president, not Merchant
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Street, would control this appointment, the reaction of Hawaii’s
Republican and business interests was swift and hostile. They
now defended the Organic Act against any threatened violation
and criticized the prospect of what they called a carpetbag gov-
ernor. Commission government had been proposed, but para-
doxically in a form unacceptable to its keenest advocates. Local
opponents of the haole elite were delighted with its discom-
fort over this matter. “For years our local leaders in politics
and industry have been trying to frighten the people of Hawaii
with threats of a ‘Commission form of Government‚’” “To serve
their own selfish ends and whip reluctant citizens into line, they
have painted a terrifying picture of this bogey-man,” the Hawaii
Hochi commented with undisguised relish.
Now the chickens have come home to roost! The imaginary
“bogey” has materialised into a vigorous and menacing reality.
The amusing feature of the present situation—if there is anything
amusing about it—is that the threat is directed against the very
ones who have been using it so long as a means of frightening
the people of the Territory into doing their bidding. The latest
measure introduced in Congress … would absolutely prevent the
dictation of appointments by the local coterie of “big interests.”
… It would strike a fatal blow at the domination of local govern-
ments by our “captains of industry.” 44
Apparently preferring the unfamiliar devils to the ones they
knew, a few local opponents of the haole elite were now pre-
pared to risk a commission government.
Immediately upon the Democrats coming to office under
Roosevelt, Congress seriously examined possible alternative
forms of administration for the territory. With memories of the
Massie incidents still fresh, Representative John E. Rankin
(Dem., Miss.) introduced into Congress in 1933 a bill to alter
the Organic Act and empower the president to appoint nonresi-
dents to the most important positions in the territory—those of
governor, secretary, and the judiciary. Many congressmen, es-
pecially Southerners, felt this might ensure a pattern of race
relations more in keeping with mainland practices (a pattern
which presumably would not have permitted white Americans
to be sentenced to ten years imprisonment for the manslaughter
of a black). Rankin’s bill was classified as “must” New Deal
legislation by the administration. It was reported favorably by
the House Committee on Territories, and passed the House of
Representatives, despite protests by some liberals that it would
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provide a carpetbag governor for the territory. Eventually the
legislation was defeated, but only after a protracted filibuster
was waged against it by Senators William Borah and Arthur
Vandenberg. 45
In Hawaii, the Rankin bill aroused extreme protests from the
delegate to Congress, the Chamber of Commerce, political party
executives, and a variety of local business representatives. The
legislature passed a resolution opposing it. Governor Judd ap-
pointed a three-member Home Rule Commission to protest
against the bill in Washington. Local Republican Samuel Wilder
King, a member of this commission who protested personally to
Roosevelt, returned from Washington in 1933 shocked by the
offhand manner with which Hawaii’s affairs were managed in
Congress. This experience convinced King that statehood was
essential. It also prompted him to run as the Republican can-
didate for delegate to Congress. After his victory in 1934 King
worked conscientiously for statehood, although his efforts did
not always have the overwhelming support of party backers. (A
popular part-Hawaiian who had risen to the rank of lieutenant
commander of the U.S. Navy, King resigned his place in Con-
gress in 1942 and rejoined the navy to fight in the Pacific War.)
The Rankin bill, along with other proposals for forms of com-
mission government appointed by the president, encouraged a
growing number of islanders to view statehood as a guarantee
against the possibility of severe political discrimination.
However, it was the imposition in 1934 of discriminatory eco-
nomic legislation against “King Sugar” which, more than any
single event, galvanized and broadened support for statehood.
The fact that this action virtually coincided with a brief visit to
the territory by Roosevelt merely underlined Hawaii’s unequal
status. The president praised the high living standards and edu-
cational achievements of the territory, conceding that they were
superior to those in many areas of the mainland. Nevertheless,
such compliments did not reflect general congressional sym-
pathy for Hawaii and its precariously concentrated economy. 46
Sugar remained Hawaii’s economic backbone. In 1934 it
comprised over 70 percent of total exports to the mainland. Ap-
proximately one-third of the population lived on plantations or
were entirely dependent on plantations for employment. After
1900 the sugar industry was afforded equal treatment with
mainland sugar and protected equally by United States tariff
laws. Moreover, the 1924 bill of rights had reassured local
planters that mainland sugar producers would not be given
favorable treatment by Congress. But this provided only tem-
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porary respite. A decade later Congress approved the Jones-
Costigan Sugar Act, which seriously reduced Hawaii’s sugar
quotas in relation to quotas imposed on mainland states.
Mainland sugar producers were given a quota above their av-
erage past production. By contrast, Hawaii’s quota was approx-
imately 10 percent less than its average annual production in
preceding years. Also, Hawaii was permitted to refine locally
only 3 percent of its quota of sugar. At the same time Cuba was
permitted to refine 22 percent of its crop, and the Philippines
and Puerto Rico to refine 10 percent of their respective quotas.
47
The Sugar Act outraged the island community. The Hawaiian
Sugar Planters’ Association, English language newspapers, and
most political and commercial groups joined a chorus of oppo-
sition against it. A representative of the sugar planters’ groups
complained because the act “grossly discriminates against us,
not only as compared with the states, but as compared with the
possessions, and even a foreign country.” The Honolulu Star-
Bulletin protested for identical reasons: “Hawaii is lumped with
foreign countries and possessions, notwithstanding the fact that
Hawaii alone of all non-continental areas pays all federal taxes
and internal revenue to the United States Treasury.” The act
represented a victory for the mainland sugar producing states
of Florida and Louisiana plus the various states which produced
sugar beet over the interests of offshore producers. 48
Hawaii’s sugar interests contested the constitutional validity
of the Jones-Costigan Act. But this merely brought them greater
discomfort. In a case against the secretary of Agriculture the
court of the District of Columbia ruled that although provisions
of the United States Constitution extended to Hawaii, Congress
was at liberty to legislate for the territory and could thus impose
limits on the production of sugar in the territory. The implica-
tions of this ruling did not go unnoticed in Hawaii. “If Congress
has the right to limit the production of sugar‚” stated a local
attorney, “it evidently can limit the production of anything else
which may be raised or produced in the territory.” 49
The Sugar Planters’ Association was disappointed and dis-
mayed by the Jones-Costigan Act. Without representatives who
could vote in Congress, its president suggested, Hawaii could
not confidently anticipate equal treatment with the existing
states: “Except when it comes to assessing the territory for all
federal taxes and compelling us to bear our proportion of the
burdens borne by the mainland, we apparently are not to be
considered an integral part of the United States.” 50 Appeals
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for political equality quickly followed the realization of eco-
nomic discrimination. “Taxation without representation was bad
enough,” stated the vice-president of the Sugar Planters’ Asso-
ciation, “but in this instance our own government has denied
its own citizens their fair share of their own market.” 51 The
concrete advantages of immediate statehood were now appre-
ciated by a much wider cross section of business and commu-
nity leaders. Clearly, a threat to the sugar industry was a threat
to the general economy of the islands, especially during the
uncertain days of the depression and New Deal. The Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, which reflected the interests and opinions of most
businessmen, was now convinced of the political and economic
reasons for statehood.
Statehood for Hawaii is no longer solely a political aspiration.
Bitter experience has shown that as a territory, Hawaii is open to
economic attack….
As a territory Hawaii has only one delegate in Congress. He
has a seat in the lower house, but no vote on the floor. As a state
Hawaii would have two Senators, and with its present population,
one representative.
Therefore as a state, Hawaii would have immediately a
stronger delegation to uphold its rights than it has as a ter-
ritory—whether the rights be political, or economic, or both. 52
Island support for statehood developed quickly in reaction to
discrimination by Congress. Even the Sugar Planters’ Associ-
ation recognized that an informal lobby in Washington was an
inadequate guarantee against arbitrary, and costly, decisions
by Congress or the president. After 1934 Tavares, a prominent
early campaigner for statehood observed: “we in Hawaii were
by an overwhelming majority … converted to the drive for
statehood.” 53 Developments in Hawaii during 1935–1941
suggest that Tavares’ view was, at most, only a slight exagger-
ation.
Hawaii’s sugar interests were finding it harder to live with
territorial rule after 1934, but some planters were yet to be con-
vinced that life would be any easier under statehood. The am-
bivalence of the Big Five, Theon Wright has correctly argued,
grew out of a fundamental political dilemma: “if they argued too
strongly for statehood they might get it [but] in a form they did
not want; and at the same time they realised they needed more
political muscle in Washington.” 54 Most kamaaina haoles were
not yet wholehearted champions of statehood, although they
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were nonetheless disturbed by the economic consequences of
the Jones-Costigan Act. The proportions of nonwhites who were
local-born and thus entitled to full political rights grew quickly
after the 1920s, threatening to shift the balance of power from
the haole-Hawaiian coalition which dominated island politics
through the Republican party. The election results of 1932 made
this fear more concrete. For many supporters of the old elite the
threat to Hawaii’s sugar quotas was much less a problem than
the danger of Japanese control of elected offices, especially if
the power of such offices was increased by statehood.
The support of sugar and business interests in the territory,
although at times ambivalent, gave new impetus to the cam-
paign for statehood. King’s election as delegate in November
1934 provided an additional boost. He enjoyed strong support
from Hawaiians and haoles and was the first prominent elected
official from either party to link his political fortunes to those
of the statehood cause. He correctly sensed that the events
of 1934 had transformed statehood from an empty slogan to
a genuine aspiration of many islanders, including some pow-
erful backers of his own party. By 1935 statehood was the an-
nounced policy of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association.
It donated the services of its public relations experts to the
statehood campaign and provided substantial financial support.
On June 9 King introduced in Congress “A Bill: To Enable the
People of Hawaii to Form a Constitution and State Government
and to be Admitted into the Union on an Equal Footing with
the Original States.” Similar bills had been introduced by pre-
vious delegates. However, King’s bill was the first to receive se-
rious consideration by either chamber of Congress. King was a
sincere and effective champion of statehood, but without sup-
porting pressure from the powerful sugar lobby in Washington,
his efforts would have been futile. A six-member subcommittee
of the House Committee on Territories was appointed to in-
vestigate Hawaii’s statehood qualifications. In October it con-
ducted extensive hearings in Hawaii, accepting evidence from
105 witnesses. 55
Proponents in the territory eagerly grasped the opportu-
nities presented by these unexpected developments. In 1935
an official campaign was organized to promote statehood gen-
erally, and to arrange the presentation of favorable testimony
at the scheduled congressional investigation. In September a
five-member Hawaii Equal Rights Commission was appointed
by the governor to provide support for Hawaii’s right to equal
treatment with the states by the federal government, to prevent
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discrimination by Congress, and to promote amendments to the
Organic Act which would enhance Hawaii’s status relative to
the states. In part, this mandate simply restated the aims of
the petitions sent to Washington a decade earlier. Significantly,
however, the Equal Rights Commission was also directed to
“make a thorough study of all aspects of statehood for Hawaii
and the advisability of submitting the issue to plebiscite at some
future date.” An appropriation of ten thousand dollars had pre-
viously been authorized by the legislature to support the ac-
tivities of this official statehood body. Its first public act on
behalf of statehood was of a kind that would later be seen as
a depressing symbol of Hawaii’s frustrated ambition—it autho-
rized its ex officio chairman, Governor Joseph B. Poindexter,
to present evidence to a visiting team of congressional inves-
tigators. 56 Literally hundreds of islanders performed similar
rituals, either in Honolulu or Washington, during the next twen-
ty-five years. Nonetheless, in 1935 two unprecedented devel-
opments were initiated—an official government-supported cam-
paign was organized and a congressional statehood investi-
gation was undertaken in the island.
Proponents of statehood conceded during the subcommittee
investigation that economic motives had provided the imme-
diate impetus for the organization of a formal statehood cam-
paign. They also emphasized, quite legitimately, that Hawaii’s
campaign rested on other, more basic developments and consid-
erations. By the 1930s population growth and general political
and economic conditions in the territory provided a firm basis of
support for Hawaii’s statehood demands. Hawaii fulfilled many
of the traditional conditions necessary for admission. Its pop-
ulation of approximately 180,000 residents exceeded that of
many territories at the time of admission, and was greater than
the populations of four states, Vermont, Nevada, Delaware, and
Wyoming. Slightly less than one-quarter of Hawaii’s residents
were not American citizens. The overwhelming majority of these
92,000 aliens were first-generation Japanese or Filipino immi-
grants. Yet this seemingly high proportion of alien residents was
lower than the percentage of aliens living in New York or Boston
as late as 1930. Hawaii had already served a longer period of
territorial pupilage than many territories prior to admission.
Its area exceeded that of three of the existing states—Con-
necticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware—and was almost as large
as Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, or New Jersey.
Moreover, Hawaii had an advanced and expanding economy ca-
pable of sustaining self-government. It paid more in taxes an-
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nually to the federal treasury than fifteen of the states. This sum
was five times greater than the amount expended annually by
the federal government in the territory for local purposes. 57
Despite these facts, and favorable testimony from 90 of the
105 witnesses who appeared before the House subcommittee,
a majority of the committee did not accept that Hawaii met the
conditions necessary for statehood. The committee refused to
propose any change in the political status of the territory. Two
members recommended that the statehood bill be reported fa-
vorably to the House of Representatives. The remaining three
found the territory to be “a modern unit of the American Com-
monwealth, with a political, social and economic structure of
the highest type,” but recommended that “considerable further
study was necessary before a favourable report could be made.”
Significantly however, all members expressed the opinion that
by even a conservative estimate a “comfortable majority” of
Hawaii’s citizens favored statehood. 58 Most members of the
committee rejected immediate statehood, or at least endorsed
additional investigation, because they believed “it would be
wiser to wait until another generation of American citizens of
Oriental ancestry … had an opportunity to absorb American
ideals and training.” 59 The gentle wording of this conclusion
could not disguise the widely, if discreetly, acknowledged fact
that fear of alien Japanese practices and political weight under-
pinned most opposition to statehood.
With the support of the sugar lobby in Washington, King con-
tinued to press for statehood. In 1937 the House and Senate
appointed a joint committee of twelve senators, twelve repre-
sentatives, and King to investigate the question further. 60 The
territorial legislature appropriated twenty thousand dollars to
support the activities of the Equal Rights Commission during
this investigation. 61 During October 1937 hearings were con-
ducted on the five major islands. The testimony of proponents
again emphasized that Hawaii met the traditional conditions
necessary for admission. The population size, geographical
area, and economic resources of the islands were stressed. Both
the willingness and ability of its citizens to maintain an orderly
and stable government as well as their desire for statehood
were supported with voluminous testimony and statistics com-
piled by the Equal Rights Commission. The legality of appeals
for statehood was supported by frequent references to the New-
lands Resolution and the Organic Act, which classified Hawaii
as an incorporated territory. 62
Last Among Equals
67
In contrast to the 1935 hearings, opponents also presented
exhaustive testimony to the committee. Predictably, most of
the arguments against statehood were based, explicitly or im-
plicitly, on appeals to anti-Japanese sentiment. It was argued
that Hawaii’s population was of predominantly Oriental ex-
traction and could not be classified “as truly thoroughly, fun-
damentally and unequivocally American.” The alleged threat
of bloc voting, particularly among the Japanese, and the ques-
tion of the future loyalty of Japanese residents were sufficient
considerations for many to validate their opposition. Some op-
ponents, including a few haoles, were also genuinely alarmed
that statehood might consolidate the economic monopoly of the
Big Five in the islands. This view had already been expressed
forcefully in 1935 by residents who believed that the constraints
of decisions imposed by Washington were preferable to a pow-
erful state government dominated and manipulated by the Big
Five. The plantations and allied interests like the bar associ-
ation, inter-island transport facilities, and most business en-
terprises were, Fred W. Beckley told the 1935 subcommittee,
“but tentacles of the ‘Big Five’ octopus of King Sugar’s oli-
garchy.” Many nonwhites in particular were alarmed by the con-
centration of wealth and power in so few hands, but not all
accepted that statehood would necessarily accentuate this in-
equality. Indeed most believed that statehood might help to un-
dermine oligarchic privileges. 63
In addition to emotive assertions about possible Japanese, or
alternatively Big Five, domination of the proposed state, some
residents had concrete political reasons for opposing statehood.
A few inhabitants of the outer islands believed statehood would
reduce their voting representation in the legislature, as
statehood legislation included provisions for automatic reappor-
tionment of this body. Under Section 55 of the Organic Act,
reapportionment should have occurred after each population
census. But outer-island residents, who constituted a majority
in each chamber over representatives from Oahu, successfully
averted reapportionment after 1900. If introduced on the basis
of changes in population distribution, reapportionment would
have given Oahu a majority of representatives in the legislature.
Investigating committees in 1935 and 1937 found opposition
strongest on the outer islands. For example, ten residents of the
island of Hawaii testified in 1937, and seven of them strongly
opposed statehood. Resistance to the concentration of political
power on Oahu and in Honolulu was often fuelled by cultural
and ethnic considerations. Many Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian
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residents of the outer islands viewed reapportionment as but a
further formal step toward the triumph of American values and
interests, symbolized so acutely by the rapid growth of Honolulu
City and the modernization of Oahu. 64
The findings of the joint committee were influenced sub-
stantially by the testimony of opponents. Underlying its rec-
ommendations, however, were new factors totally beyond the
influence of forces within Hawaii. During the late 1930s rela-
tions between the United States and Japan deteriorated sharply.
Japan’s assault on nationalist China in 1937 and ambitious at-
tempts to develop its Co-prosperity Sphere in Asia gradually
drew firm responses from Secretary of State Cordell Hull and
President Roosevelt. The joint committee could not have antici-
pated the shattering consequences of the widening rift between
Tokyo and Washington, but its findings were nonetheless de-
termined by what it called “the present disturbed condition of
international affairs.” Because residents of Japanese ancestry
comprised the major single ethnic group in the islands, the com-
mittee report implied, the present strained relations with Japan
would inevitably induce Congress to reject immediate state-
hood. 65
In contrast to the 1935 report, the joint committee did not
accept that a majority of Hawaii’s citizens wanted statehood. In-
stead, it requested irrefutable evidence that a substantial ma-
jority desired statehood before Congress was again asked to
act, and recommended that the territory attempt to determine
popular sentiment within the islands on the issue. A minority
report issued by a congressman by this time well known to
Hawaii, Rankin of Mississippi, was much less ambivalent. It
recommended that statehood be postponed indefinitely. As early
as 1934 through the Rankin bill, Southern Democrats had as-
sumed the leadership of attempts to frustrate Hawaii’s
statehood aspirations. Various representatives of the conserv-
ative, segregated, race-conscious Southern states willingly per-
formed this function for the next twenty-five years. The report
of 1937, however, was not completely negative. The majority
opinion conceded that Hawaii had met all the requirements
which had previously been set for territories. The apparent
contradiction between this finding and the committee’s failure
to recommend favorable congressional action is difficult to ex-
plain. It can only be assumed that the committee recommended
additional study because of the strained relations between
America and Japan. However, local statehood proponents were
able to gain some comfort from the ambiguous findings of the
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committee. The report emphasized that the disturbed interna-
tional environment was not a permanent obstacle to Hawaii’s
aspirations, and concluded that prolonged denial of its valid de-
mands for statehood was unlikely.
It is obvious that such a community, industrious, prosperous and
progressive, will not be content for long to be held in a subor-
dinate position in comparison with other parts of the nation. It is
hardly conceivable that the United States, dedicated to the very
principle of self-government and equal treatment of all its cit-
izens, should long desire to impose any restrictions upon the full
measure of self-government to be accorded Hawaii. 66
THE LONG CAMPAIGN BEGINS
Anxious to allay doubts expressed both in Washington and lo-
cally that island residents did not solidly favor statehood, local
proponents accepted that a vote must be held on the question.
As early as 1935, amid the furor generated by the Jones-
Costigan Act, the territorial house had approved a joint reso-
lution to hold such a vote. But it was an indication of Hawaii’s
ambivalence over statehood that this resolution was never even
discussed by the Senate. Sam King remained confident that
statehood enjoyed strong local support, and introduced in Con-
gress a bill to make a plebiscite mandatory in the elections of
1936. However, this move died in the Committee on Territories.
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Undaunted, King worked diligently to convince island politi-
cians that a plebiscite must be conducted. When the joint con-
gressional committee report called for a clear assessment of
the electorate’s views, King and other statehood advocates im-
mediately interpreted this as a mandate to act. King, in fact,
had drafted most of the committee’s report. He was the undis-
puted champion of statehood both in Hawaii and on Capitol
Hill, where in the difficult days before Pearl Harbor he had few
genuine supporters. 68 “The obvious inference from the report,”
King informed Vitousek, the most powerful Republican in the
legislature and close ally of the Big Five, “is that we should hold
a plebiscite on the question of statehood before again asking
Congress to pass an enabling act for us.” 69 King’s persistence
was eventually rewarded. In 1938 the local Republican and De-
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mocratic parties accepted the proposal. In the following year
the legislature agreed to schedule a plebiscite to coincide with
the elections of November 1940. 70
Proponents could scarcely have chosen a less propitious
time to conduct such a critical test of local opinion. The years
of preparation for the plebiscite coincided with the emergence
of a menacing Japanese presence in East Asia and the Pacific.
Caught unhappily in the center of the growing storm between
Tokyo and Washington, Hawaii’s statehood advocates were
obliged to modify the wording of the plebiscite question. They
recognized that in the face of deteriorating relations with Japan
it would be difficult to salvage a favorable result. When initially
proposed by territorial Senator Farrington, the bill read: “Are
you in favor of immediate statehood for Hawaii?” This was
quickly altered to read: “Are you in favor of statehood for
Hawaii?” Those answering affirmatively were then to be asked
another question: “Are you in favor of statehood for Hawaii
NOW?” This wording was also rejected however. Fearing a neg-
ative response to any question which embraced the idea of
immediate statehood, proponents eventually opted for a deliber-
ately imprecise alternative. When signed into law by Governor
Poindexter on May 16, 1939, the plebiscite question asked only:
“Do you favor statehood for Hawaii?” The bill was thus am-
biguous, designed to avoid the very real possibility that a ma-
jority of voters would reject a specific proposal for immediate
statehood. 71
Conscious of the support of the Hawaii Sugar Planters’ As-
sociation (HSPA) the territorial legislature voted funds to the
Equal Rights Commission and gave it responsibility for coor-
dinating the plebiscite campaign. King collaborated with com-
mission members to promote local support. The campaign
stressed that statehood was “Hawaii’s inherent right as well as
its inevitable destiny,” and encouraged voters to reject Hawaii’s
qualified, unequal status. The official, rather cumbersome cam-
paign slogan stated:
Hawaii, U.S.A.—an integral part of the United States, sharing
equally with the forty-eight states the nation’s obligations—is en-
titled to equal rights for her citizens—equal treatment for her in-
dustries—equal benefits under national law. 72
The campaign highlighted equal rights rather than immediate
statehood. It was promoted actively by the Honolulu Star-Bul-
letin, but the Advertiser remained ambivalent at best. The Pan
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Pacific Press, publicity agent for the Sugar Planters’ Associ-
ation, was engaged by the Equal Rights Commission to organize
publicity. The Sugar Planters’ Association donated substantial
funds to supplement legislative appropriations and expressed
support for the statehood drive. 73 Despite understandable local
scepticism over the sincerity of the Big Five’s conversion to
statehood, 74 influential members of the powerful Hawaiian
Sugar Planters’ Association were now among its most active
proponents. During 1939, for example, the association’s pres-
ident, John Waterhouse, wrote privately that Hawaii should
“move heaven and earth” to secure a substantial favorable vote
in the plebiscite. 75 During the campaign the vice president of
C. Brewer and Company expressed the view of most large cor-
porations when he asked rhetorically, “Is it selfish to desire
… representation in the Senate of the U.S.? To desire those
Senators to protect the economic interests of the territory? To
ask that you be accorded the same treatment, more or less,
as any other part of the U.S.?” The lessons of 1934 were not
forgotten. Predictably, the Star-Bulletin agreed that sugar in-
terests had a clear and justifiable interest in statehood as the
vehicle for Hawaii’s right to self-determination. 76 Most Repub-
licans in the legislature now accepted this view. Moderate re-
publicans like King, Farrington, and Fong did not owe their
positions on statehood to pressure from sugar interests. But
most conservative Republicans, including legislative leader and
attorney to the HSPA Vitousek, only embraced statehood after it
became an aspiration of the HSPA. 77
Unhappily for those committed to statehood, a series of in-
cidents during the plebiscite campaign threw into sharp relief
emotion-charged questions concerning the loyalty and Amer-
icanization of Hawaii’s Japanese. Proponents hoped that the
so-called Japanese problem would not form part of the cam-
paign agenda. They were anxious to defuse any controversy
which might focus national attention on Hawaii’s people of
Japanese descent. Early in 1940, for example, the local Demo-
cratic and Republican parties had both demurred when res-
idents of Japanese ancestry were fired from jobs on defense
projects simply because of their ethnic origin. The parties were
nevertheless reluctant to draw attention to this sensitive issue
by protesting it in a vigorous way. 78 Such attempts to limit
public controversy were eventually undermined. A few weeks
before the November elections Kiichi Gunji, a former Japanese
consul in Hawaii, commented that the “Japanese in Hawaii are
all determined to undergo great sacrifices for Japan during
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the present uneasy condition” of international relations in the
Pacific. 79 Despite substantial evidence that Gunji’s words had
been misinterpreted by the island press, 80 they confirmed the
suspicions of those who viewed Hawaii’s Japanese as an imme-
diate security threat.
The alarm sparked by Gunji’s statement intensified local
opposition to Hawaii’s flourishing Japanese language schools,
newspapers, and radio stations. Malihini, or newly arrived,
haoles, notably those working in defense industries or serving
in the military, were especially disturbed by the presence of
such foreign institutions on American soil. In 1940 there were
174 Japanese language schools. They were attended, after
regular school hours, by more than 40,000 of Hawaii’s total
public school population of 92,000. Until 1940 noncitizens
always comprised a majority of the combined teaching staff of
the Japanese schools. These institutions were, as Gunji con-
ceded, a major barrier to statehood. Few islanders were sur-
prised when a convention of the American Legion in Honolulu
during 1940 advocated that responsibility for foreign language
instruction be transferred to public schools or the university. In
recommending that the schools be closed, the American Legion
argued that they did not foster Americanization and were often
staffed by foreign teachers loyal to their homeland. These pro-
posals were unanimously endorsed by the territory’s board of
public education. 81
Japanese language newspapers and radio stations also
became targets of this growing intolerance during 1940. The
Star-Bulletin regularly reprinted articles from the Hochi and
Nippu Jiji under the insensitive heading: “Comment from the
Alien Press.” At the same time the Adver tiser seized every op-
portunity to criticize the alleged willingness of the Japanese
language press to defend Tokyo while relations with Washing-
ton slid toward war. 82 Pressure from within the islands induced
the Japanese language radio stations to cease transmitting the
chauvinistic Domei news programs supplied free by the
Japanese government. 83 Not all local Japanese were anxious
to cut their ties with their native land however. Only a month
before the plebiscite was held the Japanese Chamber of Com-
merce sponsored a shipment of fifty tons of “comfort bags” to
soldiers in Japan’s army. At the same time an appeal was circu-
lated among prominent Japanese in the islands urging them to
support the “holy war” in China by sending donations via the
Sumitomo Bank of Honolulu. 84 These were isolated incidents in-
volving only a small fragment of elderly issei (first-generation
Last Among Equals
73
Japanese) in the territory; but they did irreparable damage to
the plebiscite campaign, encouraging rumors about Japanese
fifth-column activity and strengthening scepticism about the
success of Americanization. Such doubts could not be easily
or quickly erased. Rather than highlight particular incidents
involving local Japanese, proponents attempted to defend
statehood by arguing broadly that all immigrant groups,
whether European or Asian, were entitled to freedom of cultural
and linguistic expression in their adopted nation. 85 Yet appeals
to democratic sentiment and references to America’s immigrant
origins could not overcome the doubts which fed on emotive
incidents involving local Japanese which erupted throughout
1940.
Perhaps the most damaging of these incidents was the
heated controversy over dual citizenship sparked by the Adver-
tiser on the eve of the November polls. All people born in the
territory were American citizens, but before 1924 Japan claimed
all people of Japanese ancestry as subjects of the emperor, ir-
respective of their place of birth. After this date children born
abroad of Japanese parents could only acquire Japanese citi-
zenship if they were registered shortly after birth with a Japa-
nese consulate. During the late 1920s large numbers of children
born in Hawaii were registered in this way—as many as six
thousand annually in 1929. However by 1939 the number of
registrations had fallen dramatically to less than one thousand
each year. 86 Nonetheless, on the eve of the war forty thousand
aliens of Japanese descent lived in the territory, and approxi-
mately the same number were dual citizens. Dual citizenship did
not necessarily imply dual allegiance. Opponents of statehood
argued, however, that if Hawaii’s Japanese were committed to
their new nation they would immediately end their technical
allegiance to Japan by expatriating their Japanese citizenship.
Proponents also encouraged expatriation, viewing it as the most
effective reply to those anxious about the loyalty of Japanese
in the territory. However, expatriation was a complicated and
costly procedure. Despite a drive for expatriation led by the Ad-
vertiser, in 1940 only about one thousand islanders chose to end
their dual citizenship. On the other hand, statehood proponents
did gain some comfort from the fact that only a handful of in-
fants were registered annually with the Japanese consulate. 87
The dual citizenship issue simmered until August 1940,
when a convention of the American Legion in Honolulu brought
it dramatically to the surface. The convention resolved that dual
citizens should be excluded from public positions in the ter-
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ritory. In the following elections the Legion attempted to test
the loyalty of all candidates who were of Japanese descent
by asking them to prove that they were expatriated or had
never been dual citizens. One candidate, Sanji Abe, replied
that he had initiated, but not yet completed, his expatriation.
This was the signal for a vitriolic attack on Hawaii’s Japanese
by the Advertiser—an attack which cut across every facet of
the plebiscite campaign and the pending elections. No loyal
American could possibly vote for both statehood and a can-
didate with dual citizenship, the paper claimed. Moreover, the
election of Abe would be tantamount to a public admission
that his electorate was predominantly un-American. The Hawaii
Hochi joined the dispute, and attempted to defend Abe’s loyalty
to America. This simply compounded divisions over the
Japanese issue, however, and submerged the plebiscite cam-
paign beneath a public controversy on the very question
statehood advocates hoped to ignore. 88 Opponents of
statehood, not the Equal Rights Commission, in effect set the
agenda of public debate in the final weeks of the campaign.
Confronted with this difficulty, the commission was obliged to
change its campaign tactics.
The confidence of statehood proponents virtually evapo-
rated during August-September 1940. Yet a wide cross section
of islanders continued to endorse the efforts of the Equal Rights
Commission. Support came from a majority of the legislature,
both political parties, the delegate to Congress, sugar interests,
the Star-Bulletin, and, significantly, from the two influential
Japanese language newspapers, the Hawaii Hochi and the
Nippu Jiji. 89 These supporters accepted the alteration in cam-
paign tactics without dissent. Thus, during its final weeks the
campaign conceded openly that the plebiscite was not directly
concerned with the question of immediate statehood. A fa-
vorable vote, it stressed, would simply imply support for
eventual, not immediate, admission. Increasingly, the campaign
emphasized that the plebiscite was only an initial step to
eventual statehood; that Congress, not Hawaii’s voters, would
decide when and under what circumstances the territory would
be admitted. 90
This changed strategy was also influenced by the strength of
mainland opposition to any proposal for immediate statehood.
The 1935 House committee estimated that a comfortable ma-
jority supported statehood. By late 1940, however, relations
with Japan had deteriorated dramatically. Many Americans, in-
cluding Hull and Roosevelt, clearly feared that war with Japan
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was a possibility if not a likelihood in the near future. For
proponents of statehood anxious to demonstrate that Hawaii
was united and Americanized, developments in East Asia preci-
pitated major new difficulties. Supporters could hardly have
chosen a less opportune time to test local convictions about
statehood, and by implication the Japanese population of the
territory. The Japanese remained the largest single ethnic
group, and for many whites and Hawaiians especially statehood
still represented the prospect of a state controlled by a Japanese
legislature and presided over by a Japanese governor. Some,
like John F. G. Stokes, believed that Hawaii had become an in-
strument of imperial Japanese policy, a base for Japan’s am-
bitions in the Pacific, and an area infiltrated by traitors and
corrupted by Japanese values and culture. While few shared
such wild conspiratorial and racist views, many felt that it was
still too soon to experiment with genuine democracy in the is-
lands. The Honolulu Advertiser expressed this view in familiar
terms when it argued that statehood was a questionable step
which must await an improved international climate and a more
mature local electorate. 91
Despite their determined efforts, statehood supporters were
unable to keep racial issues out of public debate on the
plebiscite. After the dispute over Abe’s citizenship broke, propo-
nents were especially alarmed. Vitousek advised King in Wash-
ington of a recent downturn in the enthusiasm for statehood.
The campaign committee, desperate to regain the initiative,
urged King to return immediately to Honolulu. “We are very
anxious to have you participate actively for us,” the executive
secretary of the Pan Pacific Press wrote King. “We simply must
have one or two good personal ‘punches’ from you.” King ac-
cepted this request and returned from Congress to campaign
during the final days before the plebiscite. King, a part-
Hawaiian who enjoyed broad support within the Republican
party, confronted the delicate Japanese problem head-on. He
argued in particular that opposition to statehood which derived
from racial prejudice was itself un-American and a repudiation
of the nation’s cherished principles. 92
Proponents gratefully accepted King’s timely intervention,
but they were not convinced that, by itself, it would be suc-
cessful. Thus, to coincide with King’s appeals, the plebiscite
committee used another cornerstone of the local Republican
party, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, in a controversial effort to
recapture support. Despite the fact that the proportion of is-
landers of Japanese descent had declined since 1920 from 42
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percent to 37 percent, it was still widely believed that as a
result of a natural increase in numbers this group would even-
tually comprise an absolute majority. As we have seen, this
view gained wide currency in the early decades of territorial
rule; and it did not quickly recede. Those convinced of its va-
lidity usually cited a study by the U.S. Bureau of Education
completed in 1920 which predicted that by 1940 the Japanese
would constitute 47 percent of the local electorate. 93 Yet as the
work of Hawaii’s respected demographer and sociologist Ro-
manzo Adams demonstrated, these predictions were wildly ex-
aggerated and based on false premises. As late as 1938 less
than 29 percent of the electorate was of Japanese ancestry, and
the proportion was never likely to rise above one-third of the
total electorate. In a full-page article in the Star-Bulletin six
days before the plebiscite, the campaign committee attempted
to highlight these figures. Titled “Getting the Facts Straight
about Statehood: The Myth about Japanese Dominance,” the ar-
ticle masqueraded as a normal news story, failing to mention
the fact that it was sponsored by the campaign committee. Such
an admission would have officially linked racial questions to the
plebiscite, something which proponents had studiously sought
to avoid. However, King felt no compunction about embracing
this artificial division of issues, and stated both privately and
publicly that racism was the root cause of hostility to a “Yes”
vote. 94
Despite the difficulties and diversions which afflicted the
official campaign, the results of the plebiscite offered some
comfort to those who genuinely wanted statehood. It must be
conceded, however, that the returns provided only ambiguous
evidence of majority support for immediate admission. In
answer to the question “Do you favor statehood?” 67 percent
of citizens answered “Yes.” However, slightly more than 20
percent of those eligible did not vote. 95 Surprisingly Oahu,
which supported 60 percent of the territory’s population and
was most exposed to the official campaign, returned the lowest
affirmative vote of any island: only 63 percent of its voters
wanted statehood. But on all other islands the proportion
hovered consistently above 70 percent of those who voted. Only
10 of the territory’s 162 precincts recorded a majority “No”
vote, and these precincts were spread throughout all six repre-
sentative districts. When interpreting these results some sug-
gested that the relatively strong outer-island vote for statehood
resulted from the influence of the sugar companies. “King
Sugar” could still organize and deliver the outer islands to the
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Republican party, they argued, so it was reasonable to assume it
could also deliver an affirmative vote in this plebiscite. 96 It was
also argued that the strength of opposition on Oahu reflected its
larger proportion of malihini haoles, who were most susceptible
to arguments emphasizing the “Japanese problem” and the vul-
nerability of the territory to subversion from within. 97
The plebiscite question was deliberately imprecise. It did
not specify whether an affirmative vote represented a desire
for immediate statehood or admission at a later date, possibly
under different local or international circumstances. The result
thus indicated only that a two-thirds majority wanted eventual,
but not necessarily immediate, admission. Undoubtedly, many
people voted “Yes” on the clear understanding that they were
not voting for immediate statehood. Indeed, the official cam-
paign encouraged such a view. Because of the ambiguity of the
plebiscite question, members of the Equal Rights Commission
were obliged to concede that it had settled very little; statehood
remained, as John Snell acknowledged, a hotly debated issue in
the territory. 98
The negative vote was much stronger than proponents orig-
inally anticipated. The Pan Pacific Press optimistically aimed to
win at least 90 percent endorsement. King, somewhat isolated
by his work in Washington, was equally confident, predicting an
affirmative vote of 80 percent. 99 These expectations were not
realized. Yet proponents were justified in viewing the plebiscite
as an overall success. “We think that it was a very good showing
in the face of international conditions, petty prejudices and con-
siderable misunderstanding,” the executive secretary of the Pan
Pacific Press, William Cogswell, wrote privately. King publicly
pronounced his satisfaction at the affirmative vote; in private,
however, he expressed dismay at the impact of racism on the
result. 100
The plebiscite was a necessary, if unfortunately timed, local
initiative. But it could resolve none of the significant national
issues which by 1940–1941 impinged directly on Hawaii’s
statehood aspirations. Even an overwhelming “Yes” vote would
have done little to promote early action in Congress. Active
public or congressional support for statehood simply did not
exist. Indeed opinion polls conducted on the mainland during
1940–1941 indicated that slightly less than half of those inter-
viewed favored eventual statehood. Equally disturbing for local
proponents was the fact that only 55 percent of mainland res-
idents believed Hawaii should be defended if it was attacked.
In contrast, 74 percent stated that Canada should be defended
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if it was attacked. 101 War against Japan quickly altered these
views, but before Pearl Harbor support for continental security
and Anglo-Saxon solidarity generally overrode concern with the
security of America’s island possessions.
Although military and naval planners in Washington did not
share public indifference to Hawaii, their heightened interest
in the territory nevertheless served to make the prospects for
early admission negligible. While islanders debated the
plebiscite issue, the planners examined the possible implica-
tions of statehood for national defense policy in the Pacific. By
September 1940 Britain’s naval strength in East Asia was se-
verely depleted, as it concentrated all possible resources on
war against Germany in the Atlantic. Japan eagerly exploited
the weakened European presence and interest in East Asia and
the Pacific regions. Slowly but firmly the Roosevelt adminis-
tration attempted to warn Japan that further expansion would
not be tolerated, and accepted that Japanese aggression could
not be stifled by a policy of conciliation or appeasement. Pub-
licly, America’s tougher stance was symbolized in its decision to
restrict exports of strategic materials to Japan. Secretly, it re-
sulted in detailed joint defense plans being drawn up with the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand.
Even before Japan commenced its major advance south from
China in July 1941, the United States was preparing for the pos-
sibility of war in the Pacific. Indeed, in June 1941 Roosevelt and
Hull had indicated privately their receptivity to a joint Anglo-
American commitment against Japan should it attack any new
areas in Asia. 102
As American policy hardened, Hawaii’s strategic importance
increased. Naval planners in Washington were well aware of
the implications of war in the Atlantic for European strength in
the Pacific, and recognized that the United States must fill the
vacuum. When the New York Times observed in 1940 that the
United States was now the only major Western power whose
position in the Pacific was uncompromised, 103 it was simply
echoing a view widely shared within the Roosevelt adminis-
tration and the chiefs of staff. In this context, it was argued, the
unprecedented naval and strategic significance of Hawaii dic-
tated that it must remain a territory under the tight control of
Washington. Naval and military bases twenty-five hundred miles
from continental America in the mid-Pacific were viewed as vital
factors in all defense plans. As these plans now explicitly ac-
knowledged Japan as the sole enemy in the Pacific, it followed
that Hawaii must remain a territory under the control of a
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local executive and judiciary appointed by Washington. Indeed,
shortly before Pearl Harbor Roosevelt contemplated amending
the Organic Act to permit the appointment of a nonresident as
governor. 104 On the eve of war with Japan, Caucasians com-
prised less than one-quarter of Hawaii’s population. The impli-
cations of this bald fact were, for defense planners in Wash-
ington at least, self-evident. In addition, many citizens in Hawaii
and on the mainland echoed the New York Times’ view that, “re-
gardless of the very valid and excellent arguments advanced by
Hawaii, this is not the time to give the status of statehood to a
territory, the population of which, is over one third Japanese.”
Doubts about the loyalty of Japanese residents in Hawaii, and
the degree to which they had assimilated American ideals and
attitudes could not be easily resolved, the New York Times ob-
served in September 1940: “Only a crisis could supply proof of
the correctness of either view.” 105 At Pearl Harbor on December
7, 1941, this crisis erupted.
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Chapter 3
The Tests of War
War came abruptly to the Hawaiian islands. On December 7,
1941, Japanese bombs virtually destroyed the United States
fleet and installations at Pearl Harbor. America’s losses, an of-
ficial enquiry later acknowledged, marked “the greatest military
and naval disaster in our Nation’s history” 1 The shock waves
from Pearl Harbor and the prolonged conflict with Japan were
felt in every sphere of island life. Most significantly, they were a
catalyst to Hawaii’s statehood ambitions.
During the first twenty-four hours of hostilities the com-
mandant of Hawaii’s Department of the U.S. Army, Lieutenant
General Walter G. Short, assumed the position of military gov-
ernor of the territory. Poindexter, the islands’ governor, hur-
riedly acquiesced to the demands of the military, proclaimed
martial law, and approved suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. J. Garner Anthony, attorney general of the territory
during 1942–1943, was dismayed at Poindexter’s virtual ab-
dication. 2 Roosevelt approved these radical changes. Military
government was defended as essential for protecting the nation
from invasion and possible subversion from within. But it per-
sisted long after the fortunes of war had turned against Japan.
It also outlived even the most exaggerated fears of sabotage by
Japanese descendents living in the islands. During almost three
years of military rule, the Roosevelt administration accepted
that Hawaii’s constitutional rights as an incorporated American
territory must be forfeited to the exigencies of war. Most is-
landers who were disturbed by Hawaii’s unequal status as a ter-
ritory found military government an additional, severe indignity.
In general, the strongest critics of military government were
also the most enthusiastic proponents of statehood. 3
Military government was more severe, arbitrary, and pro-
tracted than civil authorities or elected territorial officials had
ever imagined possible under the American federal democratic
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system. Government under these emergency wartime regula-
tions was not unlike that previously reserved for the seceding
Southern states under Reconstruction. Like the rebel South
in the 1860s and 1870s, Hawaii was exposed to a protracted
period of arbitrary military government, and its citizens denied
the normal guarantees of the national Constitution and Bill of
Rights. Military authorities effectively controlled or supervised
virtually every facet of public activity, including public health
services, production, wages, prices, and even prostitution. Civil
courts were supplanted by military tribunals, and the powers
of civilian authorities, including the governor, were consistently
overridden. Anthony later concluded: “Thousands of persons
were convicted in provost courts, some with trials and some
without, and sentences were imposed without regard for the
limitations of law in the offenses involved and for offenses unre-
lated to military security.” 4 The press was heavily censored and
subject to strict licensing. All but two Japanese language news-
papers were closed, and the two permitted to publish, the Nippu
Jiji and the Hawaii Hochi, were obliged to change their names
to the apparently less provocative Hawaii Times and Hawaii
Herald. So-called hearings boards were established, comprising
representatives of the military, the FBI, and prominent civilians,
to “make recommendations as to internment of people who had
been taken into custody on suspicion that they were dangerous
to the security and defense of the Islands.” The severity and un-
restrained authority of the military government was reflected
unambiguously in the fact that individuals were sometimes con-
victed for violating the spirit of martial law; plantation laborers
could not leave an island without a travel permit from the mil-
itary; workers could not change jobs without a release from
their employers; and individuals could be jailed for absenteeism
from work. Harsh constraints applied to all workers, but as one
observer noted, plantation laborers, notably the Japanese, were
most severely controlled. 5 At the same time, federal laws per-
mitting the seizure of alien property closed three predominant-
ly Japanese banks. Foreign language teaching to children under
ten was banned, and steps were taken to exclude people of
Japanese ancestry from public employment. 6
In controlling Hawaii with military government, federal au-
thorities compromised the constitutional and human rights of
all citizens, irrespective of their race; but it was Hawaii’s
Japanese, citizens as well as noncitizens, who suffered most se-
verely.
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THE JAPANESE DILEMMA
Japan’s unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor realized the worst
fears of those who viewed the world simply, in terms of racial
loyalties and international conspiracies. It appeared to validate
assertions made throughout previous decades by opponents
of statehood for Hawaii. Characteristically, this group had ac-
cepted that people of Japanese extraction were the “world’s
most intense nationalists, loyal to the Mikado to the third and
fourth generation.” In the event of war with the United States,
there was allegedly little doubt where the loyalties of these
rabid Japanese nationalists would lie. “Every Japanese, born
under our American flag or not, is always a Japanese,” Webb
Waldron wrote in American Magazine in 1937. “No matter how
much he professes to be American he is always thinking
Japanese thoughts, hoping secretly for Japanese victory.” He
concluded with a rhetorical question which concisely expressed
the alleged nexus between these racial alarms and possible
statehood: “Shall we admit to the dignity and power of
statehood a territory where Japanese, secretly hoping for our
overthrow, outnumber mainland Americans 13 to 1?” 7
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt initiated a
law, which Congress promptly endorsed, to relocate more than
110,000 Japanese from the West Coast. Altogether 70,000
American-born citizens and 40,000 Japanese aliens were
forcibly moved and incarcerated. Some remained imprisoned
until January 1945. These people were arrested without war-
rants, not formally charged, and released only if investigators
found them loyal. Yet under the Constitution, sympathy for the
enemy was not an offense. Unlike their mainland counterparts,
Hawaii’s citizens and residents of Japanese extraction did not
suffer mass arrest or relocation. Nevertheless almost 1,500
were interned, a majority of whom were aliens. Most of the
internees were Japanese government representatives, Shinto
priests, Japanese language teachers, or men who had served
previously in the Japanese armed forces. Though few in number,
some local leaders of the Japanese community were picked up,
observed a prominent nisei, or AJA (American of Japanese An-
cestry) as those of Japanese descent preferred to be known.
When the war ended in 1945, 277 remained incarcerated. De-
spite early rumors of sabotage by Japanese within Hawaii, and
some wild suggestions that Hawaii’s 157,000 Japanese be relo-
cated with those from the West Coast, the overwhelming ma-
jority remained free. The economic consequences for Hawaii of
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massive relocation and the actual costs of such a procedure en-
couraged a more sober solution than that adopted in California.
Moreover, Hawaii’s island geography and territorial status pro-
vided authorities with options not available on the mainland.
Strict military government over Hawaii’s entire population and
resources was invoked immediately after the attack on Pearl
Harbor. This made relocation essentially redundant. In addition
it kept Hawaii’s Japanese productively engaged in the nation’s
war effort. 8
Anticipating war with Japan, the FBI had established almost
twelve months before Pearl Harbor a special espionage bureau
in the Honolulu Police Department. Headed by Robert Shivers,
with John Burns filling the vital post of liaison officer between
the local police and the FBI on counterespionage matters, this
covert branch checked Japanese residents in terms of “back-
ground, general reputation and activities, and anything that
might be inimical to the interests of the U.S.” Immediately
after the Pearl Harbor attack those listed as prime suspects
were promptly incarcerated. This action removed “any chance
of them doing any damage,” Burns later observed, “even though
it might unjustly deprive them of their liberty for a while.”
Before martial law had been declared Burns was authorized to
round up and intern Japanese consular officials, principals and
teachers in Japanese language schools, and a few Japanese com-
munity leaders. Many of these suspects had not previously been
investigated by the espionage branch. Their assumed guilt was
a simple function of their common ethnic background. Those
captured were taken immediately to the immigration station,
by now under military control. Shortly afterward they were in-
terned on Sand Island. 9
These internment procedures were arbitrary in the extreme.
As Burns later conceded, some Japanese “were getting picked-
up for having too-much money in their pockets, or having the
Japanese flag stored in an old suitcase.” One young nisei re-
called: “the entire community … wanted to squash the so-called
Japanese element.” It was a period marked by hysteria, ac-
cording to Dan Aoki, when no Japanese was above suspicion.
Even prominent nisei like Mitsuyuki Kido and Ernest Murai,
who had worked with the Emergency Service Committee in
an attempt to maintain tranquility and productivity among the
Japanese populace during the prewar years, felt deeply insecure
after their worst fears were realized with the attack on Pearl
Harbor. “You can imagine the position of people of Japanese an-
cestry after December 7th,” Murai observed. “They were bewil-
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dered, lost, they didn’t know where to turn to. They didn’t know
what was to become of them because they’ve heard stories.”
The stories Murai referred to claimed that the U.S. government
was planning a mass evacuation of Japanese in the seven West-
ern states. Most AJAs believed the Hawaiian community to be
generally hostile and suspicious, Murai recalled. They felt iso-
lated: “we had very few haole friends here.” Rumors flourished
among the Japanese. There was talk that all those of Japanese
ancestry would be shipped to Molokai, and it was widely be-
lieved that plans were being drawn up to imprison potentially
disloyal able-bodied Japanese in converted school buildings
from where they would be released to work during the day.
When such plans did not materialize, the explanation offered
by many of Japanese descent was simply that the economic
situation alone militated against such action. If “they intern
all these people, what would happen to the economy?” Murai
asked rhetorically. Although exaggerated, the feelings of alarm
which generated such rumors were indeed real. And it was the
memory of these experiences which shaped the political aspira-
tions of Hawaii’s Japanese as the war drew to a close. 10
The official advice given to the American secretary of War
concerning the relocation and internment of mainland Japanese
shows clearly the kind of reasoning which lay behind the de-
cision to impose military control on Hawaii’s people. “In the
war in which we are now engaged,” General John L. De Witt
advised: “Racial affinities are not severed by migration. The
Japanese race is an enemy race and while many … have become
‘Americanized‚’ the racial strains are undiluted.” Given official
policies during 1942–1944, his concluding remarks were appar-
ently persuasive: “There were no grounds for assuming that
Japanese-Americans will not turn against the United States.’’
For some, race was apparently sufficient evidence of guilt.
Normal citizenship rights were denied and constitutional rights
abrogated because a particular ethnic group was assumed
guilty of intending to sympathize with, or actually support, an
enemy state. Yet as early as 1924 when Japan had instituted
a dual citizenship policy which permitted people born abroad
of Japanese parentage to register at consulates as subjects of
Japan, virtually all such residents in Hawaii had ignored this
invitation. Two decades later when war erupted in the Pacific,
the ties between Hawaii’s Japanese and their ancestral home
were even weaker. Despite De Witt’s prediction, and the fears
of many islanders, no member of Hawaii’s Japanese community
was ever found guilty of collaborating with the enemy during
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the Pacific War. At most, as Gwenfread Allen has suggested,
only a few thousand older Japanese remained sympathetic to
their ancestral homeland. After Pearl Harbor, most of Hawaii’s
Japanese strove self-consciously to demonstrate their American-
ization and their commitment to America’s war effort. “Speak
American” campaigns were launched, and many Japanese pe-
titioned for permission to anglicize their names. The principal
Japanese language school in the islands, the Japanese Central
Institute, was liquidated and its assets given to a war memorial
fund. Moreover, on one occasion in 1943 almost two thousand
Japanese-Americans sent money to Washington expressly for
“bombs on Tokyo.” Yet for those who shared De Witt’s stereo-
typed views of all Japanese, such actions were unconvincing.
As late as 1943 some locals who feared a Japanese presence
in Hawaii continued to advocate publicly that no less than one
hundred thousand of them should be removed to the mainland
and interned. 11
If the bulk of Hawaii’s Japanese escaped forced relocation,
they nonetheless encountered considerable hostility and re-
sentment from some sections of the island community. They
were exposed to intense social pressure to adopt the dominant
social, cultural, and linguistic mores. Some were reluctant to
conform, but most younger Japanese citizens accepted that they
must adopt and project American customs and values. Ironi-
cally, many of those Japanese who were initially assumed to
be security risks soon came under strong pressure to demon-
strate their loyalty by volunteering for combat duty. “So we
were somewhat forced into it; that’s how we got into the war,”
Aoki (who later became president of the famous 442nd Veterans
Club) recalled. “All I can say is that I was fortunate enough to
come home.” Many nisei who enlisted did so out of a desire to
avoid social ostracism and assumed disloyalty. Most were also
aware that for the Japanese segment of the islands, American-
ization must be demonstrated in an unequivocal, overt way. 12
But as the actions of Hawaii’s nisei troops during 1943–1945
suggested, and as the absence of espionage or sabotage in the
islands confirmed, legislation to control Hawaii’s Japanese was
as unnecessary as it was insensitive.
Americans of Japanese ancestry, both in Hawaii and on the
West Coast, were painfully aware that their loyalty was widely
doubted within the American community. Moreover, in the face
of strong but essentially covert racial hostility many Japanese
Americans had remained largely separate from white society, an
isolated, reserved, and accommodating minority. Pearl Harbor
Chapter 3
86
confronted this group with an unprecedented, explicit dilemma.
In Hawaii and California, Japanese Americans (most of whom
were citizens by birth) were forced to suffer the indignity of
unconstitutional restrictions on their movements and rights. At
the same time they, more than any other group, were obliged
to demonstrate undisputed loyalty to America’s war effort and
constitutional principles. In the hysteria and recriminations
which immediately followed the Pearl Harbor debacle, there
were many Americans willing to accept that the Japanese were
indeed an enemy within. In the longer term however, war in
the Pacific invalidated these irrational suspicions. It provided
what many Japanese in Hawaii had long wanted—though obvi-
ously in another form—an opportunity to demonstrate conclu-
sively that they were loyal and thoroughly Americanized. “As
much as we would hate to see a war between the United States
and Japan, and as much as we would hate to see the day come
when we would have to participate in such a conflict,” a young
nisei, Shigeo Yoshida, told the 1937 statehood investigation,
“it would be much easier for us I think, if such an emergency
should come, to face the enemy than to stand some of the sus-
picion and criticism, unjust in most cases, levelled against us.”
His concluding observation undoubtedly reflected the views of
many frustrated island-born Japanese citizens: “It is extremely
difficult to bear up under the gaff of suspicion and expressions
of doubt which have been levelled at us. It would be easier for
me to pack a gun and face the enemy.” 13
And when the opportunity to fight for the nation did occur,
the behavior and contributions of Hawaii’s Japanese were exem-
plary. The generation for which Yoshida spoke demonstrated an
undeviating commitment to America’s war effort, and provided
unambiguous evidence of the loyalty of all Japanese in the is-
lands. This was at least some consolation for the suffering which
war brought to Hawaii.
All ethnic groups in the territory energetically supported the
United States war effort. But as a result of the Pearl Harbor
attack, a prominent nisei observed, Hawaii’s Japanese readily
accepted that they had to demonstrate their national loyalty in
a far more concrete manner than other Americans. The most
striking example of this was the combat record of Hawaii’s
men of Japanese ancestry who comprised the core of the vol-
unteer 442nd Regimental Combat Team, and contributed all
1,406 men of the famous 100th Infantry Battalion. Originally
called the Hawaiian Provisional Infantry Battalion, the 100th
was formed from two all-nisei National Guard battalions in the
Last Among Equals
87
territory. A larger proportion of men of Japanese ancestry vol-
unteered for military service than from any other ethnic group
in the territory. Initially, however, AJAs wanting to enlist were
rejected automatically. Those already enlisted were barred from
receiving additional training and lost the right to bear arms.
They were reduced to the status of laborers in work battalions.
When the War Department finally accepted, in January 1943,
that nisei men could serve in combat, it called for 1,500 vol-
unteers. More than 10,000 Hawaiians of Japanese extraction
promptly came forward, about 40 percent of all those eligible
for service. A total of 2,645 were eventually selected to serve in
the 442nd team. Meanwhile, in the 100th Battalion other nisei
troops had undergone training, as a segregated unit, at Camp
McCoy in Wisconsin and Camp Shelby in Mississippi, where
many felt the barbs of racial hostility. In mid-1944 the two AJA
units joined forces in Italy, and their military exploits in the so-
called Go For Broke campaign became a focus of international
attention. 14
In objective terms the wartime contribution made by
Hawaii’s nisei population was unsurpassed by that of any com-
parable number of Americans. But as Hawaii’s statehood pro-
ponents reluctantly discovered after the war, racial stereotypes
and fears persisted. Although these views were now expressed
less overtly and often disguised by other arguments, they nev-
ertheless proved resilient, despite the unequivocal evidence of
nisei loyalty which emerged as a result of Hawaii’s energetic
role in the war against Japan. This evidence was unlikely to
sway national opinion, the Honolulu Advertiser warned soberly
a year after Pearl Harbor, because “an uninformed mainland
will not quickly nor eagerly welcome into the Union of States
a new member whose population is largely of Japanese blood.”
Although the Advertiser was still editorially ambivalent over
statehood, its belief that racism remained a major obstacle was
well founded. “Regardless of what Hawaii’s own knowledge and
experience of its citizens of Japanese ancestry may be,” it con-
cluded, “that knowledge is not shared elsewhere in the nation.”
15 Nevertheless, by the end of the war Americans and their con-
gressional representatives were better informed about Hawaii
than at any previous time.
The combat achievements of Hawaii’s troops focused
greater national attention on Hawaii’s Japanese than any single
event other than the Pearl Harbor attack. In large part the
war record of the nisei soldiers erased the doubts which had
understandably surfaced in December 1941. Furthermore, the
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decisions to let Hawaii’s nisei fight in Europe and work as mil-
itary interpreters in the Pacific helped to remove the early re-
sentment which some AJAs had felt at their exclusion from the
war effort. Many of Hawaii’s Japanese who did serve felt both
“proud and bitter,” Murai observed: proud that they were able
finally to fight for their country, and bitter because this op-
portunity was delayed and when it eventually came it involved
segregation during training and formation of a distinct, all-AJA
battalion. These feelings perhaps intensified the combat deter-
mination of Hawaii’s nisei volunteers. Members of the 100th
Battalion and the 442nd team were awarded more citations for
bravery than any other United States infantry units of compa-
rable size during World War II, or indeed any previous war in
which America was involved. But their losses were heavy—650
killed and 3,436 wounded in action. This war record, which
established the 442nd team as perhaps “the most decorated
unit in the entire military history of the United States,” 16
coupled with the overwhelming loyalty of the Hawaiian com-
munity during the war, validated statehood proponents’ claims
that all of Hawaii’s people were fundamentally loyal Americans.
In the final analysis, this conviction overrode ethnic or com-
munity allegiances. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin put these views
forcefully when it observed at the end of the war: “Our
American citizens of Japanese ancestry have acted in uniform
and out of uniform, in daily occupation and in the stress and test
of battle, just as have our Americans of other ancestries. The
basic argument against admission … has been answered.” War
removed the foremost if not the only hindrance to statehood, ac-
cording to former delegate King, because it negated skepticism
about the extent of Americanization of Hawaii’s people. 17
Such skepticism was directed principally at Hawaii’s
Japanese, but other groups of Asian origin had also been the
victims of suspicion. These groups, like the nisei, willingly
shouldered the burden of defending their country. The very con-
spicuous role played by Hawaii’s AJAs had tended to obscure
the substantial military contributions of Hawaii’s other ethnic
groups. After Pearl Harbor more than thirty thousand islanders
joined the armed forces. In addition to the Japanese, relatively
large numbers of Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, haoles, Chinese,
Koreans, and Filipinos also served. Understandably, some later
resented the glare of publicity which surrounded nisei veterans
while the combat achievements of Hawaiians from other ethnic
backgrounds were largely ignored.
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Despite this resentment, the war did significantly alter the
way in which Hawaii’s Japanese were perceived by their fellow
citizens. Equally it transformed the self-image and con-
sciousness of this group. The leaders of Hawaii’s Japanese were
now determined to expose and confront their people’s allegedly
second-class status and the subtle discrimination on which it
rested. In particular, men like Kido, Murai, Aoki, Robert Oshiro,
Sakae Takahashi, and combat hero Inouye developed very
similar ideas about Hawaii’s society and the future role which
Japanese Americans should play in it. “I came to believe with
all my heart and soul … that the time had come for us to step
forward,” Inouye later wrote.
We had fought for that right with all the furious patriotism in
our bodies and now we didn’t want to go back to the plantations.
Times were changing. The old patterns were breaking down. We
wanted to take our full place in society, to make the greatest con-
tribution of which we were capable, not for Japanese-Americans,
but for Hawaii.
Kido’s response to events after 1941 was very similar, although
like most nisei leaders he was initially more concerned with his
own ethnic group than with the wider island community. “What
triggered me into politics,” he recalled,
was the fact that youngsters that were enrolled in the 442nd
Combat Team who were then in combat in Italy would write back
letters from their hospital beds … saying “We were willing to sac-
rifice our lives and everything, are we coming back to a second
class society? What are we going to do when we get back?” We
… decided that something had to be done, and that … one way
of bringing about full recognition of the people who made this
supreme sacrifice was to get into politics and change the po-
litical life of the community and make it more democratic, to bring
about—idealistically—… equality of opportunity.
The experiences of war, both at home and in combat, stimulated
unprecedented pressure from the previously quiescent
Japanese community for unqualified political rights. Increas-
ingly statehood was viewed by the leaders of this group as the
principal means to this important end. 18 But this view was not
restricted to Hawaii’s Japanese (although they were perhaps its
most vocal and public exponents after 1945). Political leaders
of other Asian groups were also anxious to win wider equality
Chapter 3
90
through statehood. The contradiction between America’s es-
poused aims in the Second World War and Hawaii’s qualified
status as an American territory was fully realized by a wide
cross section of Hawaii’s people only after 1945.
LEGACIES OF WAR AND MILITARY RULE
The question of military government sharply divided the island
community after 1941. In particular, it split the influential haole
sector, including the Republican party, exposing divisions which
never healed completely. Through his newspaper, the Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, Farrington argued that military rule should be
ended as soon as possible, or at least modified. Shortly after he
was elected delegate to Congress in 1942 he expressed a similar
view in Washington. But relatively few members of the haole mi-
nority were initially anxious to fight for civilian rule. Those who
did seek to restore full constitutional government—including At-
torneys General Anthony and C. Nils Tavares, Judge Delbert
Metzger, Farrington, and Poindexter’s successor, Governor
Ingram Stainback—made little headway until late in the war. In
general, Hawaii’s business community was delighted with mil-
itary rule. 19 In the early months of military government, for ex-
ample, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce sent a telegram to
Roosevelt protesting against efforts to restore civil authority.
At least one prominent member of the Roosevelt administration
was dismayed “that a large group of American businessmen had
so far departed from normal American thinking as to prefer
military control of all activities of civilian life [to] the normal
processes of American Government.” 20 But Hawaii was not a
normal part of the American polity, and the Roosevelt adminis-
tration was apparently in no hurry to restore full constitutional
rights to its people.
This reluctance rested on obvious security considerations,
but it was compounded by pressure from business interests
in the islands. The “hegemony‚” Burns later claimed, strongly
supported the military because it imposed “labor controls that
made a man almost a slave.” Certainly wages were more tightly
controlled than prices, and wage and salary earners made a dis-
proportionately heavy sacrifice to the war effort. The interna-
tional secretary of the ILWU (International Longshoremen’s and
Warehousemen’s Union), Matthew Meehan, on a visit to the is-
lands early in 1944, likened the extent of controls imposed by
the military on workers in Hawaii to that of a concentration
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camp. While such claims were undoubtedly exaggerated, union
organizers argued throughout the war that their activities were
subject to constant interference from military authorities.
Within a year of Pearl Harbor, union membership had fallen
by more than 50 percent, to approximately four thousand
members. Understandably, most employers welcomed this
trend. Against this background, the efforts of moderates like
Farrington and Anthony to curtail military government met
strong local resistance from the Honolulu Advertiser, powerful
business interests, and military officers. Until late in the war the
opinions expressed by these vested interest groups prevailed in
Washington. 21
Throughout the war military officials enlisted the support
of prominent local conservatives, and appointed them to signif-
icant and often lucrative posts in the wartime government. For
example, Lorrin P. Thurston, the part owner and manager of
the ‘Honolulu Advertiser, became the new government’s public
relations adviser; Walter Dillingham, who amassed a fortune
largely from dredging and construction work under government
contracts (and maintained a lobbyist in Washington to protect
his interests) was made director of food production. Despite
the wartime emergency, local businessmen prospered as Hawaii
became an important focus of rushed defense expenditure. Not
surprisingly, more than a year after Pearl Harbor, the Honolulu
Chamber of Commerce again informed Roosevelt that civilian
government should not be restored. Many of those who now
found military rule so satisfactory were, after the war, to ex-
press strong opposition to democratic government under
statehood. 22 Short of direct military control through Wash-
ington, some continued to favor territorial government, which
also stemmed essentially from appointments determined in
Washington.
Military rule flatly contradicted America’s constitutional
principles and could not be sustained indefinitely, despite the
support it received from many influential islanders. Gradually
martial law was modified and an uneasy system of dual civil
and military authority established. Habeas corpus, however, re-
mained suspended and civil authority was subservient to mil-
itary dictates until military government ended on October 24,
1944.
The formal legal challenge mounted by Anthony, Farrington,
and others against military rule was not finally considered by
the Supreme Court until December 1945, conveniently after
the end of hostilities with Japan. The federal government de-
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fended its right to impose martial law on the grounds that full
constitutional rights, including provisions of the nation’s Bill
of Rights, did not extend to outlying territories of the United
States, except by specific act of Congress. Territorial citizens
protested that military government circumvented Section 5 of
the Organic Act, which stated specifically that the Constitution
should apply equally in Hawaii as in the rest of the United
States. The Supreme Court, in a decision handed down by
Justice Hugo Black, ruled in February 1946 that military gov-
ernment was unconstitutional. 23 This vindicated the civil oppo-
nents of wartime rule, but it was small compensation for the
difficulties experienced by American citizens in Hawaii during
the war. Nor was it any real guarantee that Hawaii’s rights
would not again be abrogated.
The experience of military government prompted many in
Hawaii to view statehood as the only vehicle capable of averting
a possible recurrence of arbitrary action by the federal gov-
ernment. The desire for equality under statehood was now
widely shared by substantial majorities from all ethnic groups.
Hawaii’s vigorous new attorney general, Tavares, stated during
the Supreme Court hearings: “Regardless of the outcome of
the Supreme Court case, my sentiments are that Hawaii will
never be free from danger and possible contentions like this
being made in any case in which civil rights are involved, until
and unless it becomes a State.” Territorial citizens, especially
those who felt additionally vulnerable becaue of their ethnic
background, appealed increasingly for full citizenship rights.
Many were now convinced that the liberties ostensibly guar-
anteed under the national Constitution far outweighed any eco-
nomic disadvantages which would accrue by virtue of being a
territory. In the light of these factors, Tavares argued for the
speedy and vigorous renewal of the struggle for statehood. 24
Some mainlanders were also convinced that statehood was es-
sential if the injustices of martial law were to be avoided in
the future. George H. Lehleitner, a very wealthy Louisiana busi-
nessman who became Hawaii’s most energetic Southern sup-
porter, had witnessed martial law firsthand as an officer in
the U.S. Navy. Disturbed particularly by the arbitrary and un-
equal way it was employed against the island’s non-white com-
munity, Lehleitner argued that statehood was essential to insure
that democratic government could never again be denied these
Americans. Burns later credited Lehleitner with spending more
time, energy, and money on the statehood drive than any indi-
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vidual in either Hawaii or the mainland, although Republican
stalwarts understandably accorded Farrington this distinction.
25
The relaxation of military government over the territory
during 1943–1944 and the increasingly secure American po-
sition in the Pacific war encouraged Hawaii to renew its
statehood initiatives. In May 1945 the local senate passed a
resolution asking Congress to grant immediate statehood. In
the following month, Hawaii’s energetic Republican delegate
in Washington, Farrington, introduced an enabling bill and
pressed for immediate congressional investigation of Hawaii’s
qualifications for admission. “The war is not over in the Pacific,
but victory is assured,” wrote the Honolulu Star-Bulletin in July
1945. “We are now justified in turning again to active steps for
statehood.” 26
By early 1946 national and local support for statehood was
unprecedented. In December 1945, Secretary of the Interior
Harold S. Ickes publicly endorsed immediate statehood. Far-
rington welcomed this as a milestone, the most important step
toward statehood since the 1940 plebiscite. In January 1946
President Truman declared in favor of statehood, the first pres-
ident to endorse Hawaii’s objectives. In this year also mainland
opinion polls indicated that a majority (60 percent) favored
statehood for Hawaii. Only 19 percent opposed it. 27 In January
a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs responded to Farrington’s demands in Congress and con-
ducted extensive hearings in Hawaii. The six-member subcom-
mittee under Chairman Henry D. Larcade (Dem., La.) conducted
hearings for twelve days on the five major islands. It accepted
testimony from 107 witnesses, 91 of whom favored statehood.
28
Anxious to demonstrate that Hawaii’s people had assim-
ilated into American society, statehood proponents now fre-
quently used the words “loyal” and “Americanized” inter-
changeably. The postwar campaign for admission relied heavily
on the unique achievements of young nisei soldiers in Europe
as evidence that Hawaii had “made its Americanism work” and
“met the test of two world wars with unquestionable loyalty to
the flag she served.” 29 But the process of Americanization and
assimilation was much slower, and less uniform, than statehood
proponents were prepared to concede after the Second World
War. Certainly the acculturation of an ethnic group comprising
almost 40 percent of Hawaii’s people could not reasonably be
inferred from the heroism displayed in battle by a youthful
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fragment of this group. The absence of any concrete definition
of what constituted an Americanized community, however, per-
mitted proponents to highlight the war record of Hawaii’s
Japanese in all future debates. The general loyalty and military
achievements of Japanese citizens and residents were eagerly
grasped by proponents who, until Pearl Harbor, had found it
difficult to confront with firm evidence the suspicions and in-
nuendos reserved for Hawaii’s Japanese by racially insecure
groups both in Hawaii and on the mainland.
The achievements of Hawaii’s soldiers in Korea a few years
later confirmed their loyalty and Americanism, even in its most
explicit anticommunist form. By contrast with 1942–1945,
troops from Hawaii were not consigned to separate units in
Korea. Nonetheless like America’s blacks in World War II,
Korea, and Vietnam, and Puerto Ricans in Vietnam, Hawaii’s
mixed peoples discovered in Korea that nonwhites were not only
unequal politically, but were also called upon to make dispro-
portionately heavy sacrifices in war. A total of 426 men from
Hawaii were killed in action in Korea, a toll almost five times
the national average. The battle casualties of Hawaii’s troops
totalled more than 1,300—a per-capita rate three times greater
than that for the rest of the United States. The Statehood Com-
mission asserted that these sacrifices, and the general com-
mitment of the island community to the war in Asia, negated any
arguments which assailed the loyalty of Hawaiians. Such sac-
rifices also strengthened the conviction that if Hawaii’s people
were eligible to die for their nation, then surely they should be
entitled to participate fully in national politics. 30
Wars in the Pacific and Asia also underlined Hawaii’s crucial
strategic significance to the United States. The ideas of Mahan
and other expansionists of the late nineteenth century had,
it seemed to military authorities at least, been vindicated by
events in the 1940s and early 1950s. The cold war tensions
which grew out of the uneasy settlements of World War II
and Korea further confirmed Hawaii’s strategic significance. Its
value as America’s principal Pacific base was obvious to all
those in Washington who viewed Asia’s instability and emerging
peasant communism as simply an extension of the cold war.
After 1945 Farrington attempted to exploit the argument that
America should dominate every facet of the postwar Pacific and
thus avoid difficulties similar to those which had erupted with
the Soviet Union in Europe. He argued that the question of
statehood for Hawaii was now an urgent national concern.
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The present is a transitional period. The pattern of American
peacetime policy is just beginning to take shape. By deciding the
Hawaii issue, Congress will take an important step in deciding
the character and extent of the United States policy and influence
in the Pacific…. American hegemony in the Pacific would be con-
firmed … It would serve notice on the world anew that the Central
and West Pacific constitute a defense zone to the U.S. 31
There were now many influential Americans who accepted this
view. Shortly after Japan’s defeat, General Douglas MacArthur,
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and the secretaries of War and the
Navy endorsed statehood because it would integrate Hawaii
more effectively and irrevocably into national defense planning.
It would also help “extend American democracy” to East Asia,
they argued. The Defense Department was no longer perturbed
by the peculiar ethnic character of its vital island base.
Moreover, Washington now found it embarrassing to have
America’s stated support for decolonization and democracy
abroad compromised so blatantly by Hawaii’s semi-colonial
status. After the United Nations classified Hawaii as a “non-
self-governing” area, this gap between principle and practice
was inescapable. Statehood proponents relied heavily on this
anomaly in future years. The “United States is striving even
at the risk of war to establish the right of self-determination
and self-government among the people of the earth,” the official
statehood campaign later pointed out. “Yet it is denying to a
Commonwealth within its own borders the right of self-gov-
ernment in the full measure to which it is entitled. Statehood
would undo this paradox.” 32
Other Allied governments encountered similar paradoxes in
relation to their colonies in Asia and the Pacific. The war against
Japan broke the back of European colonialism, and heralded the
gradual retreat of white authority over dependent peoples gen-
erally. The demands for decolonization quickly became a chorus
after 1945 and, reluctantly, the European powers were obliged
to accede to the wishes of their subjects. But America’s rela-
tions with its “non-self-governing” Pacific territory did not fit
this broad pattern. As we have seen, the war heightened the
determination of Hawaii’s mixed population to demonstrate its
loyalty to the metropolitan power. At the same time, war against
Japan confirmed the crucial strategic value of the islands to
the United States. “If it had not been for the Second World
War … Hawaii might never have become so deeply integrated
with the economic and political mainstream of the country and
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might never have become a state,” Robert Shaplen observed
in 1982. “It might have evolved instead from something like a
trust territory into an independent or quasi-independent entity,
and might by now be looking more eastward than westward and
playing a leading role among the Pacific islands, since so many
of its people have more in common with these islanders than
with the inhabitants of mainland America.” 33
But the war was only one aspect of a process of Ameri-
canization which had transformed the allegiances and aspira-
tions of Hawaii’s people over more than a century. As the next
chapter of this book demonstrates, the diverse population of
postwar Hawaii shared very little with any other Polynesian
or Asian society. It had become, in ideological terms at least,
overwhelmingly and uncritically American. Rather than stim-
ulate demands for a break with Washington, for decolonization,
the war strengthened the conviction that Hawaii’s future lay
within the American system, not outside it. The nationalism of
the islands’ inhabitants had become a variant of that of the
mainland. By contrast, the nationalist movements which sur-
faced throughout Asia and the Pacific after the war generally
rejected the authority and values of metropolitan powers and
sought, instead, unqualified national independence.
The United States emphasized in the immediate postwar
months that it sought to gain no territory from victory, but
wanted to liquidate its existing territories and possessions by
granting them self-determination. President Truman asked Con-
gress to consider the possibility of permitting Puerto Rico to
conduct a plebiscite to determine its future relationship with
the United States, and reaffirmed that the Philippines would
be granted independence in 1946. 34 Given Washington’s stated
policy of granting increased self-government or independence
to its territorial possessions, Hawaii’s unequal territorial status
could not be defended with any degree of consistency. This
neocolonial position and the attendant qualified political rights
of its citizens were pointedly emphasized in the classification
given Hawaii by the United Nations.
Other contradictions between America’s principles and
practices were also highlighted by the war. Like Hawaii’s nisei,
black Americans made a disproportionately strong contribution,
measured in deaths and casualties, to their nation’s combat
efforts. Loyalty and sacrifice in war did not guarantee either
group genuine equality under the Constitution however.
Nonetheless, it became increasingly difficult for Washington to
justify or rationalize the continued exclusion of nonwhites from
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equal access to the vote, education, and work—a situation re-
flected most starkly in the rigidly segregated Southern states.
If discrimination against nonwhites within America was incom-
patible with espoused American values, so too was discrim-
ination against the mixed population of America’s territorial
appendages. The new Truman administration argued far more
energetically for racial equality than had its New Deal prede-
cessor. It made two important concessions to mounting liberal
pressure on racial issues: First, it acknowledged that civil rights
and equality at home could not be isolated from the question
of equality under the Constitution for residents of incorporated
territories. Second, because many territorial citizens were non-
Caucasians, it agreed that the issues of statehood and equality
for nonwhite Americans were inextricably linked. Thus, after
the war Truman lumped these issues together in his tentative
legislative program on civil rights. If the Truman administration
was to argue before the United Nations that all peoples were
entitled to self-determination, and if it was to attack communist
states for not guaranteeing the political liberties of their sub-
jects, then clearly it had to remove the gap between theory and
practice in its own domain.
By linking Hawaii to other civil rights matters, Truman un-
wittingly tied it to an issue that was to split Congress for more
than two decades. Yet even if the president had excluded
statehood from his civil rights program, Southern opponents
of racial equality would still have recognized and exploited
the links between the two issues. It was widely accepted that
the patterns of racial and ethnic relations in the islands were
unique and without parallel in any mainland state (certainly not
in the segregated South). Unfortunately for statehood enthu-
siasts, this fact did little to extricate Hawaii from deep-rooted
struggles over civil rights. 35
Although the war in the Pacific did not initiate the campaign for
Hawaii’s admission, it did give a strong new impetus to such de-
mands. More than any other event, war highlighted and publi-
cized the experiences of Hawaii’s mixed population and brought
its people for the first time under close national scrutiny. The
territory’s new national prominence helped to confound and
diffuse arguments against statehood which derived from racist
premises. At the same time, Hawaii’s unfortunate experience of
military rule gave unprecedented urgency and strength to de-
mands for constitutional rights equal to those enjoyed by cit-
izens in all states. (With the memory of relocation still painfully
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fresh, some Japanese Americans on the West Coast undoubtedly
found such appeals extremely ironic.) Hawaii emerged from
World War II more confident of its Americanization, more
prominent in national politics, more convinced of the need for
immediate statehood, and more united in the conviction that ad-
mission was not only appropriate but imminent. Moreover, war
brought new investment, new industries, and new people to the
islands from the mainland. Rapid economic, demographic, and
social changes in turn helped validate Hawaii’s claims that it
was now qualified for, and entitled to, immediate admission. But
the winds of change which swept across the islands after 1945
also brought unexpected difficulties for the proponents of im-
mediate statehood.
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Chapter 4
Postwar Hawaii: An
Americanized Community?
It was widely accepted in the decade after the war that Hawaii’s
people were “thoroughly imbued with American traditions and
ideals” and “sympathetic to the principles of democracy as ex-
emplified in the American form of government.” 1 Traditionally,
these indices of acculturation and ideological uniformity were
central guides to the suitability of a territory for statehood.
Certainly Hawaii had demonstrated its loyalty to the United
States during the war in the Pacific. It had also been inte-
grated into American defense planning, trade, and tourism from
the late 1930s, and had sustained representative democratic
government throughout its sixty years as a territory. Shortly
after the war an investigating committee dispatched from Wash-
ington concluded: “the school system of Hawaii has been suc-
cessful in instilling into the people of many races and back-
grounds the objectives and ideals of democracy, and has pro-
duced a literate population capable of discharging the duties
of citizenship.” Island society was consistently described as
“loyal,” “patriotic,” “Americanized,” “harmonious,” and “demo-
cratic.” When Lind ended his study of Hawaii’s People early
in the 1960s with the question, “What Are They Becoming?”
and answered, “One People Out of Many,” he was expressing
the popular view of Hawaii as a racial uto-pia. 2 Certainly most
of its peoples accepted American democracy, free enterprise
capitalism, and the English language as legitimate and appro-
priate. Hawaii, it seemed to many observers, was the American
melting pot in microcosm—a crucible of immigrant assimilation.
Like continental America two and three generations earlier, the
Pacific territory was an example of rapid and thorough accul-
turation of diverse waves of immigrants. There were, however,
important distinctions: in Hawaii’s case these newcomers were
largely Asian, not European; and they moved into a community
which had escaped slavery and its unfortunate Southern legacy,
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segregation. Hawaii’s society had no direct parallel on the
mainland. In the light of its unique social patterns Lind con-
cluded, “[it] is reasonable to assume that assimilation or the
spiritual fusion of Hawaii’s people moves more rapidly than
[social] or biological amalgamation, but both processes are
moving irresistibly forward.” 3
Advocates of statehood had previously expressed similar
views, but in more emotive terms. The Statehood Commission,
for example, enthusiastically adopted Roosevelt’s assertion that
“Americanism is a matter of mind and heart; Americanism is not
and never was a matter of race and ancestry.” Indeed it went so
far as to assert that, in terms of its political, educational, and
community makeup, Hawaii had become thoroughly imbued
with Americanism as early as the 1890s. “Since annexation,” it
concluded, “Hawaii has made its Americanism work with a high
degree of success.” 4 If Americanism is defined simply as the in-
ternalization of America’s political values and nationalism, this
claim was not without foundation. Indeed, after World War II
most of Hawaii’s citizens accepted political democracy under
statehood as a legitimate and necessary aspiration. However,
in relation to more concrete socioeconomic indices of assimi-
lation, such as employment, housing, property, education, and
intermarriage, these claims were less valid. Hawaii’s people
might have been largely assimilated ideologically and behavio-
rally (i.e., acculturized) by the 1950s, but not all groups had yet
experienced genuine structural assimilation.
ACCULTURATION: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES
It is important, as Talcott Parsons, Milton M. Gordon, Michael
Parenti, and others have noted, to distinguish between cultural
or ideological assimilation on the one hand, and socioeconomic,
institutional, or structural assimilation on the other. Accultur-
ation, which embraces the notion of Americanization, is not
synonymous with structural assimilation. Although writing on
immigrant experiences in continental America, Gordon’s defin-
itions of these terms provide a useful vehicle for analyzing the
nature and extent of ethnic assimilation in Hawaii at the time of
statehood. Gordon has defined assimilation as “a blanket term
which really covers a multitude of subprocesses.” He correctly
separates ideological factors from social ones, and asserts that:
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The most crucial distinction is one often ignored—the distinction
between what I have elsewhere called “behavioral assimilation”
and “structural assimilation.” The first refers to the absorption of
the cultural behavioral patterns of the host society…. There is a
special term for this process of cultural modification or “behav-
ioral assimilation”—namely “acculturation.” “Structural assimi-
lation” on the other hand, refers to the entrance of the immi-
grants and their descendants into the social cliques, organiza-
tions, institutional activities, and general civic life of the receiving
society. If this process takes place on a large enough scale, then a
high frequency of intermarriage must result.
Like most social scientists, Gordon also made a further dis-
tinction between “secondary relationships,” involving public,
civic, commercial, and political activities in the wider com-
munity, and “primary relationships,” which embrace friendship
patterns, home life, and communal activities. Relationships de-
veloped in the secondary area are generally impersonal and
segmented. In contrast, primary associations tend to be in-
timate, warm, and personal. 5 Unfortunately there is not suffi-
cient empirical data to examine thoroughly the types and extent
of primary and secondary relationships experienced by Hawaii’s
various ethnic groups after World War II. However, by using
the distinction advanced by Gordon to order the available (if
incomplete) evidence, it is possible to reach a reasonably sys-
tematic understanding of the nature and patterns of the islands’
community on the eve of statehood. In particular, this method
permits an assessment of the processes of acculturation and
structural assimilation in relation to the assertion, repeated
monotonously by statehood proponents, that the island com-
munity was thoroughly and uniformly Americanized.
After the war the various congressional reports issued on
Hawaii’s qualifications for statehood used the terms “Ameri-
canized” and “assimilated” in an informal, interchangeable way.
Although clearly referring to cultural and ideological factors,
these committees attempted to substantiate their confident as-
sertions that Hawaii was thoroughly Americanized by citing
what they conceived of as hard evidence. This included the al-
leged absence of bloc voting, availability of educational and em-
ployment opportunities for all groups, the growth of organized
labor, and participation by different ethnic groups in the po-
litical, commercial, and social life of the islands. This evidence
was very selective, and notable primarily for its frequent rep-
etition rather than its breadth or accuracy. It was designed
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to foster the view that Hawaii, despite its unique immigrant
heritage, ethnic patterns, and class cleavages, was fundamen-
tally American in both ideological and socioeconomic terms.
After Pearl Harbor, all reports endorsed by majorities of the nu-
merous House and Senate investigating teams accepted these
assertions and evidence uncritically. These findings ignored the
critical distinction between acculturation and structural assim-
ilation noted above. They also ignored the strong relationship
between access to wealth and power on the one hand, and eth-
nicity and social class on the other—a relationship which re-
mained the fundamental characteristic of Hawaii’s community.
This is not to deny that some members of all ethnic groups
experienced real socioeconomic mobility, or that most residents
were incorporated firmly into an “Americanized” value system,
by the 1940s. But the distributions of wealth, property, and
power remained far from equal, varying dramatically according
to settlement patterns and the ethnic backgrounds of each
group.
Many of the general findings advanced by sociologists on
the experiences of immigrants to continental America and the
nature of mainland society after the war might reasonably be
applied to Hawaii also, although obviously the social structure
of Hawaii was fundamentally different and perhaps more
complex than that of mainland America. Nonetheless, Gordon’s
conclusion that “while behavioral assimilation or acculturation
has taken place in America to a considerable degree, structural
assimilation, with some important exceptions has not been ex-
tensive” describes Hawaii’s society on the eve of statehood
fairly accurately. Similarly Parenti’s finding that acculturation of
ethnic groups throughout America “was most often not followed
by social assimilation,” is relevant to Hawaii. In America gen-
erally, Parenti observed, though ethnic groups normally became
Americanized in their cultural practices, full social integration
did not necessarily follow. “In the face of widespread accultur-
ation,” he concluded, “the minority still maintained a social sub-
structure encompassing primary and secondary group relations
composed essentially of fellow ethnics.” 6
Obviously such generalizations must be qualified when ap-
plied to Hawaii. No one ethnic group comprised a simple ma-
jority of the total island population. Japanese, not whites, were
the largest single group. Curiously, in Hawaii the host, Anglo-
American, society never comprised more than one-third of the
population from 1900 to the 1950s. Despite this, the broad pat-
terns of immigrant-group acculturation developed similarly in
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both the mainland and the islands, although the rate of accul-
turation was perhaps more rapid in continental America. By the
late nineteenth century white Anglo-Americans had replaced
native Hawaiians as the host society in the islands. Despite,
or perhaps because of, the numerical strength of other ethnic
groups, whites exerted a firm control over virtually every facet
of political, economic, educational, and cultural life. Moreover,
the very variety of immigrant groups militated against any one
strong countervailing center of influence developing within
Hawaii, although eventually the large Japanese group became
a substantial political force and the Chinese experienced rapid
success in business and commerce. Hawaii remained both
ethnically and socially pluralistic, but all groups, including most
native Hawaiians, were gradually but persistently acculturated
to American values and behavioral norms. Neither mainland
America nor Hawaii were genuine melting pots, although each
developed its own pervasive myths in this regard, and each
made formal and informal demands on its immigrant minorities
to Americanize and conform to Anglo-American social and po-
litical norms. If Hawaii became “thoroughly Americanized,” as
various congressional committees asserted, this ironically was
because it had not eliminated ethnicity as a fundamental de-
terminant of its cultural and community patterns. This paradox
was not uniquely Hawaiian, but was characteristic of American
ethnic relations as a whole.
The pioneering sociological work of Gunnar Myrdal, Robert
K. Mer-ton, and others has emphasized that egalitarianism was
a fundamental American ideal. These authors identified a strong
theoretical commitment to the notions of freedom and equality
as defining characteristics of Americanization. Yet such ideals
were flatly contradicted by the racial inequalities and preju-
dices which afflicted American society. In Myrdal’s words, this
was the American Dilemma, 7 By the 1950s most of Hawaii’s
people shared these national ideals, but in the islands as in
the mainland nationalist ideals and social reality did not always
coincide. Given the ethnic diversities and socioeconomic in-
equalities which existed in continental territories when they
were granted statehood (especially in areas with slavery or sub-
stantial Indian populations), it would be inconsistent to expect
Hawaii to have been an essentially egalitarian and homoge-
neous society before it was qualified for admission. It is ar-
guable that no state had ever met this requirement. Yet as
Hawaii’s statehood campaign explicitly acknowledged, the is-
lands were a unique case. Not only were they geographically
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separate from continental America, they were also largely
peopled by non-Caucasians, the descendents of immigrant la-
borers from Asia. The only areas previously accepted with sub-
stantial nonwhite populations were slave states, and the
complex question of statehood for these territories had shaken
the Union to its very foundations. Assumptions about race, as-
similation, and Anglo-American superiority had changed dra-
matically in the intervening century. Nonetheless, as Richard
Meister observed as late as 1974, “The real issue behind much
of the turmoil associated with race and ethnic separatism is that
most Americans continue to accept without question the ideal
of a society based on a ‘pleasing uniformity.’” 8 In Hawaii this
essential homogeneity was most obviously contradicted by its
unique ethnic diversity.
Advocates of statehood for Hawaii accepted that an implicit
but pervasive belief in the need for all groups to assimilate
Anglo-American ideals and practices, combined often with ex-
plicit racism against all nonwhites, remained the principal ob-
stacle to admission even after World War II. This was a delicate
issue which proponents usually confronted obliquely with sta-
tistics on the rates of intermarriage across racial groups, ed-
ucational levels and opportunities for various ethnic groups,
socioeconomic mobility, trade union and community participa-
tion, and the alleged absence of bloc voting along ethnic lines.
Statehood proponents argued that Hawaii’s society was tol-
erant, open, and assimilated. 9 They were not, however, disin-
terested observers. The evidence they cited was partial (in both
senses of the word): it ignored as much as it revealed. At most it
indicated a likely, long-term trend, not a current reality. As evi-
dence that Hawaii’s diverse people shared the consensus values
of mainland Americans, it was reasonably convincing; as evi-
dence of structural assimilation or broad uniformity in social or
economic terms, it left doubt.
Although incomplete and far from uniform, acculturation or
“Americanization” of all ethnic groups in Hawaii was substantial
by the late 1940s. The experience of war against Japan had both
confirmed and accentuated this process. But as a number of
historians and social theorists have conceded, it is difficult to
identify confidently the means by which minorities incorporate
the values of the host society. It is equally difficult to specify the
rate and nature of ideological, cultural, or behavioral change in
any given society, even in Hawaii with its relatively compressed
history of ethnic interaction. America’s historians have long
grappled with these problems when discussing the experience
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of immigrants and their descendents in mainland society, which
they describe variously as assimilated, integrated, segmented,
pluralistic, or stratified. 10 Such problems inevitably confront
any student of Hawaiian society also. Yet there can be little
doubt that Hawaii became increasingly cohesive and uniform
in terms of ideology and values from the 1890s. This transfor-
mation coincided with the period of adjustment to the norms of
the host society by first and second generations of immigrants.
Yet it did not affect all ethnic, regional, or class segments of
the island community equally or uniformly. Many residents, es-
pecially first-generation immigrants, plantation workers, and
native Hawaiians resisted American cultural, social, and lin-
guistic norms, or at least attempted to deflect or modify them.
Also, some were effectively excluded from educational, voca-
tional, social, and voting activities open to whites. But other
members of all groups, even the once-proud Hawaiians, accom-
modated fairly quickly (if unenthusiastically) to American
values, ideals, and secondary behavioral patterns. The principal
vehicles of this change were imported and sustained by white
settlers and their descendents. Initially these included Chris-
tianity, formal compulsory education in American-style schools,
contract labor on plantations owned and managed largely by
Americans, use of English as the principal language in public
interaction, and the development of commerce and trade with
imported American capital and expertise. White European-
American dominance in Hawaii shaped the arrangements and
values (especially language, religion, law, vocational and
housing options) in the formative period around the turn of the
century. The impact of this dominance was cumulative. It re-
sulted in a web of interlocking pressures which were both insti-
tutional (e.g., education) and informal (e.g., political values). As
Hawaii was drawn gradually into the broad historical currents
which influenced America generally, the patterns and forms of
white influence became less explicit but no less pervasive.
No single criterion is adequate as an index of the decline
in ethnic group consciousness or ethnocentrism within a mi-
grant community. Nonetheless, as Lind and a number of other
sociologists have suggested, marriage is the best gauge, in the
American context at least, of interethnic intimacy. There ap-
pears to be a strong positive correlation between the frequency
of socially sanctioned marriages between different ethnic
groups and the extent of their cultural fusion. 11 From 1912 to
1945 the proportion of interracial marriages in Hawaii is esti-
mated to have increased from about 12 percent to almost 40
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percent of all marriages. Within each separate ethnic group,
however, the ratio of such marriages did not necessarily in-
crease over time. For the Japanese, at least, the proportion of
out-marriages was apparently highest during the years when
the influence of single-sex male immigration was most pro-
nounced, and declined slightly as the ratio of the sexes within
this group became more equal. Despite such temporary re-
versals, however, there was a general tendency toward inter-
marriage. 12 This was relatively common for members of the
smaller ethnic groups, notably Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, Fil-
ipinos, Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, and Koreans. Figures com-
piled by Adams, and later Lind, suggest that the proportion of
children of exclusively single-race ancestry also declined—from
about 75 percent in 1931 to about 60 percent in the early
1960s. Yet out-marriage was less common for Caucasians and
Japanese than for other ethnic groups. These two groups, espe-
cially the Japanese, provided a disproportionately small number
of children of mixed ancestry. At the time of statehood only 12
percent of children of Japanese ancestry were not exclusively
Japanese; only 20 percent of children with Caucasian ancestry
had one parent from another ethnic group. In contrast, 76 per-
cent of all children with mixed parentage had one parent of
Hawaiian or part-Hawaiian ancestry. 13 To infer from these de-
velopments, as Lind and statehood proponents did, that Hawaii
had taken a substantial step toward the physical amalgamation
of its diverse peoples, is perhaps unwarranted. 14 By the late
1950s the smaller ethnic groups were amalgamating to a con-
siderable degree as a result of intermarriage, but haoles and
Japanese remained far more separate and homogeneous com-
munity groups.
Some observers of postwar Hawaii maintained that, because
of these changing marriage patterns, it was futile, even de-
ceptive, to compile statistics of Hawaii’s population by race. As
early as 1940 the official census reduced racial types in Hawaii
from twelve to eight categories because of the large percentage
of marriages “between the two types of part-Hawaiians, and
between the Portuguese, Spanish and other Caucasians.” 15
Other indices support the view that enthocentrism and racial
consciousness had substantially declined by 1946. After 1931
when the first member of Japanese ancestry was elected to the
legislature, all major ethnic groups except Filipinos were con-
sistently represented in either the territorial house or senate.
Members of Japanese ancestry, however, never comprised more
than one-fifth of either chamber. 16 In sharp contrast to many
Last Among Equals
107
mainland states, no laws promoted racial segregation or formal
discrimination. The Christian Science Monitor undoubtedly un-
derestimated Hawaii’s achievements when it observed: “There
is less racial friction and discrimination in Hawaii than in many
mainland areas.” 17 Lind wrote in 1946 that: “Examination of
Hawaii’s record of population and vital statistics during the past
25 years reveals a steady trend toward a citizen population of
numerous racial antecedents, but unified through their common
experience within an American community.” 18 Five years later
another student of Hawaii’s society, Ch’en-K’un Cheng, con-
cluded that all ethnic groups shared “to a very large extent the
attitudes, habits and ideas of their fellow Americans in the ter-
ritory as well as in the continental United States.” 19 Not surpris-
ingly such findings were usually repeated before committees
investigating Hawaii’s bid for statehood.
Writing of the United States as a segmented society, Robert
H. Wiebe has argued that the endurance of a unique pattern
of relationships between myriad, changing social units had not
stifled the growth of a cohesive society in ideological terms.
Indeed this unity was essential for social harmony—“a seg-
mented society could not function without it.” Wiebe attempts
to show how this structurally divided society has avoided frag-
mentation. “By far the most powerful cement of this new system
was consumption,” he argues. “Consumption, everybody’s stake
in society, offered a ready ideological answer to everything from
class cleavages to civil rights.” 20 It might reasonably be as-
serted that Wiebe’s very general analysis underestimates the
significance and permanency of socioeconomic and ethnic divi-
sions in American society. Still, there can be little doubt that a
central unity in ideas and values did result from the processes
he identifies.
Although geographically remote, Hawaii was nonetheless
subject to these processes. Certainly by the 1950s it was an in-
tegral part of America’s corporate and commercial structures,
with a relatively affluent, consumer-oriented local population.
Most Chinese, haoles, and Japanese were part of America’s
“people of plenty” by the 1950s. In 1947, for example, the value
of Hawaii’s exports to the mainland was $228,353,010. Only
three countries exported more to the United States. In the same
year Hawaii’s 540,000 people purchased $472,241,868 worth of
retail goods, most of mainland export. Patterns of advertising
and merchandizing increasingly reflected those of West Coast
America. Many mainland retailers and businesses established
outlets in the islands after the war. Although the Big Five still
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dominated the islands’ economy, business ownership diversified
rapidly: thirty-six thousand corporations, firms, and individuals
operated in 1945, and the number grew quickly in the next
decade. It was usual for Hawaii’s executives and businessmen
to be educated in mainland universities. During 1900–1960 the
proportion of islanders who were Caucasian almost doubled,
due largely to increased in-migration from the mainland. At the
same time, the proportion of islanders living in Honolulu rose
sharply, to about 70 percent. The influx of mainlanders and
rapid urbanization consolidated patterns of consumption and
economic activity common to modern America. 21 Moreover, im-
provements in communications, symbolized by the Pacific cable
of 1902 and the advent of regular air services after 1936, tied
the islands increasingly to the mainland. Radio, and later tele-
vision, greatly accelerated the impact of American mass culture
on the island community and added to the pressures for cultural
uniformity and social homogeneity.
The political manifestations of broad acculturation are
easier to identify, though no more influential, than the role of
mass consumerism and economic change. Despite its peculiar
ethnic patterns and island geography, Hawaii was by the late
1950s equally subject to, and fundamentally affected by, the
forces which sustained ideological cohesion throughout
America generally. For example, political allegiances in the ter-
ritory closely paralleled those throughout the nation. Public
participation in politics, as indicated by voter turnout, was
higher in the territory than in virtually any mainland area. 22
Hawaii also shared, and in some respects anticipated, changes
in political culture associated with the emergence of anti-com-
munism and McCarthyism throughout America after the war.
Whereas the New Deal had affected the islands only marginally,
after the war they were not immune to the cold war tensions
which fuelled the prolonged and emotive public attacks upon
the New Deal and its supporters.
Insofar as acculturation and Americanization were affected
by broad processes like the expansion of the middle class, ed-
ucation, the rise of literacy, or mass consumerism, Hawaii was
exceptional in an American context largely because such de-
velopments came to it relatively late. Although expressed in
clichés, the findings of the 1947 investigating team accurately
identified the impact of such processes on Hawaii’s people.
“Distance has never meant a great deal to the American pio-
neer,” it concluded chauvinistically.
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Hardly a century ago California and New York were divided by
vast unsettled areas. But it was not many decades before they
were welded into one unbroken expanse of national life, with the
same customs, the same basic economy, the same standards and
ideals.
The pioneer spirit did not stop at the Western seaboard. With
a much shorter distance to go than that separating New York and
California, it crossed the Pacific and carried the American way of
life to Hawaii. 23
Ernest Gruening, the governor of Alaska and a vigorous
champion of statehood for his own territory and Hawaii, studied
the impact of “the American way” on the AJAs of Hawaii. He
roundly declared: “they are Americans in every sense of the
word just as much as the second or third generations of Amer-
icans born of English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh, German, Dutch,
French, Italian, Spanish, Slavic, Chinese, or Filipino may be
considered Americans.” Like President Roosevelt, Gruening de-
fined America as preeminently an idea. He proposed that
Hawaii was a unique and stunning incarnation of that idea, “the
finest example under the flag of the welding of alien peoples
of diverse racial strains into Americans.” If few observers could
explain how Hawaii had been so quickly Americanized, most
were nonetheless convinced that it was. Recalling his visit to
Hawaii as a member of the 1937 joint investigating team on
statehood, former senator Edward Burke of Nebraska informed
Truman: “We mingled with a people whose ideals and insti-
tutions are in every respect in accord with the American tra-
dition.” Burke supported this assertion by outlining develop-
ments in Hawaii’s schools, judicial system, mass media, and
political leadership. Most members of the investigating com-
mittee, he concluded, were convinced as early as 1937 that all
of Hawaii’s peoples, including the Japanese, were “so imbued
with the American ideal that they could be counted upon as
loyal citizens in all circumstances.” For Burke and others com-
mitted to statehood, Hawaii’s war record vindicated this early
confidence in its Americanization. 24
Yet there persisted until after the Pacific War a gap between
the patterns of culture and living imported from America, and
those typical of much of rural nonhaole Hawaii. The latter was
generally termed “local culture,” but it was more than narrow
parochialism. It was a by-product of a number of overlapping
factors—difficulties with the English language, immediate social
contacts with neighborhood and plantation families, shared eco-
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nomic and work situations, and the relative isolation of plan-
tation or outer-island life. Often manifest in the speaking of
pidgin English, the so-called local culture cut across most ethnic
divisions, embracing in addition to many Hawaiians and part-
Hawaiians, Filipinos, Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, and some rural
Japanese. Although seldom explicit it valued informality, egal-
itarianism, something called aloha spirit, and preservation of
traditional norms and arrangements against the inroads of com-
mercialism and Western development. Until perhaps the 1950s
local culture symbolized a shared rural past in Hawaii and
general exclusion from the institutions and groups which
shaped the economic and political life of the islands. Well into
the twentieth century, as a number of authors have argued, “in-
tense intercultural contact within the plantation communities
provided a more immediate intercultural challenge than the
vague pressures for assimilation to a larger American society
which existed far away on the mainland.” 25 Few of those who
journeyed from Washington to investigate statehood were ex-
posed to this essentially rural aspect of Hawaii. In evidence to
these investigators, the proponents of statehood, ever anxious
to stress the uniformity of Americanization, played down the
substantial divisions which local culture symbolized.
The composition and structure of Hawaii’s population was
changed dramatically by the war. In part it accelerated trends
apparent in the prewar years. It hastened participation by
Japanese in community affairs, broadened the aspirations of
this group, and instilled an unprecedented confidence in at
least the younger nisei, convincing them that they could partic-
ipate fully in the political and commercial life of the territory.
Ironically, Hawaii’s nonwhite majority, especially the Japanese,
became assertive and influential at a time when their relative
numerical strength was being eroded. War brought a wave of
defense workers from the mainland, and pushed the proportion
of whites in the islands to a much higher level than on any pre-
vious occasion. The size of the white civilian population more
than doubled in only six years. By 1945 over 85 percent of
Hawaii’s people had been born either in Hawaii or in mainland
states. In 1945 Caucasians comprised approximately one-third
of the total population, but this figure was inflated by as much
as 10 percent as a result of the war. Substantial elements of the
Caucasian population were relatively recent arrivals who were
stationed on military bases. Because these “new Caucasians”
could qualify as territorial citizens after residing permanently
in the islands for more than twelve months, they had a signif-
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icant impact on island politics. These new arrivals were usually
unfamiliar with the established haole population of the islands.
Some newcomers, especially those from the South, had incor-
porated the values and practices of the more race-sensitive
mainland areas. Most chose to stay aloof from the mixed island
society. And unlike many members of the local haole population,
the new arrivals were essentially wage and salary earners who
were as likely to vote Democratic as Republican. 26
Statehood proponents eagerly attempted to exploit the in-
creased Caucasian influence, arguing that it was further evi-
dence that the islands were adequately Americanized. At the
1946 congressional hearings, for example, they presented sta-
tistics which purported to show that Caucasians now outnum-
bered people of Japanese ancestry. The fact that these were
aberrant figures, based on temporary defense-related em-
ployment, was not overlooked by the congressmen. On aver-
age, during 1940–1950, Caucasians comprised not more than
25 percent of the total population. In contrast, the proportion
of Japanese citizens and residents remained fairly stationary,
around 37 percent, while the remainder of the population was
made up of Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians (about 15 percent),
Filipinos (about 12 percent), Chinese (6 percent), Puerto Ricans
(2 percent), and Koreans (less than 2 percent). Unable to argue
convincingly that Caucasians comprised a majority in the is-
lands, or indeed that they were the largest single ethnic group,
statehood proponents were obliged to argue that Hawaii’s di-
verse peoples were equally imbued with and sympathetic
toward the principles of American democracy as exemplified
in the nation’s Constitution. Some of the more cynical pro-
ponents were doubtless tempted to point out to visiting con-
gressmen that many existing mainland states, most notably in
the segregated South, were often oblivious to such principles.
Usually however, proponents were content to argue patiently
that Hawaii was a progressive social laboratory, united funda-
mentally by common values, racial toleration, and social assim-
ilation. Despite its more complex social and ethnic composition,
Hawaii certainly outstripped most mainland regions in these
terms. Nonetheless, the claims made about Hawaii’s achieve-
ments were sometimes exaggerated, and the evidence mar-
shalled to support them was often highly selective. Yet the
thrust of arguments advanced by proponents was sound. The
acculturation of Hawaii’s numerous ethnic groups was per-
sistent and irreversible. Group consciousness had waned, occu-
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pational and residential stratification was declining, economic
mobility and educational opportunity had improved, and inter-
marriage across racial lines was fairly common. 27
Despite the diverse backgrounds and sequential immi-
gration of Hawaii’s major ethnic groups, by the late 1940s all
had effected a considerable degree of social integration and ad-
justment to American culture and ideology. Widely available ed-
ucation was partly responsible for the patterns of persistent ac-
culturation. The territory inherited from the kingdom a unique
system of government-supported public education. Schooling
was compulsory and the attendance law was implemented with
reasonable success; after 1900 an estimated 80 percent of all
children were exposed to perhaps eight years of formal
schooling. The standards and availability of public schooling
were very high, comparable with those in mainland states. In
1907 this broadly based school system was complemented by
the establishment of the University of Hawaii. The Statehood
Commission exaggerated only slightly when, in 1948, it charac-
terized this campus as a unique environment, where growing
generations of Hawaiian-born Americans from both Eastern and
Western cultures mingled freely and in harmony under the
American flag. Measured in terms of general literacy and stan-
dards of instruction, the 1947 House investigating committee
concluded, Hawaii’s educational achievements exceeded those
in many states. Predictably, however, the children of the most
recent immigrant groups, notably the Filipinos, were least likely
to attend school. Outer-island institutions, which the children
of plantation workers were most likely to attend, were gener-
ally inferior to those on the more populous and urban Oahu.
Haole children were more likely to attend private schools and
mainland universities than their Oriental counterparts. The
public school system, however, exposed a substantial proportion
of children from all ethnic groups to educational programs of
a uniformly high standard. Moreover, these programs incor-
porated very self-conscious attempts to instill American ideas
and values in the young. The 1947 congressional team lauded
Hawaii for its outstanding efforts in its successful campaign to
institute Americanization in its schools. 28
Although there persisted until long after World War II con-
siderable variation in the amount of schooling the various
groups received, education transformed the values and aspira-
tions of all sectors of island society. From the late 1920s, as
the proportion of teachers trained in mainland institutions rose
sharply, schools and curricula were increasingly free of elite
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haole influence. Many teachers from the mainland were young.
“They came with this fresh, unbiased, idealistic concept un-
touched by the local hegemony,” Oshiro recalled. “They had a
tremendous impact, I think, on all of us.” Working with the in-
fluential principal of McKinley High School, Dr. Miles Carey, a
champion of open and progressive education, many teachers in
the territory’s public schools felt free to underscore inconsis-
tencies between American ideals as they were professed and
practiced in the islands. These specific influences, along with
the general impact of the idealism of the New Deal in the 1930s,
helped to undermine the authority of the old order and further
eroded the strength of ethnic customs and the use of languages
other than English. The experiences of Mitsuyuki Kido, one of
the first teachers of Japanese descent, typify such changes. “I
identified myself as a Democrat—I was enamored of FDR and
his idealism,” Kido recalled, and as a teacher, “I tried to point
out to my students some of the inequalities in Hawaiian so-
ciety—the political, economic and social structure was so con-
trolled by a small group that I felt that the American dream of a
free, democratic society was the thing we should try to achieve
in Hawaii.” Like Fuchs and other commentators, Kido agreed
that for the old order at least, education was a Trojan horse. He
observed that although the business elite recognized the perils
of his type of teaching, they could hardly interfere, given the
value they themselves placed on education. Much of this edu-
cation stressed the fundamental significance of democracy, eco-
nomic and social as well as political. 29
Education could not be controlled, even if its fruits were
at times unpalatable to some. Before the war some haoles had
lamented the costs and consequences of public education,
viewing it at worst as a menace and at best an unnecessary
extravagance. Even after the war some in Hawaii remained
anxious to limit the social and political consequences of broad
public education, especially as pressure for the redistribution of
power and wealth surfaced. But for many Caucasians, parents
and teachers, events up to 1945 had confirmed the value of ed-
ucation as a homogenizing agent and a vehicle for monitoring
and moulding social change. “In a degree astonishing to those
who note it for the first time‚” a private committee on Postwar
Needs of Hawaiian Education reported with evident relief,
“there has been a welding of this social miscellany [the per-
ceived extremity of Hawaii’s ethnic complexity] with all its
abrupt differences, into a democratic community.” Anticipating
the concern of those who sought to stifle or direct the forces of
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change unleashed by the war and the arrival of New Dealism
in the islands, this group asked: “How shall we go about con-
trolling social change?” Its answer perhaps overestimated the
power of schooling, but it nonetheless reflected a clear per-
ception of the relationship which existed between formal
learning and social change. Its reply was unequivocal. “In a
democratic community, by definition, the method of control is
always education.” Certainly the role of education as an agent
of acculturation cannot be dismissed, and many doubtless
shared this group’s view that in postwar Hawaii education was
a means to avert social instability as well as to illuminate and
assist in the achievement of democratic ideals. 30 Ironically, the
seeds sown by educators and teachers in prewar Hawaii later
gave rise to the very pressures this predominantly Caucasian
group wished to contain.
If acculturation through education was a broad often im-
perceptible process, it could also be an explicit, self-conscious
movement. During World War I and throughout the 1920s, in-
tolerant nativist groups throughout the United States had at-
tempted to impose total, unqualified Americanization on recent
arrivals from Europe. Assimilation through education and ac-
ceptance of Anglo-American customs and ideals was the central
thrust of this powerful, organized movement. In Hawaii such
pressures were less formal or overt, being most pronounced
in the years surrounding the war against Japan. Yet from the
time of their arrival as contract laborers, Hawaii’s various Asian
minorities, especially the large Japanese group, found that the
practice of American customs and ideals was a necessary pre-
condition to social and vocational acceptance by the dominant
white society. Americanization, as we have seen, was a central
aim of the islands’ educational system. Moreover, military rule
indicated firmly that in a time of stress Hawaii’s Japanese, and
to a lesser extent other Asian groups, were acutely vulnerable to
white suspicions and insecurities—fears similar to those which
had motivated the national Americanization movement a gen-
eration earlier. The Japanese had been obliged to demonstrate
their loyalty unequivocally during the war. In the postwar years
too they anxiously, and at times self-consciously, attempted to
demonstrate that they were Americanized beyond question. As
Gruening observed in 1947, “the loyalty of the Americans of
Japanese descent in Hawaii has not only been normal, it has
been conspicuous, exceptional and outstanding.”
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By the 1950s the chauvinistic concern with Americanization
might more appropriately have been directed against smaller
groups, especially the Filipinos and Hawaiians. The disadvan-
taged Filipino group was, as late as the 1940s and 1950s, ex-
periencing patterns of settlement and incorporation common to
first-or second-generation immigrant groups. Many Hawaiians
and part-Hawaiians were reluctant to accommodate themselves
fully to imported public norms and withdrew from or resisted
haole dominance. Edwin Burrows noted in 1947, for example,
that “recreation reversion” was increasingly common among
native Hawaiian groups, and was manifest in the revival of tra-
ditional pageantry and folklore. Alienation and demoralization,
as expressed in alcoholism and absenteeism from work or
school, also remained a feature of some native communities. 31
THE LIMITS OF STRUCTURAL ASSIMILATION
Supporters of statehood were understandably anxious to place
confident generalizations about Hawaii’s Americanization
before investigators, and they conveniently ignored evidence
which might have contradicted these generalizations. Fifteen
percent of Hawaii’s people were born outside Hawaii or the
mainland—one-quarter of all Koreans and more than half of
all Filipinos were still within this so-called alien category.
Moreover, as late as 1950 30 percent of Hawaii’s adult Japanese
and almost 20 percent of its adult Chinese did not qualify for
territorial citizenship. Only 65 percent of its adult population
had qualified for territorial citizenship (this figure was perhaps
artificially low, as all Americans who had not resided in the ter-
ritory for at least a year were excluded from citizenship). When
the last official survey of literacy was made in 1930, 15 percent
were judged to be illiterate (although almost without exception
this group comprised older people brought originally to the is-
lands from Asia before the end of contract labor). Approximately
one-quarter of the population surveyed could not speak English.
32 Moreover, pidgin English was still used widely, especially in
rural areas. Such information later provided valuable ammu-
nition to those who wished to defeat statehood.
Even some of Hawaii’s most ardent statehood supporters
acknowledged privately, if not publicly, that the degree of as-
similation of various ethnic groups, and of different generations
within each group, was not uniform. Quite appropriately, many
in Hawaii felt that thorough assimilation was a high price to
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pay for statehood. However, by focusing exclusively on those
trends in interethnic relations which would be viewed favorably
by congressional investigators, and by constantly asserting that
all groups had assimilated satisfactorily, proponents glossed
over the serious strains, divisions, and inequalities which still
characterized Hawaii’s social, economic, and political struc-
tures. The war record of Hawaii’s mixed races and the influx
of more white citizens could not camouflage these realities nor
quickly eradicate the legacy of more than half a century of
control by a relatively small group of haoles.
The war did not initiate fundamental social or political
changes in the islands. It did, however, dramatically accentuate
developments which had their roots in the peculiar labor and
immigrant patterns fostered by the powerful white minority
late in the nineteenth century. Second-and third-generation de-
scendents of imported Asian laborers were responsible for the
changes which surfaced tentatively in the 1930s, and which
reached fruition in the decade after World War II. The conse-
quences of these developments had been anticipated, and re-
sisted, by the old order. But while they could be delayed they
could not be permanently avoided. The children and grand-
children of Chinese contract laborers were the first Asians to
seek the rewards which had previously been reserved largely
for haoles and a few part-Hawaiians. However, the Chinese
made only a limited impact on existing social and political
arrangements, largely because by 1940 they comprised less
than 8 percent of Hawaii’s population. Initially their achieve-
ments were commercial and vocational rather than political.
Moreover, as later and numerically stronger laboring groups ar-
rived, many mobile Chinese identified increasingly with haole
aspirations and willingly supported the Republican party’s at-
tempts to preserve the political and economic status quo.
The large, increasingly visible Japanese American sector
of Hawaii was less affluent or mobile than the Chinese, but
it was numerically much stronger. The nisei had followed the
Chinese in grasping available educational opportunities and
moving from agricultural work to urban pursuits and small
businesses. It has been estimated that in the decade before
Pearl Harbor the Japanese operated more than 40 percent of
all retail outlets in the islands. A larger proportion of Japanese
than Hawaiians, Filipinos, or Koreans were also occupied in
managerial and professional positions. Nevertheless haoles and
Chinese still dominated virtually all avenues of commerce and
big business. As we have seen, the war heightened Japanese
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awareness of the social divisions and economic inequalities
within Hawaii, but virtually all had long understood the hi-
erarchical nature of the island community. Of all immigrant
groups, only the Filipinos had suffered more. The problems
confronting Filipinos stemmed largely from economic disadvan-
tages and political neglect. The Japanese experienced unequal
opportunities in social, vocational, and cultural fields. Their
numbers, cohesion, and aspirations were sufficient to threaten
many whites, Chinese, and Hawaiians, especially after they
began to exercise the vote in substantial numbers during the
1930s. The reaction against the Japanese exacerbated social
tensions, but could not ultimately thwart their legitimate aspi-
rations for equal citizenship rights. 33 Nonetheless, the decades
which saw their emergence were characterized by allegations
that they threatened the physical security and American values
of Hawaii, voted as a bloc along racial lines, and conspired
through organized political and trade union activities to
translate their numerical superiority into political and economic
supremacy. 34
Such charges betrayed fears of the consequences of genuine
political and industrial democracy, which before World War II
remained a distant prospect. Not until the late 1940s were
the votes of Hawaii’s Japanese a decisive factor in island pol-
itics. Similarly, in the industrial arena their influence came rel-
atively late. In the same year that Congress passed Roosevelt’s
Magna Carta for labor, the Wagner Act of 1935, total union
membership in Hawaii stood at only five hundred. New Deal leg-
islation encouraged rapid growth after this date. By 1940 ten
thousand Hawaiian workers, mostly Japanese, were unionized.
Controls imposed by the military government temporarily re-
versed this trend, halving membership in less than two years.
But by 1947 the unions had mushroomed, and now embraced
about sixty thousand workers. 35 Despite the postwar growth
of trade unions and the disproportionately heavy influence of
nisei in most unions, Japanese Americans still exerted only mar-
ginal influence on Hawaii’s political and economic life. Cer-
tainly, their power never mirrored their numerical strength.
After the 1920s and early 1930s second-and third-gener-
ation descen-dents of immigrant laborers moved increasingly
from plantations to towns and cities, most notably Hilo and Hon-
olulu. As defense spending increased, tertiary industry grew
and employment opportunities widened for most groups with
reasonable levels of education. Virtually all Chinese and most
Japanese had grasped these new opportunities by the
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mid-1950s and had migrated to new jobs and new, essentially
segmented neighborhoods in Honolulu or larger towns. The
process of acculturation accelerated substantially during and
after World War II. Urbanization, more varied employment,
longer periods of education and job training, and the growth
of a large, reasonably affluent middle class all boosted this
change. New systems of mass communication and advertis-
ing, most notably radio and television, allied to the growth of
modern patterns of consumerism which closely mirrored de-
velopments on the mainland, made the processes of American-
ization and acculturation even more pervasive. Other factors
reinforced this inexorable trend. Foremost among these were:
the expansion of expendable incomes associated with improved
living standards for all groups; more frequent geographic and
social mobility, which blurred class and ethnic divisions; and the
tourist boom, which had been so confidently anticipated in the
decade before statehood. 36
Occupational opportunities expanded for all groups after
1945, but in the face of declining haole paternalism and rising
Japanese influence, many Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians found
relatively good jobs more difficult to win. At the same time,
income differentials between the various ethnic groups declined
substantially. Yet professional and technical jobs were still dom-
inated disproportionately by Caucasians and Chinese, while Fil-
ipinos and Puerto Ricans filled very few such positions. Inequal-
ities in employee incomes reflected the persistence of economic
and social stratification. At the top were the Caucasians, fol-
lowed by Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, who all enjoyed sub-
stantial advantages over Hawaiians, Portuguese, Puerto Ricans,
and Filipinos. In 1950 the percentages of each major group
in professional occupations were estimated to be: Caucasians,
16.9; Chinese, 10.7; Koreans, 8.5; Japanese, 5.5; Hawaiians,
3.3; and Filipinos a mere 1.2. (Data for racially mixed groups
is not available, although in general it seems that the family
incomes of non-mixed households were higher than those of
mixed families.) Residential patterns, revealed most clearly in
Honolulu, also indicated as late as 1950 that ethnicity remained
a basic factor determining access to housing as well as em-
ployment. Although many Chinese and some Koreans and
Japanese had moved into predominantly white residential
neighborhoods, most descendents of contract laborers lived in
middle- or low-status areas. 37 Residential and vocational in-
equalities were reflected in and confirmed by informal patterns
of ethnic and class discrimination. While always more subtle
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and less pervasive than that confronted by black Americans in
most mainland states, informal discrimination and prejudice did
exist. The findings of a series of independent studies on con-
ditions in business, employment, the law courts, and housing
revealed discrimination against nonhaole groups, and a feeling
among haoles that they were inherently entitled to higher posi-
tions and better treatment than others. Discrimination against
Chinese and Japanese groups, however, was often mitigated by
the relatively high economic and social position of the Chinese,
or by the support given to Japanese by other members of their
numerically strong and now modestly mobile group. 38
According to Harry V. Ball and Douglas S. Yamamura, eco-
nomic factors alone rarely affected the patterns of discrimi-
nation. To the extent that economic or class factors could be
isolated from ethnic ones, they concluded, discrimination ap-
peared to derive essentially from racial considerations. When
Robert Oshiro returned to Hawaii in 1954 with a master of
law degree from Duke University, he confronted a situation
all too common to educated nonwhites—his application for a
position with a Big Five firm was rejected with the phrase,
“We never hire a local.” In the decade after the war many of
Hawaii’s Japanese still felt themselves the victims of unequal
opportunities resulting from discrimination, both conscious and
unconscious, by the haole establishment. A series of recent in-
terviews with the men who led attempts by the AJAs to re-
shape island politics after 1945 are dotted with references to
such discrimination. Examples discussed range from differential
wages, unwritten rules that AJAs not be hired by the legislature,
clear restrictions against Japanese living in some residential
areas, exclusion from social and sporting clubs and business or-
ganizations, and a general belief that local politics was under
the control, for the most part, of the Caucasians. William
Richardson, a Burns supporter of mixed Hawaiian, Chinese, and
English ancestry, was no less disturbed than his nisei friends
by this concentration of power and privilege. The Japanese
had numerical superiority, he observed, but that was all. In re-
action, AJAs formed their own clubs and organizations. Murai
commented in reference to one such association, the Japanese
Chamber of Commerce, that it was a necessary measure, to
provide an economic defense. Significantly, the Japanese
Chamber of Commerce was widely known as the Kenjinkai, a
name which implied that its intended function was as a means
to help Japanese children better themselves occupationally or
socially. Yet if unequal treatment nurtured a desire for change,
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very few nisei reacted with bitterness or overt hostility. Despite
Theon Wright’s exaggerated claim that deep resentment had
been building and festering among the Japanese, especially the
second generation, since the early plantation days and that
it erupted dramatically after World War II, most AJAs were
content to work patiently through established political channels
in a society which they were apparently confident would even-
tually respond to their needs. 39
Haoles enjoyed unique privileges and advantages in virtually
every aspect of life. This favorable position had emerged in the
late nineteenth century and was deeply embedded in the insti-
tutional and social structure of the islands. As late as 1950, for
example, Stainback reported privately to Washington: “I am the
first Governor that ever appointed a single citizen of Japanese
ancestry to any position whatsoever in the Territory.” (Given
the governor’s unrelenting hostility to Hawaii’s Japanese com-
munity, the irony of this claim could scarcely have escaped
officials of Truman’s administration.) Filipinos and Japanese re-
mained largely excluded from political office, landownership,
and high-status jobs until the late 1940s. Some Chinese and
Hawaiians who supported the oligarchy expressed concern that
even within the Republican party haoles enjoyed special advan-
tages. Race preferences and racial ideas inevitably developed to
sustain and protect these unequal privileges. Suspicions voiced
against the Japanese can only be understood in this light.
Various studies have concluded that ethnocentrism, racial
stereotyping, and high levels of social distance between groups
persisted in Hawaii throughout the 1950s, and indeed long
after statehood. 40 Obviously, expressed racial prejudice was
not restricted to whites against Japanese, but this antipathy
was the most widespread. In contrast, white-Hawaiian relations
were still often broadly paternalistic, although in the decade
before statehood an increased proportion of Hawaiians and
part-Hawaiians found greater independence and joined labor
unions or the Democratic party.
The protection of existing privileges for whites and a few
others, mainly Chinese, demanded that patterns of political
domination be sustained if possible. Robin M. Williams, Jr., has
written that “whenever a number of persons within a society
have enjoyed for a considerable period of time certain oppor-
tunities for getting wealth, for exercising power and authority,
and for successfully claiming prestige and social deference,
there is a strong tendency for these people to feel that these
benefits are theirs ‘by right.’” The conflicts which surfaced in
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Hawaii between unions (largely Japanese) and business groups
(largely white) in the decade after the war symbolized the vig-
orous defense of what Williams calls “an established system
of vested interests” by a long-dominant group against an un-
precedented challenge from other groups. In identifying both
the industrial and political wings of this threat as Communist
led or dominated, the old order in Hawaii grasped hopefully at
an issue calculated to rally broader resistance. 41 But the un-
equal allocation and control of political and economic resources
in the islands could no longer be sustained with customary as-
surance. It began to crack in the face of a rising middle class,
greater mobility and assertiveness by all non-Caucasian groups,
organized labor, and the growth of a determined young Democ-
ratic party. But as late as the 1950s these cracks were still rela-
tively narrow.
Ownership of real property was more concentrated in
Hawaii than in any mainland state. This unequal situation was
a legacy of haole domination at the time of annexation, and it
persisted throughout the six decades of territorial rule. In 1959
eleven families controlled more than half of all private land in
Hawaii (or expressed another way, 30 percent of all available
land). It was estimated that not more than one hundred families
still owned about 90 percent of all privately owned land. Only
2.5 percent of land (two hundred thousand acres) was set aside
for ownership by native Hawaiians under the provisions of the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921, an act designed, in
its own words, “not only to put the Hawaiians back onto the land
but by doing so to place them in more healthful surroundings,
withdrawing them from crowded city tenements, and in this way
to rehabilitate the race.” The native population also benefitted
from the activities of the largest single landholder, the Bishop
Estate. Established following a bequest from Princess Bernice
Pauahi in 1884, this charitable trust controlled 22 percent of
nongovernment land on Oahu and about 16 percent of all such
land throughout the islands. The estate was dedicated to pro-
viding access to land and education for Hawaiians which, it was
anticipated, would enable them to “compete with other nation-
alities in the struggle for national existence.” 42 Despite these
important concessions to native Hawaiians, a postwar congres-
sional team correctly pointed out that land remained concen-
trated in the hands of a few individuals, companies, or estates,
a situation without parallel in any mainland state. 43
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The distribution of wealth was substantially more equitable
than the distribution of land, but Hawaii remained deeply strat-
ified in income terms. Moreover wealth and ethnic background
were still closely correlated, despite the increased socioeco-
nomic mobility which characterized many areas of postwar life.
Certainly Hawaii’s Chinese and Japanese made substantial
gains after 1945. As measured in per capita terms, the Chinese
had by 1959 replaced haoles as the wealthiest ethnic group.
This change was influenced by two important factors: the im-
mense wealth of a small number of new Chinese millionaire
businessmen like Chinn Ho and Hiram Fong, and the influx of
large numbers of mainland white wage and salary earners in
defense and service industries, especially tourism, which sub-
stantially reduced the average per capita income of whites. Wen
Lang Li has generalized on the impressiveness of the upward
social mobility of Chinese Americans throughout the United
States within the previous two decades. Li’s observation might
reasonably be applied to Hawaii’s Chinese in an earlier period,
immediately after the war. Certainly island Chinese were even
more successful, more assimilated, better educated, and less di-
vided along vocational lines than were their mainland counter-
parts. Yet as Li cautions, assimilation is not the same thing as
integration. Hawaii’s Chinese may have been less isolated than
mainland Chinese from primary contacts with their host so-
ciety, but by the 1950s neither Chinese group was substantially
integrated. Writing of Hawaii’s Chinese more than a decade
after statehood, Nancy Young argued that postwar predictions
of the total assimilation of this group were inaccurate. She ob-
served that, for a large proportion of Hawaii’s Chinese, their
most meaningful nonoccupational activities took place within an
exclusively Chinese social environment. She further concluded
that a strong ethnic identification persisted among the Chinese
in Hawaii. 44
The remarkable material success of Hawaii’s Chinese was
not duplicated by any other ethnic group. It reflected both
their social cohesion and relatively early arrival in the islands.
However, later arrivals also improved their own material con-
ditions. But as the Japanese and Filipino experiences suggest,
these groups rarely changed their economic situation relative to
that of other groups. Moreover, the first settlers, the Hawaiians,
were by the 1950s last in socioeconomic terms. Median income
distribution in the decade 1949–1959 suggested the persistence
of class divisions which generally coincided with ethnic divi-
sions. Caucasians and Chinese were in the top bracket,
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Japanese occupied the middle range, and Filipinos, Hawaiians,
and part-Hawaiians were the poorest. Such figures, however,
do not indicate the substantial inequalities which existed within
each group, although they do suggest a general correlation be-
tween class and ethnicity. 45
The large Japanese group now occupied a lower middle po-
sition in economic terms, but Japanese access to real property
was limited. Despite increased political, commercial, and ed-
ucational participation, most Japanese remained socially, and
to a lesser extent economically, separate. Certainly in terms
of primary relationships they were at most only marginally as-
similated. Japanese was the most widely used language after
English and pidgin. Buddhism remained a substantial religious
alternative to Christianity. It was estimated that 70 percent of
Hawaii’s Japanese were nominal Buddhists in the 1950s. Private
education and managerial positions were less available to nisei
than to whites. Japanese businessmen maintained a separate
Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Honolulu. As late as 1960
approximately 12 percent of Hawaii’s Japanese were foreign-
born. The last available data on the proportion of Japanese who
were citizens, that for 1950, indicated that one-quarter of adult
Japanese did not meet this formal criterion of Americanization.
After the war Hawaii’s Japanese were far more assertive polit-
ically than their counterparts on the West Coast. The relative
numerical strength of island Japanese was largely responsible
for this. But both groups were now located essentially within
middle vocational and educational ranges. Indeed, at the time
of statehood, the median income of Hawaii’s Japanese exceeded
that of its whites. However, this upward economic mobility did
not quickly translate into definite patterns of assimilation in
primary terms. Erosion of ethnic cohesion and separation was
fairly slow in both Japanese American groups, although gradual
and uneven changes were taking place. By the late 1950s very
few nisei or sansei (third-generation AJAs) did not endorse pub-
licly dominant American values or patterns of secondary be-
havior. Yet most of Hawaii’s Japanese still identified with, and
lived within, a fairly viable ethnic community—even if this com-
munity was less separate or clearly defined in the late 1950s
than at any time before the war.
Evidence available on the degree and nature of assimilation
and integration by Hawaii’s Japanese in the 1950s is essentially
ambiguous and incomplete. But recent studies have conceded
that considerable acculturation had taken place. Despite this
homogenizing trend, however, ethnic group solidarity persisted,
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and the primary relationships enjoyed by Japanese Americans
remained fairly distinct from those of the wider community.
Like Hawaii’s Chinese, or Asian groups throughout the nation,
the substantial Americanization or assimilation of Hawaii’s Jap-
anese did not necessarily imply rapid or thorough integration
in structural terms. Indeed, more than a decade after statehood
a number of authors continued to draw attention to the persis-
tence of ethnic social cohesion, the strength of extended family
ties, and the tendency among various ethnic groups to cling
to cultural practices transported by their ancestors from Asia.
Michael Haas and Peter Resurrection observed in 1976, for ex-
ample, that “social life tends to focus around members of ex-
tended families, which usually share a common ethnic identity,
with the result that members of diverse groups who work side
by side in the daytime may be unaware of the home life of their
co-workers in the evenings and weekends.” “In this respect,”
they concluded, “Hawaii’s social patterns are segregated along
racial and class lines.” 46
If by the late 1950s Hawaii’s Japanese were marginally as-
similated in secondary terms only, the Filipino, Hawaiian, and
part-Hawaiian groups were even more separate and acutely
disadvantaged. They had the lowest per capita incomes, the
highest infant mortality rates, the least education, and were
the least urbanized. As late as 1950 less than 15 percent of
adult Filipinos were citizens, while more than 40 percent of
all Filipinos were born outside the United States. The unem-
ployment rate among Filipino aliens was so high in 1950 that
the territorial government investigated ways of transporting six
thousand of them to California, where it was hoped they could
find work as farm laborers. The chairman of Stainback’s Full
Employment Committee was among those who thought this a
convenient way to reduce unemployment and the drain on the
territory’s welfare funds. Despite Hawaii’s high average living
standards, and in the words of the Statehood Commission a
“notable health record,” native Hawaiians and many Filipinos
had access only to an inferior health delivery service. Stainback
acknowledged privately in 1950 that, “Our tuberculosis rate is
one of the highest in the nation, and the rate among the native
Hawaiians is appalling.” Many members of these groups may
have shared ideals and nationalist values with other citizens
of Hawaii, but in social and economic terms they were still
undeniably disadvantaged. David Trask, Jr., a prominent part-
Hawaiian, detected racial and class distinctions in island so-
ciety more than a generation after the war. His observation was
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applicable, at the very least, to those of Hawaiian or Filipino
extraction. The persistence of local culture, referred to earlier
in this chapter, both reflected and compounded these socioeco-
nomic and status divisions. 47
Postwar Hawaii was an increasingly open and mobile so-
ciety. Nevertheless, not all groups shared equally in this change.
Writing shortly after statehood, Lind, while subscribing to the
belief that broad opportunities existed for all groups, still cau-
tioned: “we must recognize that not all of the immigrant groups
have availed themselves of the opportunities for economic and
social advancement to the same degree and that the more re-
cently arrived immigrant groups necessarily operate at a dis-
advantage as compared to the earlier arrivals.” 48 However,
despite their early special relationship with white society, by
the 1940s and 1950s the descendents of Hawaii’s native pop-
ulation were increasingly exposed to disadvantages not unlike
those experienced by the newest nonwhite arrivals. The rapid
growth of Chinese and Japanese influence was accompanied by
a relative loss of status and influence for native Hawaiians. They
now gained fewer and fewer tangible rewards from the pater-
nalism which had characterized prewar society. Moreover, they
were too weak economically and still too few in number to com-
pete effectively with the larger Oriental groups.
Typical of many white liberal assessments of the way native
Hawaiians had responded to the loss of land, authority, and
culture was Burns’ comment: “I don’t think they allowed them-
selves to brood on it too much. That was the way it was—Take it,
enjoy life while you can enjoy it, go ahead.” The belief that ac-
commodation was an appropriate response to subjugation per-
meated white thinking long after World War II. Haoles “always
wanted to keep the vast and unruly mass of natives from the
ballot,” Burns recalled, and Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians
often accepted this as they accepted other changes, because
they knew resistance would be futile. Like many dispossessed
aboriginal peoples in other parts of the Pacific, native
Hawaiians tended to internalize the very assumption of inferi-
ority used by white settlers to rationalize colonization. Power-
lessness, paternalism, and inequality gradually inculcated what
Burns and other locals referred to as “a subtle inferiority of
spirit”—feelings of incompetence and separateness bred of
domination by other cultures. And the haole paternalism which
had helped nurture these feelings dissipated very slowly. For
example, Elizabeth Farrington observed with unintended irony
many years after statehood, that “everything” the Hawaiians
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have “progressed towards has been because of the education
they’ve gotten from us.” She further suggested that if the native
population had been left to run Hawaii it might not be far re-
moved from the Stone Age. 49
If many Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians experienced a loss
of pride and self-confidence, some other groups shared this
problem, although to a substantially lesser degree. Burns noted
that, like Hawaiians, many local Japanese simply accepted their
unequal position in society. Almost a generation after statehood,
a prominent member of Hawaii’s Japanese community com-
mented on the largely undiluted pervasiveness of haole mores
and institutions, and concluded sadly: “Now, even today, the
thing to be is a Haole, you know what I mean? To acculimate
[sic] yourself to our society is to act like a Haole and Haoles—so-
called Haoles—from the good old days when they were always
the better bred people and so forth…. it was never good to be
on the other side of the fence.” The descendents of some of
Hawaii’s native peoples were afforded minority influence within
the very paternalistic apparatus of the local Republican party
after annexation. In the face of expanding Asian immigration
Hawaiians sided with the Republicans. The more numerous de-
scendents of Hawaii’s Japanese, however, experienced no real
political compensations for their general social exclusion until
after the Pacific War. 50
Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians were more likely to oppose
statehood than were members of other ethnic groups. Their hos-
tility was nurtured by concerns more substantial than racial
animosity toward the Japanese, or understandable alarm that
demographic and voting changes would quickly erode native
political influence. Statehood undoubtedly symbolized to some
descendents of the indigenous population the total demise of
traditional culture and social patterns. It signalled the victory
of foreign practices and values, whether they be of occidental
or oriental origin, over those which characterized the islands
before missionaries arrived in the 1820s. “Something inde-
finable would be lost,” Alice Kamokila Campbell, a very wealthy
part-Hawaiian territorial senator who claimed Hawaiian royalty
as her immediate ancestors, observed sadly. “I do not feel …
that we should forfeit the traditional rights and privileges of
the natives of our islands for a mere thimbleful of votes in
Congress, that we, the lovers of Hawaii from long association
with it, should sacrifice our birthright for the greed of alien de-
sires to remain on our shores.” Alice Campbell’s views were
not necessarily those of all or even most islanders of Hawaiian
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ancestry; but she was the most prominent, and certainly the
most outspoken, representative of her people. During the war
she championed martial law and assailed Hawaii’s Japanese, al-
though her hostility to statehood did not derive simply from her
feelings about the local Japanese community. She was a genuine
conservative and a fervent, if sometimes eccentric, Hawaiian
nationalist. If old Hawaii could not be revived, she felt, then
certainly nothing should be done which might further distance
the patterns of island life from those of the nineteenth century.
Statehood would simply compound the indignities of territorial
rule, unleash new changes, and quicken the end of traditional
Hawaii. 51
The number of pure Hawaiians had declined to only ten
thousand by 1945. About sixty-one thousand, 12 percent of
Hawaii’s total population, were of part-Hawaiian extraction.
Disturbed by their loss of numbers, land, and influence, some
Hawaiians resisted statehood. In part, this was simply a gesture
of hostility; but some believed statehood would confirm the po-
litical and economic power of the overwhelming non-Hawaiian
majority. The total number of Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians
in 1940 was substantially less than the number of either the
Japanese or Caucasians, and only marginally greater than the
number of Filipinos. Statehood, they believed, would accentuate
the influence of this alien majority which was both unsympa-
thetic toward and unfamiliar with the customs and feelings
of native Hawaiians, whom Senator Campbell called “the real
people of Hawaii.” 52 Understandably, a residue of native re-
sentment remained against changes imposed by immigration
over which they had exercised no real control after 1893. But
belated verbal protests could not stifle further change or re-
capture a past now submerged beneath more than a century of
foreign penetration and settlement.
Status distinctions both reflected and reinforced class and
ethnic divisions. The material success of many Chinese and
the political assertiveness of many Japanese meant that by the
mid-1950s haole dominance was under strong challenge for the
first time since the late nineteenth century. But the status pat-
terns which Jitsuichi Matsuoka and others had identified before
the war remained largely intact. On the basis of a study of
race preferences among Hawaii’s Japanese, Matsuoka argued
that status reflected socioeconomic factors rather than phys-
iognomy. The order of preference expressed by Japanese was:
other Japanese, Caucasians, Chinese, white-Hawaiians, Korean,
Hawaiian, Portuguese, Filipino, and Puerto Rican. Moreover,
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within each group significant status differences persisted. For
example, Hawaiians descended from chiefs were viewed as su-
perior to commoners; Hakka Chinese were considered inferior
to Punti; and Okinawans were the least respected Japanese. In
general, studies of island society from the 1930s to the 1950s
agree that substantial status divisions persisted, and identify
the gradient of social preferences as haole -Chinese -Japanese
-Filipino, with native Hawaiians interspersed throughout the
lower end of the continuum. Non-Caucasian groups, Burrows
observed in 1947, invariably discovered that “the tolerance and
friendliness among races, for which Hawaii has been justly cel-
ebrated, prevailed only within limits, and at a price.” He con-
cluded that in postwar Hawaii “the price demanded by the
dominant haoles—never in so many words, but nevertheless in-
sistent—has been cheerful acceptance by other peoples of a
subordinate place.” 53
This pattern of substantial ethnic segmentation, in primary
terms at least, was compounded and complicated by socioeco-
nomic divisions. Moreover, it was prolonged, in part, by subtle
forms of discrimination as well as the persistence of pater-
nalism, especially by whites toward Hawaiians. Studies under-
taken in the decade before statehood revealed considerable
resentment among non-Caucasians against unequal opportu-
nities in employment, the administration of justice, and housing.
Many educated nonhaoles, in particular, felt frustrated by what
they saw as economic and social discrimination against them,
and criticized the importation of whites to fill managerial or
skilled positions. Despite “its unique degree of racial hetero-
geneity and overt norms of racial tolerance,” Graham Kinloch
and Geoffrey Borders concluded a generation after the war,
“racial tension and conflict is far from being entirely absent.”
In contrast to many mainland areas, severe ethnic conflict and
explicit racism rarely disrupted life in Hawaii. Serious racial
tensions surfaced only occasionally after World War II, most no-
tably in the form of resentment against the increasingly visible
presence of Japanese in trade unions, jobs, and politics. 54
Like most immigrant-receiving regions throughout the
United States, Hawaii had experienced only limited and uneven
structural assimilation by the 1950s, although acculturation
was well developed if less pervasive than in mainland commu-
nities. In general, class and ethnicity overlapped in the island
community. Some members of all immigrant groups had experi-
enced substantial socioeconomic mobility. Most shared common
secondary relationships in such areas as public education, po-
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litical participation, and consumerism. Still, there were only
partial similarities in the primary relationships and experiences
of most groups, including those descended from immigrant
Asian labor, notably the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos.
Haoles and Hawaiians, for very different reasons and in very dif-
ferent ways, shared few primary experiences with each other or
with Asian minorities. Like most descendents of mainland immi-
grants who arrived after the Civil War, minorities in the islands
maintained social substructures which largely embraced fellow
ethnics. “In Hawaii it was not so much income or occupation
that determined one’s friends, voting affiliations, or prospects
for power and prestige,” Fuchs has written. “In the forty years
that followed Annexation, the people of Hawaii thought of them-
selves not primarily as doctors, lawyers, druggists or field
hands—or even as Americans—but as haoles, Hawaiians, Por-
tuguese, Chinese, Japanese or Filipinos.” This social pattern
broke down only slowly after the war. 55 Given Hawaii’s rel-
atively compressed history as an immigrant-receiving, white-
dominated society, the persistence of such divisions is not unex-
pected. It is perhaps more difficult to explain the substantial ac-
culturation of Hawaii’s mixed peoples to Anglo-American values
than it is to understand why primary-group cohesion remained
a fundamental characteristic of the various ethnic minorities.
Given the patterns of acculturation discussed here, it is
not surprising that support for statehood transcended racial,
economic, and political divisions within Hawaiian society. All
postwar congressional investigations acknowledged this fact,
and as a corollary, accepted that all segments of the island
community were fundamentally Americanized. Nonetheless, in
1947 an investigating team cautioned: “With so many children
of alien parentage among them, a definite program of American-
ization is necessary.” 56 Americanization had developed rapidly
but, this observation implied, it was not yet complete. In the
years after the war local opponents of statehood clung to the
view that Hawaii’s predominantly nonwhite peoples were not
sufficiently Americanized to warrant statehood. A few argued
that such racially diverse people could never become truly
American, that ideological assimilation could never overcome
racial and ethnic group consciousness. Nevertheless, the evi-
dence of growing acculturation persuaded every team of con-
gressional investigators after the war that Hawaii was equipped
for statehood.
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Racial fears and antagonism were deep-rooted and seldom
amenable to rational argument. Opposition to statehood based
on fear of Japanese political influence, Louis Cain noted in
the late 1930s, “presupposes disloyalty of citizens of alien
parentage, presumes that a minority voting as a racial bloc
would prevail, and that traitors would be elected.” In objective
terms, the years 1941–1945 had invalidated such suspicions.
But those preoccupied with questions of race were seldom af-
fected by the evidence of Japanese loyalty and sacrifice in the
war. Cain warned congressional investigators before the war
of the danger of setting up race as an obstacle to statehood.
Such a stance, he proposed, was not only irrational but un-
American, and threatened to disrupt the atmosphere of racial
tolerance which characterized Hawaii. “I submit to you that you
cannot breed loyalty with suspicion. To raise embargoes on cit-
izenship because of ancestry would tend to force the people
so accused into racial blocs for self-protection.” 57 These were
fine sentiments, and they were even more appropriate after
Pearl Harbor than before. Yet in both Hawaii and in Congress,
substantial numbers remained unimpressed by the view that
Hawaii’s Japanese were thoroughly Americanized and entitled
to full citizenship under statehood. As the possibility of action
by Congress improved after the war, opposition to statehood
became more explicit, forceful, and overt. It remained very
much a minority sentiment, but it was no longer confined to the
private whisperings of a few.
Debate over the Americanization of Hawaii’s people became
more public and more ideological as it was affected by the
growing national controversy over internal subversion and un-
American activities in the early years of the cold war. Ultimately,
the wild charges made during the McCarthy era against the
island community were exposed as irrelevant to statehood and
without foundation. The exaggerated charges made by
statehood opponents were contradicted at every turn by the
deep-rooted Americanization of the islands which had begun
more than a century earlier. Nonetheless, during the late 1940s
and early 1950s the nature of Hawaii’s Americanization was
again the subject of bitter national debate.
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Chapter 5
Issues Confused,
1946–1950: Civil Rights,
Party Politics, and
Communism
Hawaii remained essentially isolated from the economic and
social forces which shaped change in mainland America before
World War II. But new energies and pressures were released
immediately after hostilities ended. These rapidly transformed
existing social and political arrangements in the territory, and
precipitated intense conflicts in virtually every sphere of com-
munity life. In large part the seeds of change had lain dormant
in prewar Hawaii, unable to flower in the tightly controlled,
uniquely complex island environment. After 1945, however, the
ethnic and class tensions which cut across all aspects of com-
munity and politics quickly surfaced. Initially, the most apparent
postwar development was the emergence of a strong, orga-
nized, allegedly Communist-controlled labor movement. The re-
action of the old order to this new symbol of industrial and
social confrontation was harsh and exceedingly determined.
The ensuing conflict between labor and management, between
wage earners and the owners of property, had an indirect but
decisive bearing on Hawaii’s statehood aspirations. Political and
ideological struggles in Hawaii during 1946–1950 anticipated
and in some ways foreshadowed disputes focused nationally by
McCarthyism. After the war the question of statehood was inex-
tricably confused with the issues of communist subversion and
internal security. The alleged relationship between statehood
for a vulnerable Pacific territory and the internal security of the
nation became the principal explicit objection voiced against
statehood both locally and in Congress. Hawaii’s record during
the Pacific War had made it difficult to portray the Japanese
per se as the enemy within. But the cold war made it possible
to level this emotive charge against allegedly Communist-led
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unions which were supported overwhelmingly by workers of
Asian extraction. Thus, conveniently, opposition to trade unions
and anti-Japanese sentiment converged. This curious amalgam
of anti-communism and racism was to prove a frustrating new
obstacle to statehood.
The statehood issue was not only confused by the crusade
against communism, it was also enmeshed in the bitter sec-
tional conflicts over the related issues of civil rights for ethnic
minorities, the limits of state control over racial practices within
their borders, and the ongoing contest for power in Congress
between the two major political parties and factions within
these parties. Hawaii’s admission threatened to disrupt the po-
litical and sectional status quo in Congress. Statehood was
an explicit challenge to the power and interests of a conser-
vative coalition of old guard Republicans and Southern De-
mocrats. This group fought vigorously against any erosion of its
influence, and in so doing it resisted Hawaii’s bid for statehood.
After 1945 congressional action was determined much less by
the validity of Hawaii’s appeals for entry than by the anticipated
effects this might have on civil rights legislation and sectional
and political strength in Washington.
AN OPTIMISTIC CAMPAIGN
Hawaii’s formal statehood campaign was revived and restruc-
tured shortly after the war. The early enthusiasm which pro-
moted these initiatives soon evaporated, however, as local pro-
ponents accepted reluctantly that a forceful and expensive cam-
paign could only exert modest influence in Washington. In May
1946 a Citizens’ Statehood Committee replaced the old Equal
Rights Commission. 1 The new committee was financed from
the governor’s contingency fund—an arrangement later found
to be unsatisfactory because it relied on the sympathy of an
official appointed by Washington. The Citizens’ Committee was
headed by an executive board of 15 members, and supported
by a general committee of 230 with representatives from all
the major islands. The executive board was appointed by the
governor, but a majority of its members was drawn from the
local legislature. The general committee included all members
of the legislature and the former Equal Rights Commission, the
mayor of Honolulu, and representatives of business, academic,
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and civic groups. An initial fund of ten thousand dollars was al-
located to support the new organization, and additional grants
were to be given when required. 2
Joseph Farrington, the wealthy son of a former governor
of the territory and Republican delegate to Congress until his
sudden death in 1954, gave firm guidance to the early postwar
drive for eventual admission. He was actively supported by an-
other Republican, former delegate Sam King, whom Eisenhower
later appointed governor of the territory. Both men had sat pa-
tiently in Congress as virtual observers, denied the right to
vote. Both were keenly aware that minority opinion often pre-
vailed in Congress, as procedural obstacles could negate or at
least delay legislation which might have commanded majority
support on the floors of each chamber. Other proponents grad-
ually learned what Farrington and King were doubtless con-
scious of in 1946–1947—that committee maneuvering and back
room strategies were often decisive in Congress. They also
learned, along with many liberals and blacks from mainland
states, not to underestimate the entrenched conservatism or
tactical ability of old guard Republicans and Southern De-
mocrats.
In the early postwar years, however, most statehood pro-
ponents optimistically felt that popular democratic pressure
would overcome the hostility of an apparently small faction
of congressmen determined to defeat Hawaii. Farrington, it
seems, was somewhat more realistic. He asked members of
the territory’s legislature to establish a permanent office in
Washington as a vehicle for lobbying Congress. However, De-
mocratic appointee Governor Stainback was unimpressed by
this view. He rejected Farrington’s request, claiming that the
use of territorial funds to support the delegate in Washington
would involve partisan politics, and would undermine the ex-
isting unity which the drive for statehood had forged between
diverse political parties and factions. Stainback also refused to
call a special session of the legislature to consider the type
of campaign most appropriate for the islands. The governor
had previously supported statehood and was a member of the
Equal Rights Commission; but by mid-1946 local Democrats as
well as Republicans like King openly criticized his new ambiva-
lence on this issue. A few months earlier the central committee
of Hawaii’s Democratic party had recommended successfully
to Truman that Stainback be reappoint-ed. This was an action
which all progressive local Democrats and sincere statehood
proponents later regretted. 3
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The activities of the Statehood Committee during 1946 typ-
ified the sort of campaign pursued by local proponents until
1959. It distributed more than thirty-eight thousand items of
statehood data in Hawaii and the mainland, and sent fifteen
hundred lengthy statements of Hawaii’s qualifications for
statehood to congressmen, newspapers, and a variety of na-
tional organizations. 4 Estimates made shortly after the war indi-
cated that more than 90 percent of all mainland newspapers
supported immediate statehood. It was also endorsed by such
diverse organizations as the Disabled American Veterans, the
National Education Association, the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, more than two thousand
Chambers of Commerce, and the House Committee on Terri-
tories. 5
Dissatisfied with the existing organizational base of the cam-
paign, but delighted with the massive national support
statehood had now received, the territorial legislature took firm
control of the campaign. On February 24, 1947, the president of
the local senate, Eugene S. Capellas, introduced a bill to set up
a statehood body supported by appropriations granted by the
legislature rather than the governor’s contingency fund. This
body was designed to replace the loosely organized citizens’
group which had established temporary offices in Honolulu and
Washington, but lacked adequate financial support. Proponents
were convinced by early 1947 that Stainback was reluctant to
either support immediate statehood or provide sufficient funds
for this purpose to the committee. Thus in May 1947, members
of the legislature overcame the governor’s ambivalence by es-
tablishing a permanent eight-member Statehood Commission
with a budget of two hundred thousand dollars for 1947–1948.
At the same time, a resolution supporting immediate admission
unanimously passed the local house and senate. 6
The bipartisan commission was appointed in June. Its
original members were: A. T. Longley, chairman; King, Metzger,
and Trask, members at large; Gavien Bush, county of Hawaii;
Charles A. Rice, county of Kauai; F. W. Broadbent, county of
Maui; and Lorrin P. Thurston, county of Oahu. (Thurston was
a surprise choice, as the influential Advertiser, which he partly
owned, was unsympathetic to statehood, and many islanders
felt he shared this opinion.) George W. McLane was appointed
full-time executive secretary of the commission. An additional
committee comprising six senators and six members of the
House of Representatives was appointed to advise the com-
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mission. 7 Responsibility for conducting the statehood campaign
was thereby made a de facto function of the territorial legis-
lature.
From mid-1947 until statehood was finally achieved, the
commission conducted an expensive and necessarily protracted
campaign for immediate admission. However, its responsibil-
ities were broadly defined and included tasks not directly re-
lated to statehood as such. The commission was instructed to:
(a) support the movement for admission of the territory to
statehood; (b) until such admission is granted, advocate and
support the rights and claims of the territory and its inhabitants
to treatment or usage, the same as, or equal to, that received by
the several states of the United States Union from the Federal
Government; (c) oppose and attempt to defeat or prevent federal
and state legislation discriminatory against the territory and its
inhabitants; and (d) assist the legislature in attaining such amend-
ments to the Organic Act as are duly requested by the legislature.
The commission was directed to correct any misinformation or
refute any false statements made about the territory, and to
provide members of staff to testify before congressional investi-
gating committees. Provision was made for it to carry on adver-
tising and publicity campaigns on a national or regional scale
and to perform any functions it considered “necessary or ad-
visable” to promote the interests of the territory. 8 Despite con-
stant setbacks in Washington and periodic criticism at home,
the commission met its obligations enthusiastically and effec-
tively during its unexpectedly long life. Short of actually gaining
statehood, however, the commission was powerless to ensure
that the territory and its citizens be granted equality with the
existing states, and unable to insist that Congress not discrim-
inate against the territory.
The commission maintained offices in Honolulu and Wash-
ington. After mid-1947 it published folders, pamphlets, and
books on statehood, and intermittently, the Hawaii Statehood
News. It regularly submitted details of Hawaii’s statehood qual-
ifications to members of Congress, government offices and de-
partments, mainland newspapers and magazines, business and
community organizations, schools and universities. Its office
maintained contact with more than seventeen hundred daily
newspaper editors, and in the first decade of its operations the
number of editorials favoring statehood grew from a modest
five hundred to about three thousand annually. It distributed up
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to forty thousand pamphlets and other literature on statehood
each year. In addition it lobbied all representatives and senators
in Washington by periodically bombarding them with a blizzard
of private letters. More significantly, members of the com-
mission lobbied energetically on Capitol Hill, giving special at-
tention to committee members and floor leaders. Farrington,
King, McLane, and McLane’s successors Jack M. Fox and Jan
Jabulka were the most effective lobbyists in Washington until
Burns arrived as the new delegate to Congress in 1956. 9 After
1946 the commission’s Washington office supplied a prodigious
amount of material to congressmen of all political persuasions.
Virtually all the information used by supporters of statehood in
subsequent debate in Congress, as well as much of the basic in-
formation cited by opponents (such as that on Hawaii’s mixed
population), was supplied through the Washington office, al-
though it was usually collected and organized by supporters in
Honolulu. 10 This exhaustive campaign promoted strong public
and newspaper support throughout most mainland states, and
helped to convince a growing number of congressmen that
Hawaii was theoretically entitled to statehood. These develop-
ments alone were no guarantee that Congress would act fa-
vorably and decisively, but they were indispensable preliminary
steps to eventual action.
The first postwar Congress, the Seventy-ninth (1945–1946),
refused to debate statehood legislation on the floor of either
chamber. The favorable report issued by the House subcom-
mittee which had investigated the issue under Chairman
Larcade was not endorsed by the full House Committee on Ter-
ritories. Farrington, with the support of Larcade, attempted to
move the report forward, but failed. 11 There was virtually no
chance of affirmative action by both chambers, as the Sen-
ate had not yet examined the question in committee. Senator
William F. Knowland (Rep., Calif.), who proved to be one of
Hawaii’s most active supporters on Capitol Hill, had introduced
a statehood bill in the Senate, but it was not taken up by the
committee. 12 Hawaii was not yet classified as a high priority in
the Truman administration’s legislative program. And although
statehood enjoyed at least tacit majority support throughout the
nation and was endorsed by most newspapers, as well as the
Democratic administration and the Republican party, Congress
was essentially uninterested in the statehood issue during the
prelude to the mid-term elections of 1946. It was not an issue in
the campaign.
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The results of the 1946 elections shocked the Democrats.
For the first time since 1938 the GOP gained majorities in both
chambers and won governorships in more than half the states.
For Hawaii, which had been virtually a one-party, Republican
territory for almost half a century, the sweeping GOP victories
of 1946 were indeed good news. Farrington, along with most
local proponents, confidently assumed that a Republican Con-
gress would quickly admit the Republican-controlled islands to
statehood. 13
Their optimism appeared well-founded when the new Con-
gress met. An unprecedented number of statehood bills were
introduced in the House during the opening of the Eightieth
Congress (1947–1948). Eleven representatives introduced bills
identical to the legislation introduced by Farrington. But only
one Southern representative, Larcade, introduced a statehood
bill. Most were presented by Republicans from Western states.
Statehood legislation was quickly taken up by Republican
leaders in the House. In March the Committee on Public Lands
(formerly the House Committee on Territories), under Chairman
Richard J. Welch (Rep., Calif.), conducted its first hearings on
Hawaiian statehood in Washington. 14
In contrast to previous investigations, these hearings re-
lated primarily to national aspects of the issue, particularly the
possible impact of statehood on national defense, trade, and
United States foreign policy in Asia and the Pacific. The com-
mittee heard evidence from thirty-five witnesses over thirteen
days. Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug best summarized
the opinions of those who testified when he stated:
There is no room in our scheme of government for holding an
incorporated territory in a perpetual state of “tutelage.” … I do
not care what standard you apply: whether it is population, de-
votion to American ideals, the effect upon the nation in foreign
affairs, wealth, ability for self government, loyalty, competence in
business or government, or social consciousness; Hawaii passes
the test. If we have any faith that “Governments are instituted
among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed,” we should keep faith…. 15
Witnesses gave voluminous favorable testimony on all aspects
of statehood. Farrington and two members of the territory’s
senate, Thelma M. Akana (Rep.) and William Heen (Dem.), reit-
erated that Hawaii was qualified for admission. Stainback also
gave supportive testimony, perhaps because his reappointment
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had not yet been confirmed and he did not wish to appear un-
sympathetic to the wishes of most islanders. Representatives
of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association and the Honolulu
Chamber of Commerce repeated testimony presented to the
Larcade subcommittee which stressed that equal represen-
tation in Congress was essential if Hawaii was to gain an equal
footing with the mainland states. 16 Generally, testimony em-
phasized that Hawaii was entitled to and desired immediate
statehood. In the following years proponents were obliged to
present such arguments ad nauseum.
The appearance of a host of eager statehood proponents
before congressional investigating teams became an annual
ritual after the war. Unavoidably, the statements which they du-
tifully made became tiresome and predictable. Their arguments
were essentially irrelevant to the selfish interests and preju-
dices which increasingly shaped the reaction of Congress. Yet
in the absence of affirmative action by both chambers of Con-
gress, statehood proponents had no alternative but to sustain an
active public campaign, lobby energetically in Washington, and
volunteer evidence before seemingly interminable committee
hearings in both Washington and the islands. Only occasionally,
in response to specific objections raised by opponents after
1947, did the thrust of testimony given by proponents change.
Usually, these objections were irrelevant, exaggerated, and
beyond rational debate. Supporters confronted such arguments
patiently and firmly. But by the early 1950s most accepted re-
luctantly that a formal statehood campaign could not alone
overcome either the prejudices or tactics of those determined to
deny Hawaii equality with mainland states. The fears which pre-
occupied these opponents, and the tactics they were prepared
to exploit, were revealed as the statehood question was peri-
odically debated by Congress after 1946. In the face of these
developments Hawaii’s vigorous campaign and valid arguments
became increasingly meaningless. Sectional self-interest and
cynical partisan politics determined Hawaii’s fate on Capitol
Hill.
THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION SURFACES:
EIGHTIETH CONGRESS
In March 1947 the House Public Lands Committee recom-
mended for the first time that the House immediately approve
statehood. No member of the committee opposed this in-
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struction. “If any doubt concerning the readiness of Hawaii
to assume the responsibilities of statehood existed … prior to
the recent hearing,” the report concluded, “they were dispelled
by the experts, both civilian and military.” The Rules Commit-
tee promptly scheduled Hawaii for consideration on the floor
of the House. No one opposed the bill when it came before
this powerful committee. Its chairman, Leo E. Allen (Rep., Ill.),
thus suggested naively that Hawaii remain a nonpartisan issue.
The full House debate commenced on June 30, 1947. A bipar-
tisan group of proponents reiterated Hawaii’s qualifications and
desire for admission. Passage of statehood legislation would
not be the signal that the United States had taken up a new
policy, Farrington contended, but would simply represent the
fulfillment of a policy initiated by annexation of the islands. 17
Mike Mansfield (Dem., Mont.) argued that statehood could not
be denied, because the citizens of Hawaii were “asking with an
overwhelming voice for normal absorption into the body politic
of the United States with all the privileges and obligations of
American citizenship.” Those who spoke forcefully against the
bill were either Democrats from Southern states (like E. E. Cox
of Georgia and W. R. Poage of Texas) or Republicans repre-
senting large states (like Frederic Coudert of New York). After
debate lasting only four hours, the Republican majority lead-
ership brought the statehood bill (symbolically numbered H.R.
49) to a vote. It passed, but only by a modest margin, 196 votes
to 133. 18 Significantly, almost one-quarter of all representatives
abstained from voting. This was the first occasion that either
chamber of Congress had approved statehood for an offshore
territory.
Although the vote did not conform rigidly to party divisions,
it did reflect narrow party and sectional interests. Republicans
supported Hawaii by a margin of almost three to one (141 votes
to 56). In contrast, only fifty-five Democrats voted yes, while
seventy-seven voted no. Formal endorsement of statehood by
the Democratic administration did not sway a majority of House
Democrats. Given this voting pattern it is impossible to agree
with the New York Times when it stated that it could detect no
partisanship in the outcome of the vote. The Honolulu Star-Bul-
letin’s suggestion that the vote did not reflect partisan or sec-
tional considerations was equally inaccurate. 19
Sectional division was clearly evidenced in the House debate
and vote. Principal support came from the smaller New England
states, the Western states, Mountain states, and the large Far
Western state, California. Opposition derived almost exclusively
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from the eleven Southern states, the border states of Missouri
and Maryland, and some large Northern states, notably Penn-
sylvania, New York, Illinois, Ohio, and New Jersey. Most of
the ninety-four representatives who abstained from voting were
representatives of large Northern states. However, a majority in
only one Northern state, Pennsylvania, voted against admission.
Four former Confederate states—Alabama, Arkansas, Virginia,
and Texas—voted unanimously against statehood. A majority
of representatives from the Southern states of Georgia, Mis-
sissippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and the
border states of Missouri and Maryland opposed statehood.
A majority of representatives from only two Southern states,
Louisiana and Florida, favored Hawaii. The eleven former Con-
federate states provided only fifteen affirmative votes while
sixty-three votes opposed. All but two Southern opponents were
members of the Democratic party. In contrast, all the represen-
tatives of large Northern states who opposed statehood were
Republican. 20
The proportion of congressmen prepared to support Hawaii
increased throughout the next twelve years; but the pronounced
voting pattern of 1947 was duplicated whenever the issue was
actually put to a vote in the House. On no occasion during
1947–1959 did a majority of representatives actually oppose
statehood, although in 1947 a substantial number abstained
from voting. The alignments which emerged in the first House
vote reflected political and sectional factors that subsequently
complicated and delayed all future attempts to push a statehood
bill through both the House and the Senate.
The strong support given Hawaii by House Republicans was
influenced, in part at least, by the simple fact that the islands
were a traditional Republican stronghold. Most observers an-
ticipated that statehood would place two additional loyal Re-
publicans in the United States Senate. From 1902 to 1946 both
houses of the territorial legislature had consistently been con-
trolled by substantial Republican majorities. With one brief ex-
ception, all delegates to Congress had been Republicans. The
days of GOP ascendancy were about to end, but in 1946 this was
not anticipated. In the territorial elections of 1946, half of the
thirty House members elected were Democrats; Republicans
kept a majority in the Senate. This was the best result ever by
the local Democrats, but most observers thought it was simply
a temporary reversal for the GOP. Nor could the Democrats yet
muster a serious challenge to Farrington’s secure position as
delegate to Congress.
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Both sides of national politics found it difficult to resist
narrow partisan pressures. In general, Democrats were re-
luctant to elevate strongly Republican Hawaii and thereby help
to undermine their own party’s power in Congress. In the
Senate, where the two parties were usually quite evenly bal-
anced, this was a critical issue. Two additional assured votes for
either side might make the difference between majority or mi-
nority status in this chamber. After the 1946 elections, for ex-
ample, the Republican majority was only six; after 1952 party
numbers were equal and the vote of Vice President Richard
Nixon was necessary to permit the Republicans to organize the
Senate. Some Democrats opposed Hawaii’s admission during
the Eightieth Congress because it would complicate their task
of regaining control of the Senate. A number of Democrats
wanted to delay Hawaii’s admission until Alaska could be simul-
taneously admitted. Alaska was traditionally a Democratic ter-
ritory. Thus some Democrats wanted Congress to consider both
territories concurrently as they thought this strategy would
nullify unilateral gains by the GOP. 21 In antebellum America the
critical problem of admitting new states without disrupting sec-
tional or party balance in Congress had usually been resolved
(in the short-term at least) by expedient procedures which ad-
mitted new states in pairs. Given such significant precedents, it
was hardly surprising that the questions of statehood for Hawaii
and Alaska were immediately fused when they came before Con-
gress.
In contrast to Hawaii, Alaska’s claims were based less on
its ability to meet the traditional preconditions for admission
than on assertions that statehood was necessary to ensure the
satisfactory economic development of the territory. Alaska was
certainly less qualified than Hawaii. Its population was approxi-
mately two hundred thousand, about half that of Hawaii. These
people were sparsely scattered over an area twice the size of
Texas, and were neither numerically nor financially capable of
supporting a state government. More than 90 percent of all
land was owned by the federal government, largely for defense
purposes. Opponents thus argued that the vast northern area
should remain a territory under firm federal control. However,
the relatively small population of Alaska, its inability to develop
its natural resources without federal aid, and its importance
in national defense planning were not considered by a 1947
House subcommittee as sufficient reason to deny it immediate
statehood. Moreover, Truman had endorsed Alaska’s admission.
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But during 1946–1947 the Republican-controlled House of
Representatives refused to consider Alaska, despite the unan-
imously positive report of its subcommittee and its favorable
vote on Hawaii. 22 Some members sincerely believed that Alaska
was not yet qualified, but party politics was perhaps the major
factor averting House action. Certainly, most Republicans were
unenthusiastic about Alaska because they had no desire to add
to the Democrats’ power in Congress, especially in the Senate.
Predictably, after 1947 many Democrats stressed that if Alaska
was not admitted at the same time as Hawaii, then both should
be denied entry. Truman apparently shared this view. Reporters
on Capitol Hill wrote confidently that he would veto a separate
Hawaii bill in the unlikely event that it passed the Senate as well
as the House in 1947–1948. “Unless he can get statehood for
Democratic Alaska at the same time and offset the Republican
gains from Hawaii,” the Star-Bulletin claimed, “Truman is sure
to veto the bill.” “On the other hand,” it asserted, “a Republican
controlled Congress is just as sure not to give Alaska a chance
to add to the Democrats in the legislature.” Truman carefully
endorsed statehood for both territories in 1947; but the Repub-
lican party wanted Congress to consider only Hawaii. 23
In the months following the favorable House vote propo-
nents learned some bitter lessons about the nature of politics on
Capitol Hill. They also came to accept, however reluctantly, that
real power in Congress rested in the Senate and that victory
in the House was not necessarily a precursor of success in the
Senate.
The Christian Science Monitor proclaimed that statehood
for Hawaii was closer than ever after the House had shown its
approval in June 1947. 24 Proponents anticipated that the Senate
would act favorably, if not in 1947 then certainly in 1948. 25 The
political, sectional, and racial issues introduced by opponents in
the House debate had not averted, or indeed delayed, the vote
in this chamber. These issues nevertheless had a decisive neg-
ative impact on Hawaii’s prospects when the statehood bill was
considered by the Senate.
Under the chairmanship of Senator Guy Cordon (Rep.,
Calif.), the Senate subcommittee on Territories and Insular Af-
fairs conducted extensive investigations in Hawaii in January
1948. Testimony was accepted from 231 witnesses during
eleven days of hearings on all major islands. Only 16 witnesses
opposed immediate statehood. Previous committees dispatched
by the House had heard all of these arguments during
1935–1947, but senators, particularly those opposed to
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statehood, willingly authorized a fresh investigation. After 1948
this became a convenient tactic of delay. Predictably, there was
never any shortage of congressmen eager to volunteer for a
free trip to the exotic Pacific islands as members of investi-
gating teams. (Disgruntled islanders later protested that these
pilgrimages were blatant political junkets which did little to
broaden support for statehood in Washington.) Cordon’s sub-
committee heard exhaustive supporting testimony from
representatives of business and labor groups, the Hawaii
Statehood Commission, community service organizations, aca-
demics, members of the Republican and Democratic parties,
and citizens from all major ethnic groups in the islands. 26 His
findings reflected the opinions of the overwhelming majority
of witnesses. He reported in March that Hawaii “met the re-
quirements for statehood” and was “able and ready to accept
the social, political and economic responsibilities of State gov-
ernment.”
It was widely expected that this action would pave the way
for debate of the House-approved bill on the floor of the Senate.
Instead of sending the bill on, however, the chairman of the
committee to which Cordon reported, the old guard conserv-
ative Hugh Butler (Rep., Nebr.), scheduled additional hearings.
These began in Washington in April under a new subcommittee
which this time included Butler. No testimony was given which
opposed statehood, but numerous letters and statements were
submitted in opposition. 27 “It was indicative of the lack of any
real opposition to statehood for Hawaii, or sound argument
against it,” the New York Times observed, “that not a single
witness appeared in opposition.” 28 Yet the Senate Committee on
Public Lands again refused to send the bill on. Senator Eugene
D. Millikin (Rep., Colo.) moved on May 9 that action on the
subcommittee reports be deferred indefinitely. After a “furious
fight” the committee agreed by a margin of seven votes to five to
accept Millikin’s motion. This abrupt decision was tantamount
to defeat of the bill in the Eightieth Congress. Identical bills
must pass both chambers during one Congress, or subsequently
be reintroduced in both chambers. Thus, the Millikin resolution
nullified the favorable House action of 1947. Ironically, the com-
mittee’s decision was made the day after Robert A. Taft (Ohio),
chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, had placed it on
the proposed agenda for Senate action. 29
Farrington was reportedly very dejected after the Millikin
motion had won. He attributed the decision to the prejudice
and isolationism of the likes of Butler, and privately referred to
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it as a “damned outrage.” Truman’s White House staff viewed
Farrington’s position sympathetically, and suggested that some
senators wanted to delay Hawaii in order to justify yet another
junket to the islands. Led by Farrington, Hawaii’s Republicans
had lobbied energetically but ineffectually in Washington. The
statehood bill was now “deader than a doornail,” one of
Truman’s aides conceded privately on May 10. 30
Most supporters of the Millikin resolution were conservative
Republicans who sometimes voted with the Southern faction in
Congress and opposed liberal domestic legislation. There were
no Southern Democrats on the committee. 31 This vote clearly
indicated that Republican opposition was stronger in the Senate
than in the House. Writing in the New York Times, Arthur Krock
suggested that Senate Republicans were apprehensive about
the influence Hawaii would exercise in the Senate. They feared,
Krock suggested, that Hawaii’s senators might be the decisive
factor in controversial issues, such as labor legislation. Krock
noted that many Republican senators were privately alarmed
that Hawaii’s votes would increase liberal strength in Congress.
The dramatic Democratic gains in the territorial elections of
1946, and the growth of organized labor were accepted by some
Republicans as permanent, threatening trends. Thus, many Re-
publicans believed that Hawaii might send at least one Democ-
ratic senator to Congress. In addition, some senators from both
parties privately expressed alarm that congressional represen-
tatives would not be Caucasians. 32
Yet Hawaii did have some dedicated supporters in the
Senate. The influential Republicans Knowland and Cordon re-
fused to accept the committee decision as final. During May
1948 they led a vigorous attempt to bring H.R. 49 to the Senate
floor. Knowland moved to discharge the Public Lands Com-
mittee of responsibility for the statehood bill and thus place it
on the Senate calendar. Although the Washington Evening Star
stated that it failed to see any legitimate reason for delaying
consideration of the bill or opposing Knowland’s resolution, the
Senate rejected the resolution by a decisive margin of fifty-one
votes to twenty after only one hour of debate. 33
This defeat resulted from a combination of influences which
reflected conservative versus liberal cleavages in the Senate, as
well as party preferences. One-third of all Senate Democrats ab-
stained from voting, but more than 70 percent of those who did
participate recorded a “No” vote. With only three exceptions all
of the Democrats who voted negatively were from the eleven
former Confederate states. They were joined by a majority of
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Republicans. This voting alignment conformed closely to the
conservative-liberal split which emerged whenever the Senate
debated civil rights or related legislation. 34
Filibustering by conservative senators helped to defeat
Truman’s civil rights program during 1947–1948. Most senators
who supported statehood also consistently backed civil rights
measures. In addition, they wanted to pass cloture legislation
that would limit debate and permit votes to be taken on contro-
versial issues. The positions adopted by individual senators on
cloture were thus fairly accurate barometers of their liberalism,
especially on racial matters. All Democrats and all but two Re-
publicans who voted for the Knowland resolution and retained
their Senate seats also voted for cloture legislation in 1949.
35 Opposition to the Knowland resolution derived almost exclu-
sively from conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats.
“The list of opposing Republicans reads like a roll-call of the Old
Guard,” observed William H. Ewing, Washington correspondent
of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. 36 This voting alignment was very
similar to that on Hawaii in the House the previous year. But
as proponents discovered in the following decade, conservative
strength was relatively much stronger in the Senate than in
the House. At the same time, senators could employ a range of
procedural tactics which were calculated to cripple legislation
to which they objected.
The Senate vote in 1948 did not relate exclusively to the
question of statehood for Hawaii. It also involved the important
issue of support for procedural rules. Many senators apparently
wanted statehood but would not support Knowland’s move.
Some voted negatively because the resolution sought to cir-
cumvent normal committee functions, not because they opposed
statehood. Larcade pointed out that “unfortunate circum-
stances … resulted in the resolution being placed in a legisla-
tive position where it was impossible to vote on the main issue
rather than the motion to discharge the Committee.” However,
this influence should not be overestimated. Knowland correctly
commented that his resolution would have passed had a ma-
jority of senators been genuinely “enthusiastic” about
statehood. Moreover, the brief Senate debate focused on
statehood rather than procedural matters. Cordon’s admission
of his inability to thoroughly investigate Hawaii’s political or
economic situation was eagerly exploited by opponents. They
argued that further investigations were obviously necessary.
Knowland replied that Hawaii had been adequately investi-
gated. As he and other supporters doggedly pointed out, by
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1948 Congress had completed seventy days of hearings on this
question. Almost five hundred witnesses had testified in favor
of statehood; only sixty-six had opposed it. More than three
thousand pages of testimony had already been taken. “The
record of testimony and information built up around the
question of [Hawaii’s] statehood,” Knowland remarked, “is
more voluminous and complete than was the case for any other
state prior to its admission.” 37 Even the most pessimistic pro-
ponent could hardly have imagined in 1948 that it would take
another ten years of exhaustive, repetitive investigations before
resistance in Congress was finally overcome.
REAL OBSTACLES: THE SOUTH, CIVIL RIGHTS,
AND STATEHOOD
Despite the periodic intervention of party politics, this was not
the major reason for the alignments evidenced in the first or
subsequent congressional votes on Hawaii. The core of resis-
tance derived from a combination of racial and sectional in-
fluences. This resistance exploited the issues of party power
and state representation in Congress, but it derived from much
stronger ideas and prejudices than simple party affiliations. And
it was supported by representatives of a cohesive, determined,
and substantial section of mainland America—the South.
After 1945 an overwhelming majority of Southern con-
gressmen opposed Hawaii’s admission. They were adamant that
Congress should not acquire power to legislate in areas over
which individual states assumed control after Reconstruction.
The Civil War had brought the rebel South back into the Union,
but almost a century later Southern states remained unre-
pentant upholders of states’ rights. They had once defended
states’ rights in order to sanction their peculiar institution,
slavery, and now they championed them to protect their unique
segregated social practices and laws. To guard their sectional
interests Southern representatives determined to resist all at-
tempts to dilute the power of their section in Congress, espe-
cially in the Senate. Statehood for Hawaii was perceived as
a direct threat to existing Southern authority on Capitol Hill.
One Mississippi newspaper cautioned that Hawaii’s two sen-
ators might command the key vote on major legislation involv-
ing racial issues on the mainland United States. 38 Similarly,
a Texas newspaper argued that statehood would “give Hawaii
the right to exercise two Senators’ worth of self-determination”
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on the South. 39 Any doubts which might have existed over the
South’s position on statehood were quickly dispelled when the
issue came before Congress after the war. 40 For more than a
decade opposition from the South, especially in House com-
mittees and on the floor of the Senate, was the decisive factor
contributing to the perennial defeat of statehood legislation.
Southern resistance was also influenced by racism directed
against all nonwhites. Publicly, this was expressed in the
timeworn argument that Hawaii’s mixed population of natives
and Asians could never be assimilated into American society.
Racial fears were compounded by the belief that Hawaii’s con-
gressmen would probably be non-Caucasians, and would cer-
tainly be liberal on questions of racial equality and civil rights.
Larcade, one of the few Southerners who supported statehood,
conceded the importance of this concern when he stated in the
House debate:
… my people, the South, and myself have definite opinions in
regard to the racial question; however, on my visit to Hawaii I
observed men and women of all races intermingling and assimi-
lating in perfect … harmony. If that is their way of life, that is their
business, and they are entitled to their way of life. In the South we
do not approve of this way of life, and this should be our business;
and like Hawaii all that we ask is that we be given the same privi-
leges to make our own determination in this respect.
Most Southerners were convinced, however, that the ability of
states to determine domestic racial policies would be eroded
by Hawaii’s admission; two new, liberal senators might give the
pro-civil rights factions a majority in the Senate. Certainly they
would not boost the power of the Southern bloc. In the words
of the powerful Mississippi Democrat Senator James Eastland,
senators from Hawaii would mean “two votes for socialized
medicine, … two votes for Government ownership of industry,
two votes against all racial segregation and two votes against
the South on all social matters.” Statehood for the Pacific is-
lands would contribute to the destruction of “our dual schools,
our social institutions and harmonious racial relations,”
Eastland claimed. 41
Southern opponents were seldom embarrassed by the racist
character of their arguments. In the 1947 debate, for example,
Prince Preston, Jr., (Dem., Ga.) stated:
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What does it [the Hawaii bill] do? It makes citizens with equal
rights with you and me of 180,000 Japanese…. It gives these
people the same rights you and I have; we, the descendants of
those who created, fought and maintained this country. Who are
those people? … descendants of the recently deposed [sic] Em-
peror of Japan…. When you give these people the same rights we
have today, you will have two Senators speaking for these 180,000
Japanese. 42
Supporters were generally reluctant to denounce explicitly the
racist bias of such resistance. However, Robert Hale (Rep.,
Maine) made the point late in the House debate that the funda-
mental justification for serious opposition to statehood was the
mixed racial population of the islands. He attempted to expose
the assumptions of racial superiority by arguing:
Let us be frank about it. The opposition to this measure arises
primarily from the fact that the racial strains in Hawaii are more
Asiatic than European. This opposition springs from a dangerous
form of racism…. I tremble to think what the American future will
be if we predicate any national policy on an assumption of inferi-
ority in Asiatic peoples. 43
This “dangerous form of racism” was not restricted to a few
congressmen. Indeed their views reflected a substantial body
of mainland opinion. In letters to congressmen demanding that
Hawaii be rejected, various mainland groups and individuals
expressed alarm that whites comprised only a minority of the
proposed state’s population. Not all such views came from the
South. 44 Racial fears provided the foundation for most mainland
opposition to Hawaii until 1959.
A small minority of newspapers from various geographical
areas of the United States advocated that Hawaii be denied
statehood. “Opponents, though in the minority, have a strong
case,” the Portland Press Herald (Maine) remarked. It then ana-
lyzed the racial composition of the territory and expressed con-
sternation at the “thought of two Japanese Senators and two
Japanese Representatives in Congress.” The Port land Evening
Express was even more explicit when it claimed that statehood
should be denied because citizens of Japanese ancestry prac-
ticed bloc voting: “The Japanese in the Hawaiian islands have
reached high subordinate positions, but so long as Hawaii is a
territory they can reach no higher…. In the Hawaiian islands
the Japanese are still Japanese. Their voting power is a bloc….
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They vote as Japanese to strengthen their tribal position.” 45 The
Topeka Daily Capital (Kans.) expressed fear that Hawaii’s ad-
mission would permit “a new influx of Japs into the islands” and
result in “a heavy infiltration of Orientals into our citizenship.”
Predictably, some Southern newspapers also argued strenu-
ously against Hawaii. After comparing Hawaii’s position with
that of the Philippines prior to 1946, the Jackson Clarion-Ledger
(Miss.) concluded that independence would be the wisest po-
litical status for Hawaii, and certainly in the best interests of
the nation. The Houston Post (Tex.) remarked that the advis-
ability of admitting new states depended not on physical size,
population, or level of civilization, but rather on the impact of
new congressmen on the political strength of existing states.
It concluded that statehood should be denied because Hawaii’s
representatives in Congress might not support the interests of
Texas. 46
A preoccupation with states’ rights was not restricted exclu-
sively to the old Confederacy. Some conservative Republicans
from the more populous Northern states were anxious that
membership of the Senate should not be extended. Along with
many Southerners they argued that Hawaii’s admission would
establish a dangerous precedent. Ignoring the fact that Alaska
was the only other incorporated territory, opponents maintained
that Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands as well as Alaska would
inevitably be admitted after Hawaii. Coudert, a leading con-
servative Republican opponent and anti-communist crusader,
stated:
What we do on this bill is bound to … set a precedent for Alaska
and Puerto Rico and such other insular territories as we now
possess … [I]n considering the position we take on this bill we
must consider all three of these dependencies and determine
whether or not we are about to admit them to statehood with the
two Senators that go with statehood, and the resultant further
distortion of popular representation in Congress.
Many congressmen were determined to preserve the existing
voting strength of their particular state in Congress. Coudert
unashamedly expressed this position. He protested that the
Hawaii bill would in effect grant Hawaii one senator for every
35,000 island citizens. In contrast, one senator from New York
State represented at least 2,500,000 citizens. “My complaint is
constitutional,” Coudert stated. 47 Similar arguments had been
levelled against the structure of the Senate when the Constitu-
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tion was originally drafted in the late eighteenth century, and
they resurfaced whenever Congress debated the entry of new
states.
Most opponents were far less concerned with constitutional
principles than with the immediate political realities involved
in protecting the existing social order of the South. During the
Senate debate in 1948 the real obstacles to Hawaii’s ambitions
emerged as participants acknowledged openly that statehood
for either Hawaii or Alaska was a central issue in the broader
liberal-conservative battle over civil rights and desegregation.
Hawaii was thus enmeshed in the most pervasive and bitterly
contested aspect of American domestic politics after World War
II. It is not possible to understand the delays and reversals
which confronted Hawaii without appreciating this relationship.
In his state of the Union message in January 1948 Truman
stressed that his desire was to insure that basic human rights
were extended to all citizens. Acting on the advice of a Com-
mittee on Civil Rights which he had appointed twelve months
earlier, Truman acknowledged that equal political, educational,
and economic opportunities were not available to all citizens.
He recommended a comprehensive policy aimed at eliminating
discrimination based on “race, or creed, or color, or land, or
origin.” 48 His ten-point program included anti-lynching laws,
abolition of poll taxes, equal voting rights, and an attack on
discrimination in employment. New enforcement agencies were
also recommended, most notably a permanent Fair Employment
Practices Commission, a Civil Rights Division in the Department
of Justice, and a Civil Rights Commission. Truman undoubtedly
had black Americans in mind when he made these proposals,
but his program was not limited to this most oppressed group.
“There still are examples—flagrant examples—of discrimination
which are utterly contrary to our ideals,” Truman proclaimed.
“Not all groups enjoy full privileges of citizenship and partic-
ipate in the government under which they live.” An assault
on these inequalities demanded full citizenship rights for all
minorities, including the inhabitants of America’s territories.
Statehood for Hawaii was thus included as one part of Truman’s
comprehensive civil rights program. 49
Given the conservative nature of Congress, the program was
most ambitious. It was, however, more a statement of prin-
ciples and intention than a confident legislative agenda: “I sent
the Congress a Civil Rights message,” Truman recorded in his
diary. “They no doubt will receive it as coldly as they did my
state of the Union message. But it needs to be said.” When
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he left office five years later the legal structures of discrimi-
nation had scarcely been touched, let alone dismantled. But in
the interval the proposition that blacks should be entitled to
full equality had gained much wider support, and civil rights
had emerged as a burning issue in virtually all facets of do-
mestic politics. Truman was convinced that segregation, dis-
crimination, and racial violence must be eliminated from the
South, that “equality of opportunity for all human beings” must
replace such a “radically wrong” system. 50 Cold war crises
and McCarthyism diverted his second administration from civil
rights questions, but these did not weaken his personal con-
viction nor reduce the determination of blacks and liberals to
overthrow discriminatory practices based on race. The South,
however, resisted vehemently all aspects of the civil rights
program. The only part which actually came before Congress
for serious debate during Truman’s terms of office was
statehood for the territories. Yet even this mild civil rights pro-
posal confronted determined opposition from those who viewed
it as a threat to their power in the Senate and an affront to
their notions of white superiority. Even if Truman had not clas-
sified Hawaii as an explicit civil rights issue, it still would not
have escaped the strategy of resistance adopted by Southern
Democrats against any legislation which challenged their po-
litical power.
Southern representatives were less united in their oppo-
sition to Hawaii than were Southern senators. V. O. Key, Jr.,
observed in 1949 a fundamental similarity in the voting be-
havior of Southerners in both the House and Senate. However,
Southern representatives spoke for smaller constituencies than
senators, and often represented predominantly urban or black
electorates. Thus, there was a tendency in the voting behavior
of some Southern representatives to deviate from the voting
pattern exhibited by most Southern senators. 51 Virtually all
Southern senators opposed the admission of Hawaii because
they believed Hawaii’s Senate delegation would support the
liberal Senate faction on civil rights, cloture, and labor legis-
lation. 52 For some Southern members of the House, however,
these considerations were not of overriding importance. Hence
a slightly smaller proportion of Southern representatives than
Southern senators opposed Hawaii.
No part of Truman’s optimistic program to end, or at least
limit, discrimination was approved by the Senate during
1947–1948. Conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats
easily defeated legislation on the floor, filibustered against it,
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or used procedural strategies in committee to stop it from
reaching the floor of the Senate. Indeed, liberal proposals suf-
fered defeat or emasculation in both chambers of Congress.
The Alaska bill was unanimously reported by a subcommittee of
the House, but it was not debated in either the House or the
Senate during the Eightieth Congress. Legislation to establish
a Fair Employment Practices Act, a major aspect of Truman’s
program on civil rights, was not debated in the Senate. The
Republican leadership was not committed to this legislation,
and Southern Democrats were expected to filibuster to defeat
it. The House and Senate Judiciary Committees reported anti-
lynching bills, but these were never voted on. Anti-poll tax legis-
lation, which might have improved the voting opportunities of
poor Southern blacks, managed to pass the House during 1945
and 1947. But the Dixiecrats easily averted a Senate vote on
it. Liberals and civil rights supporters also failed to establish
an effective cloture rule in the Senate. 53 In the following years
Truman referred to his intransigent Southern colleagues var-
iously, but privately, as “Dixiecrats,” “Republicats” (“helpers”
of the GOP who were nominally Democrats), or “Southern ‘De-
mocrats’—who are not Democrats.” But they could not be dis-
missed as merely a disruptive minority faction of his party, for
they effectively dictated the fortunes of the Democrats’ leg-
islative programs during Truman’s two terms as president. 54
“The informal conservative coalition of Southern Democrats
and Northern Republicans,” William C. Berman has observed,
“remained powerful enough to hamstring and block all efforts
to put new civil laws on the statute books.” 55 The fact that the
Senate refused to liberalize its rules governing filibusters both
symbolized and confirmed the strength of conservatives. Key’s
pioneering studies have demonstrated that during 1933–1945,
an odd confluence of circumstances sometimes compelled
nearly three-quarters of the Southerners to join the Republicans
in a coalition against non-Southern Democrats. After the New
Deal and Roosevelt’s death, Republican strength in Congress
grew, while Southern Democrats sustained their strong minority
influence. Southern Democrats strongly resisted civil rights,
progressive labor legislation, and any extension of federal
power at the expense of states’ rights. Conservative large-state
Republicans usually opposed labor interests and sought to min-
imize possible federal encroachments on states’ rights. 56 To
protect these interests effectively, conservatives had to main-
tain at least a veto power in the Senate. This was possible while
the conservative coalition could sustain reasonable numbers in
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the Senate and rely on their existing right to invoke a filibuster
or threat of filibuster against what they perceived as liberal pro-
posals. Statehood for Hawaii thus had important implications
for the future of national politics.
Southern opposition to Truman’s civil rights program and
related measures was intense and uncompromising. During
1948 an anti-civil rights faction bolted the Democratic party
and established the Dixiecrat party. The Dixiecrats unsuccess-
fully contested the 1948 elections on a platform which called
on all loyal Americans to support segregation and states’ rights.
Dixiecrat presidential candidate Strom Thurmond (S. C.) won a
majority in four Southern states—Alabama, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, and South Carolina. But not all Southern Democrats were
prepared to leave the party. Moreover, progressives under the
leadership of Henry Wallace also split with Truman. Despite de-
fections from the right and left, Truman won a substantial if un-
expected victory over the very confident Republican candidate,
Thomas E. Dewey. Black voters, encouraged by Truman’s stand
on civil rights, helped boost his margin of victory. The De-
mocrats also gained control of both houses of Congress by
large majorities. 57 But increased liberal strength on Capitol
Hill during 1949–1950 could not salvage Truman’s civil rights
program—and hence statehood for Hawaii—from humiliating
defeat at the hands of its intransigent opponents. Moreover,
before any part of this program could be addressed by the new
Congress, Hawaii was obliged to confront another emotive ob-
stacle to admission—the charge that the island community was
Communist controlled. This development linked Hawaii to an-
other central aspect of the liberal versus conservative conflict
in national politics during the late 1940s and early 1950s—the
battle over McCarthyism and un-American activities.
RED HERRINGS: THE COMMUNIST ISSUE AND
STATEHOOD
Resistance to statehood within Hawaii did not derive exclusively
from anxiety over growing Asian influences. It was also fed by
anti-labor and anti-communist passions, feelings which were an-
imated after 1945 by the cold war abroad and the growth of
vigorous trade unions at home. Prior to World War II, as John
Shoemaker observed, management in Hawaii equated unionism
with radicalism and successfully exploited all its influence to
restrict the organization of labor. 58 As we have seen, wartime
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conditions and martial law also stifled union growth. In Janu-
ary 1944 the only large union in the islands, the International
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) had only
nine hundred members. Two years later, however, its mem-
bership had climbed to thirty-three thousand. Wage contracts
negotiated by the ILWU during 1945–1946 increased the total
wages of its members by $10 million. 59
Labor’s new authority resulted in part from the Hawaii Em-
ployment Relations Act (the Little Wagner Act), passed in 1945,
which extended the rights of collective organization and bar-
gaining to agricultural workers. Large numbers of Japanese
and Filipino laborers on sugar and pineapple plantations joined
unions for the first time. Leaders of the ILWU, notably Jack
Kawano and its regional director, Jack Hall, quickly recruited
the majority of Hawaii’s plantation workers and stevedores into
this union. When the opportunity for labor to escape the tight
controls of owners and managers finally arrived after the war,
most unskilled workers eagerly joined the unions. War had
helped weaken the grip of plantation owners and big business
on labor. It also stimulated demands for a larger, more varied
work force. These circumstances gave unions a unique oppor-
tunity to bargain effectively for increased wages and improved
conditions. If management proved intractable, unions were
willing to strike and hold out for a reasonable response. Not
surprisingly, many planters, property owners, and businessmen
found this new situation extremely unpalatable. At the same
time, some were disturbed by the very fact that the Little
Wagner Act had been approved by a legislature which the Re-
publican party controlled. Fong has observed that this unex-
pected action implied that moderate elements now had real
influence in the party and might no longer be subservient to
wishes of those who had dominated island politics before the
war. 60
Immediately after Hawaii reverted to a peacetime economy,
organized labor was prepared to challenge entrenched eco-
nomic and political forces in the territory. Hall predicted early
in 1946 that relations between employers and unions in Hawaii
could not be forever harmonious. He anticipated that disagree-
ments would develop between labor and employers, and warned
of organized strikes. 61 According to Edward Johannessen, labor
had acquired a new significance in the territory; almost every-
where in the economic, political, and social life of Hawaii its ef-
fects were evident. 62
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Before Pearl Harbor, as we have seen, it was labor that
lost ground in strike situations; often strikes brought about
the collapse of the union. 63 But the first major strike after
the war, the sugar strike of 1946, suggested that relations be-
tween employers and employees had indeed entered a new
phase. On September 1, 1946, twenty-one thousand sugar plan-
tation workers, members of the ILWU, went on strike. Their
action closed down thirty-three of the thirty-four plantations
for seventy-four days. 64 Although the strike was led by Hall,
a Caucasian, most of the workers involved were of Asian an-
cestry, principally Japanese or Filipinos (the latter comprised
the largest single ethnic group on the plantations after the
early 1930s). Non-Caucasian ethnic groups tended to sympa-
thize with the strikers and supported the strike with financial
contributions. By contrast, Caucasians tended to identify with
and support the employer interests. 65 The unionists were suc-
cessful in gaining increased wages and better working condi-
tions. “The victory was a tremendous one,” Hall claimed. “The
interracial unity and determination of the workers to end for all
time dictatorial control over their lives and destinies is the out-
standing feature of the strike.” 66
Organized labor also made a successful bid for influence
in the territory’s legislature. Through its Political Action Com-
mittee the ILWU endorsed sympathetic candidates in the elec-
tions of November 1945. Most of these were members of the
Democratic party, which won more seats at this election than on
any occasion previously. But Farrington, a Republican, also ac-
cepted endorsement, as did a few other more liberal members
of his party. Labor endorsed twenty-one candidates for the
thirty-seat lower house. Sixteen of these were elected. In the
Senate there were nine seats vacant. Labor endorsed seven can-
didates, six of whom were elected. Two ILWU officials, Joseph
Alapai Kaholokula and Amos Ignacio, were elected to the House.
67 It should not be inferred that labor’s support was an essential
ingredient in the victories of all endorsed candidates however.
Most of the majority Republican party won without it. What’s
more, Farrington and many other candidates would certainly
have won irrespective of endorsement.
The growing political influence now exercised by labor and
non-Caucasian citizens was, however, reflected in political gains
made by the Democratic party. In the 1946–1947 session of
the territorial legislature the Democratic party gained unprece-
dented support. Half of the members of the House of Represen-
tatives were Democrats. In the Senate, the Republicans main-
Chapter 5
156
tained only a one vote majority. In contrast to the Caucasian-
dominated Republican party, nonwhites comprised a majority of
the Democratic party. It should be emphasized that all major
ethnic groups were represented in each party. Nonetheless, as
late as 1954 it was found that two-thirds of the members of
the Democratic party were of Japanese or mixed ancestry. Re-
publican party membership was two-thirds Caucasian, with the
remainder largely of Hawaiian or Chinese extraction. 68 In the
immediate postwar years these racial alignments were even
more pronounced than in 1954.
Along with the many changes which transformed island life
after 1945, war had a critical bearing on the fortunes of both
organized labor and the Democratic party. One returned nisei
veteran recalled the dissatisfaction of AJA soldiers even before
going off to war, and explained their determination upon their
return to change Hawaii’s social structure. Murai, another in-
fluential nisei explained that during 1945–1946 all minority
groups knew they were politically disadvantaged, and that in
some way race was the causal factor. Politics, Murai said, ap-
peared to be the most efficacious means to alter this situation.
This conviction was not restricted to those of Japanese descent.
The informal coalition largely responsible for rejuvenating the
Democratic party comprised Burns, Hall, David Benz, Murai,
Kido, Aoki, and Kawano, along with a prominent member of
Hawaii’s Chinese community, Chuck Mau. These allies were
later referred to as the Burns faction or group; nevertheless
in the immediate postwar months Mau was the group’s unoffi-
cial political leader and Kawano its most successful union orga-
nizer. While based largely on the support of Japanese, Filipino,
and to a limited extent Hawaiian and Chinese groups, public
leadership of both labor and the new Democrats soon rested
with two Caucasians, Hall and Burns. The two men very early
reached an understanding that labor activities be reserved for
Hall and party activities left to Burns. 69
Building on contacts established with Japanese community
leaders and members of the Emergency Service Committee
during the war, Burns and his supporters began to build a
new Democratic party through precinct and grass roots orga-
nization. Realizing that it would be impossible to infiltrate and
transform the local Republican party, the Burns group focused
exclusively on the disorganized Democratic party, which was
run by a relatively small group of haoles. According to Kido,
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“[We] felt that if we got into the Democratic party we would be
able to control it, set up a machinery and offer the people of
Hawaii an alternative.” 70
Later, after memories of the bitterness of postwar politics
had been dulled by time and success, Burns recalled the relative
ease with which his so-called Young Turks had taken control of
the Democratic party. In fact, it had been a divisive and pro-
tracted struggle for control, spanning the years 1946–1956. And
it was a contest not only between old and new Democrats, but
also an increasingly bitter struggle between the Burns group
and a range of other independent and ambitious young liberals
equally anxious to build and lead a revived party. Foremost
among these were local lawyers Tom Gill and Vincent Esposito,
and a controversial malihini and former marine by the name of
Frank Fasi. If these men shared with Burns a desire to defeat
the old order and transform island society, the deep divisions
within the Democratic party during the next two decades sug-
gested they had very little else in common.
It was the Burns faction that was largely responsible for
challenging and gradually defeating the old guard Democrats,
represented by Stainback, Charles and Harold Rice, and various
members of the Heen, Trask, and Holt families. “I was called
some pretty rugged names [by the old guard],” Burns recalled,
“the least of which was ‘communist.’” Largely untouched by the
liberalism of the New Deal, both major parties in the islands re-
mained fundamentally conservative, with those in authority still
deeply suspicious of reform and reformers. There were perhaps
many wealthy Caucasians who, like Elizabeth Farrington, found
it difficult to understand Burns and his pragmatic brand of
liberalism. “He was a haole, but he was against the haoles,
some how,” she recalled with dismay: “he was getting even with
them.” Local-born Caucasians were not expected to identify
with, and certainly not champion, the underdog in society. 71
In general, the Burns group was united by a common desire
to create equality of opportunity and to get their fair share of
power. Rather than being radicals, Communists, or fellow trav-
ellers, as they were so often portrayed, the leaders of this group
were pragmatic, fairly cautious liberals, anxious to establish a
genuine two-party system of government. While the individual
political ambitions of the group’s leaders, especially Burns and
Inouye, cannot be ignored, it was united initially by a desire
to help those who as yet had no spokesmen in government.
Mau (one of the few prominent postwar Democrats of Chinese
parentage), who later drifted away from the Burns faction, ac-
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knowledged that the early goals of his party were essentially
limited to “getting good and fair employment—better wages,
better working conditions for the ordinary working people”
along with “more participation in government … for the working
classes, the poor people.” “We had a philosophy of government
which [was] much more liberal [than old guard Democrats],” he
observed. “They were more conservative. They were older. They
had been in government for a long time. They of course knew
the ropes and occasionally I guess they played around with the
Republican gang.” If old guard Democrats were disturbed by
the challenge from within their party after 1945, the traditional
backers of the Republican party were even more alarmed when
this same challenge threatened their authority a few years later.
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After 1948 the strength of the Burns faction was further
boosted as a large number of prominent veterans, notably
Inouye and Spark Matsunaga, returned to the islands and joined
the Democrats. Educated under the GI Bill, many of these vet-
erans were of Japanese parentage. They were confident of their
Americanism and eager to wrest power from the haole-dom-
inated Republican party. Burns and his friends patiently cul-
tivated their support. In contrast, Quinn has conceded, the
Republicans ignored, even rejected them. Complacency and en-
trenched conservatism in the Republican party made the task
of the young Democrats relatively easy. Even in the 1950s,
Quinn recalled, most Republicans were complacent, believing
their political preeminence was inviolable and eternal. Conse-
quently, organization at precinct level was often neglected and
campaigns were conducted in a very relaxed way. The party’s
hierarchy acted in the 1940s much as it had before the war: can-
didates were usually nominated and accepted without debate
or an open contest; organizational support given to candidates
was generally very poor, and the party remained biased against
people of Asian descent, especially the AJAs. In the late 1940s
only about 15 percent of Hawaii’s electorate were registered
members of either party. Despite this, the Republican legis-
lature approved a “closed” primary bill in 1949. Fong recalled
that this greatly inhibited his party’s electoral fortunes, as it
had the effect of reinforcing Merchant Street’s authority over
party organization and selection of candidates, and Merchant
Street was largely unaware of the nature and aspirations of
Hawaii’s electorate. In general, traditional practices and tra-
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ditional associations weighed heavily on the Republican party
after the war. It failed to meet the challenges of a rapidly
changing society and itself became a victim of these changes. 73
The Young Turks of the Democratic party eagerly recruited
new members. Oshiro’s explanation of why he joined the Burns
group typified the motives of many of its supporters, especially
those of Japanese ancestry. “I don’t like to say it this way but
I identified myself with the working class, the have-nots and
the ones who felt that they had not been treated fairly,” he
stated. “We were trying to improve the working conditions of
the laboring people here,” Murai, an established dentist, later
explained. “Of course the majority of these were of Japanese
ancestry, but it wasn’t only them; it was the Filipinos, and the
Chinese, and the rest of them.” Those who identified with the
Burns group accepted, albeit unofficially, a common program
which, according to Kido, embraced the following aims: (1) as-
sistance to returning veterans; (2) pursuit of equality of op-
portunity; (3) free public education and an expanded role for
education in the lives of the people; (4) the achievement of
improved standards of living via political strategies such as a
minimum wage, better unemployment benefits, and the like;
and (5) progressive taxation assessed, first, according to ability
to pay, and, second, on real property. While most members of
the group accepted that the land being monopolized by the few
should be turned over to the many, they rejected the use of
direct expropriation by legislative acts as a means to this end.
Rather, “we wanted real property taxes based on highest and
best use,” Kido concluded. “Using that principle we could un-
freeze a lot of land for residential purposes.” In the context of
island politics in the 1940s this was an ambitious program. And
when viewed in conjunction with the demands then being made
by a militant labor movement, it foreshadowed a period of un-
certainty and dislocation in political and industrial life. 74
As we have seen, war politicized Hawaii’s Japanese, chal-
lenging them to reject the paternalism and exclusion of prewar
life. But old political habits and attitudes, the results of a
lifetime of indoctrination, died hard among local Japanese, Aoki
recalled a generation later, “coming from the plantation com-
munity where all your life they have been telling you: ‘Stay
away from politics; leave politics alone; politics is dirty; we’ll
handle politics and we’ll take care of these things for you.’”
More than any other experience, combat as an American soldier
helped counter this conditioning. “When they throw you [into
combat] … and you see your buddy getting killed right next
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to you and somebody gets maimed then you begin to wonder
‘What the Hell am I doing here?’” Aoki commented. “And our
attitude was that if we were good enough to be sent off to be
killed and go to war, certainly we had a place for ourselves in
our community in peace time.” The impact of the war on nisei
Americans, captured so forcefully by Aoki’s comments, closely
paralleled its impact on Afro-Americans throughout the nation.
War highlighted a fundamental double standard in American
life which meant that many minority Americans, while excluded
from normal political and social equality, had nonetheless to be
prepared to risk their lives for the nation. This gap between
rhetoric and reality in national life was no longer accepted
passively by Hawaii’s Japanese. The benefits of organizing, of
forming a cohesive and powerful political base from which to
press for change became apparent to some, Aoki observed. In-
creasingly, the ILWU, the fledgling reformist arm of the Demo-
cratic party, and in an informal way the 442nd Veterans’ Club
provided this base. Immediate statehood was now a primary
aim of these groups. More than any other event, statehood
would symbolize and confirm the equality of Hawaii’s nonwhites
under the American Constitution. Throughout the postwar years
statehood enjoyed more united support from local Japanese
than from any other ethnic group. 75
Organized labor was now confident, aggressive, and broad
based; the Democratic party had emerged as a genuine alter-
native to the long-dominant Republicans; and Hawaii’s Japanese
were now politically active and self-assured. These were related
aspects of underlying social, economic, and political changes
which threatened the power and perhaps ultimately the wealth
and status of the old, predominantly haole elite. These changes
had a profound impact on every facet of the statehood cam-
paign.
Resistance to these developments influenced the core of all
local opposition to statehood. Very few residents were prepared
to voice public hostility to statehood; but a much larger number
uttered this sentiment in private. Opponents argued with some
validity that people who resisted statehood, for whatever
reason, would not declare their position publicly. 76 Stokes ex-
aggerated greatly when he suggested that “implied threats and
pressure tactics” or “fear … prevented many from expressing
their opposition.” 77 But it was clearly not expedient for business
or community leaders to object. Sociologist Bernard Hormann
observed that those who did not want statehood for racial
reasons rarely dared to publicize this opposition. 78 Some busi-
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nessmen, and perhaps some politicians, were reluctant to
oppose it publicly because this might alienate the large
Japanese ethnic group. Significantly, only one of the residents
who presented negative testimony at the 1946 hearings had
substantial business or political associations in the islands. 79
It was neither intelligent politics nor sound business practice to
publicly oppose statehood after 1945. 80 The results of a ballot
on immediate statehood conducted by the Honolulu Chamber of
Commerce early in 1946 support this contention. Almost two-
thirds of the 1,307 members of the chamber were Caucasians
and part-Hawaiians. 81 Only 42 percent of the membership re-
turned ballots, with 170 opposing immediate statehood. A ma-
jority of the negative returns were unsigned. 82 Although the
Honolulu Chamber of Commerce was not a representative
sample of the general population of Hawaii, these returns
suggest that there was considerable minority opposition from
business interests and whites in Honolulu at least. They also in-
dicate that most opponents preferred to express their opinion
anonymously or privately. Moreover, within this particular
segment of Honolulu citizens, approximately one-third opposed
immediate admission. Although only about 10 percent of the
testimony presented to the 1946 subcommittee was negative,
local opposition was possibly more widespread than was ap-
parent during these hearings. The Honolulu Advertiser, which
had never given unqualified support to immediate statehood,
remarked after the 1946 hearings had ended: “It was unfor-
tunate that opposing testimony was not better documented and
more forcefully delivered. The underground of opposition con-
fined itself to whisperings, and failed to make its point.” An
outspoken member of the territory’s senate, William C. (“Doc”)
Hill (Rep., Hawaii), claimed that the majority was reluctant to
express its true opinion on statehood. He alleged that thou-
sands of local residents did “not voice their sentiments openly
because of fear of political and economic retaliation at the
hands of certain racial groups and certain politicians seeking
to use the statehood issue for their own glory and political ad-
vantage.” No evidence of such reprisals was ever uncovered.
Nonetheless as William Quinn, the territory’s last governor,
later observed, until 1959 “the articulated opposition and the
real opposition were two different things.” Few people were
prepared to acknowledge openly their belief that statehood
would “turn Hawaii over to the Japanese.” 83
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Concern with possible Japanese influence in the proposed
state was generally expressed in an indirect, covert form. Op-
ponents maintained that Hawaii was not sufficiently Ameri-
canized, and its various ethnic groups not adequately assimi-
lated to warrant statehood. Almost invariably this view was sup-
ported by claims that citizens of Japanese extraction voted over-
whelmingly along racial lines. In view of the political control ex-
ercised by the cohesive haole elite through the Republican party
before the war, it was indeed ironic that the Japanese were now
condemned for allegedly voting as a bloc. Charges of bloc voting
by the Japanese were never substantiated. The 1946 subcom-
mittee concluded that, at worst, some ambiguous evidence of
bloc voting did exist, but that this had not assumed serious pro-
portions. Patterns of voting behavior were generally consistent
with those for mainland areas like New York or Chicago, which
also had very mixed ethnic populations. 84
After the war, as before, opposition to statehood was also
linked to the issue of reapportionment. But only a minority
of outer-island residents now felt strongly about the fact that
statehood would guarantee new, more equitable electoral
boundaries throughout the islands. By 1945 Oahu supported
more than 60 percent of all registered voters, but elected less
than half of the territory’s legislature. Statehood would imme-
diately remove this electoral bias. Hence the outer islands re-
mained generally less enthusiastic than Oahu about statehood.
Two senators from the outer islands—Harold M. Rice and
Clarence Crozier—spoke against the resolution before the leg-
islature in 1945. In the following years, the Senator from the
Big Island, the island of Hawaii, Doc Hill, was the only outer-
island representative to oppose statehood consistently in the
legislature. 85 Overt local opposition increased considerably as
soon as martial law ended, but it related primarily to particu-
lar ethnic, social, and economic groupings in the territory, not
to any one geographic region. (In 1956, three years before
statehood, those opposed to reapportionment finally lost their
fight and the Democrat-controlled legislature instituted the first
redistribution of electoral districts since the Organic Act of
1900.)
Local opposition to statehood was restricted almost exclu-
sively to a small minority of only two groups, Hawaiians and
Caucasians, who equated majority rule with domination by an
alien, Asian population. Alice Campbell expressed this view
rigidly and frequently in the following years. During the 1946
subcommittee hearings she stated forcefully that she opposed
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statehood “in any form and at any time.” The 37 percent of
Hawaii’s population of Japanese descent, Campbell argued, rep-
resented a “menace” which was already apparent in every
aspect of private and public life in the territory. “It is obvious,”
she concluded, “that in due time they will get a definite hold of
the islands politically and economically.” John Stokes, who had
presented a similar view to the 1935 hearings, again echoed
this argument in 1946. But he expressed the opinions of only
a small fragment of local whites when he asserted emotionally
that, under statehood, Caucasians in the territory “would be
endlessly enslaved because the control by our Japanese over-
lords would be complete and permanent.” He presented sta-
tistics which allegedly demonstrated that descendents of
Japanese immigrants would control the proposed state: “it is
the children and grandchildren of these enemy aliens who are
about to dominate Hawaii’s electorate.” This reflexive hostility
to full citizenship for Hawaii’s Japanese was not widespread,
but it was tenacious. 86
Typical of this intolerant attitude was the opinion expressed
by a former Republican committeewoman, Mrs. F. Bolte, to the
1948 House investigation. Her disjointed, emotive testimony al-
leged that statehood would permit the laboring class of Ori-
entals to triumph politically and culturally in the islands.
Alarmed by the fact that some Japanese communities remained
separate from mainstream Hawaiian society, that many schools
were attended largely by students of Japanese parentage, and
that Japanese language radio broadcasts were still made, Mrs.
Bolte suggested to visiting congressmen that they were ig-
norant of the true nature of Hawaii’s society. Finally, she pro-
jected her racism onto the investigators, claiming that, “The
Negroes to you people are not any worse than the Japanese to a
lot of us people in the islands.” 87
Local statehood advocates claimed optimistically that 90
percent of Hawaii’s people now favored immediate admission.
But the House subcommittee was undoubtedly more accurate
when it estimated that a majority of at least two to one wanted
statehood. 88 Nonetheless this support was sufficient to con-
vince Truman’s secretary of the Interior that Congress should
quickly admit Hawaii. “The period of apprenticeship served by
the people of Hawaii should now be brought to a close,” Krug
stated, “and on the basis of the amply demonstrated readiness
of Hawaii for statehood, the Congress should fulfill its early
and reiterated pledges to admit the territory to the Union when
it was qualified.” 89 Statehood proponents were strongly en-
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couraged by support from the Truman administration, and were
no longer constrained by doubts previously expressed about the
loyalty and Americanization of Hawaii’s Japanese. “If the pre-
requisites for statehood have already been met in all other re-
spects, and if the doubt as to the loyalty of a portion of our
population has been allayed by the war,” King asked a House
investigating team, “then what remaining condition must we
fulfill before we take our rightful place as the forty-ninth state?”
90 This question, in various forms, was repeated persistently
during the following fifteen years. Yet those who felt threatened
by Hawaii’s so-called Japanese problem were not easily per-
suaded that war had demonstrated Hawaii’s right to statehood.
Charges of future Japanese control were undemocratic,
unfashionable, and impossible to substantiate. Hence many op-
ponents preferred to argue, as they had before the war, that
the unchecked economic power of the Big Five made statehood
inappropriate. Certainly, as the House subcommittee acknowl-
edged in 1946, the five major sugar agencies continued to dom-
inate a substantial portion of the islands’ economy. In addition,
landholdings remained concentrated in the hands of a few. 91
Some protested that statehood would confirm the centralized
economic and land control of these huge companies, and argued
that it should be delayed until the economic fabric of the islands
became more open and equal. 92 Yet as the Advertiser com-
mented, for virtually all opponents “the financial superiority”
of the Big Five “was of secondary importance to the numerical
superiority of the Japanese.” 93 Leading opponents ingeniously
tried to attribute the economic supremacy of the white oligopoly
to the support given it by local Japanese. Not surprisingly, they
failed to identify the precise relationship which purportedly ex-
isted between these two very disparate groups. 94
As we have seen, the Big Five did wield enormous power
over Hawaii’s economy and, to a lesser extent, its politics. Even
in the late 1940s as Kido and many others have observed,
Hawaii’s social, economic, and political climate was distinct
from that of the mainland: “it was a conservative community
dominated by the oligarchy and anybody who spoke against
it was ostracized and even penalized.” 95 This assessment was
not confined to Democrats or disgruntled nisei. It was certainly
shared by some moderate Republicans, including Fong and at
times Farrington, although those who aspired to office as Re-
publicans were understandably reluctant to express such senti-
ments publicly. But as the Statehood Commission pointed out,
questions of monopoly or elite control were not directly relevant
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to the statehood issue. 96 Certainly, the concentration of wealth
and power in various mainland territories had not affected their
demands for statehood in the nineteenth century. Indeed, in
Hawaii’s case it might reasonably have been expected that the
increased local authority of a new state legislature would help
to undermine the power of the few large corporations. Even if it
is conceded that the influence of the Big Five was a legitimate
issue in the statehood debate, the war had initiated changes
which quickly challenged its traditional authority. 97
The two major arguments made against Hawaii immediately
after the war were fundamentally contradictory. Allegations
that Japanese citizens would control the proposed state were
clearly inconsistent with the contention that statehood should
be denied because the Caucasian-owned sugar corporations
exercised monopolistic economic control and undue political
influence in the islands. Hostility to the alleged economic mo-
nopoly of the sugar corporations, however, was not a genuine
preoccupation of many opponents. This was demonstrated con-
clusively when, after the outbreak of severe labor unrest, oppo-
nents suddenly ignored the alleged threat of big business and
grasped instead onto a new issue calculated to appeal more ef-
fectively to influential haoles. It was now argued that the real
threat to the islands came from the left, not the right. Against
a background of growing cold war suspicions and national in-
security, opponents asserted that statehood would consolidate
the economic and political control of the islands by militant left-
wing, allegedly Communist-controlled labor unions.
Early in 1947 the commanding general of the Army in
Hawaii presented Governor Stainback with a list of alleged
Communists. (Just six years before, Army and FBI lists had
resulted in the internment of locals allegedly sympathetic to
Japan. Now the enemy within was Soviet communism and there
were doubtless some in Hawaii who wished suspected Commu-
nists could be dealt with as promptly and simply as were the
earlier Japanese suspects.) Among those nominated as Com-
munists were Hall and Kawano, both close political associates
of Burns and Mau. In April, Hugh Butler, the chairman of the
crucial Senate Public Lands Committee, claimed that entry
would be delayed until labor interests stopped controlling the
territory’s government. The following month he suggested that
Hawaii be incorporated as a county of California. 98 During the
House debate in June, some opponents argued that statehood
should be denied until the influence of labor unions in the ter-
ritory was reduced. Yet opposition based ostensibly on concern
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with the political and economic influence of labor was of little
consequence during the first House debate. Indeed many op-
ponents still argued that the Big Five exercised decisive power
over the islands’ economy and politics, and that statehood
would simply consolidate this monopoly control of “labor, agri-
culture, manufacturing, banking, transport and public ser-
vices.” 99
Consistency and understatement were never the hallmarks
of arguments advanced by opponents. By late 1947 local and
congressional opponents were asserting that communist influ-
ences in the territory should be removed before its relationship
with Washington was changed. 100 After the House had passed
the Hawaii bill in mid-1947, Governor Stainback apparently ac-
cepted this view and refused to endorse statehood. He now
pledged to “unearth” the “dangers of Communism” in Hawaii
and requested an investigation of the problem by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice. (Old guard Democrats were no more sym-
pathetic to the growing militancy of labor in the islands than
were their counterparts in the Republican party.) At the same
time some community leaders who had previously supported
admission changed their public attitude. The “irresponsible ac-
tions of Union leadership,” warned A. G. Budge, president of
Castle and Cooke, would undermine Senate action. Others who
had never embraced statehood were quick to exploit the
growing furor over strikes and communism. For example,
Campbell formed an Anti-Statehood Committee with an office
in Honolulu. This organization was established, she claimed, in
response to “many requests from Congressmen who opposed
statehood and wanted detailed evidence to support their
opinion.” 101
Caught between a personal commitment to statehood and
mounting pressure from old guard Democrats as well as Re-
publicans to expose communist and labor power in the islands,
Farrington chose a compromise path. He requested a limited in-
vestigation of the issue, and suggested that the FBI make all
records of Communists in the territory available to a local inves-
tigation committee. 102 Farrington was not anxious to alienate
labor groups, as their support might later help him stem the
tide of support for his Democratic rivals. Moreover, he recog-
nized correctly that the communist issue could not be ignored
or pushed aside, but had to be confronted openly if statehood
was not to be further jeopardized.
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Ever since he was first elected delegate in 1942, Farrington
enjoyed wide popular support. He appealed not only to tradi-
tional GOP voters, but also to moderate labor groups and many
newly mobile Asian voters. Unless the Democrats could make
substantial inroads into this support they were condemned to
the political wilderness, except in Honolulu City. When the com-
munist issue surfaced dramatically after the war, some local
conservatives felt betrayed by Farrington and the Star-Bulle tin,
claiming that Farrington and Allen had allied with the Com-
munist dissidents within the Democratic party. Another islander,
Joe Keenan, observed privately: “There is a weird combination
between the owner and publisher of a newspaper, Farrington,
who is a reactionary Republican,” joining with the ILWU and
Harry Bridges’ “left-wing crowd for popular elections to attract
the Japanese (almost 50% of the voters), the Chinese, and
others of the yellow race.” Such comments were racially as well
as politically inspired. They were also wildly exaggerated, al-
though Farrington did enjoy wide popularity and initially vac-
illated over the communist question. Unlike many fellow Re-
publicans, Farrington was generally disturbed by the frequent
accusations of communist which were levelled against labor or-
ganizers by big business interests. As a result, Elizabeth Far-
rington observed, he was “called a communist and everything
else” by these very interests. Conscious of the likely adverse
effects the highly volatile communist issue might have on the
statehood drive and his own political survival, Farrington’s Star-
Bul letin cautioned local citizens against reacting hysterically
to the real or fancied dangers of communism in Hawaii. 103
Later however, as support for the Democrats grew, his paper
succumbed to these very pressures.
The infusion of the communist issue into the national debate
on statehood did not create new resistance to admission. It did,
however, make existing arguments against entry more effective
and difficult to combat. It also made local opposition far more
overt and confident. During subsequent years opponents em-
phasized that the question of statehood could not be viewed in
isolation from the question of communist influence in the is-
lands. Equal status in the Union and the right to influence na-
tional domestic or foreign policy, they argued, should be denied
a territory dominated by un-American, subversive, communist
interests. The effectiveness of this argument derived less from
the actual extent of the influence of communism in Hawaii than
from the anti-communist hysteria which poisoned the national
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political climate during the early years of the cold war and
which reached its climax during the McCarthy era of the early
1950s.
Attempts to impose ideological consensus and expose ac-
tivities perceived as disloyal or subversive predated America’s
entry into the war against Japan and the other Axis states.
They also predated difficulties with the Soviet Union in Eastern
Europe. In America, Louis Hartz has observed, socialism was a
“national heresy.” Certainly, the phenomenon now generally re-
ferred to as McCarthyism was not a brief aberration of the early
cold war. Rather, as Robert Griffith and others have argued,
“it was a natural expression of America’s political culture and
a logical though extreme product of its political machinery.”
The anti-communist persuasion and preoccupation with internal
subversion reflected entrenched hostility to radicalism from the
left, an irrational identification of all social change with com-
munism, and a general susceptibility to conspiracy theories. The
formal precursor of McCarthyism, the Dies Committee on Un-
American activities was established late in the New Deal years,
in 1938. It enjoyed strong support and adequate congressional
funding in its attempt to expose groups and individuals “sympa-
thetic with totalitarian ideology.” In 1940 Congress passed the
Alien Registration Act (or Smith Act) which prohibited the
teaching or advocacy of the violent overthrow of the United
States government, thereby establishing guilt by intent or as-
sociation. The Un-American Activities Committee was made a
standing committee of the House of Representatives shortly
after the war. 104
Cold war tensions quickly exacerbated distrust of com-
munism and helped condition a widely held belief that Commu-
nists had infiltrated government, labor unions, and schools in
the United States. The Mundt-Nixon bill of 1947 was perhaps
the first decisive indication of the extent of anti-communist sen-
timent. Intended to secure swift prosecution of Communists and
so-called subversives, this bill passed the House but was de-
feated in the Senate. In this year Truman established an order
which permitted investigation of the loyalty of civil servants.
As a result of these investigations 212 people were dismissed,
but none was prosecuted immediately. Many Americans were
apparently prepared to abandon parts of the nation’s Consti-
tution and deny full citizenship rights to those who espoused
a conflicting ideology or supported a fringe political group like
the Communist party. Well before Senator Joe McCarthy had
begun his public crusade against “Communists,” “liberals,” and
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“subversives,” Congress and the administration had moved to
expose those who supported un-American causes. Conserva-
tives like Democrat Pat McCarran, chairman of the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee, did not need any prompting from McCarthy.
Nor did they have to await the groundswell of anti-communism
which accompanied the “loss” of China late in 1949 or the frus-
trations of Korea in the early 1950s. Truman’s election victory
of 1948, along with growing liberal support for civil rights
and Soviet gains in Eastern Europe, had convinced many con-
servatives by 1947–1948 that America was being eroded from
within. McCarran, for example, was anxious to stamp out the
“Communist-liberal heresy of racial equality,” and to expose
those officials who had allegedly appeased communism in
Europe and Asia. 105
Hawaii was isolated geographically, but not ideologically.
Certainly, it was sufficiently Americanized to share fully in the
surge of anti-communism which affected the nation beginning
in the late 1940s. Indeed in some respects Hawaii’s experience
was a prelude to events in the United States generally. Anti-
communist sentiment and arguments were important ingre-
dients in the strategy invoked against Hawaiian statehood, es-
pecially in the Senate.
As we have seen, the House approved Hawaii in mid-1947.
The Senate, however, did not begin preliminary committee
hearings on the bill until early the following year. The Statehood
Commission attempted to exploit this new situation. It engaged
the Holst and Cummings advertising agency, at a cost of three
thousand dollars per month, to direct publicity in Washington
during the first months of 1948. New campaign material was
collected and distributed. Three local Republicans were sent
to Washington to urge national Republican support “strictly on
a party line.” In addition, on September 25, 1947, the com-
mission had appointed six subcommittees to draft various sec-
tions of a proposed state constitution. Local proponents were
confident that these initiatives would ensure favorable action
by the Senate in 1948. But the Hilo Trib une Herald was more
realistic. It acknowledged that major obstacles remained and
warned that deliberations on statehood might hinge on consid-
erations of political pragmatism rather than on the merits of
statehood itself. 106
Conducted against a background of growing concern over
internal subversion and the cold war, the Senate investigations
of Hawaii in early 1948 could not avoid the deep conflicts
between labor and capital or charges that Hawaii was Com-
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munist controlled and a threat to national security. Less than
10 percent of the evidence taken by Cordon’s committee was
negative. But a larger number opposed admission before this
Senate hearing than during the previous two House investi-
gations conducted after the war. To assess more accurately
the state of private opinion in the islands, Cordon requested
that citizens submit their views in writing to him. He gave an
assurance that names would not be made public unless oth-
erwise stipulated by correspondents. According to Cordon, his
appeals inspired a substantial influx of letters. His survey re-
vealed that 58 percent favored immediate statehood, 40 percent
were opposed. Almost half of the correspondents who opposed
statehood cited the racial character of the territory as the
reason for their position. In addition, some objected to
statehood because the Japanese allegedly practiced bloc voting.
The communist problem in Hawaii was cited by approximately
one-quarter of those against statehood. 107 If this evidence is ac-
cepted as representative, then clearly racial considerations re-
mained the basic reason for local opposition.
After the war, however, opponents increasingly argued that
their position derived from fear of communism in the islands.
The Houston Post predicted in 1947 that this issue did not
promise to enhance the chances of statehood in Congress. 108
Communism provided a convenient new focus for opponents
in both Hawaii and Washington. For example, Hill informed
Cordon that statehood should be delayed until the extent of
communist influence in the islands could be more clearly as-
sessed. “There is a sort of tradition here that if you are not in
favor of statehood immediately … you are more or less a traitor
and disloyal,” he claimed. “That has been worked up by Del-
egate Farrington mostly. I think that some day we should have
statehood, but I do not think we should have it now. My main
reason is the I.L.W.U. and the Communist situation.” In a letter
to Butler, Hill asserted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Stainback, and Army and Navy intelligence were familiar with
the “dangerous inroads” made by communism in the territory.
Hill contended that statehood would give a subversive element
an opportunity to dominate the proposed state government. 109
Previously, however, Hill had commented that, “A Jap is a Jap
even after a thousand years and can’t become Americanized.”
110 While Hill later regretted this indiscretion, there can be little
doubt that many haoles still shared his opinion of the Japanese,
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or that some accepted his view that un-American ethnic and
communist groups were inseparable elements of one general
problem.
Hill’s views were supported in public by a small minority of
local citizens. For example, Walter Dillingham, president of the
Hawaiian Dredging and Construction Company and possibly the
richest Hawaii-born citizen in the territory, argued that mainte-
nance of territorial status was necessary to stop labor leaders
from gaining “economic, political and social control of the is-
lands.” For him, the only valid interests in the territory were
employer interests, and he opposed statehood because it would
possibly reduce the influence of business interests in Hawaii’s
government. According to Elizabeth Farrington, Dillingham and
other wealthy residents were comfortable with territorial rule
because it enabled them to strike bargains directly with officials
in Washington and bypass interference from elected representa-
tives in either Honolulu or Washington. In a similar vein, Samuel
P. King has commented: “Walter Dillingham had better connec-
tions in Washington than most States: and he could see that
statehood would decrease his influence, rather dramatically.”
Fuchs has inferred that Dillingham also opposed statehood be-
cause he believed it would strengthen Oriental influence in
local government. 111 Hawaiian Airlines employee Larry Powell
argued that statehood should be opposed simply because “every
one of those who have been accused of being Communists
or subversives and every ‘liberal’ is radically in favor of
statehood.” Campbell attempted to correlate the growth of
labor unions with the increased political and economic influence
exercised by citizens of Japanese ancestry. Ignoring his pre-
vious opposition to the Big Five, Stokes informed Cordon that
statehood should not be granted because the Communist-con-
trolled ILWU had all but taken over the Democratic party, and
had insinuated itself into the Republican party. Such assertions
gained at least oblique support in the influential Honolulu Ad-
vertiser, which was partly owned by Lorrin P. Thurston. In-
censed by the Advertiser’s position on statehood, Honolulu’s
Democratic mayor John Wilson purchased space in other island
newspapers to denounce Thurston as “Public Enemy No. 2”
of statehood—second only to Butler, the unofficial leader of
opponents in the nation’s Senate. 112 Locally, the communist
issue stimulated fresh debate over who would control the future
state and permitted opponents to focus on more palatable argu-
ments than those relating exclusively to the political and eco-
nomic power of the islands’ Japanese. Nationally, allegations
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of communist subversion provided a convenient rationalization
for self-interested opposition based on party affiliations, racial
prejudices, or states’ rights considerations.
The small number of witnesses who informed Cordon that
communism was “threatening Hawaii’s economic structure and
future welfare” failed to document precisely the extent of com-
munist influence. Cordon reported early in 1948 that although
there were active Communist organizers in Hawaii, as
throughout the nation, the evidence did not support the al-
legations that communism exerted extreme influence in the
islands. As far as Cordon could determine, there were less
than one hundred Communists in Hawaii. No evidence was pre-
sented to Cordon proving the infiltration of Communists into
the legislature or any elective office in the territory. 113 Even
Thomas O’Brien, author of The Plot to Sovietize Hawaii (1948),
conceded: “There are probably comparatively few Communist
agents in the Territory.” 114
Nonetheless, statehood opponents and anti-labor factions
maintained that communism constituted a real threat to the po-
litical and economic security of the islands. Stainback, a con-
servative Democrat who had reputedly appointed more Repub-
licans than Democrats to high posts and through whose long
service to the interests of the Big Five, some said, the Democ-
ratic party had nearly been extinguished, 115 now charged that
communism was rampant in Hawaii:
The I.L.W.U. Union which controls the labor in the production of
sugar, pineapples and our marine transportation system, is com-
pletely dominated by Communists. All their leaders are actively
enrolled Communists, most of them from the Mainland, with a
number of local lieutenants. We also have some in our University
and among our school teachers.
O’Brien contended that although true card-carrying Commu-
nists constituted a small minority in the territory, these few
Communists had been able to seduce both the professional lib-
erals and a number of discontented workers. 116 If actual Com-
munists couldn’t be found they were simply invented by those
determined to unearth a threat from the left. The tactics of
smear, exaggeration, and unsubstantiated accusation later iden-
tified with McCarthyism were introduced into Hawaii during
1948–1949.
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The tenacity and frequency of these accusations reflected
deep tensions within the local Democratic party and growing
hostility from a majority of Democrats to their titular leader in
the islands, Stainback. These strains emerged as labor groups
and Japanese Americans began to use the Democratic party as
a vehicle for progressive industrial and social change. By 1948,
however, this new liberal faction met open resistance from an
entrenched, conservative, and largely haole minority within the
party. This conflict remained unresolved until Stainback was re-
placed in 1951. In the interval, the Central Committee of the
Democratic party, which was now dominated by Burns’ Young
Turks, urged Truman to dismiss the governor whom Roosevelt
had appointed in 1942. The charges laid against Stainback in
petitions to the president, secretary of the Interior, and Demo-
cratic National Committee were very serious. But most focused
on his political activities in relation to the fortunes of the De-
mocratic party, not administrative inefficiency or impropriety.
Among the charges made were allegations that he had failed
to give active support to local Democrats; appointed mainly
Republicans to high offices; supported efforts to destroy labor
unionism; blatantly encouraged untrue and imagined allega-
tions of Communist infiltration in the Democratic party; and
undermined Hawaii’s statehood prospects through his refusal
to back appeals for statehood to Congress. The Truman ad-
ministration was initially unimpressed by these charges. It re-
mained sympathetic to Stainback’s private reports which played
up the threat of communism to the islands and the local Democ-
ratic party. In May 1948, for example, he wrote Undersecretary
of the Interior Oscar Chapman: “As feared, the communists
have taken over the so-called ‘Democratic’ Party organization
in Hawaii—lock, stock and barrel.” Stainback was adamant that
the recent convention of his party had been controlled by Hall,
who was supported by “enrolled communists, the fellow trav-
ellers, the sympathisers, the members of the I.L.W.U. who were
controlled by communist leaders, and those joining up with
these leaders through ignorance or political ambition.” 117
While unaware of the actual contents of Stainback’s reports
to Washington, liberal Democrats correctly suspected that they
gave a very biased view of local events, and an unsympathetic
picture of those younger party members anxious to wrest power
from the conservatives. In an attempt to counter Stainback’s in-
fluence (particularly over appointments), Burns and Mau trav-
elled to Washington to meet with and lobby administration offi-
cials and leading Democrats in Congress. It was their hope that
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they could demonstrate that the local party was viable and vital,
Burns recalled. Apart from a meeting with Truman, Burns es-
tablished direct and lasting contacts with various White House
aides and labor union leaders. Building on these during
1948–1950, the Burns faction gradually came to control Demo-
cratic party patronage in the islands. 118
If Stainback—along with other local conservatives from both
parties—was disturbed by an alleged threat from the left, he
was equally alarmed by the spectre of growing Japanese po-
litical influence in the islands. During 1947 he had warned
Washington confidentially that “the communist drive … is
making great headway, particularly among the Japanese.” He
identified as the most ominous development in local politics,
“the inroads of communism upon the Japanese of the com-
munity, particularly those connected with labor organizations.”
This was a wild assertion indeed. It confused the new political
and industrial assertiveness of Hawaii’s nisei population with
radical socialism. Yet when the FBI finally identified a handful
of islanders as Communists, Japanese Americans were conspic-
uously underrepresented in the list, while haoles were overrep-
resented. Stainback, like many defenders of the old order in
Hawaii, was convinced that the Japanese were a particularly
vulnerable and embittered group. He asserted the extreme sus-
ceptibility of the Japanese to communism, and informed the
Truman administration:
Because the early Japanese here, who were plantation laborers,
lived pretty much under a feudal system and since the younger
generation has become educated and their scale of life has risen,
they are considerably embittered, many of them connecting the
white race and its government with tyranny and oppression.
Moreover, the communists are using as propaganda the appeal
to race prejudice, strenuously contending that the Japanese are
discriminated against in the employment of labor on the planta-
tions and elsewhere, that they are not given the better paid po-
sitions even though qualified therefore. Whatever the reason, the
Japanese have proved very susceptible to the communistic propa-
ganda and, as one communist stated, Hawaii is the “most fertile
field for communism in the whole nation.”
When complaining about Communist domination of the local
Democratic party convention a year later, Stainback again be-
trayed his preoccupation with the racial characteristics of those
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on the left. “Incidently,” he told Chapman, “practically no white
men were elected to any positions, as the whole communist
appeal to race hatred was very effectively used.” 119
At most, only limited and sometimes contradictory evidence
existed to support the charge that Hawaii was heavily influ-
enced by Communists. Even if such evidence had existed, it
should have been immaterial in a society ostensibly wedded to
principles of free speech and free association. Nonetheless, in
late 1947 Dr. and Mrs. John Reinecke were suspended from
their teaching positions by the Territorial Board of Commis-
sioners of Public Instruction because of their alleged associa-
tions with the Communist party. Some members of the Hawaiian
Civil Liberties Committee, formed to defend the Reineckes,
were later also identified as Communists. The House Un-
American Activities Committee unanimously agreed in 1950
that the Civil Liberties Committee was “a subversive organi-
zation initiated and operated by communists for the sole
purpose of expanding the influence of the small communist
minority in the Territory of Hawaii.” Leadership of the powerful
ILWU was also widely assumed to be Communist. In 1944 the
ILWU was cited by a special Congressional Committee on Un-
American Activities as having a solidly entrenched Communist
leadership. Harry Bridges, national president of the ILWU-CIO,
was classified by anti-statehood and anti-labor factions as a
Communist. The United States Supreme Court, however, later
ruled that the charge that Bridges was a Communist had not
been substantiated. Hall and other union leaders were also clas-
sified as Communists by local Army intelligence sources, and
usually identified with the Communist party by statehood oppo-
nents, the local press, and later by the House Un-American Ac-
tivities Committee. Indeed, during 1948 O’Brien and a former
Communist Ichiro Izuka independently claimed that a majority
of ILWU officials were members of the Communist party. Hall,
Charles Fujimoto, Dwight Freeman, Ralph Vossbrink, and
Robert McElrath were among the labor leaders named by Izuka
and O’Brien. 120
Allegations that the Democratic party was dominated by
Communists or sympathizers of communism were never sub-
stantiated. In May 1948 the Democratic Party Convention re-
pudiated the anti-labor strategy promoted by a conservative
faction of Democrats led by Stainback, Heen, and Chief Justice
James L. Coke. But an attempt by the ILWU to gain control
of the party failed. Independent Democrats won most of the
critical votes taken at the convention. The influence of orga-
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nized labor within the Democratic party was strong, but not
dominant. Former Communist Kawano stated that only eight
delegates seated at the convention were Communists. Thus
Communists constituted less than 5 percent of all delegates
seated. (In contrast, Stainback informed Washington that
ninety-one of the five hundred delegates were Communists, and
that, in league with those sympathetic to them, they had a two-
to-one margin of control at the convention.) Liberal Democrats
were now well aware that communism had become their party’s
Achilles heel, and they grasped every opportunity to discredit it.
“The Democrats made a point throughout the Convention of de-
nouncing Communism and also the Republicans for ‘smearing’
the Democratic Party with a communist taint,” Riley H. Allen,
editor of the Star-Bulletin wrote Farrington in Washington. “In
view of the Democrats’ utterances,” Allen concluded, “the Re-
publicans are not going to find it easy to identify the Democratic
Party with the Communist Party.” 121
Yet the extent of alleged communist influence in the De-
mocratic party remained a major issue in Hawaiian politics.
Statehood opponents, anti-labor interests, and opponents of
the Democratic party relied heavily upon this issue to avert
statehood, defend the interests of employers, and retard the
appeal of the Democratic party to the local electorate. Repub-
licans certainly felt that the communist issue could be used to
electoral advantage; but it was a double-edged sword. By exag-
gerating the menace of communism many Republicans and old
guard Democrats gave credence to the anti-statehood campaign
and risked losing the electoral support of sincere statehood
proponents. Hence Farrington and some pro-statehood Repub-
licans were ambivalent over the issue. Most Democrats, like
Honolulu’s outspoken Mayor Wilson, identified all those who ex-
aggerated the threat of subversion from within as opponents of
statehood. A trenchant critic of Stainback’s “indifference and
neglect” of his party, Wilson asserted that a majority of people
who express “fear of growing Communist activities in the ter-
ritory as a basis of their opposition” to statehood “do not hon-
estly believe in any Communist menace here but are using this
red herring in their actual fear of a curtailment of the present
political power of big-business.” 122 Representatives of labor as-
serted that attempts to identify unions with communism were
calculated to engender a generalized atmosphere of hysteria,
and thus undermine the interests of labor organizations and the
Democratic party. 123
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During elections for the territory’s legislature in 1948 the
communist bogey was exploited with some effect by elements
of the Republican party. More damaging than GOP tactics,
however, were the internal divisions within Democratic ranks
over the extent and nature of communist influence in their
own party. Stainback led the conservative faction. Prominent
Democrats like Wilson and Mau were, he alleged, communist
sympathizers. In the same unsubstantiated way he charged the
Democrats’ new national committeeman, Charles E. Kauhane,
with being “completely subservient to Hall and his communist
gang.” 124 If the governor was alarmed by the strength of the
left in his party, he was, as indicated earlier, also concerned that
few “white men” held influential posts within it. 125 There were
many who shared Stainback’s exaggerated views. The Honolulu
Advertiser, which generally reflected the attitudes of conserv-
ative Republican party and business interests, stated early in
1948 that “left-wing democracy” was being perpetrated on the
people of Hawaii:
… we dislike Harry Bridges so roundly and distrust him so deeply
that we want no part of him or his stooges controlling our political
life. Harry and his nefarious C.I.O. are interlopers in these fair
islands, preaching an alien ideology, to wit, class consciousness,
class hatred and class strife, stirring up trouble by needless and
disruptive strikes with a view to ruining private enterprise and
setting up state socialism, with a dictatorship of the proletariat.
126
Organized labor had arrived late in the territory. Never-
theless the reaction to it, in terms of the slogans and tactics
of McCarthyism, took root relatively early in the fertile soil
provided by bitter conflict between big business and newly
emergent working groups. Despite the strong national trend
toward the Democratic party, in the elections of late 1948 island
Democrats suffered severe losses. The gains made in 1946 were
reversed as the GOP won a House majority of ten and a Sen-
ate majority of three. In addition, Farrington won a landslide
victory over his rival Burns, winning more than two-thirds of the
vote. 127 As mainland liberals were shortly to learn, communism
was a damaging electoral issue for the Democratic party. Alle-
gations that the territory’s Democrats were sympathetic to and
influenced by communism were the major issues in the election
campaign of 1948. As indicated previously in this chapter, the
Republicans exploited communism, while the Democrats split
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over it. After their election defeat some Democrats charged
Stainback with openly supporting fabrications of communist in-
filtration of the party. 128 Farrington, ever eager to promote
statehood, interpreted his massive victory as a clear and en-
thusiastic endorsement of immediate statehood, and proof that
communist influence in the territory posed no threat to its gov-
ernment. 129 Yet the fact that Republicans had partly based their
election campaigns on opposition to communist and left-wing
labor influence in the territory gave some credence to the argu-
ments advanced by opponents of statehood.
It should be emphasized, however, that many local residents
who opposed the so-called subversive communistic influence in
labor unions also supported statehood. Farrington’s Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, for example, simultaneously promoted statehood
and denounced left-wing influence in local unions. 130
Nonetheless during 1948 and after, local and congressional op-
ponents of statehood attempted to equate support for statehood
with tacit sympathy for the interests of labor and communism in
Hawaii. 131 As previously indicated, local opponents were deter-
mined to preserve the political, economic, and racial status quo.
The question of who should rule at home was more important
to opponents than the issue of self-government and equal citi-
zenship for Hawaii’s people. Similarly, congressional opponents
were much more concerned with political and sectional control
in Congress than with granting full democratic rights to Hawaii.
Both groups seized enthusiastically on any issue which might
delay change. Available evidence suggests that the problem of
communism in Hawaii was comparatively no greater than in
any other part of the United States. Nonetheless, during 1948
the communist issue became the dominant, overt argument em-
ployed both locally and in Congress against Hawaii’s efforts to
gain statehood.
CYNICAL POLITICS: EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
The Democrats dominated both chambers of the Eighty-first
Congress, 1949–1950. In contrast, Hawaii’s political complexion
was again overwhelmingly Republican. Nonetheless, when
Truman reiterated his ten-point civil rights package early in
1949 he included statehood for Hawaii and Alaska. Early in the
new session seven Hawaii statehood bills were introduced in the
House and two in the Senate. Farrington and Senator Estes Ke-
fauver (Dem., Tenn.), one of the few Southerners committed to
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statehood, introduced identical bills in the House and Senate. A
protracted legislative battle was foreshadowed, however, when
a leading opponent, Senator Butler, introduced a bill to grant
Hawaii only one voting member in the House of Representa-
tives and the right to elect its own governor. 132 Opponents were
clearly determined not to add any new members to the Senate.
Communism, it seems, was only a threat if Hawaii sent senators
to Washington.
Mau claimed that he and Burns were responsible for the po-
litically astute choice of Kefauver, a prominent Southerner, as
leader of the Democratic supporters in the Senate. Island De-
mocrats were anxious indeed to be identified with statehood
and to reap the electoral harvest which might accrue if they
could break the congressional deadlock over the issue. Far-
rington’s position was perhaps more delicate. He was obliged
to initiate or accept tactics involving Democrats, as his fellow
Republicans did not control Congress. But he was anxious that
progress on statehood be seen to be a result of his endeavors
and Republican support, not Democratic initiatives. In the
short-term, however, neither party was able to exploit statehood
successfully. Democrats were embarrassed by the intransigence
and overt racism of most Southern representatives of their
party. Republicans were equally disturbed by the inflexibility
and narrowness of their party’s old guard.
Those Republicans opposed to or ambivalent about imme-
diate statehood conveniently blamed “lousy goddam Dixiecrats”
for defeat in Congress. In response, island Democrats charged
local Republicans, including Farrington and King, with insin-
cerity because they only supported enabling legislation in Con-
gress. Unlike an admission bill (which Burns later successfully
introduced), enabling legislation required approval by the in-
famous Rules Committee before it could be debated. During
1947–1948, Farrington had rejected suggestions that he intro-
duce an admission bill, believing that it was a questionable
procedure which would simply be interpreted on Capitol Hill
as a subterfuge. In the absence of a drafted and approved
constitution for the proposed state, Farrington was correct to
maintain that Hawaii was not yet in a position to justify an ad-
mission bill. After the Constitutional Convention of 1950 this sit-
uation no longer applied. Local Democrats from the Burns camp
argued that Farrington’s position betrayed the ambivalence of
many island Republicans on statehood: it reflected a pattern
which persisted until the Republicans lost office. Anxious to
avoid the charge that the Southern racist wing of their own
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party had perennially delayed statehood, local Democrats later
claimed that many powerful members of the GOP in Hawaii
were for statehood in public, but against it in private. It was also
alleged that while in Washington the Farringtons and their aides
had totally ignored the Southern bloc. This alleged reluctance to
cultivate broad regional and bipartisan support had little actual
bearing on the fate of statehood legislation. It did, however,
provide the Democrats with additional ammunition in the de-
bates over congressional strategy. Farrington also refused to
amend the statehood bill to give Hawaii one (not two) members
in the House of Representatives. Democrat opponents imme-
diately claimed that this inflexibility was another deliberate,
if subtle, device for galvanizing opposition to the legislation
in Congress. At worst, Democrats charged, Farrington and his
wealthy GOP backers were opposed to immediate statehood. At
best, the Republican delegate was a poor strategist and inef-
fectual lobbyist. While some local newspapermen privately en-
dorsed this assessment, the heavily pro-Republican island press
largely ignored the whole issue. 133
Before late 1948 both national parties had accepted only
eventual statehood planks in their platforms. As a delegate
to the 1948 Democratic National Convention, however, Mau
managed (after an exhaustive struggle) to have his party adopt
an immediate statehood plank. “We felt it was very important,”
he later observed. “Because if the Democrats were to build their
political strength in Hawaii we should be the first of the political
parties to get that plank in…. It showed the ordinary people in
Hawaii that the Democrats in Hawaii at least cared for them.”
Acceptance of this plank helped vindicate the activities of the
Young Turks, and further boosted membership of their party. 134
But Farrington’s hold on the position as delegate to Congress
remained fast. Most electors accepted that he was a sincere
advocate of statehood and believed his moderate tactics would
quickly win admission.
If most young island Democrats were anxious to use
statehood as a vehicle for equalizing their society, they were
also determined to exploit the issue electorally. To achieve this
it was essential that the national Democratic party not be iden-
tified, through its reactionary Southern faction, as the principal
opponent of Hawaii. The day after Truman’s second inaugu-
ration, Burns and Mau again made personal contact with po-
litical influential in Washington. Aware that statehood was a
civil rights issue, they concentrated initially on liberals, be-
ginning with Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey advised them that
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statehood was contingent upon winning over the Southern in-
transigents who had recently walked out of the national con-
vention: “Without their support, it’s dead.” In the following
decade Burns and other local Democrats followed this advice
religiously. “We took that cue” and “remembered it well,” Mau
recalled. “And that is why [Burns] … made friends with speaker
Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson and other Southern Senators.
And he concentrated on them.” These lobbying activities were
further expanded after Burns became Hawaii’s delegate to Con-
gress in 1957. 135
By early 1949 the Statehood Commission accepted that pub-
licity alone could not guarantee action in Congress. It eagerly
supported the lobbying activities of Democrats, especially
Burns and Mau, as well as those of prominent Republicans like
Farrington and the new chairman of the commission, King. Also,
McLane had by now developed many influential contacts. De-
spite growing frustration with the cynicism of politics on Capitol
Hill, he pursued his lobbying activities with commendable en-
thusiasm. During the Eighty-first Congress the commission re-
ceived $136,000 from the legislature, maintained its offices in
Honolulu and Washington, and flooded Capitol Hill and news-
paper offices with information. The territory’s legislature again
passed resolutions asking Congress for immediate statehood.
The only dissenting vote in either chamber was cast by Doc
Hill. 136 Again the Statehood Commission expressed confidence
that Hawaii was nearer than ever to statehood. In March 1949
separate Hawaii and Alaska bills reached the powerful House
Rules Committee. The New York Times immediately observed
that there was no justification for the House and the Senate to
delay in accepting Hawaii as a state. 137
However, the statehood bill made no further progress in
either chamber of Congress in 1949. 138 A poll conducted by the
Hearst newspaper group in August 1949 indicated that a solid
majority of the House not only favored statehood for Hawaii,
but was amenable to voting on it in the current session. McLane
estimated that 244 members of the 435-member House would
vote for statehood in 1949. 139 Yet a majority of the Rules Com-
mittee refused to report Hawaii. Republican members of the
committee decided to block any action on Alaska until Hawaii
was reported separately. But Democrats comprised a majority
of the committee and they united to promote Alaska before
Hawaii. A further barrier resulted from the fact that the com-
mittee chairman, Adolph J. Sabath (Dem., Ill.), and four of its
Southern Democrat members—Cox (Ga.), Howard Smith (Va.),
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William Colmer (Miss.), and John Lyle (Tex.)—implacably op-
posed the admission of either territory. 140 However, some
House Democrats, even a few from Southern states, supported
the separate admission of Republican-dominated Hawaii. The
chairman of the House Public Lands Committee, J. Hardin Pe-
terson (Dem., Fla.), attempted to discharge the bill from further
consideration by the Rules Committee. “Though there is con-
siderable support in the House for action … to get the Hawaii
statehood bill to the House floor where it is quite certain of
passage,” McLane informed the Hawaii Statehood Commission,
“it is apparent that many House members are reluctant to
invoke discharge petitions.” In July Peterson conceded that
there was no prospect of action during the first session of the
Eighty-first Congress. 141
The Democratic House leadership was reluctant to promote
the immediate separate admission of Hawaii. House Speaker
Sam Rayburn (Dem., Tex.) indicated to the Hearst poll that he
was undecided on statehood. The Washington Post, however, re-
ported that Rayburn was definitely opposed. Majority Leader
John McCormack (Dem., Mass.) supported statehood but was
undecided about bringing it to a vote in 1949. Partisan politics
doubtless induced this convenient ambivalence, which now af-
flicted most liberal Democrats. 142 Hawaii enjoyed stronger
backing from Republicans than from Democrats. Most Demo-
crats endorsed the joint admission of Alaska and Hawaii, or
opposed the entry of either territory. A few only supported
Democrat-dominated Alaska. Southern Democrats, of course,
overwhelmingly opposed both territories. Early in 1949 the De-
mocratic administration pressed for consideration of Alaska
before Hawaii. Combined Republican and Southern Democratic
opposition nullified this strategy. The Rules Committee took no
action on Alaskan statehood during 1949. 143 Opponents of both
territories combined with a majority of Democrats who opposed
the separate admission of Hawaii and with a majority of Repub-
licans who opposed the separate admission of Alaska to avert
House debate on either territory.
In the Senate, the Democrats refused to schedule debate on
Hawaii until the House had acted. Nonetheless, Senate oppo-
nents were not inactive. While the Hawaii bill was before the
House Rules Committee, Butler reported to the Senate Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee on an investigation he had conve-
niently undertaken in Hawaii late the previous year. His investi-
gation began shortly after the Alger Hiss case broke in August
1948. This protracted, celebrated episode brought the New
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Deal liberal into disrepute as an alleged spy and communist
sympathizer. More than any single event, the Hiss affair focused
national attention on internal security. The fact that this preoc-
cupation was exaggerated and largely without foundation did
not in any way retard its influence on the nation’s mood. Amid
mounting controversy fanned by the Hiss case, Butler began the
third Senate investigation of statehood for Hawaii. He was im-
placably opposed to statehood and, as chairman of the Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee, was determined to exploit the
emotive internal subversion issue for cynical political ends. Con-
servative Republicans in the islands were doubtless delighted
when Butler scheduled his investigation to coincide with the
campaign for the local elections of 1948. During November
he conducted seventy-seven confidential interviews in Hawaii
and accepted public testimony from more than one hundred
additional witnesses. But his investigation did not focus on
statehood per se. As the title of his subsequent report sug-
gested, its central concern was “Communist Penetration of the
Hawaiian Islands.” Butler’s visit and enquiries were front-page
news. Few local proponents doubted that he would unearth
sufficient people concerned about Japanese or union influences
to justify a negative report. Predictably, however, Butler’s
report was not made public until June 1949, a few days before
Congress was again due to consider statehood legislation.
Butler recommended without equivocation that statehood
for Hawaii be “indefinitely deferred.” 144 A few weeks previously
the House Public Lands Committee had also, if unwittingly, fu-
elled the controversy on internal subversion. Its report con-
ceded that the extent of communist influence in the territory
had not been fully ascertained, but concluded that “the people
of the territory were alert to the problem and would be better
able to cope with it as a State than as a Territory.” 145 Butler’s
findings could clearly not have been issued at a more opportune
time for those determined to defeat Hawaii.
In seven thousand words of unrelenting hyperbole, Butler
charged that “international revolutionary communism has a
firm grip on the economic, political and social life in the Ter-
ritory.” The Japanese might not have sabotaged the United
States at Pearl Harbor, but foreign influences were clearly un-
dermining internal security and threatening America’s position
in the cold war against the USSR. “Since VJ-day, in September
1945,” Butler charged,
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the Hawaiian Islands have become one of the central operations
bases and a strategic clearing house for the Communist campaign
against the United States of America. By the well known infil-
tration tactics of world Communism, a relative handful of Moscow
adherents in the islands, operating chiefly through the Inter-
national Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, has per-
sistently sabotaged the economic life of the Territory. This pre-
meditated campaign of stoppages, and violent racial agitation, is
inspired, managed, directed and financed largely through the in-
ternational headquarters of the I.L.W.U. in San Francisco.
The president of the ILWU, Bridges, was classified as the
“unseen Communist.’ Primarily through the activities of Bridges
and Hall, communism had “penetrated every aspect of life in
the Territory—business, labor, transportation, agriculture, edu-
cation, publishing, radio entertainment, and, in lesser degree
even the religious life of the community.” To support these wild
charges, Butler offered a variety of what he represented as ev-
idence. By 1947, he claimed, there were eleven branches of
the Communist party in Hawaii, controlled by a ten-member
executive committee which included Hall, Jack Kimoto, Robert
and Ah Quon McElrath, Charles and Eileen Fujimoto, Ralph
Vossbrink, and David Hyun. Butler was keen to identify local
Japanese as Communists. Party activities, he asserted, were
promoted by a “Communist-line Japanese newspaper,” the
Hawaii Star, and a secret educational group comprising Hall,
Freeman, and John Reinecke. Through the Political Action Com-
mittee, the Communist party had gained control of the local
Democratic party. Communists also controlled the Hawaii Civil
Liberties Union. Using these organizations and the ILWU, he al-
leged, party members attempted to implement programs and
policies outlined by the Communist party in Moscow. These de-
manded strikes, sabotage of legitimate business activity, and
disruption within the community “at a time,” Butler argued,
“when every consideration of patriotism and national welfare
demands peace, harmony and constructive co-operation for the
general welfare.” In particular, he maintained, Communists
were directed to disrupt wharf activities and shipping between
Hawaii and the mainland, for in this way they could paralyze the
island economy. 146
At the same time as he asserted that Hawaii was in the
grip of communism, Butler also emphasized the numerical su-
premacy of residents of Japanese ancestry in the territory. A
preoccupation with the racial complexion of the islands was by
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no means confined to representatives of the deep South. Pri-
vately Butler argued against the possibility that crucial national
questions might be determined by “Hawaiian Representatives
and Senators, perhaps of some Oriental nationality.” He was
adamant that he did not want to see “two Japs in the United
States Senate.” Four years later he was equally concerned that
the island state might be under the control of Orientals. The
“alien backgrounds” of many citizens in the territory, Butler
wrote with characteristic insensitivity, meant that they were
“unusually susceptible to appeals to racial hatred or to Com-
munism or other alien creeds.” Butler was strongly influenced
by the racial fears which motivated many statehood opponents,
and was prepared to exploit racial prejudice as well as political
intolerance. His findings were based largely on anonymous tes-
timony and reflected the timeworn bias of many of the old, die-
hard opponents of statehood, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin sug-
gested bitterly. 147 It was certainly more than coincidental that
Butler’s purported findings echoed the assertions of local oppo-
nents like Hill, Campbell, O’Brien, Stainback, and Dillingham.
His claims were also influenced substantially by a pamphlet
published earlier by Izuka which allegedly told the “Truth About
Communism in Hawaii.” 148 Izuka, a disgruntled former member
of the ILWU who had established a rival but ultimately unsuc-
cessful union of plantation workers on Hawaii and Kauai, pro-
vided much of the fuel for the local un-American campaign after
1946.
Butler concluded adamantly that the issues of statehood
and internal subversion were inextricably linked. “Statehood for
Hawaii is a primary objective of the Communist Party in the Ter-
ritory,” his report stated.
It is my opinion that the immediate objectives of the I.L.W.U. Com-
munist Party conspirators in Hawaii are:
(1) Statehood, with a State constitution to be dictated by the tools
of Moscow in Honolulu.
(2) Removal of Gov. Ingram M. Stainback to be replaced by a Gov-
ernor named by the Communist High command in Hawaii;
(3) A general strike to paralyze all business activities in the is-
lands.
Moreover, Butler argued, the admission of Hawaii was contrary
to the national interest because it would place the American
people in a “permanent league with Communism within the
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structure of the Federal Union.” 149 Such assertions were highly
fanciful, but they were calculated to exploit an unprecedented
development in the islands—the maritime strike of 1949.
Butler released his report in June 1949, almost two months
after the beginning of the most serious industrial dispute in
Hawaii’s history. On May 1 about two thousand dock workers,
members of the ILWU, went out on strike. This action crippled
Hawaii’s waterfront and disrupted the entire island economy for
more than six months. The strike was directed by Bridges, Hall,
and McElrath—a fact not lost on those who viewed union ac-
tivity as synonymous with communist subversion. 150 It was now
ten years since a group of organized waterfront workers in Hilo
had first tested the resolve of the Big Five. This early strike, as
we have seen in chapter 2, provoked angry retaliation and was
a disaster for the unionists. Two years later, on Kauai, another
union strike was easily beaten. 151 Things were very different by
1949 however.
The dock workers held out for 157 days in a dispute which
cost the territory an estimated $100 million. Supporters of the
strike, including most of the Burns faction of the Democratic
party, were convinced that a truly secret polling of opinion
throughout the islands would have revealed overwhelming
support for the strikers. Newspapers and elite opinion, on the
other hand, bitterly opposed the disruption, viewing it as firm
evidence of left-wing and Communist control of the once-pas-
sive island community. The strike brought the simmering con-
flict between capital and labor into the open. No maritime
strike of this magnitude had ever been waged in the United
States. Unemployment in the territory increased from nineteen
thousand to thirty-four thousand during the conflict. When it fi-
nally ended, almost one person in every five was unemployed.
Yet the strike was more a symbol of Hawaii’s peculiarly concen-
trated patterns of ownership under the Big Five than a cause of
economic difficulties. Moreover, its effects were aggravated by
decisions made in Washington. During 1945–1950, annual mil-
itary expenditure in Hawaii declined from about $800 million to
less than $150 million. This, combined with the effects of the
strike, produced perhaps the most serious depression Hawaii
had experienced. Hawaii’s island geography and essentially un-
diversified economic base made it uniquely vulnerable to this
unhappy combination of circumstances. During the early days of
the strike Stainback claimed that the “economic strangulation”
being imposed by the unions was more serious than the effects
of World War II on the islands. But the Truman administration
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was apparently unconvinced, and refused to intervene in the
dispute. Hawaii had to find its own solution. A compromise set-
tlement was eventually secured, but only after protracted and
bitter negotiations between the ILWU and employer represen-
tatives and passage of an act by a special session of the leg-
islature which permitted the government to seize and operate
the crippled stevedoring companies. 152 The formal ending of
the strike did little to reduce tensions between labor and man-
agement. Predictably, and as the tone of Butler’s report implied,
the strike became a propaganda weapon for those determined
to resist statehood.
Claude Jagger registered profound surprise at the change
in public attitudes in Hawaii as a result of the dock problems.
He advised the White House: “The feeling that we are the
victims of a communist plot is widespread among the people
generally.” Jagger was president of the influential Hawaiian
Economic Foundation, an organization supported by the larger
corporations in an effort to break down residual community sus-
picion of big business in the islands. Jagger claimed to be a
self-confessed champion of unionism who had “not infrequently
been called a radical” for maintaining this attitude. He was
doubtless more liberal than his backers and emphatic that he
was not a red-baiter. Nonetheless, he advised Truman to check
the FBI dossiers on union leaders in the islands. Like many
statehood supporters, especially those with business interests,
Jagger was alarmed that Washington had refused to invoke
the national emergency section of the labor-management act
against the dock strikers. Equally, he was concerned about pos-
sible communist influence in the islands. Initially Hawaii’s leg-
islature had resisted federal intervention, fearing that it would
confirm mainland suspicions that the islands were unstable
politically and vulnerable economically. If Hawaii could not
manage its own affairs as a territory, some implied, why should
it be permitted greater self-government as a state? Jagger con-
ceded that the territory had been reluctant to highlight its
difficulties for two understandable reasons: “First, those of us
who are firmly devoted to Statehood for Hawaii know that sen-
ators are sensitive to reports of radicalism in Hawaii”; and,
“Second, we need mainland capital down here.” Even if im-
mediate statehood was not crucial to the economic survival
of Hawaii, mainland capital and investment confidence were.
Hawaii’s high level of unemployment underscored this fact. De-
spite a decline of almost fifteen thousand in Hawaii’s civilian
population after the war, by 1949 more than 17 percent of
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the work force was unemployed. War in Korea reversed this
trend dramatically during 1951–1952. 153 But in the aftermath
of the dock strike, confidence in Hawaii’s economic survival was
shaken. Economic insecurity compounded irrational fears of in-
ternal subversion, and accentuated the tensions over unionism
and suspected communism which now sharply divided the
island community.
Supported by substantial business interests, the Honolulu
Advertiser increased its criticism of labor activities and refused
to give unequivocal support to immediate statehood. It com-
mented in September 1949 that immediate statehood would
provide the powerful communist elements with a vehicle
whereby they could grab key positions and power in the pro-
posed state government. The Advertiser consistently argued
that communist influence and a left-wing takeover, using com-
munist strategies, of the Democratic party machine were tan-
gible barriers to statehood. 154 (The conservative nature of
Hawaii’s nonlaboring community can clearly be gauged from
the opinions expressed by two dominant newspapers, the Ad-
vertiser and the Star-Bulletin. The Bulletin was the mouthpiece
of Farrington and moderate Republicans, and its influence was
challenged not from the left, but from the right, in the form of
the Advertiser, which reflected reactionary white opinion and
conservative Republican party views in terms rarely used in
any mainland papers after the New Deal.) But the Advertiser
was not alone in suggesting that the maritime strike made
statehood inadvisable. For example, a special report sent to
Truman and congressional leaders by the Bar Association of
Hawaii warned that Communists—“a subversive group serving
the ends of a foreign power”—were attempting to control the is-
lands. 155 Some businessmen would only support statehood, the
New York Times observed, when there was no prospect that
leftists or Communists would control the legislature of the new
state. The opinion of this group was perhaps best expressed by
Dillingham. “I don’t think we should be admitted until we’re
perfectly sure that through the vote we could control these is-
lands according to the American way of life,” he stated. “We’re
subject out here to Union dictators who want to get control
of this important spot politically, economically and militarily.”
King was obliged to concede during the strike that concern over
the potential of leftist labor elements to control state politics
was eroding enthusiasm for statehood in some quarters. White
House officials and some of Hawaii’s friends in Congress also
were said to view the strike as detrimental to statehood. 156
Last Among Equals
189
Farrington, as well as members of the islands’ legislature,
attempted to demonstrate that opposition to communism was
consistent with support for statehood. They asserted that the
strike simply pointed up Hawaii’s political isolation and unequal
status. The federal government’s prompt action in comparable
situations on the mainland had helped to end dock strikes. 157
But Washington did not invoke the Taft-Hartley law against the
ILWU in 1949. Had Hawaii been a state, Farrington argued, it
might have quickly gained federal assistance to end the strike.
Stainback, aware of his delicate position as an appointee of
the Democratic administration, made only mild criticism of its
failure to intervene decisively to end the strike. He was appar-
ently confident that the dock seizure law passed by the ter-
ritorial legislature would be effective, despite the efforts of
Bridges and his so-called cohorts. 158
While Hawaii had been sensitive to the charge that it was
controlled by un-American ethnic elements before Pearl Harbor,
it was also sensitive to the charge that it was controlled by un-
American political and industrial groups during the cold war.
A series of measures passed by an emergency session of the
territory’s legislature immediately after the 1949 strike began
were explicitly designed to demonstrate that subversive ele-
ments were totally ineffectual in the islands. Despite strong op-
position from the ILWU and the stevedoring companies, these
measures included legislation which authorized the territory to
seize and operate the docks until a settlement was reached.
Fong attempted to turn this “most drastic legislation” to the ad-
vantage of statehood by arguing that it proved the integrity of
the legislature in resisting pressure from any and all special in-
terests. Also included in the measures was an anti-subversives
act which required people working in the stevedoring industry
to stipulate on oath that they were not Communists. Three
days after the dock strike began, a compulsory non-communist
oath for all public employees in the territory was instituted. Al-
though membership in the Communist party was not illegal in
the United States, territorial employees and prospective em-
ployees were required to state on oath that they were not and
had not been during the preceding five years members of the
Communist party. An appropriation of seventy-five thousand
dollars was made by the territorial legislature to support the
activities of a seven-member commission on subversive activ-
ities. Moreover, in response to Butler’s report, the legislature
by joint resolution requested the House Un-American Activities
Committee to investigate communist activities in Hawaii. These
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actions were designed partly to refute allegations of communist
influence in Hawaii and thereby support statehood. 159 They re-
flected both the strength of anti-communist sentiment in the ter-
ritory, and the determination of some statehood proponents to
negate Butler’s charges.
Proponents denied that the communist issue was related to
the question of statehood, and attempted to expose the contra-
dictions contained in Butler’s report. “I do not wish to minimize
the menace of Communism,” Farrington informed Congress, but
“I cannot agree that the issue is pertinent to our just claims to
statehood.” 160 In fact, Butler’s report conceded that the vast
majority of Hawaii’s citizens were loyal advocates of self-gov-
ernment as defined by American tradition. He also acknowl-
edged that a majority in Hawaii sought to defeat communism.
Proponents emphasized that these observations contradicted
his conclusion that the Communist party would influence the
new state constitution through its control of a majority of the
delegates chosen to draft it. Moreover, they argued that, as
any proposed state constitution would be subject to approval
by plebiscite in the territory and by Congress, subversive in-
fluences could not conceivably dictate the structure of the con-
stitution. 161 Exposure of the inconsistencies in Butler’s report
did not, however, lessen the appeal of the communist argument
to opponents after 1949. Nor did Butler’s failure to name more
than ten Communists deter the House Un-American Activities
Committee from conducting investigations in Hawaii.
The dock strike and Butler’s report also led to the estab-
lishment of a local citizens’ committee determined to oppose
and expose communism in the territory. On June 14, 1949,
a public meeting of approximately three hundred residents
formed the Hawaii Residents’ Association (Imua). Initially set up
to battle the effects of the waterfront strike, the group remained
a permanent anti-communist association. Conveniently, it con-
fused communism with trade unionism generally, attacking fel-
low travellers in both the ILWU and Democratic party. Burns,
for example, was portrayed publicly as “the man in red socks.”
Membership of Imua climbed to about one thousand within
three weeks of its formation. Its members were almost exclu-
sively Caucasians from the conservative Republican-employer
faction in the community, or were military officers. Imua was ini-
tiated and partly financed by the Dillingham family. Its primary
explicit function was to uphold the United States Constitution
and to maintain freedom of private enterprise in the community.
To achieve these objectives Imua pledged to “combat Commu-
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nism and other subversive elements” and to “oppose individuals
or groups who plot to destroy the right of individual enterprise.”
162 Imua adopted no official policy on statehood, but its subse-
quent activities demonstrated that a majority of its members
sought to delay or defeat statehood. They clearly believed that
white interests, and unrestrained capitalism, could be best pro-
tected by territorial government and would be threatened by
full-fledged democracy under a state constitution.
Truman urged immediate concurrent action on both Hawaii
and Alaska when the second session of the Eighty-first Congress
convened in 1950. He also met personally with the chairman
of the House Rules Committee in an effort to dislodge the
bills from this traditionally obstructionist group. This initiative
was unsuccessful. 163 However, after the requisite twenty-one
days the chairman of the Public Lands Committee, Peterson,
discharged the bills from the grip of the Rules Committee. A
discharge petition was also used to bring another part of Tru-
man’s civil rights program to the floor—a bill to establish a
Committee on Fair Employment Practices. This bill had pri-
ority over Hawaii and Alaska; 164 but Democrat and Republican
House leaders agreed that the fair employment bill would be
followed by Alaska and Hawaii. The Democrats now firmly con-
trolled Congress and Democratic Alaska had priority over Re-
publican Hawaii. This strategy was portrayed as a sincere and
reasonable device for extricating statehood from party politics
by balancing the likely gains by each party in Congress. In ad-
dition, Democrats believed that this procedure would induce
more Republicans to vote for Alaska, as Hawaii would not be
considered if Alaska was defeated. 165
The House passed a weakened Fair Employment Act in Feb-
ruary. Shortly afterward, on March 3, it approved statehood
for Alaska by a fairly close margin, 186 votes to 146. Alaska
received considerable bipartisan support, but a majority of
Southern Democrats and some large-state Republicans voted
against it. In addition, one hundred members abstained from
voting. Some opponents of Alaska sincerely believed that it was
not qualified for immediate admission. Most, however, viewed
the admission of Alaska as a threat to their states’ existing in-
fluence in the Senate, claiming that under statehood Alaska’s
citizens would exercise approximately “200 times the represen-
tation” of a citizen of New York State in the national Senate.
166 States’ rights champions feared the admission of any new
senators, whether they be from Alaska or Hawaii. Most Re-
publicans, however, were more enthusiastic about Hawaii than
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Alaska. Nonetheless the general liberal-conservative House di-
vision on the Alaska issue in 1950 closely resembled the voting
pattern on Hawaii in 1947.
Hawaii was debated thoroughly by the House during March
6–7, 1950. In contrast to the debate in 1947, opponents now fo-
cused on the question of internal subversion. Butler’s alarmist
report was quoted and paraphrased extensively. Cox, for ex-
ample, used it when he told the House that by admitting Hawaii
“we are creating a state that we know is Communist con-
trolled…. When you admit Hawaii you will have accepted into
the sisterhood of States a community that Harry Bridges dom-
inates.” Proponents replied that communism constituted no
more grave a threat in Hawaii than in the nation in general.
Others rightly pointed out that internal security was not a
genuine concern of most opponents. Hale again charged, as he
had in 1947, that “a fairly low form of racism” based on hostility
to Hawaii’s mixed population, motivated most opponents. 167
With the exception of the wild charges of communist influence,
no significant new arguments were introduced into the House
debate.
On March 7 the House again voted to admit Hawaii. The
margin of victory was much greater than in 1947—262 votes
to only 110—in part because fewer Representatives abstained.
168 The vote in 1950 did not conform rigidly to party lines, but
as with the previous House vote a larger proportion of Repub-
licans than Democrats voted affirmatively. Republicans voted
120 for statehood and 32 against; Democrats voted 141 for
and 71 against. Predictably, opposition again derived largely
from Democratic representatives of Southern states and Repub-
lican representatives of large Northern states. Southern De-
mocrats provided slightly more than 80 percent of all negative
Democratic votes. Republican representatives from the large
Northern states—New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and
Illinois—provided more than 90 percent of all Republican oppo-
sition. 169
The favorable House action coincided with preparations for
the constitutional convention in Honolulu. Proponents, like
McLane, were now confident that the Senate would follow the
example of the House in voting emphatically for statehood. To
prompt the Senate, the Statehood Commission sent seventy-five
citizens to Washington, and the territory’s legislature appro-
priated an additional twenty-five thousand dollars for its cam-
paign. Joseph C. O’Mahoney (Dem., Wyo.), the new chairman of
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the powerful Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
assured these visitors to Capitol Hill that his committee would
not “evade or avoid the issue.” 170
Nevertheless, O’Mahoney refused to schedule hearings on
statehood until after the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee had completed its study of communism in the islands.
Shortly before this investigation opened in Honolulu on April
9, 1950, a court in San Francisco made a controversial ruling
which statehood opponents eagerly exploited. The court ruled
that Harry Bridges, president of the eighty-thousand-strong
West Coast ILWU and organizer of the union’s protracted dock
strike in Hawaii, was guilty of perjury for falsely denying pre-
vious membership in the Communist party. Bridges, an Aus-
tralian, had not acknowledged membership when he became
a naturalized American citizen in 1945. Following the court’s
ruling in 1950, Bridges’ American citizenship was revoked and
he was sentenced to five years in prison. He immediately ap-
pealed against his conviction. Four years later, when Mc-
Carthyism had been largely discredited, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld Bridges’ appeal, albeit on a technicality. In the
meantime, however, the verdict of the San Francisco court was
sweet music for statehood opponents. They cited it as further
proof that the ILWU, and by implication Hawaii, were controlled
by Communists. 171 Commenting on Bridges’ conviction, Jack
Hall stated bitterly: “If President Roosevelt were alive today
he would be convicted as a communist under the hysteria that
is rampant in our nation.” Hall’s comment, and developments
before the House Ur-American Activities Committee in Hon-
olulu during the following few weeks, gave new substance to
the fears of that insecure minority in Hawaii who apparently be-
lieved their community was so fragile it could be subverted by a
handful of radicals. 172
The anti-communist committee subpoenaed sixty-eight wit-
nesses to appear before it. Among these were Hall, McElrath,
Kimoto, Fujimoto, and Reinecke. Thirty-nine witnesses invoked
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and re-
fused to answer the question of whether they were, or ever
had been, members of the Communist party. Their refusals were
based on the grounds that answers to this question might be
self-incriminating. Former affiliations with the Communist party
were admitted by seventeen witnesses. 173 The evidence pre-
sented by those who did not invoke the Fifth Amendment in-
dicated that local Communist party membership was greatest
during 1946–1949, and even then did not exceed about 130
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members. Chairman Francis E. Walter (Dem., Pa.) subsequently
informed a Senate committee investigating statehood that there
were never more than 160 Communists in Hawaii, and by 1950
there were less than 100. Independent Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation estimates agreed. Most people identified as Commu-
nists were members of the ILWU or the Hawaii Civil Liberties
Union. Yet a small number had been active in the Democratic
party, most notably Kawano. These revelations temporarily
slowed the growth of the Burns faction within the party, and in-
fluenced at least one of its principal figures, Mau, to reduce his
ties with the group. The Kawano incident was an acute embar-
rassment for progressive local Democrats, but they successfully
denied any knowledge of Kawano’s secret affiliations. “None of
us knew that he was connected with the Communist party at the
time,” his close friend Mau stated. “It never dawned on me that
he was a Communist.” 174
However, the efforts of local Communists to influence the
Democratic party during 1946–1950 were abortive. Commu-
nists also failed to infiltrate local unions affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor. 175 Even J. Edgar Hoover, an of-
ficial not noted for sympathy to the left in any form, conceded
that communism was less of a problem in Hawaii than in the
nation generally by 1950. 176 This information, coupled with
the evidence given to the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, as Robert Carr has concluded, demonstrated unequivo-
cally the feebleness and impotence of the communist movement
in Hawaii then and at any time in the past. 177 But at the height
of the red scare not many islanders were prepared to argue pub-
licly that existing fears of subversion from within were alarmist
or exaggerated.
At the opening session of the investigation into subversive
activities, Chairman Walter denied charges that the intent of
the hearings was to damage the statehood campaign. 178 Cali-
fornia’s redoubtable anti-communist member of this committee,
Richard Nixon, also claimed that regardless of its findings,
communism was not an appropriate issue for the statehood
debate in Congress. 179 Yet the hearings on statehood conducted
by the Senate Insular Affairs Committee in May of that year
focused almost exclusively on the communist issue. 180 Given
the hysterical national debate over internal subversion, and
recent incidents in Hawaii, it would have been surprising if the
hearings had been restricted to questions genuinely relevant to
statehood.
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If the Senate committee’s hearings were largely sidetracked
by the House un-American inquiry, its report was not. On June
29 a bipartisan group of nine senators from the Insular Affairs
Committee reported the Hawaii bill to the Senate floor. It took
similar action on an Alaska bill. The responsible committee in
the Senate had never before taken such a decisive step on
statehood. Butler was the only member to vote against the
Hawaii bill in committee. 181 He inserted a dissenting minority
opinion in the report which betrayed his preoccupation with red
herrings rather than substantive issues. Citing the refusal of the
1950 Hawaii Democratic Party Convention to expel fifteen dele-
gates who had invoked the Fifth Amendment during the recent
un-American Activities hearings, Butler contended that the De-
mocratic party was Communist controlled. He again asserted
that if statehood was granted, Communists might have a “de-
cisive voice in selecting the Governor, the judiciary, the police
and other officials of importance.” However, the energetic Re-
publican senator did not focus exclusively on this question. Pre-
sumably to demonstrate that his argument was not primarily
one of race, Butler conceded that there was “no reason why
a man of Japanese or other Oriental extraction should not be
as loyal a citizen and as good an American as a man of any
other racial extraction.” Paradoxically, he then implied that he
opposed statehood because a majority of Hawaii’s residents
were non-Caucasians. Most of Hawaii’s people had “traditions,
customs and outlooks” that were Asian rather than American.
Butler predicted that before long residents of Asian ancestry
would achieve total ascendency in all aspects of island life. Had
Hawaii “been settled and primarily populated by Americans
from the mainland,” he concluded, “there might be no great
problem about admitting it as a state.” Butler recommended
that Hawaii be granted a political status similar to that granted
the unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico. 182
Truman strongly encouraged the Senate committee to
report both statehood bills. In evidence placed before its
hearings Truman concluded that the case for statehood rested
on both “moral and legal grounds.” More importantly, the pres-
ident also stated that he would attempt to bring both bills to a
vote in the Senate before the Eighty-first Congress ended late
in 1950. However, Truman’s intentions far outstripped his in-
fluence. The Senate was expected to adjourn in late August.
Senators were anxious to leave Washington to campaign in the
mid-term elections of 1950. The statehood bills thus had less
than eight weeks—from early July to late August—in which to
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pass the Senate. In early July, however, the Democratic Senate
Policy Committee, with the concurrence of the Senate minority
leadership, reduced its proposed legislative program to a few
major bills. The Hawaii and Alaska bills were omitted from this
list of so-called must legislation. Majority Leader Scott Lucas
(Dem., Ill.) stated that consideration depended upon the length
of time the Senate remained in session. The New York Times
concluded that if the Hawaii bill could be brought to a vote in
the Senate before adjournment, it would have the support nec-
essary for its passage. 183
Having failed to defeat Hawaii in the House or in the Senate
committee, statehood opponents had only one effective tactical
option open to them—the filibuster. Rarely, however, was it
necessary for senators determined to defeat legislation to ac-
tually stand and speak on the floor of the Senate for long pe-
riods. The mere threat of such behavior was usually sufficient
to induce a change in the Senate’s agenda. Between 1917 and
1964 only six filibusters or threatened filibusters were actually
defeated by cloture. 184 During the 1950s members of the con-
servative coalition were rightly confident that, as a last resort,
they could block a vote on legislation which they opposed by
filibuster. Liberal civil rights initiatives bore the brunt of such
tactics, and statehood was a civil rights issue. In July 1950 a vig-
orous advocate of white supremacy, Senator James O. Eastland
(Dem., Miss.), implied that he and like-minded senators would
filibuster if necessary against statehood. If either the Hawaii
or Alaska bill was called up for debate, he advised, the Mundt-
Ferguson anti-communist bill would be substituted for them.
This blatantly discriminatory bill would have prohibited Com-
munists from holding public office and made the registration
of all individual Communists compulsory. It would thus have
complemented the Alien Registration Act (the Smith Act) of
1940 and the Internal Security Act of 1950 (the McCarran
Act) which made it unlawful to advocate the violent overthrow
of the government and compelled all organizations designated
as subversive to register with the attorney general. Debate
on the Mundt-Ferguson proposals would have reopened sen-
sitive wounds within the Democratic party in an election year.
Liberal Democrats were already electorally vulnerable on the
communist issue and anxious to deny conservatives another
chance to exploit it. The anti-statehood faction fully appreciated
also that debate on the Mundt-Ferguson bill would be bitter
and perhaps inconclusive. It would not only aggravate tensions
within the Democratic party but also delay adjournment of the
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Senate. Rather than confront these possibilities, the Democratic
leadership acquiesced. Early in August it withdrew plans to
schedule debate on statehood before the November elections.
185 Although the Senate did not finally adjourn until September,
statehood was not debated. The threat of obstruction, it seems,
was sufficient to defeat Hawaii in 1950.
The election results of that year had a direct bearing on
Hawaii’s future. The Democratic party retained control of both
chambers of Congress. But in the Senate it ruled with a slender
two-seat majority. More important was the impact of the
election on liberal-conservative cleavages in Congress. Oppo-
nents of Truman’s modest Fair Deal and civil rights program
made important gains and the surprise 1948 upsurge in support
for liberal Democrats was reversed abruptly in 1950. The New
York Times estimated that conservative Republicans and anti-
administration Democrats would now control 54 seats in the
Senate, and 237 in the House—a clear majority in each
chamber. Almost half of the Democrats elected to the House and
Senate were from eleven former Confederate states. 186 Liberal
measures had little chance of success in this Congress. Equally
significant, however, was the failure of either party to gain a
decisive majority in the Senate. Thus, four new senators might
tip the scales of power either way. In the Eighty-second Con-
gress Democrats determined to maintain their slim majority in
the Senate and refused to promote Republican Hawaii 187 unless
Democratic Alaska was first admitted. To complicate matters
further, many Republicans refused to give priority to an Alaska
bill because they had no guarantee that the Democratic admin-
istration would immediately bring the Hawaii bill to a favorable
vote. The national political implications of statehood legislation
thus acquired new significance.
However, before the Eighty-second Congress actually con-
vened, Truman made a sincere attempt to break the impasse in
the Senate. Congress was reconvened on November 27, 1950.
On the opening day of this special lame duck session, Vice
President Alben Barkley (Ky.) placed before the Senate a letter
from Truman urging the immediate admission of Hawaii and
Alaska. Debate began on Alaska the following day. It lasted
three days. 188 Those senators who later led the fight against
Hawaii were also intransigent opponents of Alaska. Included in
this energetic group were Butler, Eastland, John Stennis (Dem.,
Miss.), Richard Russell (Dem., Ga.), John McClennan (Dem.,
Ark.), and Kenneth McKellar (Dem., Tenn.). An attempt by pro-
ponents to bring the bill to a vote by a unanimous consent
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motion was blocked by Eastland. On December 5, 1950, liberals
acknowledged that statehood opponents were prepared to fili-
buster to defeat the Alaska bill. The Democrat leadership thus
deferred further consideration of either statehood bill during
1950. 189 O’Mahoney correctly charged that the Southern Demo-
crat-led resistance represented a full-blown filibuster. 190
Truman was bitterly disappointed, observing privately that the
Dixiecrats were obsessed with two things—“color and power.”
Many Southerners “still have that antebellum proslavery
outlook,” he wrote confidentially. “The main difficulty with the
South is that they are living eighty years behind the times
and the sooner they come out of it the better it will be for
the country and themselves.” Looking back on the failure of
his moderate legislative program the president commented de-
jectedly: “I suppose the Presidents in the past have had hostile
Congresses—but they were frankly of the opposition. This
one—the 81st—happens to be of my own party on the surface.
But the majority is made up of Republicans and recalcitrant
Southern ‘Democrats’—who are not Democrats. So I get the re-
sponsibility and the blame.” 191
It was no coincidence that civil rights legislation was also
defeated during 1950 by Southern-led filibusters. The fair em-
ployment act was never voted on in the Senate, as Eastland
successfully invoked a filibuster against it. 192 Similarly, an at-
tempt by liberals (with the explicit support of Truman) to es-
tablish an effective cloture rule was also defeated. As originally
adopted, the cloture rule permitted a two-thirds majority in the
Senate to terminate or limit debate; but after its inception in
1917 a series of precedents and rulings made it ineffective. In
1949 the Senate accepted a compromise which slightly altered
the cloture rule. However, this change was essentially cosmetic.
Indeed it was so ineffectual that Southern Democrats actually
voted for the new rule, and continued to exploit the filibuster
after it was approved. 193 Certainly the changed cloture rule did
little to limit the obstructionist power of a determined conserv-
ative minority in the Senate. Hawaii and Alaska, as well as other
aspects of Truman’s civil rights program, could not overcome
this tactical veto. Few congressmen privately doubted the real
reasons why the Southerners had invoked this strategy against
Hawaii and Alaska. Confident that he knew what had frustrated
the drive for statehood, Senator Clinton Anderson (Dem., N.
M.), one of its strongest advocates later wrote confidentially:
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The Southern Democratic Senators who are greatly concerned
about civil rights are not enthusiastic about statehood for either
Hawaii or Alaska or both because they do not want to add two or
four Senators who might not support them in keeping their fili-
buster going against civil rights laws. It is pretty close right now.
There are plenty of votes in the Senate to pass civil rights leg-
islation but under our present Senate rules 32 Senators can fili-
buster forever and we cannot close debate. If you add four more
Senators they would have to find some new allies and they have
just barely enough now, so they have been a little slow about
adding additional Senators. 194
“There is no valid reason of justice or even of expediency for
withholding ‘statehood’ any longer,” the Statehood Commission
proclaimed in late 1948. 195 Such a view was politically naive.
It ignored the impact of important changes in Hawaii and Con-
gress after the war. Statehood legislation became an integral
factor in the heated, largely sectional dispute over civil rights
during 1947–1950. The debates in Congress also revealed
strong, if scattered, hostility to the admission of a state which
was not overwhelmingly Caucasian. Explicit racism was not
amenable to reasoned argument, but it remained a core factor
behind the obstructionist tactics employed by many oppo-
nents—especially those from Southern states. Moreover,
Hawaii’s entry as a state would inevitably affect the political, as
well as sectional, composition of Congress. Republican Hawaii
was thus increasingly linked with Democratic Alaska as the
Truman administration attempted to counter possible GOP
gains from the separate admission of Hawaii. The related issues
of communist influence in Hawaii and internal security further
confused the debate in Congress. Within the context of these
divisive and emotive national questions the objective validity of
Hawaii’s appeal for statehood was of little significance. Party
strength in Congress and preservation of states’ rights were
fundamental issues; the status of Hawaii’s relatively small pop-
ulation was not. The interaction of these political and sectional
factors in Congress was to deny Hawaii’s admission for ten frus-
trating years.
Chapter 5
200
Chapter 6
A Constitution in Search of a
State
Fifteen of the twenty-nine former territories entered the Union
by drafting and adopting state constitutions before Congress
finally accepted them as states. Confronted with a “lethargic
Congress,” 1 Hawaii’s decision to draft a constitution before
Congress passed enabling legislation was based on long-estab-
lished precedent. In 1791 Vermont was admitted as a state
without prior approval of an enabling bill. Seven of the states
admitted by this procedure had their constitutions approved un-
conditionally by Congress at the same time as it passed their
admission bills. By first adopting “state” constitutions most
territories had been able to encourage favorable action by Con-
gress. 2 Hawaii expected a similar result. But by 1949–1950
it also confronted unique obstacles which it hoped a consti-
tutional convention might help to overcome. “Should Hawaii’s
State Constitution be announced by prominent constitutional
authorities to be an eminently satisfactory document,” McLane
observed, “it would refute charges that the islands were being
subverted internally by un-American elements.” 3 Significantly,
the decision to schedule a convention for 1950 was taken in
mid-1949, against a background of bitter local divisions over the
dock strike and Butler’s allegations that Communists and fellow
travellers controlled the territory. Although the Statehood Com-
mission had previously called for a constitutional convention, it
was not until the communist issue erupted that money was ac-
tually allocated for this purpose. In July 1949 the legislature ap-
propriated $295,000 for the anticipated convention. However,
this decision was not merely an attempt to demonstrate that
Hawaii was sympathetic to American political ideals and ca-
pable of framing a constitution appropriate for an American
state. The laborious and expensive steps involved in electing
delegates and in drafting and ratifying a constitution were also
taken to confirm that immediate statehood was overwhelmingly
201
supported by Hawaii’s electorate. 4 Local opinion had not been
tested since the ambiguous and inconclusive plebiscite of 1940,
although nearly all those elected to the legislature after the war
wanted statehood.
Early in 1948 the Statehood Commission accepted responsi-
bility for drafting a tentative state constitution. A State Consti-
tution Committee with authority to submit its proposals directly
to a convention was appointed by the commission. The rec-
ommendations of the Constitution Committee derived largely
from the work of various subcommittees of the New York State
Constitutional Committee of 1938. In addition, Hawaii’s Con-
stitution Committee, and later all delegates to the convention,
were helped by the Territorial Legislative Reference Bureau. It
collected manuals and relevant data from previous state consti-
tution committees, compiled comparative data on existing state
constitutions, and requested information from “groups inter-
ested in constitutional revision in California, Florida, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey and Tennessee.” Further
guidance was obtained from the Legislative Reference Bureau
of the Library of Congress, the model constitution of the Na-
tional Municipal League, the American Political Science Associ-
ation, The American Bar Association, and the Council of State
Governments. 5
On March 21, 1950, sixty-three delegates were elected to
a constitutional convention. Any qualified voter was entitled
to be a candidate for a position as delegate. In an attempt
to divorce convention decisions from partisan political issues,
candidates were not permitted to designate party affiliations
when campaigning. Nevertheless, both major political parties
attempted to gain a majority at the convention. 6 Republicans
gained twenty-nine seats; recognized Democrats won twenty-
three seats. The remaining eleven candidates were not specif-
ically identified with either major party. Thus neither Repub-
licans nor Democrats dominated the convention. 7 But as labor
interests and some liberal Democrats later discovered with
dismay, they were consistently outvoted by conservative ele-
ments throughout the convention. The result, as we shall see,
was a constitution which incorporated some of the excesses as-
sociated with McCarthyism: it compromised the rights of free
speech and free association which the nation’s Constitution and
Bill of Rights were designed to guarantee.
The sixty-three-member convention was elected by ninety-
seven thousand citizens, almost 80 percent of those entitled
to vote. Statehood proponents eagerly interpreted this as evi-
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dence that eight out of every ten islanders wanted immediate
statehood. Yet as critics pointed out, it did not follow that a
willingness to vote for these delegates necessarily indicated
support for immediate admission. The convention was broad-
ly based, but citizens of Japanese and Filipino extraction were
underrepresented. On the other hand (as had so often been the
case in the past), whites and to a lesser extent Chinese were
overrepresented. Twenty-seven delegates were Caucasians,
twenty were of Japanese descent, eleven were Hawaiians or
part-Hawaiians, and five were of Chinese descent. No ethnic
group constituted an absolute majority in the convention. 8
However, no delegates of Filipino ancestry were elected, al-
though Filipinos comprised approximately 12 percent of the
population of Hawaii (however, only slightly more than 50
percent of this ethnic group was naturalized and thus eligible to
vote). 9 Some found this imbalance unfortunate. Others argued
that it was further proof that Asian groups did not bloc vote.
Oahu, which supported more than 60 percent of Hawaii’s five
hundred thousand people, elected a majority (thirty-six) of con-
vention delegates. The county of Hawaii elected twelve dele-
gates, the county of Maui nine, and the county of Kauai six.
10 Although many delegates were lawyers, a variety of occupa-
tional interests were represented. Most, however, were drawn
from the old haole business elite or from the small, if expanding,
middle class. 11 Twenty-two members of the legislature were
nominated for the convention, but only twelve won seats. The
ILWU endorsed fourteen candidates, but two alone were suc-
cessful. Only five women won seats at the convention. 12
Delegates convened at Iolani Palace on April 4, 1950, to
draft the proposed state constitution. Farrington told an early
session that an acceptable constitution would offer “a complete
and final answer to charges discrediting, prejudicing, and
bringing into doubt the character” of Hawaii’s people. 13 Con-
scious of the need to establish conclusively the loyalty of del-
egates and thereby refute Butler’s charge that left-wing in-
fluences would dictate the state’s constitution, the convention
stipulated that all delegates must make an oath of loyalty. This
was in part an overreaction by a community which felt par-
ticularly vulnerable on the issues of internal security, but it
was a position supported enthusiastically by all factions of the
local Republican party. A motion moved by the Republicans’
rising star, Fong, stipulated that all delegates must state on
oath that they were not members of the Communist party and
had not been members of the Communist party during the pre-
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ceding five years. Fong’s proposal was based on the loyalty
oath added to the Organic Act shortly before the dock strike of
1949, and it was promptly accepted. All convention members
took the oath. The Honolulu Star- Bulletin stated confidently
that this action would demonstrate the Americanism of all del-
egates. But the suspicions and tensions raised by McCarthyism
and Mao Tse-tung’s recent victory in China could not easily be
subdued. The convention coincided with McCarthy’s wild asser-
tions that members of the State Department, especially Owen
Lattimore, were communist sympathizers who had contributed
to the “loss” of China. 14 Not surprisingly, statehood proponents
were anxious that a consensus against communism be seen
to emerge from the convention—even if this unity had to be
imposed by loyalty oaths and the expulsion of delegates sus-
pected of being sympathetic to America’s cold war enemy. Some
members of the convention were reluctant to join a witch hunt
against fellow delegates who had been elected democratically
to their posts. But McCarthyite congressmen and mainland op-
ponents of statehood had conveniently arranged that the House
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) should hold
hearings in Honolulu just as the constitutional convention
began. The presence of this single-minded committee was cal-
culated to highlight the alleged connection between internal
subversion and statehood for the territory. Confronted with the
public and press furor stirred up by the HUAC, even some of
the more liberal delegates were persuaded that the convention
must not be seen to be soft on communism and internal security.
The convention could scarcely have begun at a worse
moment for statehood proponents. On April 10, Richard
Kageyama, Democratic member of the Honolulu Board of Su-
pervision and a convention delegate, stated before the Un-
American Activities Committee that he had been a member of
the Communist party during 1947. The following day, Kageyama
resigned from the convention. Kageyama conceded that his tes-
timony to the HUAC contradicted his oath of loyalty, but indicat-
ed in his defense that his membership in the Communist party
in 1947 had been a brief, disillusioning experience. Convention
delegates accepted his resignation unanimously. But on a split
vote they also agreed to a resolution which recognized that his
cooperation with the HUAC in “testifying before and otherwise
assisting it in the exposure of Communists and Communist ac-
tivities in Hawaii has been of distinct service to this country.”
Given the strength of McCarthyism in mid-1950 it is not sur-
prising that Kageyama’s testimony rather than the actions of
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the constitutional convention made front-page news in the New
York Times and other mainland newspapers. 15 What is more, to
the dismay of statehood proponents, the Kageyama incident was
but one of a series of exposures about communism which hung
over the convention.
Another convention delegate was also caught in the net cast
by the Un-American Activities Committee in Honolulu. Frank G.
Silva, business agent for the ILWU on Kauai, was identified as
a former Communist on April 11 in testimony by Ichiro Izuka.
16 When subpoenaed to testify before this committee, Silva “de-
clined to answer any questions regarding his membership of the
Communist Party on the ground of self-incrimination.” 17 Unlike
Kageyama, Silva refused to resign from the convention. In reply,
forty-eight delegates signed a resolution which argued that he
should be ejected because of his contempt of the Congressional
Committee on Un-American Activities. This resolution was soon
modified, as Silva was legally not in contempt of Congress. In-
stead, delegates voted by a margin of fifty-three to seven to
expel him from the convention on the grounds of “contumacious
conduct” before the congressional committee. Silva’s cause was
certainly not advanced by his fiery charge that delegates of
the convention ranged from “tools of the big five” to moral
“cowards.” 18 Kageyama and Silva were dealt with decisively,
but the broader questions raised by their associations with the
Communist party could not be dismissed as easily or swiftly. The
communist issue would simply not go away. Out of sixty-six resi-
dents subpoenaed to testify before the House committee, thirty-
nine responded in the same way as Silva. As the next chapter of
this book demonstrates, the actions of the so-called reluctant 39
provided new ammunition for Hawaii’s implacable opponents on
Capitol Hill.
The constitutional convention met on seventy-eight working
days. Those who naively believed that the official nonpartisan
convention would not become a heated political arena were
soon disillusioned. Republicans won control of virtually all im-
portant posts. The chairman of the Statehood Commission,
former delegate to Congress King, was unanimously elected
temporary president of the convention. He was later elected
permanent chairman. Three of the four vice presidents and the
secretary of the convention were also Republicans. One vice
president was drawn from each of the four counties: Fong won
office from Oahu; Arthur Woolaway was elected from Maui;
Thomas Sakakihara won from the Big Island; and the lone De-
mocrat Charles Rice (a committed if somewhat independent
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member of the old guard who had little in common with
members of the emerging Democratic party) was elected from
Kauai. The office of secretary went to a Republican, Hebden
Porteus. Predictably, Democrats promptly charged their oppo-
nents with exploiting the convention for partisan advantage.
However, various political and geographic interests were also
strongly represented on other committees and fairly prominent
during general debate.
The draft constitution was based largely on recommenda-
tions made by the Hawaii State Constitution Committee and
studies compiled by the Legislative Reference Bureau in a four-
hundred-page book, Manual of State Constitutional Provisions.
This information was made available to all delegates and served
as a preliminary guide for committee decisions and general
debate. The convention divided into twenty committees which
were directed to make specific recommendations on aspects
of the constitution such as a bill of rights, education, labor,
executive functions, or the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act.
Committee memberships varied, but all committees comprised
between seven and fifteen delegates. Recommendations of the
various committees formed the basis of subsequent debate by
the committee of the whole. Thus the convention debated each
article of the draft. When agreed upon, the specific wording of
each clause was finalized by the Styles Committee and then sub-
mitted for final reading and vote by the committee of the whole.
19
The draft constitution was finally approved on July 22, 1950.
Only one delegate voted against it. Marguerite K. Ashford, a
Statehood Commission member from Molokai, objected to the
article on the Hawaiian Homes Commission which required that
Congress consent to any decisions by the state government on
matters relating to the management and disposal of lands under
the Hawaiian Rehabilitation Act of 1921. In her view, any ex-
ceptional provisions for native Hawaiians constituted racial dis-
crimination, which Congress could reject as unconstitutional.
A small number of legislators from the neighbor islands, in-
cluding Harold Rice of Maui and William Nobriga of the Big
Island, joined the attack on the Hawaiian Homes Act, advo-
cating its repeal and the substitution of fee simple title for lands
currently occupied by Hawaiians under this act. At the same
time, some native Hawaiians were reluctant to embrace a state
constitution which gave distant officials in Washington joint au-
thority over the future of their unique homesteading lands. 20
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But unlike Ashford, most delegates with reservations about the
draft hoped to amend it in the legislature rather than defeat it
in the convention.
A special session of the territorial legislature was convened
on September 29, 1950, to consider the draft constitution. By a
unanimous vote the House of Representatives agreed to submit
it to the electorate without alteration. In the Senate, however,
Nobriga, Ben F. Dillingham (Rep., Oahu), and J. B. Fernandez
(Dem., Kauai) expressed opposition to some of its provisions. All
three argued that the proposed seventy-six-member legislature
was too large. Nobriga, an outspoken critic of the Hawaiian Re-
habilitation Act, was adamant that Hawaiian Home Lands pro-
visions should be omitted from the constitution and from all
statehood bills. Dillingham’s opposition was in part a reaction to
the fact that the proposed constitution did not limit the taxing
power of the state. 21 Predictably, Stainback was out of step
with both his party and the electorate at large over the con-
stitution. He advised the special session of the legislature that
the draft proposal should be amended. In his view it was “too
unwieldly, cumbersome and expensive.” Stainback also argued
that the draft be changed because it did not completely correct
the disproportionately heavy representation accorded to the
outer islands. There were many in Hawaii who portrayed such
arguments as another unsubtle attempt by their appointed gov-
ernor to jeopardize or at least delay statehood. However, the
governor did not flatly oppose the constitution. Indeed, he con-
ceded it to be generally excellent. 22 Moreover, his concern with
the excessive power it gave the outer islands was shared by
many people from Oahu who understandably felt that reappor-
tionment was long overdue.
Despite this opposition, the Senate passed the constitution
without amendment by a decisive thirteen-to-one vote on Oc-
tober 11, 1950. Nobriga cast the only dissenting vote. 23 Neither
chamber of the local legislature amended the draft. Thus it was
submitted to the territorial electorate for ratification exactly as
written by the constitutional convention.
A campaign for ratification was conducted jointly by the
Statehood Commission and a special committee formed by the
constitutional convention. More than two hundred thousand
information folders were distributed in Hawaii. Both the Re-
publican and Democratic parties (with the important exception
of Stainback) actively supported the proposed constitution.
McLane returned to Honolulu from Washington late in Sep-
tember to direct the affirmative campaign. 24
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Statehood proponents were adamant that those who ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the draft constitution did so simply
to defeat statehood. For example, Randolph Crossley, chairman
of the Republican party, charged that the Democratic governor
was attempting to undermine the statehood campaign by op-
posing the constitution. Despite Stainback’s position on
statehood, he did have genuine reservations about certain as-
pects of the constitution. A substantial minority of citizens also
opposed the constitution—albeit for a variety of reasons. The
most sustained objections were mounted by the powerful ILWU.
It was not opposed to statehood per se, but bitterly resented
some of the clauses of the proposed constitution. 25 Ironically, by
adopting this position the union unwittingly strengthened the
position of the small but determined group of anti-statehood,
anti-labor conservatives. As late as May 1950, the ILWU had
publicly endorsed immediate statehood. Nonetheless it was dis-
turbed by the proposed constitution and conducted a vigorous
campaign against its ratification.
Union spokesmen argued that the constitution did not
permit adequate direct public participation in government. This
view was shared by many nonunionists, especially from within
the Japanese and Chinese communities. Opposition centered on
the clauses which called for the election of only two statewide
officials—the governor and lieutenant governor—and provided
for executive appointment of all other judicial and adminis-
trative positions in the proposed state. The powers of the ter-
ritory’s governor were a central issue in the local contest over
statehood. Predictably they were also the most keenly disputed
issues during the convention. The appointment of officials and
judges would be more efficient, Fong argued, but direct election
would be more democratic. In the final analysis, most delegates
favored efficiency over increased democracy. It was widely be-
lieved that appointments made by Hawaii’s governors, espe-
cially Stainback, had been heavily biased in favor of haoles.
Many felt that direct election of all prominent officials in the
new state would ensure that all ethnic groups were fairly repre-
sented in political life. However, the convention did not accept
this view. A motion moved by Yasutaka Fukushima to provide for
the election of all local supreme court justices and judges of the
circuit courts was squashed, fifty votes to eleven. A compromise
moved by Fong to elect the chief justice and empower him
to appoint all other judges also failed—although by a reduced
margin of thirty-seven to twenty. A related move to permit direct
election of the state’s attorney general was also defeated, al-
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though by a relatively narrow margin of thirty-five to twenty-
five. Efforts to have education controlled by elected officials
were also rejected. However, the convention did establish a rel-
atively large house (fifty-one members) and Senate (twenty-five
members). This increased the likelihood that all ethnic groups
would be directly represented in the legislature. 26
In general labor leaders argued that the proposed executive
was much too powerful and the influence permitted the outer
islands too great. They also resented the fact that the con-
stitution did not permit the use of initiative, referendum, and
recall—procedures, adopted by many states during the Pro-
gressive Era, which boosted the direct role of the public in gov-
ernment. These were all substantial criticisms. The constitution
could certainly have been less centralized and reserved fewer
powers to the executive branch. Still, some found the argu-
ments of the ILWU less than genuine, and suggested that the
union’s opposition to the constitution derived simply from the
fact that it made compulsory a loyalty oath for all government
employees and elected representatives. 27
Local statehood proponents were determined to establish
Hawaii’s anti-communist credentials, even if this meant that
basic democratic rights of citizens might be compromised. They
reacted to the charges of Butler and other McCarthyite conser-
vatives in a way which tacitly endorsed the view that internal
subversion was a real not an imagined threat. The loyalty oath
incorporated into Hawaii’s draft constitution closely resembled
the infamous 1940 federal anti-subversive act—the Smith Act.
Article 14, Section 3 stated: “No person who advocates, or who
aids or belongs to any party, organization, or association which
advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the government
of this State or of the United States shall be qualified to hold
any public office or employment.” All elected representatives
and prospective government employees were also compelled
to state on oath that they would “defend the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of the State of Hawaii.”
Hawaii’s constitution was the first “state” constitution to incor-
porate such provisions. 28
Despite opposition from the ILWU on the left, and the
Dillingham anti-statehood faction on the right, the electorate
ratified the draft constitution. It was submitted to the people
at the general election on November 7, 1950, and approved
by slightly more than a three-to-one majority of voters. The
constitution was endorsed by 82,788 votes, and rejected by
27,109. It gained majority support in all precincts. 29 The sub-
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stantial negative vote did not accurately represent the strength
of opposition to statehood per se, as the campaign against
ratification was organized and largely supported by the pro-
statehood ILWU. Yet the strength of dissatisfaction with the
constitution was much stronger than statehood proponents had
anticipated or desired. A substantial minority—almost a third
of those who voted—was apparently not prepared to accept
statehood on the terms written into the constitution.
In 1940 the plebiscite had indicated only that a majority
of citizens favored eventual statehood. The evidence presented
by the 1950 vote was less ambiguous. It suggested that a sub-
stantial majority wanted statehood under the constitution
drafted earlier in 1950. But opponents could still argue that
Hawaii’s people had never actually voted on the separate
question of immediate statehood.
Hawaii’s constitution incorporated many of the usual provi-
sions of existing state constitutions, but it also reflected the pe-
culiar demands and needs of the unique island community. It in-
cluded the traditional bill of rights guaranteeing trial by jury in
civil and criminal cases, as well as freedom of religion, speech,
and the press. The right of assembly and redress of griev-
ances was assured. However, the bill of rights also included two
unique provisions which were influenced by Hawaii’s wartime
experience and a desire to preserve its relatively harmonious
multiracial society. Article 1, Section 13, stipulated that the writ
of habeas corpus could be suspended by the legislature alone.
Moreover, the supremacy of civil authority was clearly defined.
Article 1, Section 14, stated simply: “The military shall be held
in strict subordination to the civil power.” The bill of rights
also explicitly prohibited segregation or discrimination in public
schools and other institutions, and guaranteed equal protection
under the law and full civil rights to all citizens, regardless of
race, religion, sex, or ancestry. 30 These substantial guarantees
were qualified, however, by the loyalty oath which directly chal-
lenged the democratic right of all citizens to associate freely
in the political arena without fear of penalty by the state. The
fact that this clause mirrored federal loyalty oaths was small
comfort to its critics.
Although generally a conservative document, the consti-
tution nonetheless made an important concession to employee
interests. It specifically guaranteed the right of persons pri-
vately employed to organize themselves into a collective bar-
gaining unit, and the right of public employees to organize
for the purpose of presenting their grievances and proposals
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to the state. Only three states—New York, New Jersey, and
Missouri—had revised their constitutions and included similar
provisions. 31
The most significant feature of the constitution concerned
the governor: it provided for a very strong executive branch.
The governor was to be elected to the usual four-year term of
office. He was responsible for the traditional duties ascribed
to state governors, namely, the carrying out of the laws, the
right to recommend legislation, and command of the armed
forces of the state. In addition, however, the governor of the
proposed state of Hawaii was given power to appoint the heads
of the various administrative departments established by the
legislature. Executive departments were reduced from thirty-
two under the Organic Act to a maximum of twenty under the
new constitution. To facilitate greater administrative coordi-
nation in executive departments, provision was made for an “ad-
ministrative director to serve at the pleasure of the Governor.”
Moreover, as James M. Burns and John W. Peltason have pointed
out, legislative reapportionment whereby population changes
were registered in the House—a seemingly insoluble problem
in many states—was left to the executive and the courts rather
than the legislature. 32 As noted above, another feature of the
constitution, which also broadened the functions of the exec-
utive, established the judiciary on an appointed rather than an
elected basis. This had been the practice under territorial rule,
but it was exceptional for a state constitution to include such
a provision. The constitution set up one supreme court and
various circuit courts and inferior courts. Provision was made
for the governor, “with the advice and consent of the Senate,”
to appoint “the justices of the supreme court and the judges of
the circuit courts.” 33 Through the articles of “Taxation and Fi-
nance” the governor controlled the purse strings and thereby,
according to S. Gale Lowrie, was in a position to exert decisive
influence on state activities. It was the duty of the governor to
submit a complete budget to the legislature, but at the same
time he was authorized to veto or reduce proposed legislative
appropriations. 34 He was also granted power to veto legislation
within a ten-day period following final passage by the legis-
lature. The governor and the lieutenant governor were the only
two officials elected directly by all citizens of the state. 35 By
these provisions, Lowrie has concluded, the drafters of Hawaii’s
constitution had essentially established “one of the most pow-
erful executive offices in the United States.” 36
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The state legislature was to comprise two houses: a Senate
with twenty-five members and a House of Representatives with
fifty-one members. House members were elected for two-year
terms; senators for four years. The proposed legislature was
smaller than the legislatures of most of the existing states.
Only five states had a Senate comprising less than twenty-five
members. Only eight states had a House of Representatives
with less than fifty-one seats. Because Hawaii had a population
of less than half a million, this comparatively small seventy-
six-member legislature would nonetheless have provided one
legislative representative for every 1,760 registered voters in
1950. 37
The organization of the legislature was influenced by
Hawaii’s unique island geography. The six senatorial districts
represented areas which did not necessarily support approxi-
mately equal populations. Each Senate district included either
part of a major island or a group of islands. Representation in
the lower house was apportioned on the basis of population.
In the Senate, representatives from outer islands, which sup-
ported less than half of Hawaii’s population, comprised a ma-
jority. In the House most representatives were from Oahu. This
was a compromise solution to the controversial question of
reapportionment. Sectional division over the issue of reappor-
tionment was further dissipated by the inclusion of a provision
for automatic reapportionment of the House in accordance with
population changes every ten years. However, a constitutional
amendment was necessary to authorize reapportionment of the
Senate. 38
The minimum age for voting in state or local elections was
twenty years under the new constitution. This continued a
practice established under territorial rule. Only Georgia per-
mitted citizens less than twenty-one years of age to vote in such
elections before 1950. 39
Hawaii’s proposed constitution was a brief document of less
than fourteen thousand words. John Bebout, assistant secretary
of the Council of the National Municipal League, observed that
its drafters had resisted “virtually all temptations and pressures
to include the kind of restrictive and legislative details that …
so encumbered most of the constitutions of the older states.”
40 By excluding all statutory material and superfluities, the leg-
islature of the proposed state was left reasonably free to re-
spond flexibly and effectively to the changing needs of the state.
41 Rather than “outline constitutional procedures for the state
to follow,” Lowrie commented, the constitution simply asserted
Chapter 6
212
“the basic duties of the state, leaving it to the legislature of
the future to devise appropriate means of meeting these obliga-
tions.” 42
“The Constitution as drawn up by the Constitutional Con-
vention has been hailed as perhaps the best state constitution
in existence,” the Star- Bulletin claimed enthusiastically in Sep-
tember 1950. 43 This view was not wholly without foundation.
Despite the restrictions it imposed on civil liberties through
the mandatory loyalty oath, and the concentrated power of the
executive notwithstanding, the constitution was generally ac-
claimed as an excellent, flexible document. Bebout emphasized,
for example, that Hawaii’s constitution “demonstrated that it is
perfectly possible in the 20th century, as it was in the 18th, to
write a Constitution that is confined to fundamentals.” Political
scientists Burns and Peltason praised it for avoiding many of the
flaws and frailties of other state constitutions, and for incorpo-
rating fresh ideas and the recommendations of contemporary
experts for improving the organization of the executive and ju-
dicial branches of state government. Lowrie, in 1951, compli-
mented its stylistic and organizational excellence. 44
The events of 1950 clearly demonstrated Hawaii’s ability to
organize a state government and its desire to gain immediate
admission. They also refuted Senator Butler’s allegation that
Hawaii’s constitution would be “dictated by the tools of Moscow
in Honolulu.” 45 Ratification of the constitution in the face of
strong ILWU opposition, inclusion of a loyalty oath, and the
prompt expulsion of Silva from the convention invalidated
statehood opponents’ claims that the territory was Communist
controlled. In 1951 a U.S. Senate investigating committee cor-
rectly concluded that “the prophesy that the State constitution
of Hawaii would reflect Communist influence has not been even
remotely fulfilled.” 46
Other developments in Hawaii during 1950 also refuted the
contention that labor interests or Communists dominated the
political life of the territory. The 1950–1951 territorial legis-
lature, like the constitutional convention, included represen-
tatives of virtually all major political and economic interests,
as well as social and ethnic groups. Ethnically, for example,
the House of Representatives comprised fourteen Caucasians
or part-Hawaiians, ten members of Japanese ancestry, three
of Chinese-Hawaiian extraction, two of Hawaiian ancestry, and
one of Chinese ancestry. Politically, labor interests were repre-
sented, but the strongly anti-labor Republican party held thirty
of the forty-five seats in the legislature. During 1950 also, the
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House Un-American Activities Committee found that the ILWU
was Communist led, but failed to confirm Butler’s suggestion
that the Democratic party and the territory’s economy were
Communist controlled. 47
“The framing of a Hawaii State Constitution,” McLane ad-
vised the Statehood Commission, “would soon make Hawaii the
49th State.” 48 The constitution was used deliberately as a tool
in the statehood drive. It was cited consistently as evidence
that Hawaii, despite its uniquely mixed peoples and its radical
labor movement, was an unexceptional American community. As
Meller has correctly pointed out, the constitution “showed and
was meant to demonstrate how thoroughly the people of the Is-
lands were imbued with American political and cultural tradi-
tions.” 49 Even before the convention ended, a large delegation
of its members visited Washington to lobby Senate investigators
and point out the territory’s success in containing so-called
un-American elements. “Great interest was expressed in Wash-
ington in our constitutional convention,” Fong reported. “The
constitution we present to congress will in no small measure de-
termine the outcome of the statehood campaign. Congressmen
are impressed, too, with the action of the Hawaii legislature in
handling the long waterfront strike here, and in the action of
the constitutional convention in expelling two delegates.” 50 By
drafting and ratifying its proposed state constitution the ter-
ritory reaffirmed its capacity and desire for self-government.
It was not only qualified for statehood, but now for the first
time was fully prepared for immediate admission. No longer
would approval by Congress merely enable Hawaii to take the
steps, such as drafting an appropriate constitution, necessary to
become a state. Now congressional approval would guarantee
prompt admission. The new constitution was thus potentially
a decisive initiative. In practice, however, it had little direct
impact on the wider forces which shaped congressional action,
or inaction, on statehood.
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Chapter 7
Politics of Nonaction,
1951–1956
The procedures and arrangements under which Congress op-
erates, like all institutional processes, are not neutral. Both
implicit inertia and explicit manipulation determine what Con-
gress does and does not decide. The agenda adopted by Con-
gress essentially decides the fate of legislation. Only a small
proportion of the bills introduced ever receive serious consid-
eration by relevant committees. Few bills escape the barriers
which opponents of legislation in House or Senate committees
can invoke to prevent a debate on the floor of either chamber.
As political scientists have long acknowledged, it is the nu-
merous committees and subcommittees which mould, promote,
or bury legislation. Although the combined number of House
and Senate committees is less than 40, there are more than
250 subcommittees. The significance of these small, unrepre-
sentative groups can scarcely be overstated. They have, in ef-
fect, veto power over most bills. Woodrow Wilson once observed
that “Congress, in its Committee rooms, is Congress at work.”
1 But he could not have anticipated that the power of these
committees would perhaps rival that of Congress itself as the
amount and complexity of legislation increased. Nor did he ap-
preciate sufficiently that committees are select groups which do
not necessarily reflect the views of a majority of representatives
or senators on a particular issue. Legislation is often defeated,
delayed, or amended by committees, although it might have the
support of a majority on the floor of either or both chambers.
From 1950 statehood proponents learned with dismay that the
Congress they so eagerly wished to join could have its legis-
lation vetoed or obstructed by a small minority of its members.
In recent years congressional procedures have been re-
formed and streamlined, but such changes came too late to
help Hawaii. Before 1960 a majority in committee was given
to the party which had a majority in the chamber to which
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the committee was responsible. The most powerful member of
any committee was the chairman. Even without the support
of a majority of the committee, he could block or modify leg-
islation. A chairman could arrange the agenda, schedule (or
not schedule) meetings or hearings, or appoint a subcommittee
comprising members sympathetic to his views and direct con-
troversial legislation to this group. Chairs were usually held by
a member of the majority party, but like committee membership
in general, they were determined on the basis of seniority. The
majority party in Congress, however, was sometimes hostile
to the administration. Thus in many vital committees, control
of procedure and voting power lay with elderly, conservative
members who were not necessarily from the same party as
the president. “The population of the United States as a whole
is increasingly young, geographically mobile and urban,” Ira
Katznelson and Mark Kesselman have pointed out, but “Com-
mittee chairmen tend to be old, rural and Southern.” 2 Repre-
sentatives from solidly Democratic Southern electorates gen-
erally enjoyed much longer tenure of office than representatives
elected by other, more volatile sections of the country. The se-
niority system thereby permitted the South to exercise dispro-
portionately strong influence in Congress. The consequences of
these arrangements were most obviously and most decisively il-
lustrated in the work of the powerful House Rules Committee,
which in effect had the power to determine the agenda of the
House. During 1937, for example, three Democratic and four
Republican members of this committee blocked much New Deal
legislation. In the following decade the conservative coalition
of Southern Democrats and old guard Republicans thwarted
liberal legislation sponsored by Roosevelt and Truman in com-
mittees rather than on the floors of Congress. And if other
tactics failed, the filibuster remained a potent device for de-
feating the will of Congress.
The power of the Rules Committee was restricted tem-
porarily during 1949–1950. Liberal Democrats, with the support
of urban Republicans, overrode the conservative coalition and
instituted a discharge rule. This permitted the chairman of a
standing committee to call up his legislation if the Rules Com-
mittee refused to sanction it within a twenty-one-day period.
Legislation on Hawaii and Alaska, as well as an anti-poll tax bill
and minimum wage legislation, was brought to a floor vote in
1950 as a result of this new procedure. But after conservative
strength had been bolstered by the mid-term elections in No-
vember 1950, the coalition quickly repealed the discharge rule.
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The Rules Committee immediately resumed its traditional, ob-
structionist role. Fred Greenstein has pointed out that the
American political process allows various individuals and
groups, through their veto power, to delay or stall policymaking.
Congress, he correctly concluded, is a prime example of that
process. “The checkmating possibilities are so substantial that
one wonders how any policy—especially on controversial
issues—ever emerged from the Washington labyrinth.” 3 By ma-
nipulating committee procedures and the filibuster, opponents
in Congress were able to block the controversial statehood
question during 1950–1958. The strategies they adopted were
transparently cynical, but extremely effective.
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS, 1951–1952
The Senate defeat of 1950 was a bitter reversal for all those in
Honolulu who were working so optimistically and energetically
to shape the proposed state’s constitution. While conceding its
disappointment and frustration, the Statehood Commission was
nonetheless firmly resolved to carry on with the campaign. Re-
publicans still dominated the commission and gave Farrington
every possible support, although many Democrats continued to
mutter privately that the GOP still looked forward to statehood
in the eventual, not immediate, future. The official campaign
lost further momentum in mid-1951 when McLane returned to
Honolulu to work in the governor’s office. He was replaced as
executive secretary to the Statehood Commission by Jabulka,
who had previously been on the staff of the Honolulu Advertiser.
4 McLane had worked closely with Farrington and members of
the commission, helping both to advance the statehood cause
in Washington and to organize the constitutional convention in
Honolulu. They had given the campaign continuity, efficiency,
and a solid foundation. They had found, however, that hard work
and enthusiasm often went unrewarded on Capitol Hill.
Local Democrats were no less determined than their po-
litical opponents to be identified with the statehood drive. But
their efforts were frustrated by Stainback’s vigorous opposition
to statehood. They were also angered by his (usually veiled)
suggestions that Hawaii’s Japanese were a racial and political
threat to the islands. In April 1951 Truman made a decision
which most island Democrats thought was long overdue: he
belatedly replaced Stainback with a nominee who was more
sympathetic to the mainstream of his party and genuinely en-
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thusiastic about immediate admission. Oren E. Long was ap-
pointed governor, although some Democrats felt that Honolulu’s
energetic seventy-nine-year-old Mayor, Wilson, or Ernest Kai
were the local Democrats most entitled to fulfill this powerful
post. Nonetheless, the young Democrats had now proved their
political muscle against the old guard. Still, it was a qualified
victory.
“One of the gripes we had as Democrats in those early
days was that the national appointing authority and the national
Democratic party did not consider the wishes and aspirations
of the people of Hawaii, of the Democrats of Hawaii,” Kido
stated. “They appointed governors, … judges, … customs of-
ficials, district attorneys—without consultation with local offi-
cials…. [If] we wanted to develop a strong Democratic party
in Hawaii, the party had to be consulted.” Appointments made
previously by Roosevelt and Truman had so seldom advantaged
the local party that, indeed, Mau, Burns, and others wryly ques-
tioned whether or not the appointees were Democrats. Their
conclusion was that many were pro-Republican. They were
often referred to as “pseudo-Democrats” or “so-called De-
mocrats,” and were viewed as the puppets of elite business in-
terests. It was obvious to Richardson “that the appointments
were being dictated by the Big Five and the appointees were
going to those who had friends in the U.S. Senate.” “I couldn’t
live my life under this kind of set-up,” Richardson stated. Cer-
tainly many were convinced that the Big Five’s privileged con-
nection with Capitol Hill had to be summarily dismantled and
along with it the misconception that local candidates were inept
or unqualified. Led by Burns, the young Democrats thus lobbied
strongly in Washington against Stainback and the so-called old
guard. Truman and Interior Secretary Chapman were the prin-
cipal targets of their activities. Burns and Kido in particular
were determined that a new Democratic governor should agree
in advance to make appointments which would consolidate the
local arm of the party, a practice which had served the GOP
well in previous decades. But the first choice of the Young
Turks, Kai, a part-Hawaiian who had graduated from Yale Law
School and served as secretary and attorney general of the ter-
ritory, rejected these conditions. Long, a native of Kansas who
had lived in the territory since 1917 and had exhibited some
liberal inclinations as head of the Schools Department, was then
selected. He was a compromise candidate. No people of Ori-
ental descent were considered as it was felt this would retard
the growth of the party by alienating local haole, Hawaiian,
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and part-Hawaiian voters. Moreover, as Mau acknowledged, the
Southern Democrat bloc in Congress was expected to veto any
such nomination. Race was a central factor in both island and
mainland politics. The fact that Long was a Caucasian with a
mainland background made him a very safe choice. He replaced
another Caucasian originally from the South. 5
While the Burns faction had successfully backed Long, its
recommendations that Kido be made secretary of Hawaii (a
position equivalent to lieutenant governor) and Mau be ap-
pointed attorney general were rejected by Washington. Being
non-Caucasian and identified as pro-labor, Kido later claimed,
both he and Mau were unacceptable to the Southern Democrats
in Congress; Long was induced to find other candidates. This
lesson was not lost on Burns supporters, who pushed hard
and with eventual success to have Sakae Takahashi made trea-
surer under Long. The nature of local politics and patronage
was gradually changing. “Our Democratic governors previously
didn’t owe the local party any obligation, and never dealt with
the local party,” Kido commented. “But with the coming of Oren
Long … governors … had to play with the party.” 6
Confident that statehood now enjoyed the support of a ma-
jority in the House, proponents realistically focused their cam-
paign on the Senate after 1950. This strategy met with some
initial success as the Senate Interior Committee reported fa-
vorably on both Hawaii and Alaska during 1951. However,
support for Hawaii was much stronger than for Alaska. Hawaii
won a five-vote margin, while Alaska gained a slim one-vote
majority. 7 Led by Butler, opponents signed a dissenting report
which charged that Communists still held a tight grip on the
economy, politics, and social life of Hawaii. Given Hoover’s
comment in March that there were only thirty-six Communist
party members in Hawaii, this dissenting opinion was clearly
without substance. Moreover, Hoover conceded that forty of
the existing states had more Communists than Hawaii. 8 The
majority report cited this information and dismissed the com-
munist issue as irrelevant and highly exaggerated. It also re-
futed the suggestion that Hawaii was unqualified for statehood
because most of its people were aliens. Hawaii’s residents were
true Americans, the report suggested, and could not justifiably
be denied complete political parity with other Americans simply
because they were largely of Asiatic ancestry. The Statehood
Commission welcomed this majority opinion as the most
forceful report yet issued by Congress. The fact that it came
from the Senate rather than the House was especially encour-
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aging. Local proponents were convinced Hawaii’s statehood bill
would be brought to the Senate before the year (1951) was out.
9 Despite the optimism, however, the Senate took no further
action on either territory during 1951. A threat by conservatives
to filibuster was sufficient to avert a debate. 10
When Congress resumed in January 1952 this threat was re-
peated. Opponents focused on the Alaska bill, as it apparently
enjoyed less support in the Senate than Hawaii. If Alaska was
defeated or interminably delayed, it was considered most un-
likely that the Democrats would push forward with separate
legislation to admit Republican Hawaii. Farrington was con-
fident Hawaii could muster fifty-five votes in the Senate, if it
could ever be brought to an actual vote. But potential majority
support was irrelevant unless the threat of a filibuster could
be overcome. And in January 1952 leading Senate opponents
met and devised a detailed filibuster strategy. At the same time
Farrington convened a meeting of proponents. It included De-
mocratic and Republican leaders, Interior Secretary Chapman,
and officials from both Hawaii and Alaska. With the support of
the White House, agreement was reached on a new strategy
aimed at bringing both territories into the Union simultane-
ously. Under this arrangement, Democratic Alaska was to be de-
bated before Hawaii. The Truman administration would support
no alternative procedure. 11
On February 3, 1952, the Alaska bill was again debated
by the Senate. An attempt to substitute Alaska with a Hawaii
bill was defeated. The debate on Alaska was vigorous and pro-
tracted, consuming eleven days of debate over a four-week
period. It had all the hallmarks of a filibuster and was cut short
only when the Senate voted to recommit Alaska to the rel-
evant committee for further consideration. This action was tan-
tamount to the defeat of both Alaska and Hawaii during the
Eighty-second Congress. 12
The recommital motion, moved by George Smathers (Dem.,
Fla.), provided that the Senate committee conduct additional
hearings on Alaska, and consider granting Commonwealth
status as an alternative to statehood. Although passed during
debate which was technically restricted to Alaska, Smathers’
motion stipulated that the Senate committee consider an al-
ternative status to statehood for “the territories,” not Alaska
per se. It thus constituted an attempt to grant Commonwealth
status to both Alaska and Hawaii. Commonwealth status would
give each territory the right to elect its own governor, legis-
lature, and executive officials, vote in presidential elections, and
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elect a voting delegation to the House of Representatives plus a
nonvoting delegate to the Senate. It would take a constitutional
amendment, however, for Commonwealth status to be granted
to Hawaii or Alaska. 13 Smathers’ motion was a convenient alter-
native tactic to the exhaustive filibuster which would have been
necessary to avert a Senate vote during the remainder of 1952.
Increasingly during the 1950s, local and mainland oppo-
nents attempted to delay or avert statehood by promoting an
alternative political status for Hawaii. In 1952, after fifty-three
years as an unincorporated territory, Puerto Rico was made a
Commonwealth under a unique arrangement accepted by Con-
gress, the president, and its own electorate. The U.S. Con-
stitution did not specifically provide for such a status. Under
the Commonwealth Act of 1952 Puerto Rico’s residents were
granted American citizenship but denied voting representation
in Congress or the right to vote in national presidential elec-
tions. While this decision did not give Puerto Ricans equal po-
litical rights with other American citizens, it did give them
unique economic benefits. As a Commonwealth, Puerto Rico
was entitled to generous grants-in-aid from the U.S. gov-
ernment. In addition, Puerto Rico’s residents were exempted
from payment of all federal U.S. taxes. 14 Some observers sug-
gested that by this action Washington had purchased control of
Puerto Rico, and averted any potential challenge to the political
and ethnic composition of Congress which might have come had
Puerto Rico sought to follow the statehood example presented
by Hawaii. During 1953 and after, more opponents of Hawaii
pushed the idea of Commonwealth status as a substitute for
statehood.
The Commonwealth idea was first suggested by Butler in his
anti-statehood report of 1949. A year after Smathers’ motion
had been passed by the Senate, opponents introduced a bill
to grant Hawaii increased self-government under a political
status very similar to that accorded Puerto Rico. During the
Senate hearings of mid-1953, Smathers suggested that another
plebiscite be held to determine whether Hawaii’s citizens de-
sired Commonwealth status or statehood. 15
These moves were transparent designs to obstruct
statehood, but they also reflected the growth of a determined
pro-Commonwealth minority within Hawaii. Significantly, vir-
tually all those who wanted this new status also opposed
statehood. Stainback, Campbell, and O’Brien, for example, all
proposed Commonwealth status during the 1953 Senate
hearings. Stainback suggested that one attractive feature of
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Commonwealth status was the exemption from federal taxes
which it gave to Hawaii’s residents. During 1952 Hawaii paid
$140 million in federal taxes. Commonwealth supporters
argued that if this money were paid to the local legislature or
if taxes were reduced, the territory would undergo unprece-
dented economic growth. Moreover, the abolition of federal
taxes would negate statehood proponents’ claims that as a terri-
tory Hawaii was subject to taxation without representation.
O’Brien informed the Senate Insular Affairs Committee that
if given the choice between statehood, with all the additional
obligations it entailed, and Commonwealth status, with the
federal tax exemption, Hawaii’s people would vote emphatically
in favor of Commonwealth status. 16 O’Brien grossly exag-
gerated. Nonetheless, during 1953–1954 unprecedented local
support for Commonwealth status—either as a permanent
alternative to statehood or a temporary means toward in-
creased home rule—developed. In March 1954 J. Harold
Hughes, with the support of Campbell and Stainback, formed
the Commonwealth for Hawaii organization. Hughes claimed
that “several hundred business people” were interested in Com-
monwealth status. 17 Growing support for Commonwealth status
reflected the belief that all federal taxes paid by Hawaii’s res-
idents and all customs duties collected in Hawaii would be re-
mitted by the federal government. Commonwealth advocates
estimated that this would save Hawaii between $135 million
and $185 million per annum, and permit a significant decrease
in income tax payments by island residents. Despite a reduction
in the individual’s tax burden, the Commonwealth government
would collect greater revenue per capita than the proposed
state government, and could thus foster rapid economic devel-
opment in Hawaii. According to Stainback, this political system
would ensure the continued development of local industry and
business and encourage a marked increase in the level of
mainland investment. Although denied voting representation in
Congress, Hawaii, like Puerto Rico, would constitute a self-
governing state. Its citizens would be protected by the United
States Constitution. “We do not have to stay in our present
situation, neither is statehood necessary,” Stainback argued in
1954. “We can have all our freedom and independence under
Commonwealth status.” 18
These claims were vehemently refuted by local statehood
supporters. King pointed out that advocates of Commonwealth
status were attempting to utilize this issue to conceal their real
opposition to statehood. He charged that Commonwealth pro-
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posals were based on fallacious arguments and motivated by
“race prejudice and distrust of democracy.” King correctly em-
phasized that Commonwealth status did not necessarily guar-
antee that taxes would be remitted. In contrast to Hawaii,
Puerto Rico was never an incorporated territory. It was thus
never legally entitled to statehood. Puerto Rico did not at any
time pay federal taxes. Thus the exemption of Puerto Rico from
such taxes was not directly a result of its Commonwealth status.
Although federal taxes might be reduced or abolished under a
Commonwealth government, King argued, such economic ad-
vantages were not necessarily permanent. Moreover, rejection
of incorporated status and acceptance of Commonwealth status
might lessen Hawaii’s share of federal appropriations and pos-
sibly reduce Hawaii’s sugar quota. Finally, King stressed, Com-
monwealth status would deny Hawaii’s citizens the right to send
voting representatives to Congress or participate in national
presidential elections. 19
As Commonwealth status was promoted essentially by
statehood opponents it was largely supported by Caucasians
and a few part-Hawaiian or Hawaiian citizens. Hughes claimed
that Commonwealth status enjoyed considerable private
support from businessmen who found it “necessary to remain
inarticulate” because of “the fear of boycott of their business by
the Japanese population.” 20 Influential Democrats, most notably
Burns, alleged that some prominent businessmen still privately
opposed statehood. Yet not all Commonwealth supporters op-
posed statehood. Some former statehood proponents suggested
that acceptance of Commonwealth status might be a necessary
intermediary step to statehood, and a means of increasing local
taxation revenue and curbing rising unemployment. Harold W.
Rice, a former Democratic senator and a vice president of the
constitutional convention, was perhaps the most influential
citizen apart from Stainback to offer at least tentative support
to the Commonwealth proposal. 21
Ironically many of those who had previously attacked unions
and liberal Democrats as threats to American democracy in
the islands, now supported a plan which would deny Hawaii’s
people their legitimate democratic rights as American citizens.
Those who wanted Hawaii to join Puerto Rico as a Common-
wealth tax haven were apparently prepared to sacrifice
democracy at home for uncertain economic gains. Significantly,
those who paid the most tax expected to benefit most from Com-
monwealth status. Not surprisingly, many wealthy islanders, in-
cluding Campbell and Dillingham, found the Commonwealth
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proposal very appealing. Those who had never wanted political
equality under statehood found in Commonwealth status a con-
venient means of preserving, and perhaps extending, their po-
litical and economic privileges. Throughout the 1950s they sup-
plied voluminous material on the alleged advantages of Com-
monwealth status to various congressmen and statehood
hearings, and attempted to foster wider local enthusiasm for
this alternative to statehood. 22 The Commonwealth proposal
was actively supported—but only by a small minority of local cit-
izens. At most the Commonwealth issue complicated but did not
seriously delay action on statehood in either chamber of Con-
gress.
The majority support given in the Senate to Smathers’
motion to reconsider Alaska and investigate Commonwealth
status for both Alaska and Hawaii did not necessarily imply
that a majority favored this alternative status for either ter-
ritory. Approved by the narrowest possible margin, the recom-
mital vote did indicate however, that the Senate was evenly
divided over statehood. As with previous House votes, this divi-
sion reflected conservative-liberal cleavages rather than party
affiliations. Voting for recommittal, and thus against statehood,
were twenty-five Democrats and twenty Republicans. Voting
against recommital, and thus for statehood, were twenty-four
Democrats and twenty Republicans. The strongest support for
statehood derived from representatives of Western and
Mountain states. By contrast, Southern Democrats voted over-
whelmingly for recommittal, as did conservative “Taft Repub-
licans.” 23 The strength of the conservatives on this bill was
slightly inflated as a result of bargains struck with moderate
and undecided GOP senators. Southern opponents of Hawaii
lobbied furiously, offering those who supported Smathers’
motion a quid pro quo of Southern votes on legislation which
they considered vital. The conservative coalition could still
muster, at a price, majority support in the Senate. Nonetheless
the filibuster remained the least costly and most effective device
for the conservatives, as it could be invoked without majority
support.
The confusion surrounding the Smathers motion brought
into high relief the fact that while Hawaii and Alaska were tech-
nically separate legislative measures, they were always lumped
together when considered by the Senate. Bipartisan Senate
supporters of both territories agreed to promote debate on
Alaska immediately before Hawaii. If effective, this strategy
would have admitted both territories simultaneously. Some Re-
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publicans agreed to support Democratic Alaska in return for
the support of liberal Democrats on Hawaii. 24 If successful, this
strategy would not disturb the strength of each party in the
Senate. By reviving this device, which had proved so popular
with other territories throughout the nineteenth century, propo-
nents hoped to eliminate partisan politics from the debates over
statehood. But the decision to recommit Alaska undermined this
bipartisan approach. Once Alaska was rejected, members of
the Democratic party effectively withdrew their support from
Hawaii. Thus, party politics now cut across every facet of the
statehood question.
Immediately after Alaska was recommitted, the Democratic
leader in the Senate, Ernest W. McFarland (Ariz.), refused to
schedule a debate on Hawaii. In reply a prominent Republican
friend of Hawaii, Knowland, attempted to bring the bill to the
floor for debate. But on March 3, 1952, the Senate voted forty-
seven to thirty-two to substitute the controversial submerged
oil lands bill for the Hawaii bill. In contrast to the previous
Senate vote on Alaska, Hawaii did not receive strong biparti-
san support. Twenty-six Republicans and only six Democrats
favored consideration of the separate Hawaii bill. 25 Signifi-
cantly, Hawaii was supported by more Republican senators than
Alaska, and was opposed by more Democrats who withdrew
their support because the Alaska measure had previously been
defeated. In the narrowly controlled Democratic Senate, defeat
of Democratic Alaska inevitably resulted in simultaneous defeat
of Republican Hawaii. The Democratic majority refused to
permit Senate debate on a separate Hawaii bill during 1952. 26
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS, 1953–1954
A swing toward the Republicans in the national elections of No-
vember 1952 did little to extricate Hawaii from narrow par-
tisan conflicts. However, the successful Republican platform
included a commitment to immediate statehood, and Repub-
licans sympathetic to Hawaii controlled key positions in the
new Senate; Taft was the majority leader, Knowland chaired
the party’s Policy Committee, and the subcommittee on Terri-
tories was presided over by Cordon. Statehood was ranked third
on the Republicans’ list of eleven “musts” for action by Con-
gress. Also, a significant number of new senators were elected
in 1952 who had previously supported statehood legislation
in the House. Republicans controlled the House and Senate
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during 1953–1954, although they maintained only a one-seat
majority in the Senate. The new Republican president, Eisen-
hower, with the backing of the Republican majorities in both
houses, was expected to schedule Hawaii for debate ahead
of Alaska. But in 1952 Alaska unexpectedly went Republican,
giving Eisenhower’s party power in both territories. These re-
sults added new confidence to the statehood drive. Political
partisanship suggested that the new Republican administration
would welcome new states if they were likely to bolster GOP
strength, especially in the Senate. 27
The changed mood on Capitol Hill was expressed most sur-
prisingly in the conversion of Hawaii’s inveterate critic Senator
Butler. As late as May 1952 he was still opposed to immediate
admission. But in June he wrote Farrington to the effect that he
would do his best to have a plank favoring immediate statehood
adopted at the forthcoming national convention. In private
Butler continued to harbor doubts about the wisdom of such
a pledge, but political ambition and party loyalty induced his
new public attitude. Like Farrington, Butler was a supporter
of Senator Taft in the contest for the party’s presidential can-
didate. And in the prelude to the Republican National Con-
vention Taft insisted that Butler change his position and em-
brace immediate action on Hawaii. “Just what was said between
Senator Taft and Senator Butler, I do not know,” Elizabeth Far-
rington later commented, “but we were confident that Senator
Taft had put Senator Butler into a situation that if he wanted
to continue in the prestige positions he held in the Senate, he
would have to go along with statehood for Hawaii.” Despite
Taft’s defeat by Eisenhower, Butler was committed to his party’s
platform and the president’s pledges on statehood. Thus in early
1953, as the new chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Butler dutifully gave public approval to
Hawaii. He acknowledged the political expediency of his stated
position in a private letter. Since statehood seemed now to be an
inevitable eventuality, he wrote: “I would rather that they be ad-
mitted under a Republican administration with the prospects of
two Republican Senators than sometime when their [sic] might
be a Democratic administration and we might lose control of the
Islands.” 28
Eisenhower’s victory gave the Republicans power over ap-
pointments in the territory, but the local party could not agree
on a candidate for the vital post of governor. To the chagrin
of some party faithfuls in Honolulu, Farrington used his asso-
ciation with “Taft Republicans” in Washington to win the gov-
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ernorship for his old friend King. The Republican hierarchy in
Honolulu had encouraged Eisenhower to appoint the local party
chairman, Randolf Crossley. However, Taft had served in Con-
gress with King and accepted the argument that the former
delegate and Statehood Commission chairman was an ideal
choice, one who would boost the fortunes of the local party,
especially among Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians. King was ap-
pointed over Eisenhower’s objections, his successor claimed,
because Taft warned Eisenhower that were King not appointed
the administration might lose the support of Taft’s influential
faction in the Senate. Farrington’s initiatives were motivated
partly by friendship and partly by a realistic appreciation of
King’s popularity in the islands. King’s sincerity on statehood
was beyond question, and this fact also influenced Farrington’s
preference. 29 The new governor took office on February 28,
1953. He was the first person of Hawaiian descent to occupy
Iolani Palace since the ill-fated Queen Liliuokalani in the early
1890s. His appointment was greeted with the words Ka Mo-i
Iloko o ka Halealii, “There’s a King in the Palace.”
The Republican victories of 1952 were interpreted by the
Statehood Commission as “substantial reasons for the belief
that few times in the history of our long campaign have so many
new and favorable factors combined to lend strength to our
cause.” 30 However, this further example of the commission’s
perennial optimism was soon punctured by events in Wash-
ington.
The departure of Truman and many liberals from Wash-
ington permitted civil rights legislation to be pushed to the
periphery of national politics. The new Republican adminis-
tration was not expected to promote progressive legislation
aimed at ending segregation or lessening discrimination. Nor
was it anxious to establish an effective cloture rule. Thus some
observers suggested that Southern hostility to Hawaii’s ad-
mission would lessen during 1953–1954. If civil rights legis-
lation was not actually before Congress then it was assumed
Hawaii’s liberal position on racial issues would not be a direct
threat to the Southern faction. Hence the former Democratic
governor of Alaska, Gruening, commented optimistically in
1953 that “opposition will no doubt be recorded against the
Hawaii bill …, but will scarcely go to the lengths of a filibuster.”
And in January 1953 leading Southern Democrat opponents of
civil rights legislation stated that while they remained opposed
they would not wage a filibuster to defeat Hawaii in the Senate.
31
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In his first state of the Union message, February 2, 1953,
Eisenhower urged that statehood be granted Hawaii at the first
possible electoral opportunity in 1954. But if the new Repub-
lican president wanted Hawaii admitted, he was not similarly
disposed toward Alaska. “The silence of Republican leaders
on Alaska leaves one plain conclusion,” the Louisville Courier-
Journal correctly pointed out. “They want traditionally Repub-
lican Hawaii in the Union, but not traditionally Democratic
Alaska.” The Republican party was clearly anxious to increase
its slender one-seat majority in the Senate by admitting Hawaii
separately. Liberal Democrats criticized this bias as blatant par-
tisanship. Moreover, witbout the unanimous support of Repub-
licans in the Senate this partisan strategy could not triumph.
Some conservative Republicans, most notably Butler, accepted
Eisenhower’s strategy and expediently changed their opinion on
Hawaii. However, other old guard Republicans, as well as their
erstwhile Democratic allies from the South, continued to oppose
both territories. 32 Eisenhower’s strategy was thus unlikely to
succeed. It could only be saved by defections from the Dem-
ocratic party, an unlikely prospect in view of the cynical Repub-
lican position on Alaska.
The Eisenhower administration defended its opposition to
Alaska on the grounds that the territory’s population was too
small and scattered, and its economic development too limited
to justify admission. Certainly the vast northern territory was
less qualified than Hawaii. And yet the Republican election
platform of 1952 had endorsed “statehood for Alaska under an
equitable enabling act.” When he was chief of staff of the Army,
Eisenhower had supported statehood for both territories as an
important defense measure. In 1950 Eisenhower had also stated
that Alaska and Hawaii should soon be granted self-government
and equal participation in the affairs of the nation. The New
York Times correctly observed early in 1953 that the reversal of
Republican policy on Alaska was fundamentally attributable to
partisan politics. 33
Island Republicans were seemingly unworried by Eisen-
hower’s inconsistent behavior over statehood. The legislature
duly allocated another $140,000 for the campaign. It also sent
its new governor, King, the new Statehood Commission
chairman, Tavares, and former governor Long to Washington to
help Farrington lobby uncommitted senators from both parties.
When the House Insular Affairs Committee began yet another
hearing on Hawaii in February 1953 the Star-Bulle tin observed
confidently that this would be the final investigation of Hawaii’s
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bid for statehood. Such optimism was again premature, al-
though in March 1953 the Senate also began extensive new
committee hearings on Hawaii. Tavares observed that these
were the most important ever undertaken on Hawaii. 34 They re-
sulted in important changes to the provisions of the statehood
bill.
If the issue of communism in the islands was largely a
smoke screen for states’ rights opposition to statehood, the
growth of communism abroad was certainly a serious matter
for Washington’s cold war warriors. Hawaii was America’s prin-
cipal Pacific base and the Pentagon was adamant that statehood
must not compromise Washington’s control of all base facilities
or limit Washington’s access to land which might be used for
defense or communication purposes. The Korean War com-
pounded this determination. Events in Asia and the Pacific in
the decade after Pearl Harbor had seemingly validated Alfred
Mahan’s belief that the islands were vital stepping stones to
Asia. Mahan could hardly have anticipated, however, that the
expansion which he so strongly favored in the 1890s might
in the very long-term embroil his nation in massive land wars
to defend unspecified American interests in distant areas like
South Korea and Vietnam. By the early 1950s the Pentagon was
anxious to strengthen Hawaii. Defense expenditure rose sharply
from less than $150 million in 1950 to about $340 million in
1959. Military spending now earned Hawaii greater revenue
than the export of sugar and pineapples combined. In 1935 it
totalled less than 10 percent of the value of these staple ex-
ports. By 1958–1959 approximately one person in every four
derived their livelihood directly from defense expenditure. 35
Hawaii’s economic survival depended upon decisions made in
Washington. Local representatives and officials were sensitive
to this fact. But they were also determined that the Pentagon
should not exploit Hawaii’s vulnerable economic circumstances
and ride roughshod over the islands’ vital interests. During
1953 Washington and Hawaii clashed heatedly over the nature
and scope of Defense Department influence in the proposed
new Pacific state.
The Defense Department argued that the Hawaii statehood
bill must be amended to give the federal government exclusive
control, rather than concurrent jurisdiction, over all lands
which might be used for defense purposes. The amendment
provided “that exclusive jurisdiction be reserved to the United
States in those lands now held by the United States and held
for military, naval and coast guard purposes for the exercise
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by Congress of exclusive legislation as provided by Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution.” Previously, the
Pentagon had not found any fault with legislation to admit
Hawaii. The proposed amendment contradicted the provisions
of the Organic Act and the Newlands Resolution. These stipu-
lated that public lands in the territory were held for the benefit
of the people of Hawaii, except sections temporarily set aside
for federal use. The Organic Act also gave the territorial leg-
islature “concurrent jurisdiction over all lands in the territory,
including military reservations.” The Defense Department
amendment would have established throughout the islands
many small areas of land over which the federal government
had exclusive jurisdiction. “This was an intolerable prospect,”
Tavares has written. Statehood proponents immediately ob-
jected to the proposed amendment. With the support of propo-
nents in the Senate and House, Farrington and Tavares agreed
“to fight the Pentagon on this issue in the Committee and on
the floor of the House and risk delaying statehood rather than
agree to the Pentagon’s demands.” Tavares, a most able former
attorney general of the territory, conferred with a delegation
of Pentagon officials and a compromise was accepted by both
sides. It permitted the federal government to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the disputed areas, provided the proposed
state retained civil and criminal jurisdiction within these areas.
With the memory of martial law and the long eclipse of civil
authority still fresh, the issue of civil versus military authority
remained a sensitive question for most island residents. The
terms of the compromise permitted the federal government to
maintain exclusive jurisdiction over disputed areas only while
the various portions of land were deemed to be “critical areas”
by the president of the United States, or the secretary of De-
fense. Tavares thus won an important concession which ensured
further negotiation on all disputed areas and denied the Pen-
tagon permanent unilateral control of these areas. This com-
promise was incorporated into the Hawaii bill. It later influ-
enced settlement of the bitter controversy over the vast tracts
of land owned by the federal government in Alaska. 36
When the statehood bill came before the relevant Senate
committee it was further amended. In response to a request
from the U.S. Navy, the island of Palmyra and a number of
other small islands were excluded from the boundaries of the
proposed state. The Newlands Resolution and the Organic Act
referred generally to “the Hawaiian Islands and Their Depen-
dencies” as constituting the territory of Hawaii, but did not
Chapter 7
230
specifically delineate the boundaries of the territory. In 1953,
following extensive consultation with Tavares and Farrington,
the Senate committee defined new, reduced geographical limits
for the proposed state. The Navy was less concerned with
Palmyra than with the possibility that Midway and Johnson Is-
lands might be considered also as dependencies of Hawaii.
Subsequent Hawaii statehood bills, including the one finally ap-
proved in 1959, thus provided that as a condition of statehood
Hawaii’s citizens must ratify by plebiscite the provision for the
new state boundaries, which stipulated:
The State of Hawaii shall consist of all the islands together with
their appurtenant reefs and territorial waters, included in the
Territory of Hawaii on the date of enactment of this Act, except
the atoll known as Palmyra, together with its appurtenant reefs
and territorial waters, but the said State shall not be deemed
to include the Midway Islands, Johnson Island, Sand Island (off-
shore from Johnson Island) or Kingman Reef, together with their
appurtenant reefs and territorial waters. 37
During 1953 resistance to Hawaii was by no means re-
stricted to these specific clauses of the statehood bill. In the
House and Senate committees, and on the floors of both
chambers, opponents employed complex obstructionist tactics
which ultimately defeated statehood again. In the House Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, for example, James A.
Haley (Dem., Fla.) moved that Hawaii’s proposed strength in
the House of Representatives be reduced from two members to
one. This motion was rejected by seventeen votes to eight. In
the House, Coudert and John Pillion (Rep., N.Y.) introduced leg-
islation to amend the nation’s Constitution. They proposed
that any state hereafter admitted shall be entitled to one Senate
seat only when it attains a population of one half of the average
population represented by each Senator of all the other states,
and shall be entitled to two Senators only if it attains a population
of one and a half times the average population represented by
each Senator of all the other states.
Pillion suggested that admission be deferred until this
amendment was approved. 38
Committee Democrats, many of whom supported the im-
mediate admission of both Hawaii and Alaska, also sought to
amend the Hawaii bill. Clair Engle (Dem., Calif.) moved that the
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Alaska bill be added so that both territories could be considered
concurrently by the House. This motion was defeated by a one-
vote margin, fourteen votes to thirteen. Thirteen Republicans
and only one Democrat voted against Engle’s motion. Eleven
of the thirteen affirmative votes were supplied by Democrats.
Most Democrats supported this motion in the hope of ensur-
ing concurrent admission of Hawaii and Alaska. A minority of
committee Democrats, those from the South, wanted it because
they believed there would be much stronger congressional op-
position to a combined bill than to a separate Hawaii bill. De-
spite the defeat of this Democrat-sponsored amendment, eight
of the twelve Democrats on the committee subsequently sup-
ported the separate Hawaii bill. 39
The House Committee was less divided than its Senate coun-
terpart. It favorably reported the Hawaii bill on March 3, 1953,
by an overwhelming twenty-one votes to five. 40 Two days later
the Republican-controlled House Rules Committee approved a
rule granting the bill four hours of floor debate. Opposition to
granting this rule was led by the intractable Virginian Smith,
who protested that “the vote of one Chinaman in Hawaii would
be worth as much as votes of 31 citizens of New York state
when it came to electing Senators.” 41 Hawaii was debated on
March 9, 1953. Opponents again contended that the admission
of Hawaii would foreshadow statehood for Alaska, Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands and thus further reduce the in-
fluence of large states in the Senate. Predictably they also al-
leged that Hawaii’s admission threatened the security of the
nation, as the territory was Communist dominated. 42 Some
Southern Democrats argued that Hawaii should be denied entry
as a state because the United States had never granted
statehood to an area where Caucasians were a minority. 43
Party politics, however, were now of more immediate signifi-
cance than the underlying racial or sectional arguments.
Hostility to a separate Hawaii bill was much stronger in
the House during 1953–1954 than previously. Most Democrats
were now prepared to reject Hawaii in the hope that this tactic
would force Eisenhower to schedule debate on both territories.
Northern and Southern Democrats thus combined in an effort
to recommit Hawaii to committee. McCormack stated that many
Democrats who supported Hawaii could not accept a separate
Hawaii bill because the Eisenhower administration had broken
a “clear understanding” between the parties that both terri-
tories would be considered at or about the same time. He ex-
pressed the views of virtually all non-Southern Democrats when
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he stated: “I am deeply concerned … that we are not going to
be given an opportunity at this time to consider the admission
of Alaska to the Union.” Engle, a vigorous statehood supporter,
also agreed that Hawaii should be recommitted “because … it is
the only practical way to get any assurance at all that Alaskan
statehood will be brought to the floor.” Democrat supporters
of both territories charged the administration with bald parti-
sanship in promoting Hawaii while ignoring Alaska. 44
Southern Democrats who opposed the admission of either
territory exploited these new circumstances most adroitly in
the Senate. But they narrowly lost their major battles with the
Republican majority in the House. The first test of strength
came when Dwight Rogers (Dem., Fla.) moved that the House
recommit Hawaii to committee. This was rejected by 227 votes
to 182. Democrats voted overwhelmingly for recommital. They
were joined by only a few Republicans from states with large
populations. This unusual Republican unity reflected the new
majority party’s determination to defeat the Democratic party
on what John Saylor (Rep., Pa.) stated was “the first major test
of the Eisenhower Administration.” 45
Despite this setback, Southern opponents pressed on.
Rogers proposed two amendments to the Hawaii bill. The first
stipulated that Congress, not the president, be authorized to
approve the new states’ constitutions. This proposal was obvi-
ously designed to make Hawaii’s admission virtually impossible,
as it also stipulated that a two-thirds majority must approve
the constitution in both the House and the Senate. Most ob-
servers agreed that it would be a very long time indeed before
Hawaii could muster such support in the Senate. However,
Saylor moved a substitute amendment which stipulated only
that simple majorities in both chambers must approve the con-
stitution. This motion was passed. A second amendment pro-
posed by Rogers was approved. This reduced Hawaii’s proposed
strength in the House of Representatives from two seats to one.
It was a small concession to statehood opponents’ claims that
as a state Hawaii’s representation would be disproportionately
large. 46
The House again voted on a separate Hawaii bill on March
10, 1953. It was approved for the third time. The vote was 274
for, 138 against. 47 Hawaii again enjoyed considerable bipar-
tisan support. But opposition from Democrats was stronger in
1953 than in 1947 or 1950. 48 Only 37 Republicans voted “No,”
but they were joined by 100 Democrats. In contrast, 177 Re-
publicans and 97 Democrats voted “Yes.” Again virtually all op-
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ponents were Southern Democrats or Republicans from large
states. They were joined by a few Democrats who would nor-
mally have supported Hawaii but were now dissatisfied with
the partisan strategy adopted by Eisenhower. Earlier in the
session, many Northern and Western Democrats had expressed
this concern by supporting recommittal of the separate Hawaii
bill. Nonetheless, when the vote on statehood was finally taken
most non-Southern Democrats relented and voted affirmatively.
49 This concession resulted from a belief that many Republicans
would abandon the Eisenhower strategy once Hawaii was ap-
proved by the House. Some naively expected that Alaska would
be considered later in 1953. Such confidence was misplaced.
The Alaska bill was reported favorably by the House Insular
Affairs Committee during 1953. Nevertheless, it could not
overcome conservative Republican opposition in the powerful
House Rules Committee, and never reached the floor of the
House. Democrats then determined to defeat the Eisenhower
strategy in the Senate.
House Democrats had failed to get concurrent action on
the two territories, but their Senate colleagues were more suc-
cessful. The Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee com-
bined the Hawaii and Alaska bills. Senator Anderson moved on
May 12, 1953, that the Senate conduct concurrent hearings
on the two bills and report them simultaneously. This motion
passed by eight votes to seven. All seven Democrats and one
Republican supported Anderson’s motion. 50 But Eisenhower’s
party was determined to accept only Hawaii. 51 The resulting
impasse was not broken during 1953. The New York Times
concluded that Senate inaction was the lamentable result of
political considerations which were totally unrelated to the
statehood question. 52 Such assessments ignored the persistent
and decisive opposition to both territories which derived not
from a concern with party strength in Congress, but from a
much deeper determination to preserve the South’s peculiar
sectional interests.
Hawaii was not debated in the Senate during 1953, but it
was examined thoroughly by the relevant Senate committee in
July. At all previous investigations an overwhelming majority
of witnesses had endorsed immediate statehood. By contrast,
opinions were evenly divided during the 1953 hearings—almost
half of the 682 pages of testimony opposed Hawaii’s entry.
The communist bogey remained the most convenient ar-
gument for those who did not want statehood. Former Governor
Stainback, O’Brien, Dillingham, former Hawaii Chief Justice
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James Coke, Campbell, and former Hawaii Taxation Commis-
sioner William Borthwick presented exhaustive testimony or in-
serted evidence which emphasized the supposed threat of com-
munism to Hawaii. 53 This evidence largely repeated the allega-
tions made by Butler in 1949 and by the HUAC in 1950; it also
highlighted other developments in Hawaii during 1951–1953.
Late in 1951 seven purported leaders of the Hawaii Communist
party were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hall
and Reinecke were among those detained. All were charged
with violating the Alien Registration Act of 1940 (the Smith Act),
which prohibited teaching or advocating the violent overthrow
of the United States government. A few days before the Senate
hearings began in Washington, these seven people were found
guilty by a court in Hawaii. The six male defendants were each
sentenced to five years imprisonment and fined five thousand
dollars. Given the earlier conviction of Bridges, these sentences
were hardly unexpected. The Hawaii court’s decision was im-
mediately greeted by a strike of twenty thousand members of
the ILWU. Approximately two thousand dock workers refused to
load military cargo for the Korean War. More than 80 percent of
all ILWU members employed by sugar and pineapple corpora-
tions also joined the strike.
The strike lasted only a few days, but it provided statehood
opponents with additional evidence of communist influence in
the islands. The kamaaina haole elite had not yet accommo-
dated itself to the industrial and political forces that were re-
distributing power, and to a lesser extent wealth, in the once-
stable island community. For many members of this group, dis-
ruption, instability, and uncertainty were obviously the result
of the un-American and conspiratorial activities of subversive
communist elements. The “Hawaii seven” had their convictions
under the Smith Act overturned by an appeals court five years
later. Nevertheless, in the meantime the convictions provided
apparently tangible evidence that the ILWU was controlled by
communist subversives. Moreover during the trial of the
“Hawaii seven,” local Democratic party leaders appeared as
character witnesses for Hall and several other defendants.
Mayor Wilson and the Democrats’ 1952 candidate for delegate
to Congress, Delbert Metzger, were among those citizens pre-
pared to defend Hall’s honesty and loyalty. 54 Statehood oppo-
nents, and conservative Republicans, immediately seized upon
this as additional evidence that Communists and communist
sympathizers dominated the local Democratic party. The action
of Wilson and Metzger was a small victory for principle over
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cynical politics, but both men were nonetheless attacked ve-
hemently for their personal and ideological loyalties. Burns
claimed that he offered to testify on behalf of his friend Hall,
who he described privately as “one helluva American,” but be-
cause this action might have meant political suicide for the as-
piring Democratic county chairman, Hall rejected the offer. “He
didn’t wanta throw me to the wolves,” Burns commented. Those
who did testify for members of the “Hawaii seven,” Burns later
observed, were subsequently closed out of important positions
in local politics. 55
Hawaii’s Republican-controlled legislature and the strongly
anti-labor Star-Bulletin and Advertiser waged a bitter propa-
ganda war on unions and liberal Democrats. On July 7, 1953, for
example, the Hawaii Territorial Commission on Subversive Ac-
tivities published a three-hundred-page report which concluded
that though the Communist party had been forced underground,
it remained a “dangerous influence in the islands.” It predicted
that, “continuing Communist control of the I.L.W.U…. will en-
danger the national security of the United States in the event
of war between this country and the Soviet Union.” 56 During
the early 1950s Farrington’s Star-Bulletin and the conservative,
pro-Republican Advertiser both launched frequent attacks on
communist and leftist elements in the ILWU and the Democratic
party. 57 Farrington, for example, called for the resignation of
Judge Metzger from the Statehood Commission, presumably
because Metzger had reduced the bail imposed originally on
the seven persons convicted under the Smith Act, given a fa-
vorable character reference for Hall, and publicly denounced
the “suppressive measures” adopted by Congress to prosecute
alleged Communists. Governor King endorsed Farrington’s re-
quest, charging that with respect to communism, Metzger did
“not appear to acknowledge or appreciate the conspiratorial
nature of the forces that are at work against our country.” Far-
rington warned Hawaii’s people that tolerance of communism
in the islands was a threat to Hawaii’s statehood prospects. 58
Yet such exaggerated warnings merely served to exacerbate the
negative influence of this issue on statehood. For anti-labor ex-
tremists, like the predominantly white and wealthy members of
the anti-communist organization Imua, Farrington’s statements
were a welcome implicit vindication of their McCarthyist activ-
ities. The fact that Imua’s principal backers were also opposed
to statehood was widely recognized in Honolulu. When local Re-
publicans sought to exploit the communist issue they perhaps
unwittingly gave credence to the allegations of the small but
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vigorous anti-statehood faction centered on Imua. 59 Statehood
opponents in Congress also exploited the statements of local
Republicans and Honolulu’s major newspapers. Eastland and
Smathers, for example, quoted these sources at length in the
Senate debates. 60
Despite these developments, the negative impact of the
communist issue should not be exaggerated. It was, as the San
Francisco Examiner remarked, at most “a convenient argument
for stalling off a decision on the statehood question.” 61 If the
communist issue hadn’t existed, it would have been invented.
Indeed, in large measure it was a fabrication of statehood op-
ponents and those anxious to retain the political and economic
status quo in Hawaii. For this group any threat to the estab-
lished order from organized labor, the Democratic party, or
local Japanese was a consequence of communist influence and
un-American sympathies. As McCarthyism was discredited na-
tionally and the Korean War wound down to a stalemate, the
appeal of hysterical anti-communism receded both in Hawaii
and on the mainland. After 1953 statehood opponents were
obliged to prop up their arguments with issues more sub-
stantive than simple anti-communism. But as is obvious
throughout this study, changes in the argument over Hawaii
did not really affect its fortunes in Congress. This was demon-
strated starkly by events in 1954.
“The political complexions of the two Territories and of the
present Congress,” Senator Anderson observed, “make it vir-
tually impossible to push Hawaii statehood through in 1954
unless Alaska is granted the same status.” 62 This prediction
gained even greater weight when in his state of the Union
message on January 7, 1954, Eisenhower endorsed only Hawaii
and ignored Alaska. 63 Republican partisanship had alienated
moderate Democrats during 1953 and was likely to have the
same effect during 1954. Yet it was not the only major barrier
to Hawaii. “It might be necessary to talk for days,” Eastland
stated, “and this the South must do” to defeat all statehood
legislation. 64 Eastland had emerged as the unofficial leader of
Southern tactics and debate against both territories. However,
no Southern-led filibuster was actually required. Procedural ma-
neuvers were sufficient to keep the separate Hawaii bill from
the floor of the Senate during 1954.
Southern Democrats failed to stop the Senate Insular Affairs
Committee from endorsing Hawaii early in 1954. 65 But on
January 19 the committee again voted eight to seven to combine
the Hawaii and Alaska bills. Republicans confidently expected
Last Among Equals
237
to report Hawaii separately. While one conservative GOP
member, George N. Malone (Nev.) was expected to defect, at
least one Democrat, Russell B. Long (La.) was induced to vote
with the Republicans. Long’s sudden willingness to desert his
Southern friends resulted from some fairly public and unsubtle
horse trading with GOP leaders over the offshore oil bill during
1953. Louisiana gained concessions from this legislation, and
as the quid pro quo, Long agreed to support the Republicans’
partisan strategy on Hawaii. However, Henry C. Dworshak, a
Republican committeeman from Idaho, unexpectedly deserted
the GOP and voted with committee Democrats. Dworshak gen-
uinely wanted to ensure that the Senate had the option to
vote on either Hawaii or Alaska separately, or both at once.
However, his action gave the Democrats a one-vote majority in
committee and resulted in the Hawaii and Alaska bills being
joined. Some liberal Democrats again supported this move be-
cause they believed it would force the Eisenhower adminis-
tration to change its position on Alaska. Southern Democrats,
however, supported this tactic because they believed it would
defeat both territories. Like the New York Times, all members
were aware “that substantial opposition to each proposal, while
not strong enough to defeat either separately, would be more
than enough in combination” to defeat a one-package bill. 66
The Senate committee’s decision forced Eisenhower’s hand.
The administration now assured Democrats that if Hawaii was
reported separately Alaska would be debated in the Senate not
later than thirty days after debate ended on Hawaii. Committee
Chairman Butler, who had conveniently changed his opinion
about Hawaii, also had second thoughts on Alaska. He now
supported immediate statehood for the northern territory, pro-
vided it was admitted after Hawaii. Butler’s quick conversion on
Alaska, like that of the GOP generally, was widely interpreted
as yet another exercise in cheap politics. Even if both statehood
bills passed both chambers of Congress in 1954, only Hawaii
could vote in the national elections of that year. In contrast to
Hawaii, Alaska had not yet drafted or adopted its “state” consti-
tution. Thus Alaska could not be admitted in time for its citizens
to vote in the November elections. 67
Despite such complications the Senate committee (or at
least Dworshak) was induced to reconsider its position. On
January 27, in response to a motion by Dworshak, it voted eight
to seven to report separate statehood bills. Hawaii was then re-
ported by a decisive twelve votes to three. Smathers conceded
that Hawaii’s prospects in the Senate were excellent. Seven
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days after the Hawaii bill was reported, the Senate committee,
by fourteen votes to one, also reported Alaska to the Senate
floor. 68
On March 4, 1954, the Senate began its first debate ever
on a separate Hawaii statehood bill. Republican leaders again
claimed that Alaska would be debated immediately after
Hawaii. But Senate Democrats and a few anti-statehood Repub-
licans united against this tactic. Smathers successfully lobbied
these factions, gaining strong support for uniting the two bills.
69 Southern Democrats were now in an unassailable position
within their own party. Many of these conservatives had stood
by passively as McCarthyite Republicans had assaulted and
undermined the Truman administration. Few were anxious to
defend their nominal national leader, the liberal Adlai
Stevenson. “The South has the bit in its teeth,” Stevenson com-
plained after the 1952 elections, “and will bite the harder if
it has anything to bite.” 70 Southerners were perhaps more
pragmatic than previously, as the appointment of the relatively
young Lyndon Johnson as minority Senate leader testified. But
they remained united on such fundamental questions as race
and states’ rights, and essentially unperturbed by the passivity
and conservatism of the Eisenhower administration. Under-
standably, this ascendent faction of the Democratic party was
not going to support initiatives which might erode its newfound
strength in Congress.
At their first party conference in 1954 only two Democrats
indicated support for a separate Hawaii bill. Johnson spoke
for most of his party when he stated that the two statehood
bills must be combined in order to negate Republican parti-
sanship. This charge against the GOP was easy to substantiate
as the Republican-controlled House Rules Committee refused
to report Alaska in any form throughout 1953–1954. More-
over Johnson stated that in the unlikely event of separate bills
passing both the House and Senate, Eisenhower could veto the
Alaska bill while accepting Hawaii. 71 It is worth repeating that
while some Democrats wanted the statehood bills combined so
that both territories would be admitted, others wanted a com-
bined bill because they believed it would never pass the Senate.
Against this background, Anderson moved that the Senate
amend the Hawaii bill and provide for the simultaneous ad-
mission of Alaska. On March 11, 1954, the Senate passed An-
derson’s motion by a narrow margin of forty-six votes to forty-
three. Only five senators failed to vote with the majority of their
respective parties on the motion. Support for combining the
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bills came from forty-two Democrats, three Republicans, and
the independent senator Wayne Morse (Oreg.). Forty-one Re-
publicans and two Democrats voted negatively. GOP leaders ap-
pealed for party unity, but three Republicans crossed the floor.
Only two senators (Long and Spessard L. Holland) deserted the
Democratic ranks to support a separate Hawaii bill. 72 As was
predicted, support for the Anderson amendment came from an
incongruous alliance of those adamantly opposed to statehood
and those strongly in favor of it. 73 The vote was roundly judged
to be the Eisenhower administration’s first serious setback in
1954. 74 Certainly the Democrats had achieved on the Senate
floor what they had narrowly failed to establish in committee.
They had united to combine the statehood bills, but they re-
mained deeply divided over the ultimate fate of either territory.
The combined bill was debated intermittently in the Senate
for almost three weeks in March 1954 while Southern De-
mocrats predictably threatened to wage a filibuster against it.
Eastland stated on March 16, after speaking for four hours
against the measure, that he had barely reached the “preface”
of his remarks. He suggested he would take three or four days
to complete his statement. 75 Before a Senate attended by only
a few senators, Eastland, Stennis, Smathers, and Price Daniel
(Dem., Tex.) spoke exhaustively against any expansion of the
Union, and supported the granting of Commonwealth status to
both Hawaii and Alaska. “Whether a filibuster or not,” the Star-
Bulletin commented, “the ‘long talk’ on statehood is obviously a
device to kill the bill.” 76
However, it was unnecessary to sustain a protracted fili-
buster. Opponents did not stop the Senate from voting on a
combined bill because they knew it would not pass the House.
Before this vote was taken, however, opponents made a last-
ditch effort to grant the territories a status similar to that
recently given Puerto Rico. A Commonwealth amendment sup-
ported largely by Southerners hostile to Hawaii was defeated by
sixty votes to twenty-four on April 1, 1954. Opponents also of-
fered an amendment which provided for a plebiscite in each ter-
ritory on the question of Commonwealth status. However this
was rejected by fifty-nine votes to twenty-six. 77
Finally, on April 1, 1954, the Senate passed the Hawaii-
Alaska bill. The margin of victory was decisive—fifty-seven votes
to twenty-eight. Thirty-three Republicans, twenty-three De-
mocrats, and Morse voted affirmatively. Nineteen Democrats
and nine Republicans voted negatively. Only three Southern
Democrats did not oppose the bill. 78 This Senate vote, like
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previous House votes on the separate Hawaii bill, reflected a
liberal-conservative division. It also suggested that, when iso-
lated from partisan politics, Hawaii enjoyed majority bipartisan
support in the Senate as well as in the House.
However, the anti-statehood faction permitted this Senate
action only because it was convinced the House would not pass
the combined bill in 1954. William Fulbright (Dem., Ark.) ac-
knowledged shortly before the debate ended: “We are told def-
initely that the House will never pass a bill granting statehood
to Alaska.” Indeed it appears the Republican leadership assured
anti-statehood senators that the combined bill would not be
brought to the House floor before the Eighty-third Congress ad-
journed. 79 A filibuster was thus unnecessary.
Three alternative legislative procedures were available to
ensure that the House considered the combined legislation: it
could have been brought to the floor of the House by a unan-
imous consent motion; it could have been placed before the
House Rules Committee and debated by the House following
the granting of a favorable rule by this committee; or a con-
ference of interested senior members of both chambers could
have been appointed to resolve the differences between the
House and Senate versions of the statehood legislation. In the
case of this third alternative both the House and Senate had
to approve the legislation as reported from such a conference
before it could be forwarded to the president for approval or re-
jection. Without substantial support from members of the ma-
jority party in Congress or endorsement by the administration,
none of these procedures had a reasonable chance of success.
Conscious of this, and aware of Eisenhower’s hostility to Alaska,
the anti-statehood faction was understandably confident that a
combined bill would never become law. Few observers were sur-
prised when the House Rules Committee refused to report the
bill. Neither the president nor House Majority Leader Joseph
Martin (Mass.) attempted to lever the bill out of the Rules Com-
mittee. 80
Nevertheless, individual supporters attempted to bring the
Hawaii-Alaska bill to the House floor during April 1954 by ini-
tiating a petition against the Rules Committee. Democrats sup-
plied half of the 218 signatures necessary to pass the petition.
But pressure from the Eisenhower administration promptly col-
lapsed Republican support for this tactic. 81
Supporters also made a unanimous consent motion to es-
tablish a conference of House and Senate members to resolve
differences in the statehood bills. An objection by Democrat
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House Leader Rayburn killed this motion. They then introduced
a resolution requesting a ruling from the House Rules Com-
mittee to send the combined bill to a joint House-Senate con-
ference. Opposition from the Republican administration defeat-
ed this move. The Republican-controlled Rules Committee re-
fused to authorize a joint conference, and on July 26, 1954, after
prolonged debate, the committee voted to end consideration of
the resolution. 82
During the summer of 1954 leading Republicans, including
Vice President Nixon, indicated publicly that the administration
was making a sincere attempt to disengage Hawaii from the
combined bill. The separate bill was then to be resubmitted to
the Senate. In addition, Knowland promised that, if necessary,
he would see to it that both statehood bills would be separately
scheduled in the Senate. 83 These GOP claims were viewed as
cynical and insincere on Capitol Hill. Indeed, the Wash ington
Star commented as early as May 1954: “House Republican lead-
ers predicted freely, but privately, that Congress will adjourn
without acting on bills proposing statehood for either or both of
the territories.” 84
Hawaii’s Republicans were severely embarrassed by these
futile developments in Washington. They were also alarmed that
GOP indecision might rebound against the party in local elec-
tions. As the communist issue receded during 1954, island De-
mocrats, especially Burns, worked increasingly to wrest power
from the old order. The statehood issue, long considered an
electoral advantage to Farrington’s party, was fast becoming
a liability. Without decisive action by the Eisenhower adminis-
tration, local Republicans could not hope to stem the growing
Democratic tide in the islands. King and Farrington thus at-
tempted a series of initiatives aimed at breaking the deadlock
in Congress. In April the governor convened a special session
of the territorial legislature. It allocated a further forty-five
thousand dollars to send a fifty-four member delegation to
Washington. The Rules Committee as well as Republicans who
had not signed Saylor’s discharge petition were the main tar-
gets of the visitors (whom disillusioned locals viewed as junke-
teers rather than lobbyists). The hasty decision to send a very
large delegation to Washington was roundly criticized as an un-
necessary and extravagant duplication of the ongoing activities
of the Statehood Commission. It was also viewed as a partisan
GOP attempt to compensate for the failings of fellow Repub-
licans on Capitol Hill. For five days during May the Republican-
dominated delegation conducted what Farrington’s Star-Bul-
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letin exaggeratedly described as “a mass attack on the
statehood blockade” in Washington. Both Eisenhower and Nixon
met members of the delegation. But the assault was firmly re-
buffed when Eisenhower admitted he was anxious to admit only
Hawaii. The activities of the visitors from Hawaii did not break
down GOP hostility to joint action on both territories. The vig-
orous, but by now routine, lobbying efforts of Tavares, Jabulka,
and Farrington also failed dismally. 85
These abortive initiatives served only to expose the irrel-
evance of the expensive statehood campaign. The organized
public drive for admission was a necessary initial factor en-
couraging action by the House. Still, publicity and pleading
by Hawaii were insignificant when weighed against the per-
suasive power of entrenched sectional and political interests in
the nation’s capital.
If Hawaii’s Republicans were disturbed by the likely elec-
toral ramifications of the obstructionist behavior adopted by the
Eisenhower administration during 1954, Republicans in Alaska
were totally demoralized by it. In the eighteen months which
elapsed from the elections of 1952 to the primary elections of
April 1954, support for the GOP in Alaska fell sharply from a
record high of 55 percent to less than 25 percent. Confronted
with firm evidence that Eisenhower would not accept Alaska,
but denied a “forthright explanation” of his position, Alaskans
quickly reaffirmed their traditional ties with the Democratic
party. The consequences of these developments were obvious. A
White House aide advised Eisenhower late in 1954: “The rank
and file of Alaskans believe they are being denied statehood ar-
bitrarily…. Largely because of this state of mind, the Alaskan
Republican Party faces an unmerciful beating in the Territorial
elections.” 86 He might have added that, because of the rela-
tionship between the two statehood bills, the fortunes of the
GOP in Hawaii would also be damaged by the behavior of the
administration during 1954.
Hawaii’s campaign for statehood, and the local Republican
party, received a critical blow with the sudden death of Delegate
Farrington in June 1954. Known affectionately as “Statehood
Joe,” Farrington had worked tirelessly to galvanize local support
and encourage action by Congress. He served as the territory’s
nonvoting delegate in Washington for twelve years, and helped
transform the campaign after the setbacks that came with Pearl
Harbor and martial law into an active, organized, and broadly
based movement. Through his newspaper, the influential Hon-
olulu Star-Bulletin, and with the close assistance of its editor,
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Riley Allen, Farrington dominated the statehood drive and gave
his party popular and effective leadership. In contrast to the
very conservative political complexion of most local Repub-
licans, Farrington was a moderate, flexible politician. While he
was prepared to exploit the communist issue in the early 1950s,
he also had some friends within the ranks of labor. If he received
less electoral support from local Japanese than from whites,
Chinese, and Hawaiians, this was primarily a reflection of exist-
ing economic, ethnic, and political divisions in the island com-
munity. It did not result from a conscious attempt to exploit race
for selfish political ends. Farrington’s popularity transcended
the racial, economic, and social cleavages which still charac-
terized Hawaii, and helped to delay the triumph of the fast-
growing Democratic party. The margins of victory which he
gained from the local electorate gradually declined after World
War II, but Farrington’s electoral appeal was more enduring and
resilient than that of his party generally. “The people of Hawaii
have shown over and over again that they have a rare affection
for Joe Farrington and place him distinctly above any sectional,
economic or racial interest,” a local Democrat had written pri-
vately in 1951 when he asked Truman to appoint Farrington
governor. 87 In 1954 few Hawaiians, including Farrington’s po-
litical rivals, would have dissented from this assessment.
A few Democrats, notably some of Japanese descent who
were long suspicious of the powerful Republican faction that
backed Farrington, later charged that he was prepared only
to work for eventual statehood, not immediate admission. As
indicated in chapter 5, this accusation first surfaced during
1947–1948 while the young Democrats searched desperately for
a flaw in Farrington’s political armor. Decades later some De-
mocrats, notably Aoki, continued to claim that this assessment
was shared by many congressmen and journalists working in
Washington and applied equally to his wife, Elizabeth, who suc-
ceeded him as delegate to Congress. “Publicly the Farringtons
were for statehood. It was their major political issue. But pri-
vately they were always against it,” Aoki charged. Other die-
hard supporters of Burns have made similar claims, assuming
always that Farrington was little more than a puppet of the
old guard Republicans and kamaaina haoles. “Make no mistake
about this business of statehood for Hawaii. The Republicans
never did want it,” Samuel Crowningburg-Amalu has written in
his glowing tribute to Burns.
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The big business interests in the Islands, the same who governed
and ruled the Republicans, had never wanted statehood. They
feared statehood, knowing full well that their own powers would
be diminished with its coming. Their representatives in Wash-
ington, the Republican Delegates to Congress, of course mouthed
pious declarations for statehood. But in private they deplored
the whole idea. Under a territorial status, the Republicans were
secure. With statehood, they were threatened. 88
This claim served the Democrats well in the political arena, but
it was as inaccurate as it was partisan. Conveniently, it assumed
that in the 1950s the old guard still dominated every facet of
the Republican party, and mistakenly lumped all sugar interests,
major business interests, and most Republicans into a solidly
anti-statehood bloc. Some Democrats apparently believed the
Farringtons were willing participants in a conspiracy hatched
on Merchant Street to avert statehood. They failed to appreciate
that politics after 1945 were far more open, flexible, and unpre-
dictable than at any time since the early 1900s.
As Elizabeth Farrington has correctly pointed out, although
her husband had been drafted into politics in 1933 by “ka-
maaina sugar types” (notably Clarence Cooke, president of the
Bank of Hawaii), he had from the early 1940s distanced himself
considerably from this once-dominant faction. During the war
he supported the challenge to military government, and during
1946–1952 he cultivated friends within the ILWU and the
Japanese community. Mrs. Farrington doubtless exaggerated
when she claimed his unflagging sympathy with the unions,
but as early as the elections of 1946 he accepted ILWU en-
dorsement, a decision which led to accusations from within the
GOP that he was “a communist and everything else.” “He hap-
pened to be a Republican,” Mrs. Farrington stated, “but he
wasn’t a dyed-in-the-wool party man.” It was this very indepen-
dence, along with shrewd advice from the editor of his Star-
Bulletin, Allen, which helped keep his political base secure.
At the same time it permitted him to work energetically for
statehood—both in Washington and Honolulu—irrespective of
the wishes of some conservative members of his party. Through
his work as delegate and with the influential Star-Bulletin
backing his every political move, Farrington made opposition to
statehood a heresy in the islands. He “used the paper the whole
time for statehood,” Elizabeth Farrington recalled, and there is
considerable justification for her claim: “If it hadn’t been for Joe
Farrington and that paper we wouldn’t have statehood today.”
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No convincing evidence exists in the private or public record
to support the allegation that the Farringtons, presumably with
very skilled duplicity, paid only lip service to statehood. Indeed
the private correspondence of the Farringtons with party offi-
cials, colleagues, and friends, especially Allen, suggests genuine
dedication to the statehood cause. Even Joe Farrington’s old po-
litical foe Burns has conceded that there was no doubt that he
“was really sincere in regard to statehood.” 89
This is not to imply, however, that Farrington always had
unqualified support on statehood from all factions of the local
Republican party. Nor does it necessarily follow that, as Paul
Pratte has attempted to argue, Farrington was “as effective as
[he] could be in a Congress with shifting political coalitions.”
Some contemporaries rightly criticized his unwillingness to
promote statehood legislation by back room deals, and re-
gretted his reluctance to foster close working relations with
prominent leaders from both sides of the House and Senate.
90 Accustomed to a much gentler tradition of essentially one-
party political life during the period of uninterrupted Repub-
lican control in the islands, Farrington undoubtedly underes-
timated the need for tough bargaining and active lobbying in
Washington.
In many ways Farrington’s death symbolized the end of Re-
publican ascendancy in the islands. Although his widow was
narrowly elected to replace him as delegate, during 1952–1956
the Republican party was pushed aside by a confident, disci-
plined Democratic party. Farrington’s untimely death perhaps
removed a major obstacle to a Democratic victory at the polls;
but the shift to the Democrats was inexorable. It grew out of
broad demographic and social changes which gave unprece-
dented strength to Hawaii’s AJAs and to a lesser extent other
Asian immigrants. The tide of change long feared by many
whites could not be halted, and after 1954 it transformed
Hawaiian politics.
No one in the islands was more acutely aware of the di-
rection of political change than Farrington’s widow and suc-
cessor as delegate in Washington. In the final months of 1954
Elizabeth Farrington tried desperately to convince Eisenhower
that he must take stronger action on statehood. Fearing an
electoral backlash against local Republicans because of Eisen-
hower’s apparent insincerity over Democratic Alaska, she
warned privately that the administration’s pledge on both ter-
ritories must be “redeemed” and its “promises maintained.”
Elizabeth Farrington criticized the fact that although the GOP
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platform pledged statehood for both territories, presidential
pronouncements largely applied to Hawaii alone. Finally, she
argued that self-interest dictated that Eisenhower act deci-
sively. “If the Administration is desirous of having added
strength in both the Senate and the House in the 84th Con-
gress,” she emphasized, “it is imperative to get the Hawaii bill
through now.” This appeal, like those made throughout 1954
by members of the Statehood Commission, fell on deaf ears.
Thus, Elizabeth Farrington wrote the White House confiden-
tially two weeks later that she wished to meet personally with
Eisenhower. “I urgently need this interview for my November
campaign,” she stated realistically. However, the ensuing cam-
paign photograph of Elizabeth Farrington with the president
was small consolation to those island Republicans who feared
they might lose office because the Eisenhower administration
had apparently permitted narrow party considerations to com-
promise its approach to statehood. 91
EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, 1955–1956
The results of the territorial elections in November 1954 had
a decisive impact on every aspect of the statehood issue. The
Democrats won power in the islands for the first time. Their
margin of victory was surprisingly wide. In the House they
controlled twenty-two of the thirty seats; in the Senate they
won nine of the fifteen positions. In the contest for delegate
to Congress, Elizabeth Farrington defeated Burns. “It didn’t
occur to me that I wouldn’t win,” Mrs. Farrington recalled. “We
didn’t have any particular strategy…. We just went out like we’d
always done.” The election results quickly shattered such com-
placency however. Elizabeth Farrington’s win reflected sym-
pathy and respect for the work of her late husband rather than
solid majority support for the GOP. Mrs. Farrington also ex-
ploited the communist issue to some effect, arguing as the cam-
paign gained pre-election momentum, “This is no time to send
to Washington anyone about whom there is any suspicion of tol-
eration or sympathy for un-American elements.” Nonetheless,
her margin of victory was by no means comfortable—960 votes
out of a total of more than 142,000. Although Burns didn’t
demand a recount, he later implied that the hand-counted votes
might have been tampered with. “Somebody lost a helluva lot of
votes,” he wryly commented. Irrespective of the accuracy of this
charge (and there were many islanders who still saw the hand
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of the hegemony in such events), Burns was obliged to wait
another two years for his long-sought triumph. But his party
had finally won undisputed control of the islands’ legislature.
92 In the euphoria which followed the Democrats’ victory there
were perhaps few who paused to wonder how the appointed
Republican governor might react. The electoral win could only
be translated into concrete policies if King consented and did
not exercise his veto power. Nonetheless, Burns was justified
in observing later that 1954 was a watershed: “the Republican
Party was losing its toehold, foothold, handhold, whatever kind
of hold you want…. necklock or stranglehold.” No longer was
Hawaii, in effect, a one-party state. 93
The Democrats won office primarily by appealing to, and
working closely with, the non-Caucasian majority in the islands.
The foundations for this success had been laid patiently and
deliberately by Burns and his followers. In later years some
members of the Burns faction overstated their impact on the
rising fortunes of their party. The mid-1950s were a triumph for
Burns supporters, but immediately after the war ended, island
Democrats had won firm control of Honolulu’s Board of Super-
visors, and the popular liberal Democrat Wilson was elected
mayor. At the same time, the Democrats displaced the GOP
on Maui and won half the seats in the territory’s lower house.
These victories foreshadowed and assisted the later success of
younger Democrats. Nonetheless, by 1954 even the most opti-
mistic Democrats were surprised that the landslide victory had
come so soon. Under the shrewd guidance of their energetic
and tough party chairman, the Democrats consciously and very
effectively exploited Hawaii’s peculiar ethnic and class struc-
tures. They gradually widened their electoral base by main-
taining the support of labor groups while appealing also to the
expanding, largely non-Caucasian middle class. Candidates and
party members were recruited from the newly visible and in-
creasingly articulate and educated nonwhite groups, especially
the Japanese. Statehood proponents and local observers had
adamantly maintained that Hawaii’s people did not engage in
bloc voting. But November 1954 confirmed what the younger
Democrats had always suspected: ethnicity was a central factor
in political preference. (Obviously, the Republican party had
also long understood this fact. Certainly Hawaii’s white commu-
nity had seldom endorsed, or voted for, candidates who were
not Caucasians.) Race might not have been an overt factor in
this campaign, but it underlay the broad political realignment
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reflected in the 1954 returns. The Democratic ticket was self-
consciously nonhaole: “Maybe ninety per cent” of its candidates
were of “Oriental ancestry or Pacific ancestry,” Burns noted. 94
The Democratic victory did not suggest that the ethnic
makeup of the islands had changed dramatically. Rather, it in-
dicated what younger Democrats and labor union organizers
had long believed and encouraged—that the Japanese majority
and other nonwhite groups were now able and willing to vote
for candidates with similar ethnic backgrounds. These groups,
especially the Japanese, were also confident that the election
of a majority of non-Caucasians to the legislature would not
precipitate a bitter white backlash. Those who realistically ex-
pected resentment were determined to confront it head-on,
and to expose it as undemocratic and racist. If Hawaii was to
justify its assertions that it was democratic and tolerant, then
clearly its legislature should represent all significant segments
of the island community. In the early 1950s Caucasians still
comprised less than 30 percent of Hawaii’s people. Citizens
of Japanese origin were still the largest ethnic group in the
community. Prior to the 1954 elections Caucasians had always
constituted a majority in each chamber of the territorial legis-
lature. During 1955–1956, however, twenty-two members of the
forty-five-member House of Representatives were of Japanese
extraction. Moreover, for the first time, representatives of
Korean and Filipino ancestry were elected. Hawaii was on the
threshold of genuine representative gov-
ernment—representative, that is, of all ethnic and social groups.
95
Hawaii’s decision to elect a predominantly non-Caucasian,
Democratic legislature disturbed many mainlanders. It precip-
itated a vigorous revival of opposition to statehood based ex-
plicitly on racial fears, and further complicated the influence
of partisan politics on action by Congress. The ethnic as well
as the political complexion of Hawaii’s prospective members
of Congress were matters of vital concern to many members
on Capitol Hill. A. L. Miller, a former Republican chairman
of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and a
leading statehood advocate during the early 1950s stated that
he was no longer as positively in favor of statehood, partly be-
cause Hawaii would not send any Caucasians to Congress. Like
many Republicans, however, Miller was also disturbed by the
sweeping Democratic victory in the islands in November 1954.
Other opponents interpreted the election results as proof of
the controlling strength of the Japanese vote and racial bloc
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voting. Southerners like James Davis (Dem., Ga.) and O. C.
Fisher (Dem., Tex.) used the returns to validate their argument
that Hawaii’s Asians were not yet adequately assimilated to
permit statehood. Others, like Smathers, interpreted the
election results as further evidence of the “rising tide of Asiatic
Communism.” Presumably this new tide was related to gains
won recently by Communists in China and North Korea. Cer-
tainly Smathers’ wild assertions were designed to link and ex-
ploit both racial and ideological insecurities. Pillion was also
publicly convinced that the 1954 election was “a complete
victory for the I.L.W.U. and the Communist Party.” “Statehood
should be rejected now and deferred for an appropriate time
when communism no longer threatens the well-being of either
Hawaii or the United States,” he concluded. 96
The national election returns also had an important bearing
on statehood. The Democrats regained control of both the
House and Senate. But their victory was by no means decisive.
In the Senate, forty-eight Democrats confronted forty-seven Re-
publicans and one independent, Morse. In the House, the De-
mocrats had a fairly small thirty-one-seat advantage. The Eisen-
hower administration was now confronted with a Democratic
Congress, but the Democrats’ strength was concentrated
largely in the conservative South. These developments did not
augur well for Hawaii.
Eisenhower’s explicit position on statehood early in 1955
was not appreciably different from that to which he had clung
during the previous year. In his state of the Union message in
January 1955 he observed that although there was no defen-
sible reason for delaying Hawaiian statehood, the admission of
Alaska should await resolution of Alaska’s “complex problems.”
97 Yet during the next two years the Republican administration
was reluctant to promote either territory, as the voting trend
manifest in 1954 indicated that Hawaii would elect one, possibly
two Democrats to the Senate. Most observers correctly inter-
preted this as a permanent and essentially irreversible tendency
rather than a temporary setback for the GOP. At the same time,
events in Alaska confirmed it as a Democratic stronghold.
The political implications of these developments were ob-
vious, especially to the conservative faction in Congress. “Based
on the 1954 election returns,” Pillion informed a House inves-
tigating committee in February 1955, “it appears that, in the
event of statehood, Alaska would surely elect 2 Democratic Sen-
ators and Hawaii would be likely to elect 2 Democratic Sen-
ators.” Cognizant of the delicate balance of power in Congress,
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and aware that since the New Deal the Republicans had become
the normal minority party, the Eisenhower administration was
unlikely to make a bad situation worse by adding four new
liberal Democrats to the Senate. Pillion succinctly assessed the
dilemma confronting the GOP during the Eighty-fourth Con-
gress.
It is most obvious that the passage of the joint Hawaiian-Alaskan
statehood bill by the Congress would place the Republican Party
in a difficult position. The President would be placed in a political
dilemma. By approving statehood for both territories, he would
risk the probability that these two territories would return 4 De-
mocratic Senators. If he vetoes statehood, he assumes the po-
litical onus of defeating a measure of popular favor. 98
But if the statehood question was now politically embarrassing
for the GOP, it was equally a problem for the divided Democratic
party.
During 1955–1956 Southern Democrats held most key po-
sitions in the Senate and House. Johnson, the Senate majority
leader, was personally opposed to admitting either territory.
His quick rise to power was based on Southern support, and
the ambitious young Texan was not anxious to compromise
his political future by alienating Southern friends—especially
when they so strongly overshadowed liberal Democrats in the
Senate. Moreover, Rayburn, the Speaker of the House, was also
a Texan and an opponent of statehood. Equally important, the
reactionary Southerner Smith remained chairman of the House
Rules Committee. Not only was Smith an implacable opponent
of statehood, he was also the unofficial leader of the anti-civil
rights faction in the House. As these three men largely deter-
mined what legislation Congress would consider, the prospects
of favorable action on Hawaii were indeed slight.
The tactics adopted by both national parties on statehood
were not altered by the results of November 1954. Democrats
attempted to combine the two bills; Republicans would only
endorse Hawaii. However GOP opposition to Alaska was now
more explicit and detailed. Alaska’s vast size, small population,
and economic instability were still cited as basic reasons for
denying it statehood. Eisenhower and the Pentagon now also
asserted that statehood would seriously damage national de-
fense arrangements. As a territory, 90 percent of Alaska’s land
was reserved for exclusive federal jurisdiction. Cold war ten-
sions apparently convinced some officials in the Department of
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Defense that control of this vast close neighbor of the Soviet
Union should not be relinquished to an elected government. In
part this argument was a transparent attempt to justify Repub-
lican partisanship. Still, it appealed to a considerable number of
military personnel, conservative congressmen, and a collection
of fervent anti-communists. 99 Surprisingly, the Pentagon’s
guarded position was not shared by the State Department. In
1954 it asserted that statehood for Alaska “would support
American foreign policy and strengthen the position of the
United States in international relations.” Certainly it would add
consistency to America’s espoused anti-colonialism. 100
If the State Department was anxious that America should no
longer be viewed as a colonial or semi-colonial power, Eisen-
hower apparently was not. He threatened to veto a combined
bill unless substantial areas of Alaska were excluded from the
jurisdiction of the proposed state government. Reluctantly,
statehood proponents agreed to compromise. They accepted an
amendment to the Alaska bill which permitted the federal gov-
ernment to retain exclusive control over 40 percent of the pro-
posed state. However, this concession failed to placate either
Eisenhower or the Pentagon. In March 1955 the president
shocked the more naive supporters of both territories when he
informed the House committee: “I am in doubt that any form of
legislation can wholly remove my apprehensions about granting
statehood immediately.” 101 Those observers who appreciated
the realities of partisan politics could hardly have found this an
unexpected warning.
Nonetheless, the House Insular Affairs Committee approved
a combined bill on March 13 by a vote of nineteen to six. 102 The
minority recommended that statehood “be deferred pending
an appropriate constitutional amendment to provide for repre-
sentation in the U.S. Senate on a basis proportionate to pop-
ulation.” In the interim, it suggested both territories be given
the right to elect their own governors. 103 The 1955–1956 Rules
Committee began protracted, hotly contested hearings on the
combined bill three days later. The majority of the committee
was comprised of Democrats who had previously opposed
Hawaii and Republicans hostile to both territories. Thus, when
that committee finally agreed to report statehood, it did so with
a rule calculated to defeat the legislation. On April 26 it granted
a rule which was unacceptable to both Republican supporters
of Hawaii and Democrats who wanted both territories admitted.
104 It was correctly described as “a monstrosity of a rule.” 105
Proponents had requested that an “open rule” be granted which
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could permit the combined bill to be separated on the House
floor. Instead the Rules Committee gave a “closed rule” which
prohibited amendments. Although details of the vote were not
made public, Colmer later stated that the closed rule was sup-
ported by a two-to-one majority of the twelve-member com-
mittee. Presumably the eight Democrats voted to combine the
bills, while the four Republicans wanted separate bills. It was
widely anticipated that a combined bill would not pass the
House. “I support the closed rule,” Colmer stated unequivocally.
“I am unalterably opposed to the bill.” 106
The House refused to devote substantial time or energy
to the combined measure. It was considered briefly on May
9–10 and promptly recommitted to the Insular Affairs Com-
mittee, ostensibly for further investigation. This motion, spon-
sored by Hawaii’s old foe Pillion, was carried by 218 votes to
170. Both parties were divided over the motion. In contrast
to previous House votes on Hawaii only, however, the GOP of-
fered strongest support for recommittal and hence strongest
opposition to statehood. The Democrats were very evenly di-
vided—105 to 107—while the Republicans divided 113 to 63.
Significantly, more than 90 percent of all Democrat votes for
recommital came from the eleven Southern States. Georgia, Al-
abama, Mississippi, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Virginia voted solidly for recommittal. Only six represen-
tatives from the remaining four Southern states—Texas, Ten-
nessee, Florida, and Louisiana—opposed recommittal. 107 In
contrast, Northern and Western Democrats voted overwhelm-
ingly against Pillion’s motion. 108 Predictably, most Republicans
who opposed recommittal were liberal representatives of
Western states, especially California and Washington. Those
voting against recommittal sincerely wanted both territories ad-
mitted immediately and concurrently. But in 1955, as in the
previous session of Congress, opponents of one or both terri-
tories combined to avert affirmative action on either territory.
The uncompromising actions of the Rules Committee and GOP
intransigence on Alaska made defeat of the combined bill a
foregone conclusion. The House debate in 1955 was little more
than a charade. Eisenhower tried to salvage something from
these murky developments by asserting that each territory
should be “considered on its merits.” But as the New York
Times commented, during eight years of exhaustive consider-
ation “merit had always played a much less significant part than
politics.” In 1955 politics had once again prevailed. 109
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Conscious of her increasingly vulnerable electoral position,
Mrs. Farrington again appealed to Eisenhower to give public
evidence that he unequivocally supported statehood. “It is not
easy for me to go home now and explain why statehood failed,”
she dejectedly told the president. However, Eisenhower’s limp
reply was small comfort to Elizabeth Farrington and other
island Republicans. He conceded his deep disappointment with
the inconclusive events of 1955, but offered no alternative
program which might extricate statehood from the constraints
of short-term political influences. 110
No further action was taken on statehood in either chamber
during 1955 or 1956. However, members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee conducted six days of hearings “on the nature and
scope of Soviet penetration of the Hawaiian Islands.” Some
local cynics suggested that Hawaii’s pleasant climate and geog-
raphy, not a genuine concern with internal security, had drawn
these senators away from winter in Washington. But Eastland,
the chairman of the subcommittee, and other Southern De-
mocrats fully appreciated the relationship of statehood and civil
rights. For this Senate faction at least, the investigation in
Hawaii was a serious political exercise. Newspapers in Hawaii
and on the mainland merely underlined the obvious when they
claimed that the hearings were designed “to build up sentiment
in the incoming Congress against another statehood bill.” 111
Eastland’s initial trip to the islands was prompted by local
residents, especially members of Imua, who opposed statehood
and wanted to stifle social and political change in Hawaii. He
was supplied with voluminous information by this fervently anti-
communist group. Eastland stated that the primary purpose
of his trip was to determine why Hawaii’s Democratic legis-
lature had reduced the biennial appropriation for the Territorial
Subversive Activities Commission from a requested forty-seven
thousand dollars to twenty thousand dollars. A rabid segrega-
tionist, he was quite willing to intervene on behalf of reac-
tionary local whites in an attempt to undermine the credibility
and power of the newly emergent Democratic party in the ter-
ritory. Nor was Imua, which remained sympathetic to the GOP,
reluctant to use a Southern Democrat for this end. 112 Statehood
advocates protested that Eastland’s free trip to their exotic is-
lands was unrelated to the un-American activities probe, and
was instead simply an opportunity for him to collect information
with which to fight statehood in the next Congress. Not sur-
prisingly, his Senate group failed to uncover any new evidence
of internal subversion. But its report concluded that “conspira-
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torial forces” controlled the ILWU and exercised an “influence
over the Territory’s legislature and over politics in general.” 113
The fact that they could not specify the nature or scope of this
influence did not deter senators from asserting that it existed.
McCarthy’s pathetic demise had not convinced all conservative
senators that the notion of guilt by association and the use of
imprecise smear tactics should be abandoned.
If such unsavory practices continued after the mid-1950s,
they now seemed less effective than at any time since the in-
famous Dies Committee was formed in 1938. Despite Eastland’s
assertions about Soviet influence, opponents of statehood in-
creasingly found that racism was a more effective weapon than
anti-communism. If they could not demonstrate that Hawaii was
dominated by Communists, they could at least show that most
of Hawaii’s people were non-Caucasian. With the decline of Mc-
Carthyism and the emergence of a violent national struggle over
civil rights from the mid-1950s on, race again became an ex-
plicit factor in the statehood debate.
Once the combined bill had been recommitted by the House,
the Senate refused to take any action on either territory.
Johnson and the Democrats’ national chairman, Paul Butler,
directed their members not to promote any statehood legis-
lation during 1956. Some liberal Democrats implied they would
disobey this instruction, provided Eisenhower gave an as-
surance that he would not veto any combined or separate state-
hood measures. During 1956, however, the president refused to
give such an undertaking. 114 Although both Hawaii and Alaska
won large majorities in public opinion polls, statehood was not
a crucial domestic issue. Nor did it appear to be a significant
issue in the presidential or congressional elections of 1956. Civil
rights was, however, the current pivotal question in national
politics; and statehood remained an explicit civil rights issue,
as well as a vital ingredient in the liberal-conservative struggle
for supremacy in Congress, especially the Senate. Northern De-
mocrats were reluctant to promote statehood during an election
year as this would add fresh fuel to the sensitive civil rights
issue, and expose the bitter regional animosities which now
split the party more deeply than at any time since the New Deal.
Neither major party had anything to gain by resurrecting the
statehood controversy late in an election year.
The modest civil rights program outlined originally by
Truman gained substantial liberal support after World War II.
Yet it could never overcome the veto power of conservative op-
ponents in Congress. In the absence of effective action by Con-
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gress, or support for tough legislation by Eisenhower, the courts
remained the only avenue of change on civil rights. Elected offi-
cials were much less responsive to the pressure from black or-
ganizations like the NAACP, and less embarrassed by the denial
of democracy to black Americans, than was the Supreme Court.
In 1954 it moved, albeit gradually, to grant blacks legal equality
with other citizens. Although it had previously attempted to
expand the rights of black Americans and sometimes criticized
discrimination, it had not confronted the most obvious and dif-
ficult question which flowed from the practice of racial sepa-
ration and institutionalized segregation. Since Reconstruction
and the proliferation of Jim Crow laws in the South, the courts
had essentially accepted the myth that laws could be applied
equally even though blacks and whites had access to separate
facilities and institutions. In a series of celebrated rulings dur-
ing 1954, however, the Supreme Court accepted that separate
facilities were inherently unequal. In the watershed ruling on
Brown v. Board of Education it ruled unanimously and precisely:
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though
the physical facilities and other tangible factors may be equal, de-
prive the children of the minority group of equal educational op-
portunities? We believe that it does…. We conclude that in the
field of public education “separate but equal” has no place. Sep-
arate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Gradually this decision was generalized to other fields. It repre-
sented, nonetheless, an attack only on the legal underpinnings
of segregation. It could not ensure changes in social practice. In
1955 the Supreme Court ruled that existing segregation must
be ended “with all deliberate speed.” 115 But the segregated
South conveniently interpreted this as a legal sanction for grad-
ualism and ambivalence. Moreover the Eisenhower adminis-
tration did not use its executive authority to expedite change.
Segregation remained essentially intact. Just as the Fifteenth
Amendment had failed to ensure equal voting rights for blacks,
so initially the 1954 Supreme Court ruling failed to end seg-
regation and discrimination. 116 The most significant short-term
consequence of the ruling lay in the bitter, sometimes violent
resistance it precipitated among whites from segregated states.
This response had an important bearing on Hawaii’s statehood
prospects.
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It is impossible to separate Southern intransigence on
statehood from its hostile reaction to the Supreme Court’s de-
segregation decision. On the one hand this gave rise to the
so-called Southern Manifesto which asserted the intention and
rights of states to reverse the Court’s ruling. 117 It was signed
by nineteen senators and eighty-one representatives. (Signifi-
cantly, nineteen Southern senators had also voted against the
combined Hawaii-Alaska bill in 1954.) On the other hand, some
Southern states responded in extralegal and illegal ways. The
Ku Klux Klan resurfaced. Demonstrations and violence erupted
against federal attempts to open schools to black students.
Most white supremacists, however, were content to join cit-
izens’ councils, which emerged as the most effective public
form of resistance to desegregation. Southern determination
hardened when Eisenhower submitted a draft civil rights
program to Congress in 1956. His modest proposal sought the
creation of a civil rights commission, a civil rights section in
the Justice Department, and new statutes to widen the civil and
voting rights of blacks. This proposal was further diluted before
it passed the House in 1956. But, like statehood legislation, it
never reached the floor of the Senate before the Eighty-fourth
Congress adjourned. Had Southerners failed to defeat this leg-
islation in committee they would have waged a filibuster against
it on the floor of the Senate. Legislation on statehood and civil
rights suffered a similar fate because in the eyes of most South-
erners at least, the two issues were inextricably linked.
DISENCHANTMENT AT HOME
Separate Hawaii bills had passed the House three times during
1947–1954, while a combined statehood bill won Senate ap-
proval in 1954. But during 1955–1956 Congress virtually ig-
nored specific legislation on statehood. Ironically, these two
years of inactivity coincided with events in Hawaii which gave
statehood new urgency—at least for opponents of the old Re-
publican elite.
The Democrats’ victory of 1954 meant that for the first time
the composition and complexion of the territory’s legislature
closely resembled the community at large. Power in Hawaii did
not rest in this elected body however. The new Democratic ma-
jority gained office on a platform which advocated progressive
labor legislation, improved public education, land and tax re-
forms. 118 For many Republicans the loss of office symbolized the
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triumph of radical non-Caucasian elements, something which
they had successfully averted for more than half a century. But
if the Democrats now controlled the elected legislature, they did
not appoint the territory’s governor. During 1955 King vetoed
seventy-one bills approved by the territorial legislature. This
action cut the heart out of the Democrats’ wide-ranging initia-
tives. “Never during twenty conservative years of Republican
legislatures and Democratic Governors,” Daniel Tuttle, Jr., ob-
served, “had a Governor so completely demolished a legislative
program.” The New York Times conceded that King’s action
was “unprecedented.” Included in the vetoed legislation were
bills increasing property taxes, land reform measures, and pro-
gressive labor legislation aimed at amending the Workers’ Com-
pensation Act. 119 Friction between the elected legislature and
the Washington-appointed governor intensified dramatically
after 1954. But while King’s action frustrated local Democrats,
some exploited the new situation. “Actually,” Burns recalled:
“King was our good whipping boy. Because once he vetoed all
those bills in the ’55 legislature, man, we were in shape.” 120
When in 1957 the Democrats were able to marshall suffi-
cient votes to override King’s veto of their graduated tax bill,
the Eisenhower administration accepted that his behavior might
alienate more voters and further entrench the political power of
the Democrats. King was now seventy years old and had served
four years as governor. The Republican party was anxious that
he be succeeded by a person capable of using the office to
bolster their party’s flagging fortunes. He was therefore re-
placed by William Quinn, who was much younger and far more
pragmatic. In contrast to King, Quinn was a malihini haole.
He had arrived in Honolulu two years after the war, less than
ten years before his sudden elevation to governor. A self-pro-
claimed “independent Republican—of a little different stripe to
the old guard here,” Quinn had been a candidate for his party,
served as a member of the Statehood Commission, and along
with many others had journeyed to Washington to give evi-
dence on statehood. Recalling his surprise at being summoned
to Washington by Interior Secretary Fred A. Seaton and told of
Eisenhower’s decision, Quinn noted that the White House had
“taken someone who could never be elected governor and im-
posed him on the people. … the very thing I’d been preaching
against.” Nonetheless, Quinn eagerly accepted the offer. In the
intervening two years before statehood he used the position to
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put a more moderate face on the local Republican party, and in
so doing he built a substantial personal following and helped re-
suscitate his party. 121
Hawaii’s statehood campaigners were understandably frus-
trated and disillusioned by events in Washington in the decade
after World War II. Local Democrats in particular were dis-
turbed that without statehood and an elected local governor
their interests could never be confidently expressed or satisfied.
King’s elaborate use of the veto compounded this disquiet, al-
though many conservative Republicans were delighted that the
status quo could still be protected by an appointee. The senti-
ments of territorial senator Ben Dillingham, expressed before
the legislature a few years earlier, typified this opinion. “The
people of Hawaii should know that the only thing that stands
between ourselves and chaos,” he claimed, “is the position
of the governor.” By denying the will of an elected majority
King sparked new awareness—among Democrats at least—that
Hawaii remained subject to a form of colonial rule. Given the
impasse in Congress on statehood, some islanders now de-
manded that Hawaii be immediately permitted to elect its own
governor. Confident that they would win the 1956 elections,
island Democrats pressed this issue. Considerable support for
an elected governor was expressed throughout the territory.
Not all advocates of this compromise were Democrats. The con-
servative Honolulu Advertiser, for example, argued that a vig-
orous attempt to get an elected governor might revive support
for statehood. Certainly it would demonstrate that Hawaii was,
at most, a qualified democracy. There were doubtless some
who remembered the Advertiser’s previously ambivalent po-
sition on statehood and found this apparent enthusiasm for
broader democracy most surprising. Some suggested, perhaps
uncharitably, that the newspaper supported the proposal be-
cause it would simply complicate and further delay statehood.
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Predictably, most Republicans opposed the proposal for an
elected governor, arguing that it was a politically motivated
attempt to attack the GOP and to undermine the statehood
cause. King questioned the legality of the proposal. He empha-
sized that the right to elect their chief executive had never
been extended to any of the twenty-nine states which had previ-
ously been territories. Like many sincere statehood advocates,
King also argued that the proposal would imply that Hawaii
was retreating from its demand for that full equality in the
Union which could only be attained through statehood. The pro-
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posal was dismissed by the Honolulu Star-Bulletin as a gradu-
alist approach which would undermine the statehood campaign.
The paper also attempted to equate support for an elected
governor with support for what it characterized as a fruitless
Commonwealth status campaign. A majority of the Republican-
dominated Statehood Commission also opposed the proposal
because, if approved, it might permit Congress to delay rather
than expedite statehood. 123 Despite strong initial support from
Democrats and extensive deliberation by the legislature, the
proposal was never formally approved. It was a symbol of dis-
enchantment both with Congress and residual Republican
strength in the islands rather than a genuine alternative to
eventual unqualified statehood.
Growing dissatisfaction with the statehood campaign also
provoked other initiatives by the Democrats. They were anxious
to identify with the statehood cause, but recognized that the
formal campaign could never guarantee success in Congress. In
previous years the GOP, through the work of the Farringtons,
King, Tavares, and the Republican-controlled Statehood Com-
mission and constitutional convention, had successfully ex-
ploited the statehood issue. Yet the Democrats’ statehood policy
reflected more than political considerations. It was, in part,
a recognition that the expensive activities of the commission
were, by 1955, largely redundant. Hence when the commission
requested a further $150,000 to support its activities during
1955–1956, the Democratic legislature balked. The campaign
was granted only $85,000, less than half the average amount
given previously by Republican-controlled legislatures. 124
Openly critical of the “Republican-dominated Commission”
and of the governor’s partisan appointments to it, 125 Democrats
decided to promote statehood essentially through the elected
legislature. Many Democrats advocated that Hawaii’s citizens
should be granted tax concessions by the federal government
until they were given full citizenship rights under statehood.
Although designed primarily to focus national attention on
statehood by reviving the issue of “no taxation without
representation,” this proposal gained considerable support in
Hawaii. In May 1955, the Hawaii House of Representatives
passed a resolution asking Congress to grant Hawaii’s citizens
“relief” from the payment of federal taxes. The resolution orig-
inally requested exemption from payment of any federal taxes,
but this provision was modified because supporters feared Con-
gress might interpret it as an expression of support for Com-
monwealth status. However, the territorial senate did not pass
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the resolution, largely because it might have undermined the
statehood campaign. Nonetheless the House-passed resolution
was inserted into the Congressional Record. It served to
reaffirm the fact that although Hawaii’s citizens paid federal
taxes just as did mainland citizens, they were denied equal po-
litical rights with these citizens. 126
Demands for an elected governor and tax exemptions re-
flected a decline in active local support for statehood, and
general disenchantment with congressional indecision. During
1955–1956, as an aggressive young Democrat, Frank Fasi
noted, support for statehood was “at its lowest point since
the war.” 127 Widespread cynicism had replaced early postwar
optimism. Burns observed that few local Japanese still felt
statehood would be granted: “Come hell or high water we
weren’t gonna get it.” A leading nisei confirmed this opinion: “I
never thought that we would ever, … ever get statehood.” 128
Hawaii might have enjoyed majority support in Congress, but
few congressmen were prepared to push the issue. Most ac-
cepted that Southern intransigence could not be overcome in
the Senate. Moreover, both national political parties were di-
vided over the Hawaii-Alaska question, and saw little political
mileage in resurrecting this divisive issue annually in Congress.
“There never was a time when Hawaii had more friends in Con-
gress—or ever a time when we had fewer of our friends working
for us,” Long observed sadly. Many supporters on Capitol Hill
were now decidedly pessimistic. Engle commented, for ex-
ample, that defeat in the Eighty-fourth Congress “may postpone
for many years, if not forever, the entrance of these incorpo-
rated territories as States to the union.” 129
Legislation to admit Hawaii made erratic but ultimately
disappointing progress in the decade after the war. Those who
optimistically expected Hawaii’s war record to induce prompt
action by Congress must have been sadly disillusioned by the
mid-1950s. Proponents’ hopes were raised periodically when
the House acted; but Senate intransigence and hostility quickly
punctured these bursts of optimism. By the end of 1956 the
Senate had never voted on a separate Hawaii bill. By manip-
ulating committee procedures, by threatening or initiating a
filibuster, opponents defeated Hawaii’s bid for statehood. This
strategy of delay was complicated and protracted. It was orga-
nized and executed by conservative champions of states’ rights
and white supremacy in both chambers. In seeking partisan po-
litical advantage from separate or concurrent entry of Hawaii
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and Alaska, the major political parties compounded the impact
of the obstructive tactics on which the conservatives’ veto
power ultimately rested. Yet even if party politics had not com-
plicated and permeated every facet of the statehood debate
after 1947, it is unlikely that Hawaii could have overcome the
determined anti-civil rights faction in Congress. Estimates of
the relative influence of racial and political factions in delaying
admission might well vary. Moreover the impact of each faction
fluctuated markedly. Yet as long as the South interpreted
statehood as a threat to its ability to defeat liberal civil rights
measures, Hawaii would confront insurmountable procedural
obstacles in Congress. The fact that these devices were erected
by a minority made them no less effective. Statehood was an
important aspect of the divisive and bitter struggle over civil
rights after World War II. Unless a compromise could be
reached on civil rights generally, there was little prospect of a
successful compromise on statehood.
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Chapter 8
Compromise Politics: Alaska
First
“Hawaii’s prospects for success in this session of Congress are
excellent,” the Statehood Commission again asserted in early
1957. 1 This time, however, such optimism was not without foun-
dation. Election results in the territories and throughout the
nation dramatically undercut the influence of partisan politics
on statehood for Hawaii. More importantly, the changed com-
plexion of Congress obliged Southern conservatives to com-
promise on statehood and civil rights or risk outright defeat on
these questions. This is not to suggest, however, that resistance
simply evaporated.
A NEW DELEGATE AND NEW TACTICS IN
WASHINGTON
Eisenhower easily defeated Stevenson again in 1956. But for
the first time since 1848 the winning presidential candidate
failed to carry either the House or Senate for his party. The De-
mocrats won a two-seat majority in the Senate, and controlled
the House by a margin of thirty-seven seats. Eisenhower was
clearly more popular than either his party or his liberal De-
mocratic rival. In Hawaii and Alaska the GOP salvaged very
little other than the ability to appoint each territory’s governor.
In both territories the Republicans were soundly defeated. In
Hawaii the Democrats won eighteen of the thirty House seats
and twelve of the fifteen Senate seats. Both territories also
elected Democrats as delegates to Congress. In Hawaii, Burns
defeated Mrs. Farrington by a wide sixteen-thousand-vote
margin. His victory completed the electoral revolution begun
two years before. It confirmed what 1954 had dramatically im-
plied: the long era of Republican ascendancy and authority had
ended.
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The rise of the new Democratic party and the statehood
issue were inextricably linked. Statehood was the central issue
in the election campaign which brought Burns his long-sought
victory in 1956. Despite a Republican administration in Wash-
ington after 1952, the polite efforts of the Farringtons had failed
to win congressional support. Increasingly, as the confident
young Democrats were very well aware, Hawaii’s community
accepted (to use Burns’ direct language) that such “methods
were never gonna win the darn thing,” and turned to the De-
mocrats for more forceful initiatives. Furthermore, after the
1954 watershed the divisive struggle between the Democratic
legislature and Republican governor convinced many that ter-
ritorial rule must end immediately. Statehood was increasingly
perceived as both a symbol of real democracy and the principal
vehicle for achieving this overdue end. In Burns’ view only
statehood would bring about a change in the distribution of
wealth and power. “That was the primary thing in the future,”
he observed. A decade after the war the ideas espoused by
the young Democrats associated with Burns had filtered into
the public domain, threatening to become the new orthodoxy
in local political rhetoric. Statehood was now projected by the
Democrats as the principal way of overcoming the authority
and privileges of the conservatives which had long dominated
island politics and were still regarded as the power behind the
scenes. Furthermore, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the
expanding middle class of the islands, which increasingly com-
prised people of Oriental ancestry, also perceived statehood
as a symbol of genuine acceptance into the host society. It
would provide confirmation that racism and inequality were not
central features of Hawaiian (and by implication American) life.
“They wanted statehood so bad,” Burns observed frankly, “be-
cause they were always the ones given as the reasons why we
couldn’t get it.” 2
In his perceptive study The Future of American Politics,
Samuel Lubell argued that the 1930s were an electoral wa-
tershed throughout the nation during which the Democrats re-
placed the GOP as the normal majority party. Under Roosevelt
the Democrats constructed a broad-based coalition of Catholic,
black, and urban voters. 3 A somewhat similar electoral transfor-
mation occurred in Hawaii two decades later. Certainly by the
mid-1950s the Republicans had been eclipsed by a vigorous De-
mocratic party, which drew its strength from newly organized
labor, wage earners in urban Honolulu, and the descendents of
the largest and latest immigrant groups to the islands, espe-
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cially the Japanese and Filipinos. This new coalition had been
nurtured by the experience of war rather than the impact of
depression. Younger nonwhite islanders were determined to
translate the confidence and aspirations fostered by war into a
cohesive political program in the following years. Veterans like
Inouye and Matsuo Takabuki who were members of the famous
442nd team and had gained university degrees under the GI Bill
epitomized this change. Their experience of inequality at home,
enlistment and combat in World War II, veterans’ education,
and political activism in the 1950s and 1960s closely mirrored
the experiences of many black civil rights advocates on the
mainland. War was a catalyst for both groups. It would be easy
to exaggerate the similarities between nisei and black experi-
ences however. Certainly, no segment of Hawaii’s diverse non-
white population confronted discrimination embedded in a legal
apparatus like segregation. Unlike the conditions which shaped
race relations in the Southern states, Hawaii’s complex racial
and ethnic relations were unique within America, stemming
from patterns of immigration and settlement peculiar to the
island community. Although seldom united in formal political as-
sociations, Hawaii’s nonwhites comprised a substantial majority
of the islands’ population—a situation which contrasted funda-
mentally with the mainland where all nonwhite groups com-
prised a minority of about 15 percent by the 1950s. The fact
that Hawaii’s racial and ethnic patterns were unique did not,
as we have seen, remove them from the national debate over
civil rights and statehood. Moreover, while these patterns had
no direct parallel on the mainland, local politics (and hence the
statehood drive) were always influenced substantially by them.
Hawaii had not yet sent a citizen of Japanese ancestry to serve
as delegate in Washington. Indeed both parties had studiously
avoided nominating a descendent of any immigrant Asian group
to contest elections for delegate to Congress. Nevertheless, as in-
dicated previously, Hawaii had elected substantial numbers to the
local legislature by the mid-1950s. For opponents of statehood
this simply confirmed that Hawaii would shortly send nonwhite
representatives to Washington. For liberal and moderate De-
mocrats, on the other hand, the ethnic background of Hawaii’s
representatives was much less significant than their likely po-
litical color; and the 1956 elections suggested that Hawaii, like
Alaska, would normally send Democrats to the nation’s Senate. 4
Any lingering belief that the islands might still be a Republican
stronghold was removed. Ironically, Republican opposition to De-
mocratic Alaska had unexpectedly delayed the admission of Re-
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publican Hawaii until it too had become a Democratic territory.
During his second term as president, Eisenhower had to swallow
this bitter political pill or side with a reactionary minority in Con-
gress and reject both territories yet again.
Despite the conspicuous inactivity of both national parties
on statehood during 1945–1956, each included immediate ad-
mission of Hawaii and Alaska in their platforms for the 1956
elections. At the same time Eisenhower retreated slightly and
supported Alaska, on condition that “adequate provision for de-
fense requirements” was included in its legislation. Conscious
of the political advantage which might flow to their party from
the entry of Hawaii and Alaska, moderate Democrats took the
offensive early in 1957. Only “Republican lethargy or deliberate
opposition” they charged, could defeat the territories in the
Eighty-fifth Congress. 5 Conveniently, this partisan view over-
looked the obstructive behavior of Southern members of their
own party, as well as the previous reluctance of some moderate
Democrats to promote Republican Hawaii.
Under Burns’ guidance, and with the increasingly visible
support of Hawaii’s Japanese, the Democrats quickly outgrew
the communist issue and rose to dominate island politics by
the mid-1950s. Burns’ enormous energy, shrewd vision, and po-
litical acumen were rewarded by the triumph of the Democratic
party and his election as delegate to Congress. But if Burns
now dominated local politics, he had yet to demonstrate that
he was other than a novice in Washington. Like the Farringtons
before him, Burns eagerly exploited the statehood issue. He was
determined to succeed where his predecessors had failed. Still,
success ultimately depended on strong support from national
leaders of the Democratic party and the collapse of Southern-
led resistance to statehood legislation. Realistically, Burns and
the Democrats who controlled Hawaii’s legislature recognized
that the expensive official statehood campaign was predictable,
ineffective, and exhaustive. Under its new chairman, Thurston,
the commission continued to send literature to congressmen
and more than seventeen hundred mainland newspapers. It
also dispatched its respectable members to perform now-fa-
miliar rituals before a seemingly endless procession of official
hearings by congressional committees. Laden with statistics on
every facet of the islands’ development, and willing to repeat
yet again that Hawaii’s people were thoroughly Americanized,
these citizens could scarcely have believed that their testimony
was necessary, let alone influential. Certainly the local legis-
lature was convinced that the campaign was useless and should
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be wound down. Thus, it allocated only eighty-five thousand
dollars to the commission for the years 1957–1958. However,
the rift between the Democratic legislature and the Republican-
dominated Statehood Commission persisted after 1956.
Moreover, Burns as well as most local Democrats were con-
vinced that direct talks with Johnson and Rayburn, not publicity
by the commission, was the only realistic way to break the po-
litical deadlock on statehood. 6
Statehood supporters introduced admission acts rather than
enabling bills in the new Congress. This important change in
strategy meant that Congress was not required to vote sepa-
rately on a draft constitution. Burns was largely responsible
for the maneuver, although it was made possible by the earlier
decision to write and approve a “state” constitution. 7 In 1956
Alaska followed suit and adopted its own “state” constitution.
Like Hawaii it now supported only admission acts. Proponents
from both territories hoped their bills would be classified as
privileged legislation, as this would permit them to bypass the
Rules Committee which the bigoted Howard Smith and his aged
Southern colleagues still controlled. 8
After 1956, when the Alaskan electorate endorsed their pro-
posed “state” constitution, Alaska attempted to exploit the so-
called Alaska-Tennessee Plan. In 1796 Tennessee had been ac-
cepted as a state after holding unauthorized elections and sending
a “state” delegation to Washington. Michigan (1835), Iowa (1846),
California (1849), Oregon (1858), and Kansas (1859) had also
adopted the Tennessee Plan to expedite statehood. In 1957 Alaska
sent two elected “senators” and one “representative” to Wash-
ington. When the new Congress convened they were introduced
to the Senate from the gallery, but they were never seated in
either chamber. During 1949–1950 the Hawaii Statehood Com-
mission had toyed with the idea of employing this plan; but it
was rejected largely because proponents naively believed that
statehood was imminent. 9 In early 1957 Hawaii’s supporters were
perhaps equally confident; nevertheless events in the following
months again deflated this optimism.
Committees of the House and Senate again conducted ex-
tensive hearings on Hawaii early in 1957. This time there was
no junketeering and all hearings were held in Washington. Pro-
ponents noted with pleased surprise that only one person gave
negative testimony to either committee. More importantly, no
attempt was made to combine the Hawaii and Alaska bills in
committee. Yet there was little enthusiasm in Washington for
Hawaii’s immediate admission. The Senate Committee on In-
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sular Affairs unanimously backed Hawaii, but only two members
were present to endorse its report. The House committee re-
fused to report Hawaii, and neither chamber of Congress de-
bated it during 1957.
Conscious of Hawaii’s recent departure from the GOP fold,
the Eisenhower administration behaved very inconsistently over
Hawaii. It briefly attempted to resurrect the communist issue
to justify this ambivalence. Deputy Attorney General William P.
Rogers suggested, for example, that communism was “a serious
threat to the Territory’s economy and politics.” GOP leaders
now refused to acknowledge publicly that statehood “would
reduce the danger of communist infiltration in the islands.”
Such claims were simply a smoke screen for partisan preoccu-
pations. They did little to enhance Republican support in the is-
lands, and flatly contradicted previous GOP policy. 10 Moreover
Eisenhower vacillated and was unable to give firm directives to
his party on statehood. The Republicans could not successfully
exploit the statehood issue. Nor could they distract attention
from it. In the absence of any substantial executive-sponsored
legislative program, statehood remained an important, if unin-
spiring, national issue. Increasingly the Democratic leadership
took the initiative on this question, and Hawaii’s future rested
on developments within the Democratic party.
During 1957 Eisenhower accepted a compromise
amendment to the Alaska bill which gave presidents the right to
withdraw land from state control if it was deemed essential for
defense purposes. The Pentagon and the State Department now
agreed that Alaska should be given statehood. 11 However, mod-
erate and liberal Democrats, not Republicans, were the leading
proponents of both territories after 1956. Indeed before Con-
gress adjourned that year leaders of the Democratic party gave
firm public assurances that separate statehood bills would be
debated in both chambers during 1958. Yet the question of
statehood had been debated exhaustively before. Unless the
anti-civil rights faction could be induced to retreat, any addi-
tional debate would again prove frustratingly inconclusive.
CIVIL RIGHTS AND STATEHOOD: THE END OF
MASSIVE RESISTANCE?
The familiar pattern of congressional vacillation on statehood
was repeated in 1957. Nonetheless, events in this year signalled
the beginning of the end of “massive resistance” by white su-
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premacists against all forms of civil rights legislation. This had
an immediate impact on the fortunes of Hawaii and Alaska.
Reluctantly, in the face of emerging bipartisan support for at
least cosmetic legislation on civil rights, Southern representa-
tives compromised. In late 1957 they withdrew their filibuster
against Eisenhower’s civil rights bill introduced the previous
year. For the first time since the end of Reconstruction more
than eighty years before, Congress had approved a specific civil
rights measure. This defeat of the Southern faction was more
apparent than real however. It was more important for what it
foreshadowed than for what it achieved. As the quid pro quo
for ending their filibuster, the anti-civil rights faction extracted
major concessions over key provisions of the bill. When finally
approved it was an emasculated version of Eisenhower’s very
modest original proposal. 12
In its final form the bill provided for an Executive Com-
mission on Civil Rights, a Civil Rights Division in the De-
partment of Justice, and empowered the federal government to
seek court injunctions against those who sought to obstruct or
deprive citizens of their voting rights. But it was a toothless
initiative. In return for the two-thirds majority which was nec-
essary to close debate in the Senate, supporters accepted
amendments which made it virtually impossible for the attorney
general to enforce the act, and reduced penalties under the
legislation to a laughably small three hundred dollar maximum
or not more than forty-five days imprisonment. In practice the
legislation did nothing to boost blacks’ access to the vote, and
totally ignored their other grievances. Some Southerners be-
moaned the fact that their peculiar “way of life” had been ir-
reversibly threatened. In contrast, others, like Senator Richard
Russell of Georgia, interpreted the amended and weakened bill
as a sweet victory for their section. Yet the white suprema-
cists had been defeated on a civil rights measure—albeit an
innocuous one—and pressure for tougher action by Congress
continued to build. 13
From the time of Truman’s first civil rights proposals shortly
after World War II (indeed from the era of Reconstruction), pro-
segregationists had relied more on manipulating parliamentary
procedure than on majority support to avert change. Events
of 1957 suggested, however, that this strategy was no longer
sufficient. By the late 1950s a number of factors coalesced to
undermine the effectiveness of the minority veto. This devel-
opment had a dramatic influence on the fate of Hawaii and
Alaska.
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Eisenhower’s belated decision to introduce civil rights legis-
lation was a political response to factional changes in Congress
which themselves reflected growing resentment over Southern
racial practices. Most vocal citizens and representatives from
outside the South now accepted that the denial of voting rights
to many Southern blacks was an embarrassing anomaly in a
country based ostensibly on a concept of freedom and equality.
As old guard, anti-New Deal Republicans were gradually re-
placed by younger, more flexible representatives in Congress,
more moderate views on race found expression in Washington.
In addition, the growth of Republican support in black districts
in the 1956 elections helped shape an informal coalition of
moderate Republicans and Northern Democrats willing to vote
for gradual and modest changes to racial legislation and prac-
tices. Referring to its bipartisan leaders in the Senate, Russell
appropriately named this unofficial coalition the “Knowland-
Douglas Axis.” 14 It comprised a substantial majority of repre-
sentatives in both chambers. Unlike the well-established con-
servative coalition which was based on an arrangement be-
tween the two factions for mutual support on a wide range of
issues, this moderate alliance was temporary, informal, and fluc-
tuating. Nevertheless it did get the 1957 bill through Congress.
And in 1958–1959 it reemerged, this time to ensure decisive
action on Alaska and Hawaii.
Confronted with large bipartisan majorities willing to push
for modest civil rights legislation after 1956, the Southern
faction reluctantly decided to compromise. The Eisenhower bill
surprisingly reached the Senate floor in 1957. In large part this
resulted from the new-found willingness of moderates to ex-
ploit procedural tactics. Knowland, the leader of the GOP in
the Senate, skillfully kept the bill away from Eastland’s enclave
of reactionaries in the powerful Judiciary Committee. He was
ably supported by the wily Democrat leader Lyndon Johnson,
who had sniffed a shift in the political winds and now sided
unashamedly with Senate moderates. Johnson, a Texan, was
conveniently placed to bargain with fellow Southern Democrats.
He was also a back room negotiator and political numbers man
par excellence. Certainly he was instrumental in persuading his
conservative Southern colleagues to abandon their filibuster.
He undoubtedly reasserted what many pro-segregationists now
accepted: that a compromise would be more effective in the
long-term than blind resistance. Many opponents of civil rights
anticipated that a protracted filibuster might strengthen the de-
termination of other senators to establish an effective cloture
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rule. Early in 1957 the Senate had rejected a motion to this
effect. Most Republicans, many of whom supported Eisen-
hower’s civil rights measure, voted with Southern Democrats
to defeat this effort to end the practice of protracted debate. It
is highly probable that at least some Southerners agreed pri-
vately not to resist Eisenhower’s mild bill in return for Repub-
lican support over the cloture issue. Some Southerners cer-
tainly appreciated that a prolonged filibuster against the Eisen-
hower measure might alienate those Republicans previously
tolerant of the Southern position on cloture. 15 This in turn
might precipitate decisive action against the rules permitting
filibuster—something which a bipartisan collection of conserv-
atives had averted earlier in the year. 16 Thus in 1957 the fili-
buster was withdrawn, and the Senate was permitted to amend
and vote on the weak civil rights act.
If any observers still doubted that statehood was tightly
linked to the civil rights and states’ rights issues, the vote
of 1957 must surely have dispelled this misconception. In the
House the vote was 126 against the civil rights measure—107
Democrats and 19 Republicans. Significantly, 130 members,
representing almost identical constituencies, had previously
voted against the separate Hawaii bill. In the Senate 18 Demo-
crats provided the only negative votes. All but one of these rep-
resented a Southern state. Virtually all House and Senate oppo-
nents of the civil rights act were also opposed to the admission
of Hawaii or Alaska. Eastland, Russell, Thurmond, and Smith
led the debates and tactics against each of these measures.
Given the explicit racism which had permeated the debate over
Hawaii and the likely impact of statehood on the Senate’s com-
position, the similar voting patterns evidenced on Hawaii,
Alaska, and civil rights from 1947 to 1957 were certainly not
unrelated coincidences. In urging Johnson to vote against “this
dastardly legislation,” this “shameful measure” to give Hawaii
equality, many Southerners acknowledged privately the link be-
tween these issues. “The admission of these islands to
statehood, is fraught with danger,” one of Johnson’s fellow
Texans warned. “To extend such rights would delegate to a
polyglot population, with ideologies completely alien to the
philosophies of our American heritage, an equal voice in the
enactment of laws under which we must live here on the
mainland.” “We know,” the warning concluded, “[Hawaii] would
always support legislation detrimental and distasteful to the
people of Texas and the entire Southland.” Among other objec-
tions were that Hawaii: “would add two more senators and a
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representative of the Hubert Humphrey-James Roosevelt kind”;
begin “a flood of Oriental immigration”; “put two Orientals in
the United States Senate”; compromise efforts to “keep our
Country as white as possible”; and accelerate the eclipse of the
“white races of this Country.” Certainly, if Texas is accepted
as representative of the South, a substantial minority believed
strongly that statehood would result in additional anti-South
votes in Congress and hasten the triumph of desegregation and
liberal civil rights legislation. “Being mixed racewise,” one of
Johnson’s constituents noted with alarm, “Hawaiians could be
expected to vote for complete integration in America.” 17
The compromise strategy adopted by pro-segregationists
in 1957 did not reflect support for Eisenhower’s original pro-
posals. By withdrawing their filibuster Southerners gained suf-
ficient reciprocal help to dilute the central provisions of the
original bill. Howard Shuman has argued convincingly that “the
failure of the filibuster may be regarded as a carefully calcu-
lated decision to avoid consequences which would have been
worse, from the Southern point of view, than those of the bill as
it passed the Senate.” Fearing a strong reaction from a majority
of senators, the Southerners not only ended their filibuster but
even criticized Thurmond for speaking for twenty-four hours in
an individual attempt to defeat the legislation. Russell acknowl-
edged that a filibuster was not sustained because in the long-
term it would have been counterproductive. “There was not a
man among us who was not willing to speak against this iniq-
uitous bill until he dropped in his tracks,” Russell stated. “We
would have done so, but for the conviction, growing out of our
knowledge of the Senate and the experience of many years in
this body, that a filibuster was certain to make a bad bill in-
finitely worse.” 18 Johnson conceded a similar point when an-
swering a constituent’s charge that he had betrayed all Texans
by compromising on civil rights. The senator replied to this tren-
chant criticism that:
Two choices were open to me in this matter. One was to do
nothing and let the extremists take over. The other was to present
a reasonable proposal that would attract the support of rea-
sonable men and women everywhere. I took the second choice be-
cause I believe this is the way we can block those who believe in
forced integration and harsh punitive legislation. The “do noth-
ing” course would have left the South exposed to the mercies of
the extremists. 19
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C. Vann Woodward, Benjamin Muse, and a number of other
authors have argued, however, that the compromise strategy
and more conciliatory rhetoric employed by opponents of civil
rights did not necessarily reflect the dissipation of Southern
hostility to external intervention in state matters. Rather, it in-
dicated a continued determination to resist federal encroach-
ments on the so-called Southern way of life. In Woodward’s esti-
mation, the South after the Supreme Court decision of 1954 was
more profoundly estranged and wholeheartedly defiant than
at any time since Reconstruction. During 1954–1956, for ex-
ample, the eleven former Confederate states adopted approx-
imately one hundred pro-segregation measures. The flexible
strategy employed by the anti-civil rights faction during 1957
was more a response to the exigencies of congressional politics
than a suggestion that racial attitudes were quickly moderating
in the South. 20 Nonetheless, the very fact that the champions of
states’ rights had been induced to compromise their position on
civil rights legislation in Congress had far-reaching implications
for Hawaii.
Passage of the 1957 act was, as Shuman pointed out, the
first major defeat for the Southern Democrat-conservative Re-
publican coalition in Congress since 1938. 21 A new majority
coalition of liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans was
willing to pass civil rights legislation, including statehood for
the territories. The 1957 vote also indicated that while four sen-
ators from Hawaii and Alaska might increase liberal strength in
the Senate, these additional senators would probably not exert
a decisive influence on civil rights. The margin of victory in
1957 was sufficiently wide to make the impact of four new votes
for civil rights relatively unimportant. Certainly the admission
of the new states was not a precondition for passage of a civil
rights measure. Moreover the events of 1957 suggested that the
filibuster would now be used only sparingly or not at all. Al-
though most Southerners still bitterly opposed the addition of
new senators who might support the liberal position on cloture,
this preoccupation declined after 1957. Most conservatives now
accepted, if reluctantly, that their influence could best be main-
tained through back room compromises and deals rather than
the filibuster. The change of strategy was clearly demonstrated
in 1958 when conservative senators failed to invoke a filibuster
against statehood and decided to accept a compromise initiated
by moderate Democrats. The South abandoned the obstruc-
tionist tactics which had served the peculiar interests of its
whites so well for more than eighty years.
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HAWAII DELAYED: A REALISTIC CONCESSION
If sectional opposition to statehood was breaking down, political
obstacles nevertheless still remained. In February 1958,
Knowland advised Johnson that the Eisenhower administration
would not support Alaska unless the Democrats used their ma-
jorities to ensure votes on Hawaii in both the House and the
Senate immediately after action was taken on Alaska. Despite
the election returns of 1954 and 1956 some members of the
GOP continued to view Hawaii as a normally Republican area.
As late as February 1958 the New York Times reported that it
remained a “basic tenet of political faith on Capitol Hill that
if Hawaii is admitted it means two Republican Senators, and
if Alaska it means two Democratic Senators.” It is doubtful if
many Republicans still harbored this illusion, although most
were anxious to salvage some political advantage for their party
by identifying it with the final successful push for statehood.
However, many Republicans (including Eisenhower) hesitated,
believing that both territories were solidly Democratic. 22
Senator Frank Church (Dem., Idaho) attempted to expose the
ambivalent position of the GOP when he told the Senate:
… any effort which has heretofore been made to combine the
two statehood bills, under any understanding or arrangement,
whether that effort involves simultaneous linking of the bills or a
successive consideration of the bills, is an effort which is directed
towards combining the opponents of both bills in opposition to
each, and thus is not an effort which is in reality designed to serve
the interests of the case of statehood for either territory. 23
Ironically, similar arguments had previously been used by Re-
publicans against Democrats who had insisted in 1953–1954
that the bills be combined.
By 1957–1958, however, sincere supporters of both terri-
tories were adamant that the statehood bills were seperate
issues, as different as Alaska and Hawaii were geographically
and economically. Burns and Alaska’s long-serving Democratic
delegate to Congress, E. L. Bartlett, agreed early in 1957 to in-
troduce and support separate bills only. With the help of a bi-
partisan group of congressmen, this strategy was adhered to
rigidly. “Separate bills in no way reflect any change whatsoever
in my belief,” James E. Murray (Dem., Ill.) stated on behalf of
twenty-three co-sponsors in the Senate, “that both Alaska and
Hawaii are equally ready for statehood, and that both should
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be accorded equal treatment by the Congress and the Admin-
istration.” As chairman of the Interior and Insular Affairs Com-
mittee, Murray gave a public assurance that the Democrats
would demand equal treatment for both territories. 24 But in
1958, as in previous years, his party gave priority to solidly De-
mocratic, white Alaska.
In late January 1958, after persistent appeals by Burns and
Bartlett, Johnson convened a private conference of influential
Democratic senators. Burns also attended. This meeting agreed
that only Alaska would be debated before Congress adjourned.
Hawaii was dropped from Johnson’s agenda. But in return
Johnson undertook to ensure that Southern Democrats would
not use procedural devices or the filibuster to defeat Alaska in
either chamber. Southern Democrats had clearly accepted this
compromise before it was put to Burns and liberal Democratic
senators. 25 Again, as in 1957 over civil rights, Johnson had
helped to engineer a compromise which preserved surface unity
within his party by placating Southern and liberal elements.
Most importantly for the Democrats, this compromise averted
an embarrassing and divisive public wrangle over a Southern-
led filibuster. It also kept the cloture issue safely at bay. If
the Democrats’ deliberations over statehood were private, their
compromise decision was very soon public knowledge. It
became obvious that Democrat leaders in the House and Senate
did not intend to vote on Hawaii in 1958. 26 With mid-term elec-
tions scheduled for November, Democrats were aware that two
new senators from Alaska might give them a majority in the next
Congress.
Yet political expediency was not the sole incentive for a firm
Alaska-only strategy. Many Democrats and a surprisingly large
number of Republicans accepted that Alaska’s admission would
inevitably bring prompt action on Hawaii. The compromise also
offered some protection for Southern Democrats as it ensured
that, at most, only one liberal state would be admitted in 1958.
For the South, Johnson’s compromise strategy was at worst a
certain way of delaying Hawaii, and at best a means of again
defeating both territories. For if Johnson could speak with con-
fidence on Democratic policy, he could not influence Republi-
can tactics, and Southern Democrats apparently believed that
Alaska would meet strong resistance from GOP members.
Southerners acquiesced to Johnson’s compromise in part be-
cause they anticipated that the anti-civil rights faction could
combine with Republicans opposed to the priority given Democ-
ratic Alaska and thereby defeat the separate measure. Eastland
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and his Southern senate colleagues undoubtedly miscalculated
early in 1958, as Republican resistance to “Alaska first” dis-
solved. Moreover the Southern faction could not overlook the
events of the previous year. The civil rights compromise in 1957,
and the absence of a filibuster against Alaska in 1958, indicated
that conservative Southern Democrats were now prepared to
modify their position slightly on states’ rights issues in the hope
of retaining a substantial, if declining, influence within both
their own party and Congress. As Dewey Grantham has noted,
the dispute over civil rights after the 1954 Supreme Court de-
cision was the first crack in Southern solidarity. With it South-
ern sectionalism began a slow and halting decline. 27 Without
this important, if imprecise change, neither Alaska nor Hawaii
could have overcome the Southern veto in the late 1950s. 28
Burns played a decisive role in initiating and sustaining
the compromise strategy. During 1957 he worked closely with
fellow Democrats from Alaska on a possible compromise. “I will
work hard for Alaskan statehood,” he stated publicly in October
1957. “If it becomes necessary to drop Hawaiian statehood in
order to get Alaska through, I will do just that.” This concession
helped to pave the way for more concrete initiatives involving
Johnson and other prominent Democrats like House Speaker
Rayburn. Both Johnson and Rayburn had previously opposed im-
mediate statehood. However Rayburn agreed to a compromise
strategy late in 1957 after he had been assured by Burns that no
attempt would be made to promote Hawaii in 1958. Like many
other Southerners, Rayburn remained adamant that Hawaii
contained “too many Japs,” but he relented on statehood be-
cause he thought the Alaska-first scheme would founder on
the rock of combined Republican and Southern Democrat re-
sistance. Johnson was more difficult to convince than Rayburn.
He refused to endorse the compromise strategy without first
gaining a definite assurance from Burns and Democratic pro-
ponents generally that Hawaii would be ignored during the
Eighty-fifth Congress. This assurance was given at the meeting
convened by Johnson in January 1958. 29 Burns also gave a con-
fidential undertaking to Johnson at this meeting. He informed
the Democratic Senate leader that he would initiate moves to
recommit the Hawaii bill if Republican supporters attempted to
have it considered by the House of Representatives in 1958.
Thus Burns agreed to oppose passage of the Hawaii bill during
the final session of the Eighty-fifth Congress. As the quid pro
quo for this concession, Johnson gave an assurance that he
would support consideration of the Hawaii bill by both houses of
Chapter 8
276
Congress early in 1959. Johnson, who now claimed publicly that
he was both a liberal and a conservative, still refused to commit
himself unequivocally to Hawaii’s cause. Throughout 1958 he
intimated privately that Hawaii would again confront protracted
debate if brought before the Senate prematurely. During his
first two years in Washington Burns became a self-confessed
Johnson man and admitted to being on fairly friendly terms with
the powerful Texan. But Johnson remained sensitive to the inter-
ests of his Southern colleagues and was, at most, ambivalent
over the delicate Hawaiian question until early 1958. 30
Both Burns and Johnson subsequently denied that any
written arrangement or deal had been made over the statehood
issue. However the above information, coupled with events
during 1958–1959, clearly substantiates the view that an ex-
plicit agreement was reached between Burns, Rayburn, and
Johnson early in 1958. Pro-statehood Democrats agreed to
support the separate admission of Alaska in 1958 and the sepa-
rate admission of Hawaii in 1959. Anti-statehood Democrats
agreed not to wage a filibuster to defeat separate bills, provided
only Alaska was considered during 1958.
After reassuring his close political friends in Honolulu of
Johnson’s pledge that Hawaii would be considered immediately
after Alaska, Burns canvassed wider support on Capitol Hill. He
wrote Senator Church, for example:
As perhaps you know—from the meeting I had with Senator
Johnson last week—I have taken the position in what I hope is en-
lightened self-interest that nothing should interfere with success
in the consideration of Alaska-S.49. To this end I am perfectly
willing and have so advised my constituents that—if necessary—I
would remove Hawaii from consideration. I do not think this will
be necessary since it is understood that action on Alaska will be
completed before Hawaii is brought up. I want statehood. 31
In a similar vein he informed Senator Murray:
Alaska and Hawaii should be considered separately … Hawaii
does not want to be the means of killing both. She would rather
withdraw to “clear the track.” The sincerity of her desire for
statehood would be suspect if she followed any other course. 32
Burns and other Democratic statehood proponents openly
acknowledged their adherence to the Alaska-first strategy. But
before the House approved Alaska they did not publicly concede
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that they would oppose attempts to admit Hawaii in 1958. Had
this been admitted, the prospects of gaining the necessary bi-
partisan support for Alaska might have been seriously under-
mined. Nonetheless, Murray did acknowledge publicly early
in 1958 that the chance of favorable action on Hawaii in the
Eighty-fifth Congress was slight. Nor did any Democratic leader
give the Republicans an assurance that legislation to admit
Hawaii would be considered in 1958. Burns and Church stated
only that favorable congressional consideration of Hawaii would
“inevitably” follow the admission of Alaska; they neglected,
however, to specify whether consideration would be initiated
during 1958 or later. 33
Early in 1958 Republican statehood proponents refused to
support Alaska without an explicit assurance from Democrats
that Hawaii would also be considered by both houses of Con-
gress in 1958. Without such an assurance, Republican Senate
Leader Knowland stated, “it is very likely that it will be moved
that the Hawaii statehood bill be made the second title of the
Alaska statehood bill.” 34 However, attempts to oppose the sep-
arate admission of Alaska, or unite the Alaska and Hawaii bills,
were not pursued seriously by GOP leaders. Given the unin-
spired program outlined by Eisenhower during his second term
as president, it is not surprising that moderate Republicans re-
lented and permitted action on statehood. Without a decision
on this important, if long-standing issue, the achievements of
Eisenhower’s party in Congress would have been chronically
insubstantial. The Republicans had vacillated for too long to
benefit from the statehood issue. Ironically, it was the party
supported by most Southerners, the Democrats, which finally
arranged and implemented a successful legislative strategy on
statehood. Still, both parties had cynically attempted to exploit
the issue since 1945, and neither could hope to be identified
electorally as sincere crusaders for the rights of American cit-
izens in either territory.
On May 28, 1958, the separate Alaska bill passed the House
by a modest margin—210 votes to 166. Both parties were
sharply divided over the issue, but a majority from each party
voted affirmatively. Democrats divided 118 for, 81 against. Re-
publican support was less decisive, resulting in a split of 92
votes for, 85 against. 35
This vote was taken after the Rules Committee was dis-
charged of responsibility for reporting the bill. Under Smith
the committee had refused to report either statehood measure.
However, both territories were now proceeding by admission
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bills and could thus be brought directly to the floor by the
chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.
With the support of Rayburn, who overruled all objections to
this procedure, Chairman Leo O’Brien (Dem., N. Y.) brought
the “privileged” Alaska measure to the House floor on May
16, 1958. Vigorous opposition from Southerners and conserv-
ative Republicans failed to negate the strategy. When a motion
by Pillion to recommit the Alaska bill was defeated, moderate
Democrats knew that their party’s compromise strategy would
succeed. Most Southern Democrats, and almost half of the
House GOP members, opposed the Alaska bill and supported
recommittal. But they could not command sufficient votes to
defeat Alaska. Eighty percent of Democrats who opposed Alaska
represented former Confederate states. 36 Most Republicans
who opposed the separate measure represented large Northern
states, but they were joined by scattered collection of members
from smaller and Western states. Republican resistance to De-
mocratic Alaska was stronger than that exhibited against Re-
publican Hawaii in 1947, 1950, or 1953. 37 The informal con-
servative coalition still provided the core of resistance to
statehood, but there were also many moderate Republicans who
were reluctant to admit Alaska first and thereby increase Demo-
cratic strength in Congress.
Immediately after the House approved Alaska, leading De-
mocrats admitted publicly that Hawaii would not be debated
by the Senate or House during 1958. When O’Brien intimated
that the Hawaii bill might be discharged from his committee,
Burns hurriedly pressed him to withdraw any such proposal.
Thus O’Brien advised that attempts to bring Hawaii into the
Union would have to be delayed until the next year. Shortly
after, Murray informed the Senate that 1958 was not the appro-
priate time to push for statehood for Hawaii, and concluded:
“Anyone who believes Hawaii has a chance of Statehood this
session is completely unrealistic.” However, to encourage Re-
publican support for the Alaska bill in the Senate, Democrats
frequently suggested that Hawaii would be considered by both
chambers early in 1959, provided Alaska was admitted in 1958.
38
The Senate debated the Alaska bill intermittently for a week
late in June. Despite Republican threats to resist the separate
measure, Southern Democrats led the opposition to it. Stennis
unsuccessfully moved that the bill be referred to the Armed Ser-
vices Committee for additional consideration. Eastland raised
two points of order, but both were decisively rejected. A motion
Last Among Equals
279
by Almer Monroney (Dem., Okla.) to substitute Commonwealth
status for statehood was defeated by fifty votes to twenty-nine.
Thurmond moved that a large section of northern Alaska be ex-
cluded from the proposed state and reserved for federal control.
This amendment was also rejected by a decisive majority. Al-
though these moves were designed to delay Alaska’s admission,
they were supported by only a few Republicans. Most Southern
Democrats vigorously opposed the bill, but they did not initiate
a filibuster against it. On June 30, 1958, the Senate passed
the Alaska bill by an overwhelming sixty-four votes to twenty.
More Republicans than Democrats voted for Alaska. A bipar-
tisan group of thirty-one Democrats and thirty-three Repub-
licans voted affirmatively. Only thirteen Democrats and seven
Republicans opposed the bill. Five Southern states—Arkansas,
Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia—voted
solidly against it, providing half of the total opposition votes.
Some Southern Democrats, notably Johnson, Smathers, and
Ralph Yarborough (Tex.) abstained from voting. 39 In the light of
Johnson’s later efforts to be identified as a leading proponent
of civil rights, his refusal to vote for Alaska appears extremely
inconsistent. Political ambitions clearly weighed heavier with
Johnson than democratic principles. He was reluctant to
alienate his Southern supporters within the Democratic party
by voting for Alaska. At the same time however, he encouraged
Southerners to seek accommodation with the moderate main-
stream of their party. Johnson, and the Democratic party gen-
erally, later reaped the political harvest of this skillful juggling
act.
The compromise Alaska-first tactic confronted Eisenhower’s
party with a complex political dilemma. By 1958 it had been out-
maneuvered on statehood. Pro-statehood Republicans were un-
derstandably reluctant to collaborate with Southern Democrats
in order to defeat the separate Alaska bill. This action would
have undermined bipartisan support for Hawaii and exposed
the GOP to the charge that it, much more than the Democratic
party, wished to defeat both territories. Most Republicans were
also very reluctant to be associated with any maneuver which
might jeopardize statehood, as this issue now constituted a
central portion of Eisenhower’s very modest legislative
program. Nor could the GOP encourage attempts to combine
the Hawaii and Alaska bills without displaying considerable
hypocrisy. Before 1957 it had consistently denounced similar ef-
forts by Democrats as a cynical political exercise designed to
defeat both territories. Democrats like Murray were, by 1958,
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eager to point this out. Also, as the New York Times remarked,
the Republican party was reluctant to continue its “unremitting
hostility” to Alaska because this may have alienated local voters
and further consolidated Democratic strength in this region.
40 Defeat of the Alaska-first strategy might also have adverse
repercussions for Republican candidates in the 1958 elections
in Hawaii. Hence, mainstream Republicans could no longer
afford to vacillate over statehood. Finally, many GOP members
genuinely believed that they could gain the support of liberal
Democrats and admit Hawaii late in 1958, immediately after
Alaska had paved the way through Congress. 41
Burns, along with other Democrats, was confident Alaska’s
admission would foreshadow favorable action on Hawaii. But
predictably, majority leaders in Congress refused to schedule a
debate on Hawaii during 1958. Johnson stated that the Senate
would only debate the issue after the House had acted. Few
congressmen were surprised, however, when the House Insular
Affairs Committee refused to report Hawaii to the floor until
the last day of the final session of the Eighty-fifty Congress.
42 The Democrats had closed ranks behind Johnson’s strategy.
To ensure that the compromise was not breached, Southern
conservatives indicated that they might have to initiate a “pro-
longed debate” in the Senate if the Hawaii bill was discussed. 43
House Majority Leader John McCormack (Mass.) predicted that
Hawaii would definitely be debated in 1959. Burns advised his
constituents that attempts to promote consideration of Hawaii
late in 1958 might endanger its strong chances in 1959. Simi-
larly, Church emphasized the excellence of Hawaii’s prospects,
provided no attempt was made to initiate consideration before
1959. 44
Admission early in the new Congress was now a foregone
conclusion. As had so often been the case since 1945, Hawaii’s
fate was determined before it reached the floor of either
chamber. Reports from Washington vindicated the public confi-
dence of Burns, Johnson, and others when they estimated that
Hawaii could confidently anticipate at least seventy favorable
Senate votes in 1959. Shortly before the national elections were
held, Johnson denied that he had ever made “commitments,
trades or deals concerning Hawaii.” However, he also stated:
I believe the Senate Interior Committee will easily in the next
session report the Hawaii bill. I believe the Senate Democratic
Policy Committee will schedule it for debate, and early in the
session there will be plenty of time to debate it. Due to the wise
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counsel of Delegate Burns and others who have put their country
ahead of politics, Hawaii has the best chance for admission at the
next session it has ever had.
Johnson was confident that “a number of former opponents”
would support the Hawaii bill, or at least “not oppose it so vig-
orously” as before. Democrats were convinced that Southern
statehood opponents would not filibuster to defeat the Hawaii
bill in 1959. In the light of these developments, Johnson’s de-
finition of “commitments, trades and deals” must have been
a very formal one indeed. Few congressmen or reporters ac-
cepted as either genuine or accurate his public claim that such
an arrangement did not exist. As Ernest Gruening later noted,
Johnson “cleared the way so that [statehood] legislation
wouldn’t be impeded.” 45
The compromise Johnson strategy was vehemently criti-
cized. The New York Times led the assault, charging that
Hawaii’s legitimate rights had again been defeated by “sub-
terfuge and obstruction.” “There is absolutely no honorable
excuse for the manipulation that is preventing the issue from
coming to a vote,” the newspaper observed shortly after Alaska
was approved. The Washington Post was equally disturbed. 46
In Congress Republicans attacked the strategy as a partisan,
“politically advantageous” maneuver designed to increase De-
mocratic party numbers in the Senate. While signing the Alaska
bill into law on July 7, 1958, Eisenhower stated that he was
“extremely disturbed over reports that no action is contem-
plated by the current Congress on pending legislation to admit
Hawaii.” 47
If Eisenhower and GOP congressmen were powerless to
break the Democrats’ strategy, similar endeavors by islanders
from both parties were destined to fail also. Nonetheless on
July 6, 1958, an official delegation of eight members arrived
in Washington to lobby for statehood. It was appointed by the
Statehood Commission and led by its Republican-appointed
chairman, Lorrin P. Thurston. (More than sixty years earlier
Thurston’s father had journeyed to Washington seeking annexa-
tion and protection of the small white elite in the islands. As late
as 1948 Lorrin P. Thurston had refused to endorse statehood,
fearing it seems that it would promote the interests of Hawaii’s
non-Caucasian majority. Now a decade later he led the islands’
official campaign for equality. Few local observers failed to see
the irony in these developments, especially those of Japanese
ancestry who remembered the attitudes expressed by the Ad-
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vertiser during martial law and the late 1940s.) In addition to
this official delegation, local Democrats Oren Long and Vincent
Esposito, and Republicans Mrs. Farrington, King, and the newly
appointed governor, Quinn, also journeyed to Washington. Des-
pite three weeks of active lobbying on Capitol Hill, the De-
mocrats’ strategy remained unchanged. Quinn’s heated en-
counter with Johnson typified the response of the Democratic
leadership to these lobbying efforts. “I’m setting the agenda”
for the Senate, Johnson angrily told Quinn. “I’ll determine when
things will be called-up and when they won’t.” Hawaii’s lob-
byists were left in absolutely no doubt that the Democrats would
not shift from their agreed strategy in 1958. Rayburn told Mrs.
Farrington unequivocally: “Hawaii will have to wait until next
year.” 48
Understandably, local Democrats from the Burns camp were
not enthusiastic supporters of these lobbying activities, as they
were directed against a strategy which Burns not only sup-
ported but helped to engineer. Island Republicans exploited
this situation enthusiastically in the months preceding the 1958
elections. Quinn accused Burns of complicity in a “dark com-
promise” designed to ensure the defeat of Hawaii and con-
demned his refusal to “strike while the iron is hot.” The
Statehood Commission, which remained firmly controlled by
appointed Republicans, refused to sanction the compromise
Alaska-first tactic. Mrs, Farrington went so far as to charge that
her old adversary had permanently jeopardized statehood. “No
man on the face of the globe has set statehood back as far
as Jack Burns,” she claimed in August 1958. Republicans also
criticized Burns and Democratic members of the territorial leg-
islature for refusing to support the Statehood Commission ac-
tively or forcefully. 49 Many Democrats, including Burns, viewed
the commission as moribund, expensive, and a de facto wing of
the Republican party. Some partisans of Burns, including Wright
in his study of Hawaii’s “second revolution,” have claimed that
“a number of members of the Statehood Commission … had ad-
vocated every move likely to jeopardize statehood.” Admitting
that not all commission members acted out of a desire to un-
dermine admission, this view nevertheless maintained that the
strategy the commission promoted in 1958 “—tying Hawaii to
the Alaska Bill, and when this failed, trying to rush passage of
the Hawaii Bill at the close of the session—were actions most
likely to kill the Hawaii Bill.” 50 Certainly Burns did his utmost
to dissuade the commission from pursuing such tactics, fearing
that they might upset his fragile agreement with Johnson. Nev-
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ertheless, in the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary
it must be assumed that all commission members genuinely
believed their tactics were in the best interests of statehood.
Denied full knowledge of the Burns-Johnson strategy, and
anxious to be identified with the final successful stage of the
long statehood struggle, they were understandably determined
to exploit the changed circumstances of 1958.
The territorial electorate was apparently unmoved by the
virulent criticism levelled against Burns and his supporters. In
the elections of November 4, 1958, the Democrats’ strategy on
statehood was formally tested. It was the central issue in the
election campaign. Burns won a handsome victory over his Re-
publican opponent, Farrant Turner. The Democratic party again
won control of both houses of the recently reapportioned legis-
lature. It enjoyed majorities of almost two to one in the House
(thirty-three seats to eighteen) and Senate (sixteen seats to
nine). While statehood was not the only issue contested in these
elections, the returns nonetheless constituted an expression of
strong support for Burns’ decision to sanction Alaska first in
order to break the perennial political impasse on Capitol Hill.
Most islanders apparently accepted that Hawaii would be ad-
mitted immediately after the new Congress convened.
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Chapter 9
Fiftieth State
STATEHOOD 1959: STILL A DIVISIVE ISSUE
Viewed objectively, Hawaii was better equipped for statehood
than Alaska. Numerous congressional committees acknowl-
edged this. Yet during the 1950s Alaska consistently enjoyed
stronger mainland support than Hawaii. Six national Gallup
polls, conducted during 1950–1958, all revealed greater oppo-
sition to the immediate admission of Hawaii than Alaska. The
proportion of mainlanders willing to accept either territory as
a state also declined significantly during this decade. For Alas-
ka it dropped from 81 percent to 73 percent of those polled.
For Hawaii it fell from 76 percent to only 63 percent. As both
territories were noncontiguous, important strategically, incor-
porated for long periods, and supported small populations, the
only significant variable which might have influenced the dif-
ferences in mainland opinion was the composition of Hawaii’s
population. The issue of communist influence appears to be the
only other variable which might have induced greater resis-
tance to Hawaii. Yet the decline in mainland support for the is-
lands coincided with the gradual retreat of internal security as
a rousing national issue. It appears that public disenchantment
with Hawaii increased as the nature of its mixed population
became more widely known. Ironically, this was a direct but ob-
viously unwanted consequence of the vigorous publicity cam-
paign conducted by supporters. It is hazardous to draw infer-
ences from opinion polls, but the consistency of these returns
for 1950–1958 suggests that racial factors remained the
primary influence on mainland attitudes toward Hawaii’s bid for
admission. 1
Other evidence supports this interpretation. As we have
seen throughout this study, Southerners provided the backbone
of all opposition to Hawaii. The Congressional correspondent of
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the New York Times, William S. White, concluded that hostility
to Hawaii reflected “the quite plain fact that some Senators are
afraid of the color of some of the people of Hawaii.” Nor was this
concern restricted to a few congressmen. As late as 1957 the
Tulsa Tribune asked rhetorically: “Do we want to put a couple
of Japs in the Senate of the United States?” It concluded that
the admission of the “polyglot people” of Hawaii would inject
foreign concepts and traditions into Congress. 2 A booklet by
Drew Smith on The Menace of Hawaiian Statehood, published
in New Orleans in 1957, protested that Hawaii’s admission
would aggravate racial tensions by allowing unchecked immi-
gration of Asians. “The cardinal and crucial fact to be borne in
mind,” Smith claimed, “is that this nation is an extension of Eu-
ropean civilization and has received none of her generative im-
pulses from Asia. It is the blood of Europe that went into the set-
tling of America and the greatness that has been attained will
be perpetuated only so long as that unity of blood remains sub-
stantially unimpaired.” The subtitles of this booklet expressed
succinctly the reactionary arguments that had almost invariably
surfaced whenever statehood was debated after 1898. They in-
cluded: “A Menacing Precedent,” “The Caucasions are Rapidly
Disappearing in Hawaii,” “America an Extension of European
Civilization‚” “The Japanese Control Hawaii,” and “Immigration
Threat.” According to George Lehleitner, a Louisiana busi-
nessman who worked energetically for Hawaii in an attempt to
break down Southern intransigence, Smith’s crude assertions
provided invaluable ammunition for opponents of Hawaii. 3
Smith, along with many opponents of the islands, was incapable
of recognizing the contribution of African or Asian immigrants
to America’s traditions and development. His notions were an
unashamed rehash of simple nineteenth-century social Dar-
winism. There were still some, however, who found such
opinions comforting. Clearly, as Murray noted with dismay,
racism was a crucial factor in the protracted statehood dispute.
The Democrats’ decision to give priority to Alaska over Hawaii
in 1958 was influenced by more than partisan self-interest; it re-
flected also a belief that predominantly white Alaska would con-
front less hostility in Congress than multiracial Hawaii. 4
After 1957 most Southerners felt it politic to adopt concil-
iatory rhetoric when opposing civil rights or related bills in Con-
gress. Nonetheless, in 1959 Thurmond and other intractable
opponents continued to criticize Hawaii’s admission on racial
grounds. He conceded that “the Japanese are as truly moral as
any other race of civilized human beings,” and accepted that
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societies could coexist, despite differences in “heritages” and
“outlooks.” However, Thurmond argued, Rudyard Kipling had
been correct when he wrote “the immortal words ‘East is East
and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.’” As Asians
and Hawaiians constituted more than 70 percent of Hawaii’s
population, and as these groups had a heritage and culture
“fundamentally different” from that of the West, the senator
concluded, statehood should not be granted. Some House op-
ponents were equally convinced that Hawaii’s racial compo-
sition made statehood impossible. Howard Smith argued simply
that Hawaii would be a “foreign state.” “With a population so
radically different from the rest of the United States,” another
Southerner asserted, “[Hawaii] cannot possibly qualify as one
of the United States.” 5 Supporters of segregation and white su-
premacy remained reluctant to grant full and equal citizenship
rights to any Americans who were nonwhite.
Perennial disputes over the balance of party strength in the
Senate, as we have seen, complicated and delayed congres-
sional action on Hawaii after 1946. Attempts by both major
political parties to exploit statehood for partisan ends inflated
the strength and effectiveness of opposition to Hawaii for more
than a decade. Yet behind virtually every facet of resistance lay
states’ rights issues. Throughout 1945–1959 the core of resis-
tance to Hawaii was provided by those states anxious to remain
immune from interference by the central government and those
congressmen who felt the more populous states were disadvan-
taged by the constitutional provisions for equal representation
of all states in the Senate. These issues had been raised but not
completely resolved when the original thirteen states accepted
the federal Constitution. They had resurfaced with tragic conse-
quences in the bitter sectional strife which precipitated the Civil
War. No territory has entered the Union without confronting re-
sistance based on the belief that the power of existing states
would be eroded by any additions to the Senate. The threatened
erosion of states’ rights, foreshadowed in Truman’s civil rights
program and confirmed by the Supreme Court’s decision of
1954, solidified Southern opposition to the entry of multiracial
Hawaii or liberal Alaska. The anti-civil rights faction opposed
statehood because in the long-term it might contribute to an
expanded role for the federal government in racial questions.
Howard Smith, an unbending foe of Hawaii and a leading apol-
ogist of segregation, claimed that “the centralization of power
in the Federal Government is an evil that will eventually destroy
the carefully preserved concept of free, sovereign and inde-
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pendent states.” 6 Sectional jealousy and attempts to preserve
the peculiar pattern of race relations in the South underpinned
such views. The states’ rights argument was a direct, if slightly
muted, echo of the rationale for secession advanced by the
South before the Civil War. Obviously, the Southern states could
not now defend their rights by withdrawing from the Union. But
as we have seen throughout this book, they believed they could
help prevent any erosion of their power by stopping new states
from joining the Union.
Pillion acknowledged the vital relationship between states’
rights and proposed statehood legislation when he told the
House:
The past 25 years can be noted for the vast and alarming growth
and concentration of power in the National Government. A par-
allel concentration continues to take place in the executive
branch of our government. These increasing concentrations of
power coincide with a reduction of powers of the States, the loss
of sovereign rights and liberties of the people, and deprivations of
the legislative powers and responsibilities of Congress.
Statehood for these Territories would accentuate the inequal-
ities of national representation. It would tend to strengthen the
national concept and weaken States rights. It would increase
the pace of nationalization of local government services and con-
centrate power in the Federal Government and in the executive
branch. 7
This argument was, a White House aide remarked, an opinion
“as old as the Republic itself.” It had repeatedly been raised
and rejected as the Union expanded from thirteen to forty-eight
states. States rights’ arguments were not confined to South-
erners determined to protect their particular way of life. Many
congressmen who were not Dixiecrats were influenced by the
calculation that on the average, one senator represented ap-
proximately 17 million citizens, while Hawaii would qualify for
one senator per 223,000 citizens. 8 Southern conservatives skill-
fully exploited bipartisan and cross-sectional anxieties about the
long-term consequences of equal representation of states in the
Senate. Willis Robertson (Dem., Va.) denied that Southern oppo-
sition to Hawaii in the Senate was motivated by either racism or
resistance to the possibility of two new Republican senators. He
told the Senate:
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Our objection is far more fundamental. It is the same objection
voiced … more than 100 years ago by Daniel Webster with respect
to Utah and New Mexico, when he said: ‘I have the strongest ob-
jection to a premature creation of States…. The bringing in of
small states with a representation in the Senate equal to the rep-
resentation of the largest states in the Union, and with a very
small number of people, deranges and disturbs the proper bal-
ance between the Senate and the House of Representatives.” 9
The threat to the so-called Southern way of life posed by the
snowballing drive for desegregation and effective civil rights
legislation could be resisted, perhaps defeated, if white South-
erners retained their relative strength in the Senate. The long-
term success of Southern resistance hinged upon the continued
effectiveness of the filibuster. In the past, “prolonged debate”
had delayed or negated federal encroachments on what Howard
Smith called “the rights of the sovereign States and the in-
dividual liberties of our people.” 10 (Clearly Smith’s definition
of people excluded fellow Mississippians who were black.) As
Paul H. Douglas (Dem., Ill.) pointed out, many Southerners still
feared the addition of four senators who would favor civil rights
legislation, or an effective cloture rule. 11 Gruening observed
that the issue was essentially the same as before the Civil War.
Southerners, he suggested, were still “trying to prevent states
that might upset their balance of power from joining the Union.”
12 Yet as events surrounding the civil rights and Alaska bills of
1957–1958 implied, outright obstruction of moderate legislation
did not automatically serve the long-term interests of the con-
servative champions of states’ rights.
Within the islands, debates over the nature and extent of
Americanization and assimilation were the more palatable
public aspects of a deeper controversy over racial questions
and statehood. Overt objections to possible Japanese control of
the local legislature and representatives in Washington were
seldom voiced during the late 1950s. Nevertheless this concern
remained a basic determinant of local antipathy to possible
changes in the structure and nature of island government. The
growth of a strong Democratic party, a confident middle class,
and assertive anti-Republican political leaders were widely ac-
cepted as related indices of the new status and strength of nisei
in postwar Hawaii. These trends exacerbated the fears of those
insecure residents who could not accommodate to the emer-
gence of genuinely representative government in their com-
munity. This concern still dominated the material supplied by
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statehood opponents to congressional investigating teams. The
findings of three extensive private surveys conducted during
1956–1959 also suggest the continued existence of a rela-
tionship between anti-Japanese feelings and opposition to
statehood.
In 1956 the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce commissioned
a confidential survey to determine whether it should actively
promote statehood. Although only slightly more than half of
its three thousand members replied, 64 percent answered af-
firmatively. “Significantly,” the Star-Bulletin noted, “Caucasian
members, members in the higher income brackets … did not
vote as strongly for active promotion as did the Chamber
members who are non-Caucasian, in modest income brackets.”
Opposition to an active campaign did not necessarily imply hos-
tility to statehood per se. Nonetheless a large minority (36
percent of respondents) would not support such a campaign.
Almost half of all members of the Chamber were apparently un-
interested in statehood or happy with the status quo. It is dif-
ficult to generalize confidently from these figures. While they
suggest disproportionately strong resistance to statehood from
Caucasians, this might have resulted from economic as well
as racial considerations. Certainly some high-income members,
especially those with interests in real property, believed that
territorial government should be maintained in order to avert
radical changes in the islands’ tax structure. 13
The results of a public opinion poll of Oahu residents in 1958
correlate closely with the findings of the survey by the Chamber
of Commerce. The poll revealed that 27 percent of citizens of
Hawaiian or part-Hawaiian ancestry and 23 percent of all Cau-
casians opposed statehood. Only one major ethnic group, the
Japanese, indicated majority support for immediate statehood.
Fuchs observed that a breakdown of opinions expressed by
members of major ethnic groups indicated that “62 per cent of
the citizens of Japanese ancestry, 44 per cent of the Chinese, 39
per cent of the Filipinos, 33 per cent of the haoles, and only 30
per cent of Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians” favored immediate
statehood. Almost one-quarter of all persons interviewed were
uncommitted on the statehood question. 14
An intensive survey conducted in the fourteenth represen-
tative district on Oahu in 1959 also revealed considerable op-
position to statehood. A little over one-third of all Caucasians
interviewed expressed opposition to statehood, or were uncom-
mitted on the issue. Nearly as many Hawaiians and part-
Hawaiians concurred. In this same survey, 60 percent of all
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Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians expressed opposition to the
Japanese racial group because it exercised undue influence
in the territory. Residents of the fourteenth district were also
asked if any “racial group or groups in the Islands had too
much power.” Of those who answered positively, “nearly nine
out of ten Hawaiians and Chinese, eight out of ten Filipinos
and haoles, and nearly seven out of ten respondents of Por-
tuguese extraction specified the Japanese.” 15 Clearly, racial hos-
tility against the Japanese majority in the territory remained
substantial. This resentment was expressed by some residents
as opposition to statehood. Removal of the appointed governor
was expected to compound growing Japanese political strength.
A belief that “the Japs are taking over” was expressed often by
members of all minor ethnic groups, although not all residents
who feared growing Japanese influence translated this alarm
into resistance to statehood. 16 Also, as previously indicated, op-
position derived from a combination of racial, political, and eco-
nomic factors. However, the evidence of these Oahu surveys
cannot be accepted uncritically.
A variety of evidence suggests that by 1959 local support
for immediate admission was more general than the surveys im-
plied. Fuchs conceded that the results inflated the numerical
strength of opponents of statehood. The 1959 survey indicated
that respondents who remained neutral on statehood, or who,
though opposed, would accept it if it came, would be likely to
vote in favor of statehood in a clear “Yes or No” referendum.
17 In the 1958 territorial elections for delegate to Congress,
the anti-statehood candidate, Edward A. Brennan, received less
than 1 percent of the total votes cast. More than 88 percent of
all registered voters cast ballots in this election. Thus, approx-
imately 87 percent of all voters were prepared to support pro-
statehood Democratic or Republican candidates for delegate.
The most conclusive evidence of the limited support for con-
tinued territorial rule or the Commonwealth alternative was
expressed by Hawaii’s electorate in 1959. Shortly after Con-
gress passed the statehood bill in March, a plebiscite was held
to ratify the decision. By an overwhelming majority, 132,938
votes to 7,854, Hawaii’s people accepted the statehood bill.
This was the most accurate gauge of statehood opinion, and it
suggested that less than 6 percent of Hawaii’s adult citizens
felt strongly enough to register outright opposition. Almost 90
percent of all eligible voters cast ballots in the plebiscite. This
was the heaviest election turnout in Hawaii’s history. 18 Tuttle
commented that both the size of the turnout and the affirmative
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vote surpassed even the most optimistic expectations. 19 Even
if it is conceded that many of those opposed to statehood did
not register their opinions at the ballot box, the anti-statehood
faction could not have comprised more than about 15 percent of
Hawaii’s citizens by 1959. The reliability of the opinion surveys
conducted from 1956–1959 is thus suspect. Local opposition
was not as strong as these surveys suggested.
If the surveys exaggerated the numerical strength of op-
position to statehood, they nonetheless demonstrated that re-
sistance was relatively strongest among citizens of Caucasian,
Hawaiian, or part-Hawaiian ancestry. Paradoxically, however,
the leading advocates of statehood were also representatives
of these groups: Farrington was a Republican of Caucasian an-
cestry; King a Republican with part-Hawaiian ancestry; and
Burns a Democrat of Caucasian extraction. Although the Japa-
nese ethnic group provided the most unqualified support for
statehood, no nisei played a vital role in the public campaign
for admission. On the statehood issue, as within politics gen-
erally, Hawaii’s Japanese trod warily, conscious always that as-
sertiveness might precipitate a negative reaction from other
racial groups in the islands, and perhaps bind these groups
into a cohesive anti-Japanese majority. The considerable degree
of political unity which developed among haoles, some part-
Hawaiians, and some Chinese under the banner of the Re-
publican party, and the fact that only a handful of Japanese
belonged to this party, was an informal but important political
manifestation of a unity based largely on shared feelings about
the Japanese.
Local statehood opponents and Commonwealth advocates
comprised a small minority in Hawaii after 1945. Yet during the
protracted campaign for admission they exerted an influence
disproportionate to their small numbers. They retarded the
statehood drive by opposing the official campaign, supplying
material to congressional opponents, and promoting Common-
wealth status as an alternative to immediate statehood. Led by
a curious collection of locals, most notably Walter Dillingham,
Stainback, Campbell, Stokes, and Hill, the anti-statehood
faction undermined the unity of the affirmative campaign, and
precipitated prolonged and often bitter divisions over statehood
and issues allegedly related to it, especially the threat to in-
ternal security and American values posed by Hawaii’s Japanese
community. In the late 1950s a small but wealthy minority
continued to cling tenaciously to the status quo. Hostility to
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statehood still correlated closely with opposition to trade
unions, an elected governor, and new tax laws, as well as with
fear of Hawaii’s Japanese.
Some “influential businessmen” and “a minority of large em-
ployers,” Leverett A. Chapin, associate editor of the Denver
Post, observed in 1958, believed “an elected State government
would be less favorable to business than a Territorial gov-
ernment headed by a governor appointed by the President of
the United States and armed with authority to veto acts of the
legislature.” The prospect of a liberal Democratic state gov-
ernment, unrestrained by an appointed governor, alarmed some
sections of business. After 1954 the Democrats attempted to
remove the taxation anomalies which favored large landowners.
But this initial assault on land and tax privileges in the islands
was effectively blunted by Governor King, who wielded his veto
power ruthlessly. King’s behavior reflected his belief that the
Democrat-controlled legislature was full of “New Deal ideas”
and “wanted to soak the rich.” 20 As late as the eve of statehood
the Republican party sought special dispensations for large
landholders in proposed tax reform measures. Party chairman
Ed Bryan stated unashamedly that these concessions would
enable “the big landowner to help himself.” Few Democrats
were surprised when their tax assessment bill was vetoed by
Quinn in 1959. The wealthy backers of Imua were adamant that
the New Dealism of Hawaii’s Democratic party could best be
resisted with an appointed governor. 21 In sharp contrast, local
Democrats argued that unqualified democracy under statehood
was essential if “the feudal system of land ownership which dis-
courages economic development” and the “tax system designed
to favor the wealthy” were to be altered. 22
In 1959 the communist issue and Commonwealth argument
remained the rallying points of public opposition to statehood,
both locally and on Capitol Hill. In the final debates, for ex-
ample, old foes Pillion and Eastland revived the charge that
Communists had captured and retained political and economic
control of the islands. By subtly infiltrating the ILWU, the local
Democratic party and even the local Republican party, the re-
actionary stalwarts again charged, communism had penetrated
the very fabric of political life in the vulnerable territory. Mc-
Carthyism died a very slow death in some quarters on Capitol
Hill. With a vigor which belied both his age and the general
unpopularity of his cause, Eastland asserted that Congress was
preparing to act on the statehood bill “in an atmosphere of
almost hysterical excitement.” A decision to elevate the “Com-
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munist controlled” territory to statehood, he concluded in now-
familiar language, would constitute a “serious threat to the
internal security of the United States.” Pillion was also con-
vinced (if his words in any way reflected his actual opinions)
that statehood would permit “four Soviet agents to take seats
in the U.S. Congress.” 23 Given the activities of Imua, some is-
landers apparently believed such wild accusations. The alle-
gations were totally without substance and had a negligible
impact on the final phase of the statehood debate. Nevertheless,
during the late 1940s and early 1950s, against a background
of cold war insecurity and the McCarthy witch-hunts, they pro-
vided a convenient overt rationale for opposition to statehood
based on racial and sectional factors. Even though genuine
concern with internal subversion did not initiate hostility to
statehood nor substantially intensify existing opposition, public
charges of communist influence were employed more often and
promoted more exhaustively than any other single argument
used against Hawaii after the war.
“This Communist question is used as an argument against
Statehood as perennially as spring grass,” Church observed
wryly at a Senate hearing in 1957. Yet even at this late stage
administration spokesmen close to Eisenhower refused to firmly
endorse immediate admission, ostensibly because of Hawaii’s
vulnerability to subversion. Deputy Attorney General Rogers
warned senators that before they approved Hawaii, “Consider-
ation must be given to the extent of influence and control Com-
munists, Communist sympathizers and their associates may be
able to exert, particularly through the I.L.W.U. in the Islands.”
Such charges were as irrelevant to the statehood issue in the
late 1950s as they had been a decade earlier; but they were still
viewed sympathetically by many conservative Republicans, and
some members of Eisenhower’s staff. They were also supported
indirectly by the Star-Bulletin, which claimed as late as 1957
that a communist conspiracy existed in Hawaii. 24 Many who had
profited from the old order in the islands were seemingly unable
to differentiate between New Deal liberals, elected trade union
leaders, and Communists during the 1950s. These blurred dis-
tinctions simplified the rhetoric of local politics in a decade of
unprecedented change, and provided a climate which the anti-
statehood faction hoped to exploit.
Most efforts to undermine the statehood drive throughout
the 1950s were financed or coordinated by Imua—an organi-
zation dedicated to defending unrestrained capitalism, pater-
nalism between haoles and Hawaiians, and white political and
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economic supremacy. Its members were the most vigorous and
well organized opponents of the forces which threatened to
transform island life after the war Imua’s explicit function was
to highlight the extent of subversion within the islands. In 1958,
for example, with Walter Dillingham as chairman of its fund-
raising committee, Imua spent ninety-two thousand dollars in
an attempt to expose such activities. 25 Its budget for this year
exceeded that of the Statehood Commission. Although it was
not officially an anti-statehood organization, Thurston, Quinn,
and Burns emphasized independently and correctly that the ac-
tivities of this three-thousand-member association had a direct,
largely negative bearing on the statehood campaign. 26 It was
both an anti-communist and anti-Japanese organization, and
its publicity and very existence accentuated tensions between
labor and employer groups, as well as across ethnic lines. It was
the last resort of kamaaina haoles unwilling to accommodate
to Hawaii’s more flexible political and racial climate. Samuel
P. King has observed that beneath Imua’s avowed anti-com-
munism was an undercurrent of apprehension about statehood,
and this apprehension was racial in origin. Indeed, King con-
cluded, “The communism part was secondary.” Leaders of the
organization maintained publicly Imua’s neutrality on the
statehood question. In 1958 however, Imua’s leading
spokesman, Lyle G. Phillips, told the American Conference of
National Associations to Combat Communism that the primary
function of Hawaii’s Statehood Commission was to “cover-up
the Communist Menace.” Hawaii did not deserve statehood, he
claimed, “until the present threat of subversive control over ter-
ritorial life ends.” (By the same curious logic it might have been
argued that democracy be suspended throughout the nation
until the threat of communism had evaporated.) Phillips sup-
ported his position by contending that a considerable segment
of Hawaii’s labor force was under Communist control, that Com-
munists were in a position to tip the balance of power, and that
they exerted increasingly an influence on Hawaii’s government
and economy. Later in 1958 the directors of Imua endorsed this
view. 27 All of this simply confirmed what most island residents
had long suspected about Imua’s attitude to statehood.
Yet the sound and fury over communism throughout the
1950s failed to convince many observers that this was a central,
genuine concern of local opponents of statehood. Chapin com-
mented, for example, that there was “a growing conviction that
the constant to-do about ‘Communism’ is nurtured by persons
who for political, economic, tax or landownership reasons,
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would like to keep Hawaii as a Territory.” He might have added
that the issue was also a camouflage for racism. Chapin’s po-
litely understated conclusion was nonetheless accurate: “part
of the emphasis on the ‘Communist’ menace,” he wrote in the
Denver Post, “may be a subtle device for defeating the granting
of statehood.” 28
Despite the much-publicized and persistent efforts of Imua,
the communist issue did not have a significant impact on
Hawaii’s statehood bid after 1956. The general disrepute of Mc-
Carthyism reduced the appeal of this argument, although Imua
clung doggedly to it. In addition, a range of specific develop-
ments in Hawaii confirmed that internal subversion was not
a political or economic threat. In June 1957 an appeal by the
seven labor leaders convicted under the Smith Act was finally
upheld. The number of man-days lost through strike activity
declined gradually in the period 1951–1957. The percentage
of island workers enrolled in the ILWU also declined in these
years, as the economic significance of agriculture was eroded
by the growth of tourism and service industries. By 1958 only
10 percent of Hawaii’s 210,000 workers belonged to the ILWU.
Legislative initiatives promoted by the union, notably repeal of
the Dock Seizure Law of 1950, were usually defeated. Moreover,
as Thurston pointed out, economic prosperity and increased in-
vestment in Hawaii by mainland enterprises were firm evidence
that left-wing labor was a spent force in the islands. 29 Hawaii’s
Anti-Subversive Activities Commission reported confidently in
1959 that “the opponents of statehood have not been able to
cite a single instance of Communist domination or control in
the Territory.” 30 The harsh union-management conflicts which
erupted during 1945–1950 gradually subsided during the 1950s
as a result of the growth of a larger middle class, general eco-
nomic prosperity for the major ethnic groups, and a progres-
sive local Democratic party. The central conflicts over equal
access to education and employment, taxation, landownership,
and employment conditions had largely been transferred from
the industrial to the political arena. This neutralized some of the
earlier bitterness, although at the time of statehood these issues
were still unresolved. They were deadlocked in the conflict be-
tween the Democratic legislature and the Republican-appointed
governor.
The economic argument against statehood was usually
translated into support for Commonwealth status. Proponents
of the Commonwealth option, many of whom were wealthy
members of Imua, argued throughout the 1950s that Hawaii
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could be disincorporated and granted a political status similar
to that accorded Puerto Rico. This might exempt Hawaii’s resi-
dents from paying federal taxes. Stainback (forever out of step
with local Democrats) and Brennan led this campaign in the late
1950s, but it did not command significant numerical support.
31 Earlier, however, many businessmen and landholders had
supported it. In 1957 the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce in-
vestigated the legal aspects of the Commonwealth proposal.
A special six-member committee comprising Tavares, Anthony,
A. G. Smith, W. C. Tsukiyama, W. B. Stephenson, and Walter
Chuck appraised the proposal but reported against it. In the
1958 election for delegate to Congress, the Commonwealth
candidate, Brennan, received less than 1 percent of all votes
cast. Not surprisingly, the 1958 House committee investigating
statehood detected little enthusiasm for Commonwealth among
Hawaii’s citizens. It conceded, however, that “a rather artic-
ulate minority,” led largely by the irrepressible Stainback, con-
tinued to support it as an alternative to immediate statehood.
32 By the late 1950s few islanders accepted the argument that
Commonwealth status would end federal taxes. Most people
now recognized the fiscal arrangements between Puerto Rico
and Washington as a unique situation made possible by a
Supreme Court ruling “that Puerto Rico was a non-incorporated
territory,” and that in legislating for it “Congress was not bound
by the constitutional clauses requiring uniformity of taxation”
within the nation. 33 Most Hawaiians were by now also at least
dimly aware that Commonwealth status had not brought pros-
perity or full citizenship rights to the bulk of Puerto Rico’s very
disadvantaged people.
Only a small minority of islanders viewed statehood as an
economic liability. On the contrary, economic self-interest had
initiated and helped sustain Hawaii’s organized campaign for
admission after the depression. In the late 1950s self-interest
remained a tangible and urgent stimulant to demands for imme-
diate political equality with the states. Before the war the pow-
erful sugar companies had pressed for statehood in order to end
discrimination by Congress against offshore producers. The in-
fluence of sugar interests on the islands’ economy and politics
was diluted after the war as a result of the rapid diversification
of Hawaii’s economic base. Even so the sugar and pineapple
corporations remained by far the largest single category of
private enterprise in the territory. The annual value of plan-
tation production by the late 1950s was approximately $250
million. Nevertheless federal expenditure on the armed forces
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and related activities was now the principal source of capital.
In 1957, for example, defense expenditure totalled approxi-
mately $300 million. Manufacturing and tourism were the most
rapidly expanding activities. Investments by mainland corpora-
tions took off in the early 1950s, leading to the establishment
of a range of wholesale and retail organizations along with fi-
nance and investment institutions which were linked directly
with these operations throughout the nation. In the decade after
the war the value of mainland commerce with Hawaii exceeded
that for all but five countries—the United Kingdom, Canada,
Japan, France, and Germany. The islands were an integral factor
in the nation’s economy. After 1945 new, more competitive retail
firms emerged, and the availability of goods and patterns of con-
sumption came increasingly to mirror those of the mainland.
The old monopoly of the Big Five had not disintegrated, but it
was under challenge, especially in the commercial and retail
fields. By the early 1950s approximately one thousand corpo-
rations did business in the islands. Two of the three leading
pineapple companies, the California Packing Corporation and
Libby, McNeill and Libby, were mainland based and competed
nationally. The Big Five still dominated sugar and related ac-
tivities, but genuine competition was developing in most busi-
ness fields. More than thirty thousand individuals or corpora-
tions had business licenses in the territory; in excess of thirty
thousand stockholders held interests in the largest 831 corpo-
rations; and mainland retailers like Sears Roebuck and Kress
competed with locally owned enterprises. In general, however,
the ownership of the means of production, distribution, and ex-
change remained more concentrated in the territory than in any
existing state. 34
Hawaii’s unique island geography, settlement patterns, and
territorial status provided a precarious base for economic
growth. Despite diversification, its economy depended largely
on export earnings from agriculture and defense appropria-
tions. When in 1949 federal expenditure in the territory fell by
about one-quarter, the unemployment level rose to almost one-
fifth of the total local work force. At the same time welfare
fund and unemployment compensation expenditures consumed
about 20 percent of the total territorial budget. 35 The Korean
War temporarily relieved this serious local depression, but most
business and labor interests were by the late 1950s deeply
aware that continued economic growth and stability demanded
further diversification of industry, increased levels of capital in-
vestment, an equitable sugar quota, and consistently high levels
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of expenditure on defense. They anticipated that statehood
would help provide conditions essential for such crucial de-
velopments. Evidence to this effect was submitted to the last
congressional investigating team by the Honolulu Chamber of
Commerce, Hawaiian Electric Company, Mutual Telephone
Company, the Sugar Planters’ Association, and the Pineapple
Growers Association. 36 Governor Quinn observed that Hawaii
had a “mature, expanding, and healthy economy,” but he also
testified that statehood would dramatically accelerate local eco-
nomic expansion. The Star-Bulletin commented that the ma-
jority of Honolulu’s business community viewed statehood as an
economic stimulus. Statehood Commission Chairman Thurston
did not exaggerate when he estimated that, “Over 80% of our
sugar and pineapple executives, all our public utilities, all our
transportation companies, the majority of banks and small busi-
nessmen” wanted immediate statehood. 37 Conscious of the fact
that Hawaii consistently paid more in federal taxes than it re-
ceived in federal appropriations, most business interests be-
lieved statehood might help to reverse this situation.
The sugar industry remained concerned with its vulnera-
bility to neglect or discrimination by Congress. Memories of
the Jones-Costigan Act had dimmed but had not been extin-
guished. They were kept alive by incidents after the war which
obliged Hawaii to protest further unfair treatment by Congress.
Under the 1946 sugar price support program, for example, the
islands were lumped with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
as offshore producers. This disadvantaged Hawaii in relation
to mainland producers, ignored its special incorporated status,
and worse still, did not even accord it parity with Cuba. Al-
though Hawaii was eventually given equal treatment with Cuba,
38 like the Jones-Costigan furor, this incident underlined the
islands’ susceptibility to arbitrary actions by Washington. In
1959 economist Robert M. Kamins remarked that sugar pro-
ducers wanted equal representation with the various states in
Congress as this would help preserve Hawaii’s existing market
quota and permit its elected representatives to pressure for an
enlarged quota. 39 Executives of four of the five major sugar
corporations were convinced that Hawaiian sugar would “never
secure equitable treatment until it has the political power that
accompanies statehood.” 40 The amount of sugar which could be
refined in Hawaii was still determined by Congress. Sugar in-
terests could not “bargain for bigger sugar quotas and proper
treatment of the industry,” the Honolulu Ad vertiser stated,
“without voting representation in Congress.” 41 Moreover, pro-
Last Among Equals
299
ducers of other agricultural commodities believed statehood
would ensure equitable “coverage for their crops under the
farm support program.” 42 Henry A. White, president of the
influential Hawaiian Pineapple Company, had earlier stated:
“Hawaii is too important economically to be represented in Con-
gress only by non-voting delegates.” 43
Throughout the the postwar years, as in 1935, most of the
major sugar interests were apparently convinced that statehood
was an economic necessity. If some sugar families and cor-
poration executives remained ambivalent over likely political
consequences of statehood, such doubts were rarely expressed
publicly. Chauncey B. Wightman, secretary of the powerful
Sugar Planters’ Association, informed the House subcommittee
in 1946: “it is important that Hawaii’s sugar industry has ad-
equate support and protection from discrimination that it has
suffered in the past.” During the war, a sugar shortage in the
United States led to the removal of quota restrictions on
Hawaii’s sugar. Indeed, during this period island producers
were encouraged to grow as much sugar as possible. However,
producers in Hawaii expected quota restrictions to be reim-
posed after the war, and as a result anticipated a partial loss
of their existing 12 to 14 percent share of the national market.
Thus, as in 1935, they actively supported statehood because
they believed equal representation in Congress was essential
if Hawaii was to preserve its share of the national market.
Wightman succinctly expressed the concern of Hawaii’s sugar
interests:
Sugar production and marketing is controlled by Congress…. As a
Territory our representation in Congress is solely through our one
Delegate. When we add up all the States on the mainland where
sugar cane and sugar beets are grown and processed and where
refineries for Cuban sugar are located, we find the total is 26.
Those 26 States interested in sugar are represented in Congress
by 52 Senators and more than 250 Members of the House of Rep-
resentatives; a clear majority of both Houses. Certainly Hawaii
deserves more than one delegate, not only to represent the sugar
industry but to represent all of Hawaii’s interests. 44
What was good for sugar interests in the islands was also
beneficial to business generally. The decision of the Honolulu
Chamber of Commerce to endorse statehood after the war was
similarly based on a belief that equal representation in Con-
gress would protect all business interests. This view, coupled
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with the fact that by 1946 Hawaii paid more in federal taxes
than fourteen of the states, prompted a majority of businessmen
to protest that continued territorial status was “inequitable for
half a million people and unsound for their business.” 45 Con-
stant vigilance and loud appeals for equity were still necessary
after the war, although in general discrimination or neglect by
Congress was not severe. Nonetheless, during the 1930s and
1940s the islands had experienced unfair treatment by Con-
gress under the sugar price support scheme. 46 Representa-
tives with the power to vote on Capitol Hill were considered
essential if Hawaii was to protect its business interests and
press for additional federal government assistance to offset any
losses in revenue which might result from reduced national de-
fense expenditure in the Pacific region. Statehood would thus
help support the pillars of the local economy, especially agri-
culture and the military. In addition, most businesses and po-
litical leaders anticipated that national business confidence in
Hawaii would be greatly increased by the granting of statehood.
They expected that mainland capital investment in island busi-
nesses would be rapidly accentuated, and industry and com-
merce further diversified. Thurston predicted that “a period of
unprecedented economic expansion for Hawaii” would be ini-
tiated by statehood. 47
Political factors also exerted strong influence on the
statehood campaign. Demands for equal political rights, unqual-
ified citizenship, and even “no taxation without representation”
48 reflected the genuine demands of an increasing majority of
Hawaii’s residents for full political rights as United States cit-
izens. Indeed by 1945 more than 85 percent of Hawaii’s
502,000 people were United States citizens. 49 Under territorial
government, these citizens were denied full citizenship rights
but subject to federal laws and taxes. Increasingly after 1945
local support for statehood was motivated by a desire to gain
political representation in national decision making along with
self-government for the territory. Under the Organic Act, Con-
gress could veto or modify any legislation passed by the ter-
ritory’s legislature. In fact, during the war the president was
able to dispense with the requirements of the Organic Act and
impose military government. Local citizens were powerless to
stop this radical initiative, and failed even to moderate the
worst abuses which emerged during more than three years
of tight military control. Furthermore, despite passage of the
Hawaii Bill of Rights in 1923, some congressional legislation
concerning labor relations, industrial and agricultural devel-
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opment, transportation, finance, as well as public health, ed-
ucation, and welfare appropriations continued to discriminate
against Hawaii in comparison with the states. 50 Special peti-
tions in Congress by the various delegates from Hawaii usually
rectified all major discrimination. But Governor Stainback had
expressed the concern of many islanders when he pointed out
that as a territory Hawaii was forced to gain equal treatment
from Congress and some executive departments of the federal
government by special appeals, rather than through normal po-
litical representation. Because it was a territory, Elizabeth Far-
rington recalled, Hawaii was compelled to attempt to attach
itself to federal aid programs by legislative amendment. Such
appropriations did not accrue automatically as they did to the
states. 51
With two crucial exceptions—the impositions of the Jones-
Costigan Act and military rule—Hawaii did not suffer acutely
from inequitable legislation. Indeed, on a per capita basis
federal appropriations to Hawaii exceeded in value those
granted a majority of states. In 1940, before wartime defense
needs temporarily inflated federal government expenditure in
Hawaii, per-capita federal grants and expenditures to the ter-
ritory totalled $36.53, and exceeded those made to thirty states.
In the fiscal year 1944 Hawaii’s internal revenue payments ex-
ceeded those of fourteen states, but direct federal government
payments, relief, and other aid exceeded those made to twelve
states. 52 As most states experienced similar minor discrep-
ancies between federal tax payments and aid received, local
proponents could not reasonably protest that Washington dis-
criminated uniquely against Hawaii, nor could they use this
complaint as a lever for admission. Proponents did not deny
that Hawaii usually received equitable financial treatment from
federal agencies, rather they stressed that without statehood
discrimination was possible and could not be effectively re-
sisted. Only representation and voting power in Congress, pro-
ponents argued, would irrevocably remove the prospect of
future discrimination. 53
The belief that statehood would transfer land to local rather
than federal control was another powerful economic stimulant
to the campaign for immediate admission. Section 5, part (d), of
the admission bill required all federal agencies with jurisdiction
over land in the islands to advise within five years of statehood
whether continued federal control of this land was necessary.
The president was given discretionary power to return all or
portions of such lands to local control. 54 As previously indi-
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cated, land was very scarce, ownership sharply concentrated,
and competition for commercial, industrial, and housing land
acute. After the Democrats came to power in 1954 the issue of
land distribution, tax, and use was a central political preoccu-
pation. Thus the prospect of a return of substantial federal land
to local control for industrial, housing, or public use intensified
support for immediate statehood. 55 This prospect appealed es-
pecially to the new, essentially nonhaole middle class, which did
not enjoy substantial direct ownership of real property.
The islands never experienced severe discrimination by Con-
gress once military government was ruled unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, the Organic Act and various decisions by Con-
gress continued to impose disadvantages which states of the
Union did not experience. “Discrimination in Federal legislation
is not as frequent as it used to be,” Quinn told a Senate com-
mittee in 1957, “but we still have to be jealously watchful
and petition for inclusion in Federal legislation which affects
all states equally.” 56 Hawaii was initially excluded from the
federal Highways Act of 1956 and had to petition Congress
for inclusion in this program. 57 Because it was excluded from
the federal defense highway scheme, the territory was forced
to collect an additional $2 million annually in local taxation.
Federal public welfare aid to Hawaii was not apportioned on an
equal basis with aid to the states. The 1958 welfare assistance
program, for example, excluded Hawaii from federal benefits
valued at approximately $240,000 annually. 58 The estimated ad-
ditional cost of state government for Hawaii was $400,000 per
annum. However, statehood proponents were confident that this
cost would be comfortably compensated for by the increase
in federal appropriations which voting representatives in the
House and Senate could secure for the islands. 59
Numerous other material and administrative advantages
were expected to follow from statehood. Under the Organic
Act, territorial government was inflexible and sometimes inef-
ficient. The Honolulu Advertiser made the point that statehood
was crucial to the efficient functioning of local government. It
commented, in effect, that the territorial legislature often con-
cerned itself with requests to Washington over matters which,
as a state, would have been handled locally or, if appropriate,
would have been presented to Congress by its representatives
or senators. During 1955, for example, the territorial legislature
issued thirty-nine joint resolutions requesting permission from
Congress to legislate on a variety of local matters. In addition,
Congress often delayed the appointment of government officers
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in Hawaii. This sometimes led to a suspension of normal ad-
ministrative processes in the territory. Even the appointment
of governors was occasionally delayed, especially before the
war. Washington was sometimes slow to replace judges of terri-
torial courts, and on at least one occasion during the 1950s this
problem severely curtailed the work of Hawaii’s supreme court.
60 Although it had become a ritual, Hawaii was even obliged
to petition each year for permission to convene its elected leg-
islature. Trivial matters were also subject to Washington’s ap-
proval. “Why should we have to go through the process of
petition by legislative resolution if we want to use the lands at
Ponohawaii South, for church purposes?” the Adver tiser asked
rhetorically. It protested, like many witnesses before the var-
ious investigating teams dispatched from Washington, that the
Organic Act was inflexible and outmoded. “We are so tightly
bound at the moment,” the Advertiser complained, “that the
Legislature had to petition Congress on behalf of the Kauai su-
pervisors to give free school bus transportation to youngsters
living more than 10 miles away from their school.” 61 Hawaii’s
appointed governors often found it necessary to lobby self-con-
sciously in Washington to ensure equal treatment for the islands
on a range of minor matters. Presidential approval was neces-
sary before the governor could permit funds to be raised lo-
cally through a bond issue. This lack of administrative autonomy
disturbed representatives of both major political parties in the
islands and all appointed governors after 1945. 62 Martial law
had made this an acutely sensitive, persistent issue. After the
war most politicians viewed the continued denial of unqualified
democracy for island citizens with a mixture of concern and cyn-
icism.
This disenchantment was most pronounced among pro-
gressive local Democrats who deeply resented the appoint-
ments made by the Truman administration to positions in the
executive and judicial branches of the territory’s government.
Stainback and to a much lesser extent his successor, Long,
were viewed by most local Democrats as conservative, unin-
spired leaders who had been foisted on island Democrats by
administration officials in Washington with little interest in or
awareness of local conditions. As early as November 1948 the
Democratic Central Committee in Honolulu had requested that
Truman remove the conservative Tennessee-born governor from
office. Three years later the secretary of Hawaii’s Democratic
party, David A. Benz, made similar appeals to Washington.
Stainback “works closely with the large business interests who
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are definitely Republican,” Benz claimed. Local progressives
were particularly alarmed with the appointments made by
Stainback, charging that less than 20 percent went to recog-
nized Democrats. 63 Even after Long was appointed to replace
Stainback, many local Democrats complained that their party
would never be revitalized while it suffered “seriously from ne-
glect and indifference as shown by former Governor Stainback
and present Governor Long.” 64 Interestingly, the Republican
party when it held sway in island politics was seldom alarmed
by the activities of these ostensibly Democratic governors.
Moreover, when the Republicans lost control of the elected leg-
islature after 1954 their interests were well served by gov-
ernors and officials appointed by a sympathetic Eisenhower
administration in Washington. As we have seen, King and Quinn
used their positions to resist Democrat-sponsored change and
to rejuvenate the GOP. This merely compounded Democrat hos-
tility to territorial government generally, and appointed gov-
ernors in particular.
Appeals for statehood which focused on the anomaly of
taxation without representation remained a central factor
throughout the long campaign for equality. During 1898–1959
Hawaii contributed more than $2 billion in taxes to the federal
government. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, the ter-
ritory paid $166 million in federal taxes. It thus paid more taxes
than ten of the existing states. On a per capita basis, residents
of Hawaii paid higher taxes than residents of twenty existing
states. Yet, as statehood proponents emphasized, the United
States government picked up only a small portion of the cost
of territorial government, and paid nothing at all for local gov-
ernment in Hawaii. Denied voting representation in Congress,
Hawaii could influence neither the raising nor the spending
of federal tax money. Moreover the appointed governor could,
through use of the veto, control the expenditure of territorial
revenue by the local legislature and nullify important domestic
legislation. Hawaii’s citizens were subjected to all of the oblig-
ations of mainland citizens, but denied complete citizenship
rights. Most citizens of Hawaii accepted that, “Taxation without
Representation is proper and legal only during the period of
pupilage of a Territory destined to become a State.” 65 However,
by the 1950s an overwhelming majority of citizens believed that
Hawaii was thoroughly qualified for statehood and had unques-
tionably completed its period of pupilage. This view was shared
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by a substantial majority of congressmen throughout the 1950s.
But it was not until 1959 that this sentiment was permitted to
prevail on Capitol Hill.
CONGRESS FINALLY ACTS
“Everything that can be said … on the subject of Hawaii
statehood, for or against, has been said,” Alaska’s new senator,
Bartlett, commented most appropriately early in 1959. 66 Few
people believed that further debate would influence a single
vote in Congress. Ritualistically, however, both sides resur-
rected their familiar arguments and marshalled speakers to
attack or defend Hawaii. Opponents dutifully repeated state-
ments which had for fifteen years provided an effective ratio-
nalization for racial and states’ rights objections to Hawaii’s ap-
peals for statehood. Now, however, this group could not rely on
procedural tactics to veto or avert action by Congress. Without
this weapon, their arguments were futile.
The favorable political conditions which brought Alaska
statehood in 1958 were not disrupted by the national election
results of that year. Indeed the composition of the new Congress
further enhanced the prospects of early action on Hawaii as
foreshadowed in the Johnson-Burns compromise strategy. The
Democrats won massive majorities in both chambers of the new
Congress. In the House their majority was increased to 128; in
the Senate it rose to 30. Hawaii, and Burns, benefitted from
the fact that Johnson retained his position as Senate majority
leader. Moreover Democratic gains were made primarily in non-
Southern constituencies. 67 Thus conservative strength within
the majority party was weaker in 1959 than in 1958. Southern
intransigents could not dictate party policy on statehood or civil
rights, although in both chambers they were virtually the only
opponents of Hawaii’s ambitions. Republican strength was cut
dramatically by the election results of 1958, but those GOP
members who retained office did not desert Democratic Hawaii.
Thus in the Eighty-sixth Congress Hawaii enjoyed strong bi-
partisan support similar to that which had previously brought
Alaska statehood. Also, in 1959 as in 1958, opponents were not
prepared to use a filibuster against statehood legislation. The
South was now increasingly split over racial issues and congres-
sional tactics. Even its most inflexible representatives appre-
ciated that they could not afford to alienate moderate opinion
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in Congress and thereby risk a backlash in the form of tougher
legislation on civil rights. Against this background prompt affir-
mative action on Hawaii seemed certain.
Congress acted with almost embarrassing haste in the early
months of 1959. Hearings were conducted by the House Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs for three days in January.
A week earlier a report was issued by a special subcommittee
based on hearings held in Hawaii in late 1958. It concluded that
the territory was “entitled to statehood by every fair test and
precedent‚” and dismissed allegations made by friends of Imua
that the islands were strongly influenced by Communists and
un-American elements. On February 4 the full House commit-
tee approved the Hawaii Bill (H.R. 4221) by an overwhelming
twenty-five votes to four. Fourteen Democrats—none of whom
represented Southern constituencies—and eleven Republicans
supported the bill in committee. A motion by Dwight Rogers to
delay debate indefinitely was rejected. However, the committee
did accept an amendment which reduced Hawaii’s proposed
representation in Congress. Although the islands were entitled
to two representatives under the existing apportionment
scheme, opponents contended that it should be granted one
representative because eighty-nine existing representative dis-
tricts had larger constituencies than those proposed for Hawaii.
Proponents accepted the amendment partly to counteract the
potential opposition of some Southerners to the statehood bill,
and partly because they expected future reapportionments
would grant Hawaii two representatives. 68
The final House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee
report was issued on February 11, 1959. Eighteen reports were
published during 1935–1959. Only one of these opposed
statehood. The 1959 report reiterated that Hawaii met the tradi-
tional requirements for entry, and concluded that “the grant of
statehood will be in the best interests of the people of the entire
Nation as well as the half million Americans who now reside in
the Territory that has been an incorporated part of the United
States for fifty-eight years.” Significantly, this favorable report
was issued earlier in the congressional session than any pre-
vious report. House leaders agreed to commence floor consid-
eration of the Hawaii bill at the first possible moment. 69
The Senate also initiated early, decisive action. On February
25 a subcommittee conducted brief hearings in Washington. The
following day it reported a bill identical to that approved by the
full House committee. On March 3 the full Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs unanimously approved this bill. 70
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Johnson assured statehood proponents in March that: “as soon
as the bill is ready, we will schedule it for immediate consider-
ation by the Senate.” 71 This decisive preliminary action was un-
precedented.
Opposition by obstructionists on the House Rules Com-
mittee was easily overcome in 1959. Four of its members, in-
cluding the inveterate reactionary Chairman Smith remained
hostile to Hawaii. But as Rogers conceded, they could not per-
manently block “the granting of a rule.” 72 Like Alaska, Hawaii
was now promoted with an admission act and classified by
the House Interior Committee as privileged legislation. Thus
the Rules Committee could be bypassed. However, strong op-
position was expressed by Smith, Pillion, Rogers, and Colmer
during prolonged Rules Committee hearings in late February
and early March. Proponents had anticipated this development,
and specified in the 1959 House Interior Committee report
that the privileged Hawaii bill be taken directly to the floor
if the Rules Committee failed to release it for debate within
a “reasonable period.” 73 This threat induced conservatives to
withdraw their opposition, and permitted a normal vote by the
Rules Committee.
On March 10, 1959, Johnson honored the agreement which
he had concluded with Burns and other statehood sympathizers
in January 1958. In what the New York Times called “a surprise
move” he scheduled a debate on Hawaii for the following day.
At the same time the House Rules Committee agreed by seven
votes to four to report the Hawaii bill and also scheduled a
debate for March 11. The final phase of the compromise
strategy was now being implemented. Specific pressure from
Democratic leaders in both chambers, especially Johnson and
Rayburn, now resulted in decisive action. In accordance with
assurances given late in 1958 by Johnson and Burns, Hawaii
was to be considered early in the Eighty-sixth Congress. 74
Debate on the Hawaii statehood bill commenced in the
Senate on March 11, 1959. “From the outset,” the New York
Times observed, “approval of statehood for Hawaii was a settled
matter.” A motion by Thurmond to recommit the bill to com-
mittee with instructions to further investigate the possibility
of granting the territory Commonwealth status was rejected
by a voice vote. In sharp contrast to previous years, Senate
opponents did not attempt to prolong the debate. After less
than one day of consideration, the Senate voted. The Hawaii
statehood bill was approved by an overwhelming seventy-six
votes to fifteen. 75
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On the same day the House of Representatives adopted
a rule permitting immediate debate on Hawaii, by an over-
whelming 338 votes to 69. On March 12, 1959, unanimous
consent was granted to substitute the Senate approved bill (S.
50) for the House Bill (H.R. 4221). The House rejected a motion
by Pillion to recommit the bill for further consideration. An
amendment moved by W. R. Poage (Dem., Tex.) to permit the
future inclusion of all Pacific possessions of the United States
into the state of Hawaii was also rejected. Following six hours
of debate, the House passed the Hawaii statehood bill by an im-
pressive majority of 323 votes to 89. 76 Thus, “after one of the
fastest actions by Congress in years,” the New York Times com-
mented, “only the mechanics of admitting a new state remain
before Hawaii joins the Union.” The irony of such rapid (if very
belated) action by Congress did not escape observers in Hawaii
or on Capitol Hill. It was the final, crucial aspect of the Burns-
Johnson strategy initiated early in 1958.
The fact that congressional old guards of each party had
thwarted Hawaii for so many years was conveniently ignored as
Democrats and Republicans alike anxiously sought to be iden-
tified with the victory of 1959. Republican leaders in both Hon-
olulu and Washington were convinced that Burns and his friends
would portray statehood as a strictly partisan triumph. In an-
ticipation of the final vote, Quinn was rushed to Washington,
where he attempted, with reasonable success, to salvage for his
party some kudos for passage of the bill. Republican spokesmen
were quick to point out that Democrats had always provided the
core of opposition and statehood had been won finally under
a Republican administration. In contrast, Democrats were con-
fident that they would win credit for breaking the impasse
which had perenially defeated Hawaii. Predictably, island De-
mocrats were quick to thank Johnson for his valuable assistance
to Hawaii’s delegate. Prominent Republicans were much less
grateful: “Johnson was against us the whole time until the end,”
Elizabeth Farrington claimed, “then he came up as the hero—he
and Jack Burns.” 77 Predictably, Johnson praised the efforts of
fellow Democrats and stated: “if any man is entitled to full
credit for Hawaiian statehood, Burns is that person.” In the
short-term, Johnson’s assessment was justified. But Burns’
achievements rested, ultimately, on foundations laid down for
over a quarter of a century by his Republican predecessors in
Washington, notably Sam King and Statehood Joe Farrington.
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Without the painstaking and long-frustrated efforts of a large
number of Republicans and Democrats alike, the statehood
campaign would not have borne fruit in 1959. 78
The Southern wing of the Democratic party was virtually the
only opponent of the final statehood bill. However, because the
Democrats held large majorities in both chambers of the Eighty-
sixth Congress, its members also provided more affirmative
votes in both the House and Senate than did Republicans. In
the House, 203 Democrats and 120 Republicans voted affirma-
tively; 65 Democrats and 24 Republicans voted negatively. Vir-
tually all negative Democratic votes were cast by Southerners.
Most negative Republican votes were cast by representatives of
large Northern states. Twenty-eight states voted unanimously
for statehood. 79
In the Senate, 46 Democrats and 30 Republicans voted for
Hawaii in 1959. Fourteen Democrats and only 1 Republican
voted against it. As in the House, most Southerners remained
hostile. All but 1 Senate opponent of the 1959 bill represented
a former Confederate state. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mis-
sissippi, South Carolina, and Virginia all voted solidly against
the bill. Smathers (Fla.) and Allen J. Ellender (Dem., La.), also
voted negatively. All but 1 of the 14 Southern senators who
voted against Hawaii also voted with the 18 opponents of the
1959 civil rights bill. Eleven of these 14 senators voted against
the Alaska bill in 1958. Senate resistance to a separate Hawaii
bill had dissipated dramatically during the 1950s. In 1948 51
senators in effect voted against Hawaii’s separate admission by
supporting recommittal of a Hawaii bill. Although the Senate
did not vote on a separate Hawaii bill until 1959, by 1954 a
majority of senators supported concurrent admission of Hawaii
and Alaska. Thus, by 1954, when Hawaii was temporarily di-
vorced from partisan politics, it enjoyed majority support in the
Senate. By 1959 this support had grown further, and now consti-
tuted an overwhelming majority of senators. But the proportion
of Southern senators opposed to Hawaii remained fairly con-
stant after the war. This contrasted markedly with the gradual
but decisive breakdown of resistance among congressmen from
other states. 80
It must be emphasized, however, that in the House after
1946, and in the Senate after 1954 at the latest, separate ad-
mission of Hawaii enjoyed majority support. Despite its rela-
tionship to the Alaska statehood issue, Hawaii passed the House
in 1947, 1950, and 1953. Although the Senate recommitted a
separate Hawaii bill in 1948, it never voted to reject such a
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bill outright. Moreover, the proposal to grant Hawaii Common-
wealth status was never supported by more than a third of the
Senate. 81 In 1954 a substantial majority of senators endorsed
the joint Hawaii-Alaska bill. Yet until the late 1950s very few
senators were willing to actively promote a separate bill. Gen-
erally, they were irresolute rather than enthusiastic or strongly
committed.
It should also be acknowledged that while the South always
provided the nucleus of resistance to Hawaii, a substantial mi-
nority of Southern representatives dissented firmly from this
position. In the House, for example, most of Louisiana’s large
delegation had always endorsed Hawaii’s aspirations. Repre-
sentatives from Florida and Tennessee also provided many af-
firmative votes throughout 1947–1959. In the Senate, Kefauver
(Tenn.), Holland (Fla.), and Long (La.) actively promoted
Hawaii’s admission in 1954 and 1959. Moreover, Southerners
Johnson and Rayburn gave decisive support to the compromise
strategy adopted by the Democratic party in 1958. Without
this somewhat overdue assistance a compromise strategy could
not have been implemented. Ultimately, Burns later claimed,
“Southerners got the damn thing [statehood] through.” 82 The
irony of this fact could not have escaped Hawaii’s people, whose
statehood ambitions were perennially frustrated by Southern-
led resistance after 1945.
LAST STEPS TO EQUAL STATUS
Eisenhower signed the Hawaii statehood bill on March 18,
1959. As amended in committee earlier that year, however, it
did not immediately grant statehood. Three important provi-
sions of the legislation had to be ratified by Hawaii’s citizens
before the president could issue a proclamation of admission.
In addition, the islands were expected to elect their new state
delegation to Congress before Eisenhower took this irreversible
action.
The referendum on the provisions of the statehood bill was
scheduled for June 26, 1959. Three related proposals were
thus placed before Hawaii’s electors. The first asked whether
Hawaii should be admitted immediately into the Union, while
the second and third asked electors to ratify the boundary and
land provisions of the Act of Congress approved on March 18.
Unless each of these clauses was accepted by a majority of its
citizens the bill would not become law. This cumbersome pro-
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cedure was necessitated by changes made in the controversial
land control and boundary sections of the statehood legislation
after Hawaii had ratified its proposed state constitution in 1950.
Voters had to cast a “Yes” or “No” reply to each proposal. The
referendum was, as the Honolulu Advertiser emphasized, “the
deciding factor in Hawaii’s admission to the Union as the 50th
State.” 83
Public enthusiasm for statehood quickly resurfaced after the
decisive events in Congress during March. Proponents were
confident that a direct vote on statehood would result in rat-
ification by a majority of “at least three-to-one” and possibly
“five-to-one.” Nonetheless, nothing was taken for granted. A
vigorous campaign was launched to ensure that the statehood
bill finally became law. The campaign slogan was as simple
as it was effective: “Vote Yes! Yes! Yes!” It was promoted en-
thusiastically by the legislature, the Statehood Commission, all
major newspapers, Governor Quinn, and Delegate Burns. 84 Now
that admission was definitely imminent, local politicians jostled
unceremoniously to be identified as leaders of the successful
struggle. Throughout the postwar years identification with the
statehood drive had been an automatic reflex for virtually all as-
piring politicians. Doc Hill was the only political survivor who
had opposed statehood, although as an appointed official Stain-
back had also been able to ignore electoral pressure and work
against statehood.
Surprisingly perhaps local opponents did not rally against
the referendum proposals. Advocates of Commonwealth status
were rarely vocal during 1959. Nor did those who had once
been identified as against statehood voice their opposition in
the pre-plebiscite campaign. Having suffered a humiliating
defeat in the 1958 elections, advocates of Commonwealth status
like Campbell and Stainback accepted reluctantly that a cam-
paign against a “Yes” vote would be futile and perhaps expen-
sive. 85 Ratification was a foregone conclusion and those who
had waged a protracted battle against statehood were now
obliged to concede this fact. While this conservative local
faction had worked energetically to torpedo statehood, it had
not influenced decisively the perennial setbacks encountered by
statehood proponents after 1945. Ultimately these reversals re-
sulted from the blatant use of veto tactics by an intolerant mi-
nority in Congress.
In the plebiscite on the statehood bill, held on June 27, 1959,
the numerical weakness of local statehood opponents was un-
ambiguously revealed. Only 7,854 local citizens rejected the ad-
Chapter 9
312
mission act. In sharp contrast, 132,938 accepted it without qual-
ification. A majority of more than seventeen to one voted “Yes”
to each of the three sections of the plebiscite. In keeping with
Hawaii’s established record of high voter turnout, 99 percent of
those registered to vote did so. It might be argued that most of
those who stayed away from the polls were expressing passive
dissent or general alienation from the American political system
and by implication expressing hostility to statehood as well.
Even if these nonvoters are combined with those who voted
negatively in the 1959 plebiscite, however, not more than 17
percent of Hawaii’s total electorate were opposed to immediate
admission.
Obviously, this is an inflated estimate, as failure to vote did
not necessarily imply opposition to statehood. 86 In only one of
the islands’ 240 voting precincts did a majority vote against the
provisions of the plebiscite. The unique exception was the small,
privately owned, isolated island of Niihau. It voted seventy to
eighteen against statehood. All eighteen representative districts
in the territory provided affirmative majorities of at least eleven
to one. The smallest (but still very substantial) margin came
from the seventeenth district of Oahu, which included an area,
from Kahala to Koko Head, where some of Hawaii’s most pros-
perous residents lived. On a per capita basis, this was perhaps
the wealthiest district in the islands. 87 The highest income sec-
tions of the haole community—the same group which sustained
Imua—continued to offer the strongest resistance to statehood.
Those who had profited most under territorial rule were the
most reluctant to encourage its dissolution. But as indicated
previously, even among this group an overwhelming majority
now viewed statehood as compatible with their interests.
Commenting on the results of the plebiscite the Star-Bulletin
noted appropriately: “The extent of the victory surprised even
those who worked hardest for it.” 88 With elections for Hawaii’s
first state representatives and governor imminent, there was
no shortage of aspiring local politicians anxious to be identified
with this hard-won and very popular victory. Both major parties
claimed responsibility for the triumph. In the euphoria which
accompanied admission and Hawaii’s first genuinely democratic
elections, most politicians conveniently ignored the cynical way
in which their national parties had for so many years behaved,
permitting action to be delayed in the hope of exploiting state-
hood for short-term political gain.
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That Hawaii had been denied equality and autonomy as a
state until after much of Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and
Africa had been decolonized was also generally overlooked. For
a nation long preoccupied with its unique role as an anti-imperi-
alist champion of democracy at home and abroad, the delay over
Hawaii should have occasioned considerable uneasiness and
embarrassment. In the years of intense cold war strain and con-
stant accusations by each side against the imperialist ambitions
of the other, the semi-colonial status of Hawaii was an irritating
anomaly for officials in Washington. Understandably the State
Department welcomed the granting of equality to Alaska and
Hawaii as an action which would enhance American foreign
policy and strengthen the nation’s position generally, and par-
ticularly in the United Nations. Privately, the department con-
ceded that “the extent to which we manifest our support for
the aspirations of dependent peoples for self-government” was
one of “the more important tests applied to American policy and
actions by the nations of Asia, the Near East, Africa and Latin
America.” Not only would the ending of territorial rule in Alaska
and Hawaii “rebound to our credit among these nations,” it con-
cluded in predictable cold war terms, but such “action would
also be in stark contrast to the policies of the Soviet Union
which practices a systematic denial of political liberty in the
areas where it exercises control.” 89
Statehood proponents had occasionally attempted to capi-
talize on such international issues. A territory “is a creature of
the National Government, which can change its form of gov-
ernment at will, and legislate for it without any regard for its
wishes,” the official campaign claimed in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. Proponents occasionally asserted that statehood
“would be a plus factor in our cold war against communism”;
that it would “greatly increase the prestige and dignity” of the
United States “in the worldwide struggle of ideologies which
now threatens our way of life.” Seldom, however, were the
phrases colonial or semi-colonial status applied explicitly to
Hawaii. Usually proponents were content to argue in polite
terms that statehood would increase U.S. prestige the world
over. At most only oblique references were made to the anom-
alous position of the territory in an ostensibly anti-colonial
nation. “Statehood is in the national interest,” the Statehood
Commission stated during the Korean War. It would “give effect
in dynamic fashion to the principles of self-government which
this country is making tremendous sacrifices to establish among
the people of the world.” 90 Given the procrastination and delay
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which confronted the statehood drive at every turn after 1945,
many congressmen and senators were apparently unconvinced
of the need to integrate “in dynamic fashion” the rhetoric of
anti-colonialism with the practice of internal self-government
for all Americans. Some who sincerely supported Hawaii em-
phasized the “national advantage” of removing it from a semi-
colonial status. Engle argued, for example, that statehood had
international significance in that it would demonstrate firmly
that the United States was committed to complete political
equality for all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity. Black civil
rights proponents bolstered their demands for an end to seg-
regation with similar assertions in the 1950s. Liberal commen-
tators occasionally highlighted the connections between colo-
nialism, racism, civil rights, and self-government for Hawaii’s
people. “If statehood should be denied,” the Denver Post com-
mented in 1959, “this country will be guilty of colonial ex-
ploitation, and Hawaii must eventually, for its own best in-
terests, demand an independent status.” 91 The Philippines had
won independence in 1946 and Puerto Rico was granted in-
creased home rule in 1952. Although some Filipinos and many
Puerto Ricans were disturbed by the nature and levels of
American influence in their islands after these formal political
changes, both areas were now essentially self-governing. Unless
Hawaii was also granted statehood, or genuine political au-
tonomy and self-government, it would remain a nagging con-
tradiction of Washington’s espoused support for decolonization.
During the cold war contest for the hearts and minds of all
underdeveloped emerging states, this was a persuasive national
consideration.
On July 28, 1959, Hawaii’s people took the first decisive step
toward the exercise of real self-government since the coup of
1893. After the most vigorous and expensive political campaign
in their history, islanders elected their first state delegations
to Washington, a state legislature, and a state governor. The
results seemed to validate the persistent claims of statehood
advocates that Hawaii was not dominated by any one political
party or ethnic group. If 1954–1956 marked the end of GOP
ascendency, 1959 indicated firmly that the Democrats would
not enjoy a long period of unchallenged supremacy. For the
first time since annexation control of the islands’ legislature
was divided—Republicans surprisingly regained control of the
Senate, while the faction-torn Democratic party won only a pre-
carious majority in the House. Representatives from all sub-
stantial ethnic groups won office. Slightly more than half of all
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elected offices in the new state were won by Americans of Asian
ancestry, including Filipinos. Members of the three major ethnic
groups, affiliated with both major political parties, were elected
to serve in Congress. Representation in the Senate was split
between a wealthy Republican of Chinese extraction, Hiram L.
Fong, and a former appointed haole governor, the moderate and
essentially independent Democrat Long. The one position in the
House of Representatives went to Burns’ talented and popular
protégé, Inouye. It was with the understanding that Long would
not seek reelection that Inouye agreed to serve a brief appren-
ticeship in the House before replacing Long as a Democratic
candidate for the Senate. 92
Despite Inouye’s easy victory, the overall results of 1959
shocked the Democrats. Led energetically by Quinn, moderate
and independent Republicans reversed the electoral trends of
the 1950s. The first state election was the closest in the islands’
history. Political cleavages were less predictable and far more
fluid than in most mainland states. An opinion poll conducted
in 1958 revealed that almost half of Hawaii’s electors perceived
themselves as independents. In general, at the time of
statehood the Republicans who polled most strongly were those
who were least associated with the conservative older wing of
their party. Included in this group were Honolulu Mayor Neil
Blaisdell, Quinn, Fong, and a number of unlikely converts to the
moderate fold, including Frank Judd and Hebden Porteus. Inde-
pendent Democrats also fared well, notably Gill and Esposito,
who criticized Burns’ authoritarian control of the party and dis-
sociated themselves from a traditional pillar of the party, the
ILWU. Both parties now contained energetic younger members
who represented a wide cross section of Hawaii’s ethnic com-
munities, although nisei were far more likely to be Democrats
than Republicans. Both parties now made strong attempts to
cultivate support from the fast-growing part-Hawaiian popu-
lation. The revival of the Republican party’s fortunes at the time
of statehood rested partly on its willingness to recognize and
exploit the fact that in Hawaii ethnicity and politics could never
be divorced—a lesson which Burns had long understood. Apart
from Fong and Quinn, the Republicans nominated a person of
Japanese ancestry, Wilfred Tsukiyama, as a candidate for the
Senate; a Hawaiian-Chinese, James Kealoha, as lieutenant gov-
ernor; and a person of Portuguese ancestry, Charles Silva, for
the House of Representatives. “This was a formidable team from
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the ethnic standpoint,” Fong observed. “Ethnically, we couldn’t
have done better, except that probably we could have gotten a
person of Filipino ancestry.” 93
The results of the state’s first elections were as unexpected
as they were encouraging for those who had argued throughout
the statehood campaign that Hawaii’s citizens were not likely to
vote in rigid blocs along ethnic lines. Their claims that Hawaii
would eagerly embrace full democracy were also vindicated. A
record 93 percent of all eligible voters cast ballots in the first
state elections.
However, this huge turnout was small consolation for the
most effective local proponent of statehood, Burns. Uncharac-
teristically perhaps, he accepted the advice of his party that
he should run for governor, and not contest the U.S. Senate,
where he was assured of a seat. Democrats were anxious to
ensure that their party win the governorship and hence the
appointment of the hundreds of officials required under the
terms of the state constitution. The first state governor would
exercise unique powers of appointment. And in the light of
their experiences under appointed governors (including nom-
inally Democratic ones like Stainback) local Democrats were
determined to replace the incumbent appointee, Quinn, with a
committed Democrat. The Republican party, representing the
still-powerful interests of the Chamber of Commerce and the
plantation owners, worked desperately against Burns, as Aoki
recalled, “because they wanted to protect everything they had.”
To limit change at home, the power of the Democrats had to
be curtailed. It was widely believed that a Democratic ma-
jority under a progressive Democratic governor would mount
an assault on the pillars of oligarchic power—including the
sharply concentrated land and property ownership which was
supported by perhaps the most regressive and inequitable tax-
ation arrangements in the Union. Though the Democrats at-
tached great importance to the first state elections, the ease of
their political victories after 1954 had generated complacency
within the party. “They didn’t do the militant work amongst the
rank and file of which they were so capable,” Quinn later ac-
knowledged. Confident that his success in Washington would
assure him victory over Quinn, Burns returned to the islands
relatively late in the campaign—too late to overhaul the sub-
stantial electoral support which his popular liberal Republican
opponent had nurtured as governor after his unexpected ap-
pointment by Eisenhower. The power so eagerly sought by
Burns and his party faithfuls in 1959 remained surprisingly in
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Republican hands. But Burns was a political fighter and he soon
triumphed over his Republican opponents and liberal critics
within his own party. He dominated island politics in the 1960s
and early 1970s much as he had dominated his own party in
the 1950s. He had to wait until 1962, however, before he could
muster electoral support equal to his ambitions. 94
The high voter turnout, revival of the Republican party, and
the varied ethnic composition of the state’s first elected rep-
resentatives appeared to negate the fears of Japanese control
which had always sustained opposition to statehood. The
election results were, as it turned out, an aberration: they pro-
vided only a brief respite for both the Republican party and
those who equated statehood with the political triumph of
Hawaii’s Japanese and their resilient haole leader Burns. In the
next state election, in 1962, the political trends of the 1950s
resurfaced and the Burns faction returned to dominate the
first two decades of state government. Burns defeated Quinn
in the race for the governorship; Inouye easily defeated Ben
Dillingham in the contest for the junior Senate seat; and Spark
Matsunaga, a veteran of the 100th Battalion, replaced Inouye
in the House of Representatives. A second House seat allocated
to Hawaii was won by Tom Gill who, despite differences with
the Burns group, ran on a Democratic unity ticket. Throughout
the 1960s and early 1970s the Burns group, based overwhelm-
ingly on the support of Hawaii’s Japanese, became the “new es-
tablishment” in local political life. Only Hawaii’s senior senator,
the self-confessed maverick Republican Fong, was able to swim
successfully against this tide. Fong’s personal stature, not his
party affiliations, accounted for his unique political achieve-
ments. Thus, the decline of the Republican party, signalled so
starkly by the electoral returns of 1954 and 1956, continued
after statehood.
In island politics generally whites still exerted a dispropor-
tionately strong influence. But as was indicated by election
returns throughout the 1960s (along with the mutterings of
some insecure haoles), this power was quickly being eclipsed by
other ethnic groups, especially the Japanese. For those native
Hawaiians who had previously received some comfort from
haole paternalism, the spectre of a state government dominated
by voters of Asian descent was an unsettling prospect. Some
locals suggested uncharitably that the growth of Japanese po-
litical power vindicated the long-standing (if seldom public)
charge that statehood would mean the end of haole dominance
in the islands. In conventional, formal political terms this fear
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was not without substance, although the eclipse of haole au-
thority in the arena of electoral politics was slow and uneven.
In economic and social terms this charge was widely exaggerat-
ed. Statehood quickly brought the numerous ethnic and class
groups into more open political conflict. The distribution of
wealth and opportunity changed relatively slowly, however, re-
maining biased in favor of kamaaina haoles and Chinese. With
statehood Hawaii was becoming more equal, but it was far from
an egalitarian society, even in the narrow sense of affording
equal opportunity to members of a particular generation. Ethnic
and class divisions were persistent, although far more flexible
than at any time since annexation. 95
After ratifying the statehood bill and electing its state repre-
sentatives, Hawaii had finally completed the steps preliminary
to statehood. Eisenhower formally proclaimed “the admission
of the State of Hawaii into the Union on an equal footing with
the other States” on August 21, 1959. Yet even this largely
ceremonial act was marred by heated partisan controversy, as
Burns was not invited to witness the president sign the doc-
uments formally admitting Hawaii. This might have been an
honest mistake on the part of White House staff—although Eliz-
abeth Farrington was convinced the president “purposely” and
“deliberately” did not invite Burns because the Republicans and
the Farringtons were responsible for Hawaii’s victory. Island
Democrats angrily claimed that Eisenhower’s refusal to include
Burns in the statehood ceremony was a deliberate slight against
the person they (with predictable partisanship) regarded as the
“father of statehood.” Inouye and Rayburn, both close friends
of Burns, were among those who attended. “We were angered
when we were advised that you were not invited—not by any
unintentional oversight but by design,” Inouye later wrote
Burns, and “Speaker Rayburn made his distress known to the
President.” According to Murai, Rayburn took one of the pens
used to sign the documents and told Eisenhower: “‘I’m going to
give this pen to Jack Burns, the father of the Statehood bill.’”
Many local Republicans undoubtedly came to regret this unfor-
tunate incident, for if island Democrats were distressed by this
episode, in later years they nonetheless eagerly exploited it for
electoral purposes. 96
The new state was to be governed under the terms of the
constitution which its citizens had drafted and ratified almost
a decade earlier. All territorial laws and procedures not ex-
plicitly altered by the admission bill remained in force, although
some were subsequently changed by the state’s legislature.
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Statehood gave Hawaii self-government within the framework
of the United States Constitution and Union. Under Article 4,
Section 2, of the federal Constitution, all citizens of new states
were entitled “to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the several states.” Hawaii’s citizens were thus granted com-
plete and irrevocable voting representation in the United States
Senate and House of Representatives, the right to participate in
the selection of the nation’s president and vice president, and
the right to vote on proposed amendments to the United States
Constitution. They were also granted authority to determine
“the extent of powers to be exercised by their own legislature,”
and the right to have “local justice administered by judges se-
lected under local authority rather than by Federal appointees.”
97 The qualified rights which came with territorial citizenship
were replaced by full and equal citizenship rights.
As this book has previously indicated, the provisions of
Hawaii’s constitution granted the local legislature much
broader law-making powers than did the Organic Act. No longer
was legislation passed by the local legislature subject to pos-
sible veto by Congress or a governor appointed by Congress.
Article 10 of the United States Constitution stipulated: “The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” Thus, as a state, Hawaii gained
the right to legislate on all matters not specifically reserved for
federal jurisdiction. Moreover, it was for the first time assured
its fair share of federal grants, appropriations, and production
quotas. Voting representation in Congress afforded equitable
protection of Hawaii’s political and economic interests for the
first time since incorporation into the Union in 1900. An ex-
panding desire to achieve this equality with existing states,
along with unqualified citizenship rights, had helped sustain
the formal statehood campaign for more than a quarter of a
century. Initially confined largely to disgruntled sugar growers,
this demand grew rapidly as a result of war, military gov-
ernment, and broad socioeconomic changes in the immediate
postwar years.
In the final analysis the acceptance of Hawaii as a state
derived from legal precedents which were reinforced by in-
ternal demographic, economic, social, and political develop-
ments during sixty years of political tutelage. These changes
were in turn highlighted and promoted by an exhaustive and
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expensive campaign rooted firmly in the assumption that
statehood was not only desirable but inevitable under the terms
of the United States Constitution.
As an incorporated territory, an inchoate state, Hawaii could
not legally be denied statehood permanently. After 1900 United
States policy relating to territorial possessions consistently rec-
ognized that Hawaii and, after 1912, Alaska were entitled to
eventual statehood. No determined attempt was made to grant
either territory independence or increased home rule. In con-
trast, after 1901, American policy in the Philippines sought to
create conditions which would permit the territory to acquire
independence. Increased self-government was granted the
Philippines in 1916 and 1934, and in 1946 independence was
granted. The other major unincorporated territory belonging to
the United States, Puerto Rico, was granted increased local au-
tonomy as a Commonwealth within the American federal system
in 1952. Congressional policy toward Hawaii was premised on
judicial opinions which classified Hawaii as an incorporated ter-
ritory entitled to equal partnership in the Union as a state. Sim-
ilarly, Hawaii’s campaign for statehood was confidently predi-
cated on a belief that statehood might be delayed but could not
be denied by Congress. This assumption was confirmed by the
various reports of congressional investigating committees. The
1959 House committee report, like those of previous years, em-
phasized the legality of Hawaii’s appeals for admission:
The citizens of Hawaii are in precisely the same legal and political
status today as were the residents of the Northwest Territory
when they were admitted to full citizenship…. they are residents
of an incorporated Territory, one to which the Constitution was
extended by the 55th Congress more than half a century ago, thus
incorporating it into the Union.
Although Congress could not be compelled to admit any
territory, no incorporated area which met the traditional re-
quirements for statehood had ever been permanently denied
equality as a state. When confronted with an inactive Congress
in the early 1950s, however, some disillusioned islanders felt
that their territory might never gain full statehood. The unique
political status granted Puerto Rico strengthened this belief,
and encouraged a small proportion of statehood supporters to
flirt with the Commonwealth alternative. Only one territory,
New Mexico, remained tied to its incorporated territorial status
for longer than Hawaii—one year longer in fact, a total of sixty
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years. Usually, however, this was a brief transitionary status.
The thirty states which passed through periods as incorporated
territories remained subject to this system of government on av-
erage for less than twenty-one years. 98
By 1959 an overwhelming majority of congressmen and
island citizens accepted that the territory was not only legally
entitled to statehood, but fully capable of supporting it. Before
World War II a joint House-Senate committee had concluded
that Hawaii had satisfied all the requirements set for territories
up until then. With the important exception of Butler’s report of
1949, no subsequent House or Senate report contradicted this
finding. By 1959 Hawaii undisputably had the requisite popu-
lation and resources for the operation of a state government
and could contribute its share in support of the federal govern-
ment. Its population had increased to 620,000—more than three
times the population of Alaska in 1958, and larger than the pop-
ulations of all but one territory at the time of admission. Ap-
proximately 85 percent of Hawaii’s people were United States’
citizens. More than 98 percent of all secondary school children
were citizens. Its population was larger than that of five existing
states—Vermont, Wyoming, Nevada, Delaware, and Alaska. Eco-
nomically also Hawaii was qualified for immediate statehood.
During 1945–1959 the islands’ economy underwent unprece-
dented diversification and growth. Individual per capita income
increased from $1,328 in 1945 to $2,274 in 1959. Despite its
relatively small population, in the fiscal year 1957–1958 Hawaii
paid more in federal taxes than ten states. The 1959 House in-
vestigating committee correctly concluded that Hawaii’s pop-
ulation was “sufficiently large,” and its “resources sufficiently
developed, beyond question, to support statehood.” 99
After the Pacific War the bulk of Hawaii’s people consistently
supported immediate statehood. In 1950 they ratified a pro-
posed state constitution by an overwhelming margin, despite
the reservations of some labor groups. The landslide approval
given the statehood plebiscite in 1959, along with the im-
pressive voter turnouts for this poll and the first state elections,
substantiated beyond doubt proponents’ claims that Hawaii’s
people earnestly wanted statehood. Neither outright local resis-
tance nor support for an alternative status ever gained wide
support. Moreover during the 1950s internal opposition to
statehood was relatively stronger in Alaska than in Hawaii. 100
The protracted campaign for statehood was made possible
by an underlying consensus on the issue which dated from
1945 at the latest. Arguments which emphasized that the is-
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lands were both thoroughly qualified for admission and legally
entitled to it always formed the nucleus of the long official
drive for equality. These views were accepted by more than
90 percent of prominent national newspapers, 101 reiterated
monotonously by the various investigating committees of the
House and Senate, and repeated tirelessly by local proponents
in testimony to these committees. In addition, they provided
the backbone of arguments advanced by statehood supporters
in the numerous, often lengthy debates in Congress during
1947–1959. 102 The Statehood Commission was largely respon-
sible for coordinating and promoting these publicity activities.
For more than a decade it spent, on average, more than one
hundred thousand dollars annually to support its activities in
Honolulu and Washington. It distributed information to approx-
imately 1,700 mainland newspapers, published and distributed
various booklets and letters, provided extensive testimony to all
House and Senate investigating committees, sent delegates to
lobby on Capitol Hill, and in effect wrote many of the speeches
used by supporters in Congress. It distributed more than
twenty-five thousand publications, pamphlets or letters an-
nually. With the active support of King, Farrington, Tavares,
Long, Thurston, and Quinn, the campaign effectively demon-
strated “that Hawaii wanted, deserved, and was fully qualified
for statehood.” 103
The campaign was a vital, if undramatic precondition for ac-
ceptance by Congress, but publicity alone could not overcome
the entrenched racial, states’ rights, and political interests
which perennially frustrated Hawaii’s legitimate aspirations.
The impact of the formal campaign was often indirect or essen-
tially covert, but it was nonetheless substantial. In the decade
after 1948, for example, support within the Senate increased
almost fourfold, although popular approval as expressed in
opinion polls declined marginally. Support from members of the
House also rose substantially during these years. Without this
significant, if gradual expansion of support, especially in the
Senate, the political and sectional impasse over Hawaii would
not have been broken in 1958–1959. Many islanders were jus-
tifiably disillusioned with the nature and effectiveness of the
formal campaign by the late 1950s. But in the long-term this
systematic propaganda and lobbying exercise played a crucial
role in Hawaii’s successful bid for statehood.
In the sixty years which elapsed after annexation, Wash-
ington had little incentive to break, or indeed alter, its formal re-
lationship with Hawaii. American interests in such vital areas as
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immigration and defense were well served by its direct control
over the islands after 1898. While Japan’s assault on Pearl
Harbor precipitated America’s entry into war against the Axis
states in Europe as well as Asia, Roosevelt had previously com-
mitted his country unambiguously to the Allied cause. Indeed,
some historians have argued that this provoked Japan into pre-
emptive action in December 1941. Events in Asia and Europe
throughout 1940–1941 made it virtually impossible for the
United States to remain permanently aloof from the war. Cer-
tainly its special association with Hawaii was not primarily
responsible for its participation in the conflict, although this re-
lationship did precipitate the actual declaration of war. Wash-
ington’s firm control over the islands also boosted the nation’s
ability to plan for and wage war in the Pacific. It was not obliged
to negotiate with a sovereign people. Nor was it restrained by
constitutional protections which would have applied to Hawaii’s
people had they lived in an American state. Martial law demon-
strated that, in a crisis at least, territoriality permitted Wash-
ington to exercise unchecked authority over every aspect of
island life—even if such activities were later deemed unconsti-
tutional. If it had been an independent country, a colony of an-
other nation, or an equal American state, Washington would
presumably have acted differently in Hawaii during the war
with Japan.
Material as well as strategic and military advantages ac-
crued to the United States as a result of its special association
with Hawaii. As indicated previously, the islands were an im-
portant, stable, and profitable area for the investment of
mainland capital. They were also a more important purchaser
of American exports than all but five countries. From the 1870s
on many American nationals profited greatly from their agri-
cultural and commercial ventures in the islands. Territoriality
had formally protected the interests of this group, ensured sta-
bility, delayed full-fledged democracy, helped prolong haole au-
thority, and integrated the islands irrevocably into the national
economy. After annexation the material interests of Hawaii’s
American citizens usually coincided with the national economic
interest, and were in part dependent upon sympathetic action
by Washington.
The triumph of Americanization in ideological, political, and
economic terms by the early 1950s confirmed the integration of
the islands into the national community. Hawaii’s interests were
now essentially inseparable from those of the nation generally.
Despite the persistence of ethnic and socioeconomic stratifi-
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cation in Hawaii, its peoples overwhelmingly accepted that they
shared values and interests common not only to the island
community but to the nation at large. Most mainlanders, con-
gressmen, national newspapers, corporate and business in-
terests agreed that the islands could not now be cut adrift
without seriously damaging the national interest. It was no
mere coincidence that arguments employed by expansionists in
the 1890s to justify annexation were sometimes repeated ver-
batim to promote statehood as late as 1959. The day before Con-
gress finally approved Hawaii’s admission, for example, Senator
Thomas Kuchel quoted a statement made by Charles Henry to
the House on June 6, 1898:
We want these islands because of their value from a naval and
military point of view; we want them on account of the com-
mercial advantages they will bring to our country; we want them
in order that no foreign power may use them as a base of oper-
ations against us in time of war; we want them because they are
more contiguous to our territory than to that of any other nation.
104
If considerations of national advantage prompted annexation,
they also remained a persuasive influence on demands for
statehood. National interests were not restricted to economic
or strategic benefits however. Equally important, as most
statehood advocates argued after the war, were ideological
issues. Most accepted that a continued semi-colonial status,
whether it be as a territory or a commonwealth, was incon-
sistent with the nation’s political traditions. 105 This same ar-
gument, applied domestically, helped foster unprecedented
support for an attack on segregation and institutional racism
after the Supreme Court’s historic ruling in 1954.
In the 1890s the advantages of annexation were regarded
as self-evident. But in the 1950s it was more difficult to define
or assess the actual rewards which an intimate association with
Hawaii brought to the nation. The last House committee to in-
vestigate statehood conceded this point. It was impossible “to
prove in precise terms the exact extent to which the residents
of the older States would be benefitted” if Hawaii was given
statehood, it concluded in 1959. 106 But in the light of America’s
professed enthusiasm for self-government, democracy, and anti-
imperialism, it could not (without considerable hypocrisy) retain
the islands as a territory. Some Americans were adamant that
Hawaii should be granted national independence, as both terri-
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torial status and statehood flatly contradicted policies pursued
by the United States in giving the Philippines independence
and encouraging the decolonization of Asia, Africa, and the
Caribbean. By retaining Hawaii and making it a state, the
American Parents’ Association asked rhetorically, “Aren’t we
supplying a perfect example of so-called capitalist imperialism
which can be exploited by the Communists?” 107 Few endorsed
this view, least of all the overwhelming majority of islanders
who so eagerly sought immediate statehood. Yet when viewed
against the rising tide of decolonization abroad and demands
for racial equality at home, many Americans undoubtedly ac-
cepted that Hawaii’s unequal and dependent territorial status
was an embarrassing anomaly. If national interest had once dic-
tated that the islands be annexed and incorporated, it now sug-
gested that territorial rule was inappropriate. Thus statehood
was proclaimed, in banner headlines, as a “Message for [the]
Free World.” Official American opinion welcoming Hawaii as
an equal in the Union was expressed in predictable cold war
rhetoric and ignored the long years of territorial rule. In words
typical of statements by the White House and State Department,
the director of the U.S. Information Agency, George Allen, wrote
about the effects of statehood:
America will gain strength, respect and reassurance at a time
when forces of intolerance threaten the free peoples of the
world…. As the only State in the Union with a striking Asian her-
itage, the example of Hawaii can have a profound effect on the
so-called uncommitted nations of Asia…. Statehood for Hawaii
should prove a convincing answer to overseas critics who have
made a great issue of our race problems. It proves to others that,
far from crushing minorities, we are glad to have them. 108
Hawaii’s status was no longer a political anomaly; it had been
transformed into an ideological asset in the struggle for the
so-called uncommitted peoples of the world. In this context
statehood was interpreted as genuine victory for America’s po-
litical, “moral and spiritual values.” Hawaii would prove, Allen
concluded, that “democracy and freedom are not only desirable
but workable as well.”
After sixty years as an inchoate American state and three
generations of pervasive Americanization, virtually no one se-
riously contemplated giving Hawaii self-government as an in-
dependent, sovereign nation. Given the proliferation of small
decolonized nations in the Pacific during the 1960s and 1970s
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this might have been considered a possible alternative to con-
tinued territorial rule. But Hawaii was too thoroughly inte-
grated into America’s economic, political, and ideological struc-
tures and patterns to even contemplate this alternative. Nor
did many Hawaiians interpret a status similar to that accorded
Puerto Rico as a reasonable alternative to statehood. Shared
American experiences and common interests dictated after the
1930s that the statehood pledge given during 1898–1900 should
be honored. Annexation had occurred fundamentally because
the interests and aspirations of Hawaii’s small but powerful
American community overlapped with and complemented Wash-
ington’s expanding aims in the Pacific and Asia. In 1959 virtu-
ally all of Hawaii’s people, irrespective of race or traditions,
believed their interests could best be served by integrated po-
litical equality with the existing American states.
In the 1890s Hawaii’s people and the nation’s political rep-
resentatives were deeply divided over annexation. By the late
1950s, however, local and national conflicts over Hawaii’s
future had subsided, and Congress moved finally to honor the
promises implied in 1898 when the United States seized formal
control of the islands. By granting Hawaii’s people equality
within the Union, statehood resolved a nagging and embarrass-
ing inconsistency in American politics. It demonstrated a be-
lated commitment to democratic principles which Hawaii’s
semi-colonial territorial status had long contradicted and com-
promised.
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Conclusion: “We All
Haoles?”
When the United States flag was raised over the Hawaiian is-
lands in the 1890s it was welcomed enthusiastically by a small
but determined minority of white settlers. Revolution against
the old Hawaiian order and annexation foreclosed the islands
to possible control by another nation. Hawaii was a prize easily
won during America’s outward imperialist thrust at the turn
of the century. But very few Hawaiians initially sanctioned this
forced transformation of their vulnerable community into an
American possession. The islands were subsequently ruled as a
semi-colonial appendage of the United States. Hawaii’s people
were denied full-fledged political democracy at home, and not
afforded equality with citizens on the mainland. These explicit
administrative and political arrangements did not challenge but
rather reinforced the authority of the powerful white elite which
dominated the islands after the coup of 1893. Hawaii’s native
peoples resigned themselves reluctantly to these imposed
changes—changes which symbolized the eclipse and eventual
subordination of their traditional way of life to imported norms
and patterns. Native Hawaiians had been conspicuously absent
from the ceremony which marked the transfer of sovereignty
over their islands to Washington and signalled the triumph of
American values and institutions over those indigenous to the
islands. Yet when statehood was eventually granted, only a mi-
nority of Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians resisted, perceiving it
as the final irreversible step toward foreign domination of their
society.
Along with most members of the islands’ various ethnic
groups, descendents of Hawaii’s original inhabitants generally
welcomed statehood. Ironically, those who now resisted were
more concerned with the influence of residents with Asian an-
cestry than with the more pervasive pressures of American-
ization. But in the years after 1959 the long-dormant under-
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current of Hawaiian nationalism resurfaced in a self-conscious
movement called the Hawaiian renaissance. This development
symbolized Hawaiian resistance to foreign influences of all
kinds, especially haole culture. It was an attempt to reawaken
cultural pride and political awareness among a generally disad-
vantaged native population. But it was not restricted to empty,
symbolic gestures. It gave rise to demands for land rights and
compensation for past injustices, formation of a state-run Office
of Hawaiian Affairs, approval by Congress of a Native
Hawaiians Study Commission, and moves to win special recog-
nition as an indigenous people. 1
The strength of anti-imperialist sentiment in Congress
during the 1890s indicated that many Americans believed the
forced incorporation of Hawaii’s people into the American po-
litical system was neither necessary nor appropriate. But if op-
position to expansion and colonialism was strong, it did not
prevail. Later, after almost three generations of white control
and territorial administration, few Americans doubted that
Hawaii’s future should lie within the American system. Sharp
disagreement existed over the political rights and constitutional
status appropriate for Hawaii, but even the most bitter oppo-
nents of statehood rarely contemplated giving it formal inde-
pendence outside the political ambit of the United States. Nor
would such a decision have turned back the tide of Ameri-
canization which transformed the island community ineluctably
after the late nineteenth century, and which accelerated sharply
as a result of war against Japan. Like annexation, statehood was
essentially an explicit reflection of underlying developments
which drew Hawaii increasingly toward the United States.
These forces, in turn, gave rise to the convenient fiction that
Hawaii’s people had always wanted to be absorbed into the
American body politic.
During World War II and the cold war internal pressures
for ideological consensus and national unity were intense. At
the same time, decolonization began to transform the interna-
tional order, and criticism of colonialism in any form became
a dominant international sentiment. Embarrassed by the unre-
solved dependent status of Hawaii, Americans were officially
encouraged to believe that their country had been invited to
annex the islands and would quickly grant them statehood. As
late as 1957, for example, Eisenhower’s Interior secretary, Fred
A. Seaton, expressed this view in a press release. “Through
the nineteenth century, as ties of friendship and trade grew
stronger, the desire of Hawaiians to be Americans became more
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vocal,” he asserted. “Ever since the Hawaiian people … have
pursued this goal with diligence.” 2 This argument was com-
patible with America’s espoused anti-colonialism and consistent
with its cold war rhetoric. It conveniently averted criticism of
America as a colonial power by claiming that Hawaii’s people
had encouraged annexation. But this view overlooked the
strength of local resistance to the events of 1893 and 1898, and
ignored internal divisions over statehood as well as hostility to
territorial rule throughout 1900–1959.
Phrases like “We All Haoles” or “Now We Are All Haoles”
were widely used to symbolize the acceptance of Hawaii’s di-
verse peoples as Americans under statehood. Rather like Lind’s
phrase “One People Out of Many,” these words implied that
all Hawaiians were assimilated, indistinguishable Americans.
3 After World War II the word haole was usually applied to
white American settlers in the islands. Hence statehood was
popularly perceived as the final stage in the Americanization
and assimilation of Hawaii’s people. But haole had traditionally
meant foreigner or stranger. In the general euphoria which
greeted statehood few pondered the irony of phrases like “We
All Haoles.” Certainly, Hawaii’s various ethnic groups had in-
ternalized the dominant values of American society. Most island
citizens were genuinely acculturized, and had anxiously sought
to demonstrate their loyalty and fundamental Americanism
during the years of war against Japan, the cold war, and Mc-
Carthyism. For Hawaii’s native peoples, this process had
exacerbated the erosion and distortion of their traditional
values and customs. As the descendents of imported Asian la-
borers began to play an active, open role in local political and
economic affairs, the relative influence of Hawaiians or part-
Hawaiians declined further. In a sense, native Hawaiians had
become haoles, or strangers, in their own land, submerged be-
neath the powerful white minority and a newly assertive Asian
majority.
In another sense, however, it is highly misleading to claim
that Hawaii’s peoples were “all haoles,” because the term had
definite economic and social connotations; it implied that
Hawaii was a broadly egalitarian society. Indeed, the slogan
“We All Haoles” certainly exaggerates the degree of structural
assimilation experienced by the nonwhite majority. The over-
whelming support for immediate statehood was an index of
widely shared political aspirations and democratic values re-
sulting from pervasive Americanization over almost a century. It
did not, however, reflect broad structural unity, the dissolution
Conclusion: “We All Haoles?”
330
of ethnic diversity, or uniform patterns of acculturation across
the numerous ethnic and class cleavages which still fragmented
Hawaii’s uniquely complex society.
In a way the statehood question exposed the limits of assim-
ilation in Hawaii. It sharpened the deep-rooted contest for po-
litical authority in the islands—a contest which derived from de-
mands by the bulk of its nonwhite people for access to political
office and economic opportunities traditionally reserved for the
haole elite. Not until immediately after World War II, when sub-
stantial numbers of local-born citizens of Asian extraction were
sufficiently confident to confront the old order, however, did
this conflict become the central concern of local politics and a
vital aspect of the struggle for statehood. Most islanders who
were uneasy about statehood feared that it would hasten un-
welcome changes. This concern was proportionately strongest
among haoles and Hawaiians, and weakest among the emerging
Japanese group. Some whites, especially those with substantial
property and wealth, were determined to resist any develop-
ments which might threaten their advantaged position in the
islands. Yet even before statehood the power and privileges of
the old order were under serious challenge—especially after
the electoral watershed of 1954. In addition, some Hawaiians
and part-Hawaiians clung to territorial rule rather than foster
further Americanization under statehood. Others were reluctant
to formally sanction the loss of their land and culture by ac-
cepting a new status as an American state—particularly if this
state might be controlled by its most recent settlers, those of
Asian descent.
For Hawaii’s numerous Asian minorities, especially the large
group of Japanese, statehood was much more than a belated
symbol of social acceptance by American society at large. “Now
we are able to make our own decisions,” one of Hawaii’s nisei
leaders observed. “We have a chance now to correct the
system.” Others of Japanese extraction welcomed statehood as
a kind of victory over the apprehension of many Caucasians
that the Asian population of Hawaii was too large to permit
such a step. “It symbolized,” Murai observed in words used
frequently by local Japanese after the war, that “we were no
longer a second class citizen as far as the United States is
concerned. We’re first class citizens on [an] equal footing with
other states in the Union.” Fong, Hawaii’s most distinguished
leader of Chinese descent, also viewed statehood in this light.
It ended Hawaii’s status as America’s “step-child,” he stated,
and brought genuine equality. 4 Statehood was a tangible, nec-
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essary step toward democracy at home and self-government
free from the arbitrary authority of officials appointed by Wash-
ington. Significantly, although both the haole and Hawaiian mi-
norities remained divided over immediate statehood until 1959,
citizens of Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino ancestry overwhelm-
ingly supported the drive for statehood. In general, those who
felt most stifled and disadvantaged under the old territorial
administration were the most anxious to embrace statehood.
Virtually all island citizens who were descended from Asian im-
migrants welcomed it as a crucial step toward wider access to
genuine political equality and improved economic and social op-
portunities.
It became clear after 1945 that the loyalty, acculturation,
and assimilation of Hawaii’s multiracial community were not
the stumbling blocks to statehood. Multiracialism itself was the
issue. There was a powerful minority, both in the islands and
throughout the nation, who held fervently that race was the fun-
damental criterion of Americanism. Being essentially nonwhite,
Hawaii’s people would thus never be suitable candidates for un-
qualified American citizenship. Racism, manifest in a variety of
ways, was therefore the central obstacle to statehood. Local-
ly, it sustained virtually every effort to defeat, delay, or divert
statehood. Nationally, it merged Hawaii’s aspiration for political
equality into the most divisive conflict in domestic politics after
the New Deal—protracted dispute over civil rights for nonwhite
Americans. And it was the relationship between statehood and
this divisive national conflict which determined Hawaii’s fate
until 1959.
The central battles over Hawaii took place in Congress,
where statehood was perceived as a threat to the political and
sectional status quo. In particular, the powerful conservative
faction interpreted it as a direct challenge to the racial prac-
tices, sectional influence, congressional authority, and tradi-
tional states’ rights of the segregated South. Statehood for
the islands had important implications for a range of related
domestic issues which preoccupied Congress during the bitter
postwar struggle to grant all Americans equality under the
Constitution, irrespective of race. In general, the opponents
of civil rights for black Americans refused also to accept the
liberal, multiracial Hawaiian society as an equal with the ex-
isting states. Hawaii thus confronted a complex series of ob-
structionist strategies which were unashamedly designed to
deny its citizens voting representation in Congress and
democracy at home. These tactics were rationalized by charges
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that Hawaii’s predominantly Asian population was by definition
un-American, uniquely susceptible to subversion from within
by enemy aliens during conflict with Japan and by communist
sympathizers during confrontation with the Soviet Union. These
wild assertions complicated debate and action on Hawaii. But
they were never substantiated, and were in large part conve-
nient substitute arguments for opposition which derived from
sectional and states’ rights considerations. However, such as-
sertions did reflect and exploit the racial, political, and ide-
ological insecurities of a substantial minority of Americans
during the 1940s and 1950s.
The decision to accept a noncontiguous possession as a state
was an unprecedented development in United States history. Al-
though this step had been anticipated shortly after annexation
when the islands were formally designated an incorporated ter-
ritory, statehood irrevocably extended the boundaries of the
nation beyond their traditional continental limits. It also in-
corporated into the Union a state with a population predomi-
nantly of Asian extraction. “By voting the admission of Hawaii,
America’s frontier has moved into the Asian world,” an Ameri-
can official concluded. 5 Certainly, the nation’s frontier now
formally extended into the Pacific, as Mahan and other impe-
rialists had anticipated a century earlier. But the idea that the
islands were a part of Asia constituted a sadly insensitive view
of Hawaii’s native peoples and their history. It was a view dic-
tated by ideological pressures and a desire to use Hawaii’s ad-
mission to statehood as a weapon in the cold war. The unique
ethnic composition of Hawaii’s community, not its particular ge-
ography, was for sixty years the underlying barrier to its at-
tempts to emulate all other incorporated territories and gain
statehood.
Despite America’s vocal support for freedom, democracy,
and decolonization abroad during the cold war, Congress was
frustratingly indecisive in its attempts to establish these condi-
tions at home. During the 1940s and 1950s it was slow to guar-
antee full civil rights for black Americans. At the same time it
refused to end Hawaii’s dependent status and qualified rights
until 1959. By contrast, other noncontiguous and essentially
nonwhite possessions acquired by the United States at the turn
of the century, as well as many European colonies in Asia and
Africa, were formally decolonized before Hawaii was finally ele-
vated to statehood.
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APPENDIX 1
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Honolulu, 1950.
First Representative District
Nelson Doi
Teruo Ihara
Frank Luiz
Richard Lyman, Jr.
Tom Okino
Thomas Sakakihara
James Yamamato
Takao Yamauchi
Second Representative District
Peter Kawahara
Earl Nielsen
Sakuichi Sakai
Charles Silva
Third Representative District
Marguerite Ashford
J. Pia Cockett
Kazuo Kage
Harold Kido
Harold Rice
W. O. Smith
Richard St. Sure
Cable Wirtz
Arthur Woolaway
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Fourth Representative District
J. Garner Anthony
Samuel Apoliona, Jr.
A. H. Castro
Ann Corbett
Flora Hayes
William Heen
Elizabeth Kellerman
Katsumi Kometani
John Lai
Nils Larsen
Herbert Lee
W. H. Loper
John Phillips
Hebden Porteus
Harold Roberts
C. Nils Tavares
Henry White
B. O. Wist
Fifth Representative District
Trude Akua
Edward Bryan
George Dowson
Hiram Fong
Yasutaka Fukushima
James Gilliland
E. B. Holroyde
Frank Kam
Masao Kanemaru
Charles Kauhane
Samuel King
Chuck Mau
Steere Noda
Frederick Ohrt
Herbert Richards
Clarence Shimamura
Arthur Trask
James Trask
Sixth Representative District
Matsuki Arashiro
Randolph Crossley
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H. S. Kawakami
Jack Mizuha
Charles Rice
Toshio Serizawa
APPENDIX 2
Summary of Debates in Congress on Hawaii*
SPEAKERS
CHAMBER DATES APPROXIMATE
DURATION
RESOLUTION FOR AGAINST
House June 30, 1947 4 hours Statehood Bill 27 6
Senate May 17, 18, 20,
1948
3 days Knowland
Resolution
4 2
House Mar. 3, 6, 1950 4 hours Statehood Bill 32 4
House Mar. 9, 10,
1953
4 hours Statehood Bill 32 29
Senate Jan. 27, Feb.
26;
Mar. 4, 9–12,
15–19,
29–31;
Apr. 1, 1955
16 days Statehood and
Related
Bills
House May 9, 10,
1955
2 day Alaskan
Statehood
27 13
Senate Mar. 11, 1959 1 day Statehood Bill 28 5
House Mar. 11, 12,
1959
6 hours Statehood Bill 70 10
Total Speakers 247 80
* Adapted from Donald Dedman, “The Functions of Discourse
in the Hawaiian Statehood Debates,” Speech Monographs 33,
no. 1 (1966):37.
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Abbreviations
AH Archives of Hawaii, Honolulu
CN Congress and the Nation
CQA Congressional Quarterly Almanac
CR Congressional Record
EP Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library,
Abiline, Kansas
FP Joseph R. Farrington Papers, Archives of Hawaii,
Honolulu
HA Honolulu Advertiser
HH House of Representatives Hearings
HH-SH Joint Congressional Hearings
HR House of Representatives Reports
HR-SR Joint Congressional Reports
HSB Honolulu Star-Bulletin
HSC Hawaii Statehood Commission
HSCP Hawaii Statehood Commission Papers, Archives of
Hawaii, Honolulu
HSPA Hawaii Sugar Planters’ Association
JABOHP John A. Burns Oral History Project, Hamilton Library,
University of Hawaii, Honolulu
JP Lyndon Baines Johnson Papers, Lyndon Baines
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
NYT New York Times
SH Senate Hearings
SR Senate Reports
TL Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
TP Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library
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